Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
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Full discussion of the above conditions can be found in the relevant passages in<br />
Part V of this Report. 271<br />
1.52 It is important to emphasise that we do not thereby intend to cast doubt on other<br />
situations in which restitution may be awarded for wrongs. For example, it<br />
appears that restitutionary damages can be awarded for proprietary torts, such as<br />
trespass to l<strong>and</strong> or conversion, without ‘deliberate <strong>and</strong> outrageous’ wrongdoing:<br />
the basis of the restitutionary liability is ‘strict’. 272<br />
We also do not intend to cast<br />
doubt on the availability of restitutionary remedies which are historically distinct<br />
from restitutionary damages, such as an account of profits for intellectual property<br />
torts, 273<br />
or for breach of fiduciary duty. 274<br />
And nor do we wish to limit future<br />
common law development of restitution for wrongs, including breach of contract.<br />
Thus, for example, courts will be left free to decide, in the future, that<br />
restitutionary damages may be obtained for a ‘deliberate <strong>and</strong> outrageous’ breach of<br />
contract, or on some other (narrower or wider) basis.<br />
1.53 We therefore recommend that:<br />
(8) recommendation (7) should not prejudice any other power to award<br />
restitutionary damages for a wrong, nor remedies which also effect<br />
restitution for a wrong but which are historically distinct from<br />
restitutionary damages (eg an account of profits for an intellectual<br />
property tort). (Draft Bill, clause 12(5))<br />
(b) Where restitutionary damages <strong>and</strong> punitive damages are claimed<br />
in the same proceedings, the judge alone should decide whether the<br />
defendant’s conduct was in ‘deliberate <strong>and</strong> outrageous disregard of the<br />
plaintiff’s rights’<br />
1.54 In Part V we recommend that, in a jury trial, the judge, not the jury, should decide<br />
whether punitive damages are available. The judge, not the jury, would therefore<br />
decide, inter alia, whether the defendant’s conduct showed a ‘deliberate <strong>and</strong><br />
outrageous disregard of the plaintiff’s rights’.<br />
1.55 To allow juries to continue to decide, for the purposes of deciding claims to<br />
restitutionary damages, whether the defendant’s conduct showed a ‘deliberate <strong>and</strong><br />
outrageous disregard ...’, would produce procedural complexity where a plaintiff<br />
claims both (i) restitutionary damages, <strong>and</strong> (ii) punitive damages. The reason is<br />
that one precondition of both claims is the same (did the defendant’s conduct<br />
show a deliberate <strong>and</strong> outrageous disregard of the plaintiff’s rights?), but the<br />
question of whether it is satisfied would fall to be decided by two different<br />
decision-makers within the same action. The jury would decide the question for<br />
271 See paras 5.49-5.56 below (punitive damages available for any tort or certain equitable<br />
wrongs); paras 5.57-5.65 below (punitive damages available for statutory civil wrongs, but<br />
only where an award of punitive damages would be ‘consistent with the policy of the Act’<br />
under which the wrong arises); paras 5.46-5.48 below (‘deliberate <strong>and</strong> outrageous disregard<br />
of the plaintiff’s rights’).<br />
272 See para 3.13 above.<br />
273 See paras 3.19-3.22 above.<br />
274 See paras 3.28-3.29 above.<br />
44