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Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission

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seem that either party may give evidence of the defendant’s resources, but that in<br />

practice evidence of the defendant’s means is rarely, if ever, adduced.<br />

1.154 Until the recent case of Thompson v MPC 451<br />

it was unclear how this consideration<br />

should be applied in a vicarious liability case, where a plaintiff seeks to make an<br />

employer liable for the wrongful conduct of his employee. One possibility was that<br />

any sum which an employer is liable to pay as exemplary damages could be subject<br />

to deduction on account of the employee’s lack of means. Another, contrasting,<br />

possibility was that the means of the wrongdoing employee are irrelevant to the<br />

size of the sum which the employer is vicariously liable to pay.<br />

1.155 In Thompson v MPC the Court of Appeal finally endorsed the second approach. It<br />

was said that where the action is brought against the chief police officer, <strong>and</strong><br />

damages are paid on the basis of vicarious liability for the acts of his officers, 452<br />

it [is] ... wholly inappropriate to take into account the means of the<br />

individual officers except where the action is brought against the<br />

individual tortfeasor. 453<br />

There seems to be no good reason why this approach should not apply generally<br />

to vicarious liability to exemplary damages.<br />

1.156 The Court of Appeal recognised that this approach might cause problems, in the<br />

event of the chief police officer seeking an indemnity or contribution from one or<br />

more of the individual wrongdoing officers. The fear is that those individuals<br />

could, indirectly, be made liable to pay a sum in excess of what they would have<br />

had to pay, directly, if they themselves had been sued. Lord Woolf MR’s solution<br />

to this problem, if it ever was to arise, was through a sensitive use of the court’s<br />

power to order contribution under sections 2(1) or 2(2) of the Civil Liability<br />

(Contribution) Act 1978. 454<br />

That is, the court should exercise its power to order<br />

that:<br />

... exemplary damages should not be reimbursed in full or at all if they<br />

are disproportionate to the officer’s means. 455<br />

(4) A ‘windfall to the plaintiff’, which may divert funds from public<br />

services<br />

1.157 The theme underlying the two principles of ‘moderation’ stated in John v MGN<br />

Ltd 456<br />

<strong>and</strong> by Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard 457<br />

is that ‘restraint’ is necessary for<br />

451 [1997] 3 WLR 403.<br />

452 See now s 88 of the Police Act 1996, <strong>and</strong> para 4.102, n 229, below.<br />

453 [1997] 3 WLR 403, 418E.<br />

454 Section 2(1) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 provides that the amount of<br />

contribution recoverable from any person:<br />

... shall be such as may be found by the court to be just <strong>and</strong> equitable having<br />

regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage in question ...<br />

Section 2(2) provides that the court may order contribution amounting to a complete<br />

indemnity or exempt a person altogether from liability to make contribution.<br />

455 [1997] 3 WLR 403, 418F.<br />

78

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