Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
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disgorge what he has saved by committing the wrong, but one of<br />
compensating the plaintiff. 245<br />
1.35 Similarly, in the leading case of Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd 246<br />
the<br />
Court of Appeal declined to award restitutionary damages for a breach of contract<br />
where the defendant, to whom the plaintiff had sold l<strong>and</strong> for a housing estate, had<br />
built more houses on the site than they had covenanted to build, thereby making a<br />
greater profit. Nominal damages were awarded on the ground that the plaintiff<br />
had suffered no loss. <strong>Restitutionary</strong> damages were held to be inappropriate<br />
because this was an action for ordinary common law damages for breach of<br />
contract: it involved neither a tort nor an infringement of proprietary rights nor<br />
equitable damages.<br />
1.36 One exception to the rule denying restitution for breach of contract is Wrotham<br />
Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd, 247<br />
where the defendants had built houses<br />
on their l<strong>and</strong> in breach of a restrictive covenant in favour of the plaintiffs’<br />
neighbouring l<strong>and</strong>. A m<strong>and</strong>atory injunction was refused, since it would cause<br />
economic waste. At the trial of the action, Brightman J said:<br />
If, for social <strong>and</strong> economic reasons, the court does not see fit in the<br />
exercise of its discretion, to order demolition of the 14 houses, is it just<br />
that the plaintiffs should receive no compensation <strong>and</strong> that the<br />
defendants should be left in undisturbed possession of the fruits of<br />
their wrongdoing? Common sense would seem to dem<strong>and</strong> a negative<br />
answer to this question. 248<br />
Brightman J concluded that “a just substitute for a m<strong>and</strong>atory injunction would be<br />
such a sum of money as might reasonably have been dem<strong>and</strong>ed by the plaintiffs<br />
from [the defendants] as a quid pro quo for relaxing the covenant”. 249<br />
The plaintiffs<br />
would clearly never have granted such a relaxation. 250<br />
Moreover, in deciding what<br />
was a reasonable price, substantial weight was given to the fact that the defendants<br />
had made £50,000 profit from the development, <strong>and</strong> damages were assessed at 5%<br />
of that profit. It would seem, therefore, that the damages were not compensating<br />
any losses suffered by the plaintiffs <strong>and</strong> are more appropriately viewed as<br />
restitutionary damages reversing the defendants’ unjust enrichment. The quantum<br />
is explicable as representing a fair proportion of the profits made by the<br />
defendants. Reference to what the parties would themselves have agreed was<br />
subsequently dismissed as “a fiction” by Steyn LJ in Surrey County Council v<br />
Bredero Homes, 251<br />
although Steyn LJ’s comments were in turn criticised, <strong>and</strong> a<br />
245 Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106, 332E.<br />
246 [1993] 1 WLR 1361. For notes or articles on this case see, eg, O’Dair [1993] RLR 31;<br />
Birks (1993) 109 LQR 518; Burrows [1993] LMCLQ 453; Smith (1994) JCL 164.<br />
247 [1974] 1 WLR 798.<br />
248 [1974] 1 WLR 798, 812H.<br />
249 [1974] 1 WLR 798, 815D.<br />
250 [1971] 1 WLR 798, 815.<br />
251 [1993] 1 WLR 1361, 1369G.<br />
39