Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
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day market). At first instance, Peter Gibson J granted the plaintiff, from 4 March<br />
1987, a permanent injunction to restrain further infringement of its right. He also<br />
awarded substantial damages, not on the basis that the plaintiff had suffered any<br />
loss of custom, but on the basis of an appropriate licence fee that the plaintiff<br />
could have charged the defendant for lawful operation of its market from 12 April<br />
1984 to 4 March 1987. The defendant company successfully appealed against the<br />
award of substantial damages, the Court of Appeal holding that the plaintiff was<br />
entitled merely to £2 nominal damages.<br />
1.18 On the facts, the plaintiff would not have granted the defendant the right to hold<br />
the market <strong>and</strong> therefore Peter Gibson J’s award at first instance is better viewed as<br />
restitutionary (stripping away part of the defendant’s wrongfully acquired gains)<br />
rather than compensatory. In the Court of Appeal the whole question was<br />
approached as if only compensatory damages could be awarded. Indeed it was<br />
only at the very end of Nourse LJ’s judgment that there was any reference to<br />
restitution. He said,<br />
It is possible that the English law of tort, more especially of the socalled<br />
‘proprietary torts’ will in due course make a more deliberate<br />
move towards recovery based not on loss suffered by the plaintiff but<br />
on the unjust enrichment of the defendant - see Goff <strong>and</strong> Jones The<br />
<strong>Law</strong> of Restitution, 3rd ed (1986), pp 612-614. But I do not think that<br />
that process can begin in this case <strong>and</strong> I doubt whether it can begin at<br />
all at this level of decision. 206<br />
The approach in Wass has been heavily criticised by commentators. 207<br />
(b) Intellectual property torts<br />
1.19 These are civil wrongs which are now either statutory torts (for example,<br />
infringement of a patent, infringement of copyright, infringement of design right)<br />
or common law torts (for example, infringement of trade mark <strong>and</strong> passing off).<br />
The reason why it is convenient to treat them separately from other proprietary<br />
torts is that restitution for these torts, through the equitable remedy of an account<br />
of profits, is very well-established <strong>and</strong> no doubt historically reflects the fact that<br />
these torts started life as equitable wrongs.<br />
1.20 So an account of profits may be ordered for the torts of passing off 208<br />
or<br />
infringement of trade mark, 209<br />
although it appears that dishonesty is here a precondition<br />
of the restitutionary remedy, 210<br />
albeit not of a claim for compensation. 211<br />
206 [1988] 1 WLR 1406, 1415.<br />
207 See, eg, P Birks, Civil Wrongs - A New World (Butterworth Lectures 1990-91) esp pp 57-77;<br />
A Burrows, The <strong>Law</strong> of Restitution (1993) pp 392-393; Lord Goff of Chieveley <strong>and</strong> G Jones,<br />
The <strong>Law</strong> of Restitution (4th ed, 1993) pp 722-723.<br />
208 Lever v Goodwin (1887) 36 ChD 1; My Kinda Town Ltd v Soll [1982] FSR 147, reversed on<br />
liability [1983] RPC 407.<br />
209 Edelsten v Edelsten (1863) 1 De G J & S 185, 46 ER 72; Slazenger & Sons v Spalding & Bros<br />
[1910] 1 Ch 257; Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25 (HCA).<br />
210 See especially the decision of Windeyer J in the High Court of Australia in Colbeam Palmer<br />
Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25.<br />
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