ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

150 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
dimension from our scientific enquiries: (1) if we already know that
no such dimension is a part of the "is"; or (2) if we know that there is
no possibility of perceiving or uncovering it even if it is there; or (3)
if we know that any possible "knowledge" of it will necessarily differ
in character from our other "scientific" knowledge, so substantially
as to require separate treatment and status. That is to say that we
cannot "know" it in the same sense that we "know" the other dimensions
of what "is."
As to the first of these alternatives, Brecht could not, of course,
consistently claim to possess knowledge of the non-existence of an
"ought" dimension to the "is"-for the purpose of constructing the
proper scientific methodology. For such "knowledge" would then be
"pre-scientific" and, as such, suspect in its accuracy and precision.
This is no doubt why he expressly denies that there is any conclusive
proof of the absence of any objective ground of "values." He carefully
distinguishes between his position of "scientific value relativism"
and "philosophical relativism" which insists that "there is nothing of
absolute value and that all values are equal" (262). "Scientific value
relativism" stops short of such a contention that all values are inherently
relative, because "there is surely no scientific proof for
that." 12 To claim to know that all "values" are inherently relative
and subjective is to claim to know that there is no objectively
discoverable "ought" dimension in the nature of things; and to make
such a claim, Brecht asserts, is to engage in a
"self-contradiction"which is "easy to refute." It is "to deny absolute
truth and in the same breath to proclaim one." And he states that he
"never met a scientific relativist who took this stand in his scientific
work" (262). We shall see in due course why Brecht formulates the
contradiction in terms of "absolute truth."
While the absence of proof of the non-existence of an "ought"
dimension to the "is" is not a proof of its existence, it would at least
appear to provide a reasonable ground for including the question on
the scientific agenda. Why should inquiry in this direction be
restricted at the outset? Perhaps because we know that such enquiries
are bound to fail, because it is impossible to obtain such
12. (435). Brecht's emphasis. "Historical relativism deals with the historical conditions
of value judgments and of science; it either denies or neglects the possibility that
there may be trans-historical values. The relativism of Scientific Value Relativism, by
contrast, is primarily `transhistorical.' It investigates the problems of values that are
thought of as independent of historical conditions, or at least refers to them also" (133).