ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

176 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER human freedom of will and methodological problems. Brecht begins his discussion of the eleventh and final "scientific step," non-acceptance, by indicating that, while the account of the first ten "steps" has provided a "positive" statement of proper Scientific Method, he will now present the "negative" side-i.e., what it is especially that Scientific Method rejects or repudiates. Summarily stated, "Scientific Method eliminates all propositions that have been arrived at otherwise or have been invalidated through it, as nonscientific in its terms" (98). Most importantly, "[i]t shuts the front door of science to (1) a-priori judgments, (2) metaphysical propositions, and (3) absolute value judgments. These three are only admitted, if at all, through the back door of `working hypotheses' and ' assumptions'." He characterizes both "metaphysical propositions" and "absolute value judgments " as " special types of a-priori propositions. " His subsequent discussion does not address each of these specifically, but rather treats of a-priori reasoning in general, reserving the "special types" for particular examination later in the book. Brecht begins his general treatment by distinguishing four different usages of the term "a-priori": (a) "the most firmly established classical sense" which refers to "notions, propositions, or postulates that are considered true or necessary , irrespective of experience or anterior to it"; (b) a more "modern" sense which refers to "all notions, propositions or postulates that are extraneous to the system or method of thought under which the inquiry is conducted," or what he terms "the methodologically repudiated a-priori"; (3) a closely related modern sense associated with methodological considerations, which refers to certain notions, propositions or postulates which "cannot be reached or verified" through the preferred "method" and which "underlie the method's operations"-termed "the immanent methodological a priori"; and (4) a sense, employed by "some writers," which refers to "all things that are `given' or simply there a priori; i.e., the things that constitute, so to speak, the raw material of scientific research"-or what he terms "the a priori of givenness" (100f.). What is immediately noticeable about Brecht's account of these four "senses" is that they are not distinct. The first or classic sense appears silently in the definition of the fourth. And the second and third senses merely add an apparently arbitrary methodological criterion as a principle of selection or standard for choosing to accept some notions, propositions, or postulates as true "irrespective of experience or anterior to it" while rejecting others.
ARNOLD BRECHT ' S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED 177 Brecht, not surprisingly, is "particularly concerned" with these second and third senses; but his subsequent discussion focuses on the Kantian treatment of the a priori in "the classical sense" for the purpose of showing the "historical continuity" between it and the "immanent methodological a prioris" favored by Scientific Method. It is unnecessary here to examine in detail Brecht's discussion of Kant's theory, other than to notice that: (1) Brecht moves among Kant's particular ideas or theories much like a shopper whose selections and rejections are guided by a specific predetermined recipe, accepting those which appear congenial to Scientific Method and rejecting those which do not; and (2) notwithstanding his rejection of some of Kant's ideas, his treatment of Kant is almost entirely uncritical, and that is to say that he not only fails to take notice of theoretical problems associated with what he finds acceptable in Kant's theory but does not even tend to do so in relation to what he finds unacceptable or uncongenial to the Method. Instead he tends to interpret Kant in such a way as to exaggerate the similarities and soften the discrepancies between the Kantian view and his own. Brecht accepts fully Kant ' s negative " a priori notions of reason"-"that no sensory experience could ever give us certainty about the 'thing-in-itself' which had caused the experience, nor about the real nature of causation or about that of space and time. In all these respects, our experience [is] limited to phenomena as they appear...to us" (103); but he apparently rejects Kant's positive "a priori notions of reason," such as "the reality of a highest immaterial being, or God," not to mention Kant's "categorical imperative." Brecht then rather misleadingly concludes that "Kant's a-priori principles of pure reason, then, were essentially negative. They tell us what pure reason can not do " . s4 As negations "which limit our possible knowledge," he finds them "in line with the basic principles of Scientific Method that science must rely on observation" (105). "In sum," he concludes, "there is no practical conflict between Scientific Method and Kant's a-priori principles. " Brecht never acknowledges the problem entailed in Kant's notion of "synthetic a prioris," avoiding the use of that term; nor does he question how Kant can properly speak about a world of " noumena " 34. (105). Brecht's emphasis. The apparent justification given for this conclusion is that Kant indicates that "reason could not state with certainty" the truth of these more positive "transcendental ideas."
Page 1 and 2: " SCIENCE " AND " VALUES " : ARNOLD
Page 3 and 4: ARNOLD BRECHT ' S POLITICAL THEORY
Page 37: ARNOLD BRECHT ' S POLITICAL THEORY

ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?