ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

ARNOLD BRECHT ' S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED 167
istential fact always imply "a rudimentary explanation in terms of
cause and effect," whether we are dealing with natural or human
events. 25 The first type of explanation is therefore clearly
distinguishable from the third only if and when it deals with "meaning"
unrelated to "existential facts." Brecht does not provide a very
clear conceptual distinction between these two, but he insists that
they "must be clearly distinguished in scientific inquiry" (74).
There also appears to be a close kinship between the first and second
types of explanation. In the first type we may seek "to point out
some or all of the meaning's implications." And in the second we
may explain "why we hold the proposition to be `true' or `false"' by
showing "that it is logically implied in the meaning of the other propositions
which have been accepted or assumed to be true or false"
(73). Thus, both have to do with the "analysis" of propositions, and
both "explain" the "meaning" or "truth" of the concept or proposition
by locating its place in a larger order. Explanation of "existential
facts" has this same character, as we have seen. The question
naturally arises as to the relationship between these two different
orders-i.e., the "logical" order and the causal order ("or some other
pattern of existential regularity"). But Brecht does not explicitly
raise the question in this context; he had done so in his earlier discussion
of logic. His remarks here implicitly bear upon the question,
however.
Brecht briefly discusses some of the modern doubts concerning
causality, ranging from the Humean denial of our capacity to
perceive causal connections, through the Kantian 28 insistence that
causality is a human mental projection whose correspondence with
reality we are unable to confirm, to more recent outright denials of
the existence of causality in nature. He concludes that, such
philosophic doubts about the reality of causation notwithstanding,
"Scientific Method continues to work with the concept of causal
relationship or its equivalent in both natural and social sciences, at
least outside microcosmic research." But that is not because it is able
"to establish the reality and the nature of causal laws." It simply requires
us to follow "common sense" in making the hypothetical
25. (74). "For when I say that stars are signs of God's greatness, this implies the
meaning that the existence of stars is causally interrelated with God's existence, and
when I say that a rotten egg is a sign of contempt, that implies the meaning that the
egg hits the speaker because someone had thrown it."
26. Brecht disputes this interpretation of Kant, at least in part. Pp. 75f.