ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

ARNOLD BRECHT ' S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED 177
Brecht, not surprisingly, is "particularly concerned" with these second
and third senses; but his subsequent discussion focuses on the
Kantian treatment of the a priori in "the classical sense" for the purpose
of showing the "historical continuity" between it and the "immanent
methodological a prioris" favored by Scientific Method.
It is unnecessary here to examine in detail Brecht's discussion of
Kant's theory, other than to notice that: (1) Brecht moves among
Kant's particular ideas or theories much like a shopper whose selections
and rejections are guided by a specific predetermined recipe,
accepting those which appear congenial to Scientific Method and rejecting
those which do not; and (2) notwithstanding his rejection of
some of Kant's ideas, his treatment of Kant is almost entirely uncritical,
and that is to say that he not only fails to take notice of
theoretical problems associated with what he finds acceptable in
Kant's theory but does not even tend to do so in relation to what he
finds unacceptable or uncongenial to the Method. Instead he tends
to interpret Kant in such a way as to exaggerate the similarities and
soften the discrepancies between the Kantian view and his own.
Brecht accepts fully Kant ' s negative " a priori notions of
reason"-"that no sensory experience could ever give us certainty
about the 'thing-in-itself' which had caused the experience, nor
about the real nature of causation or about that of space and time.
In all these respects, our experience [is] limited to phenomena as
they appear...to us" (103); but he apparently rejects Kant's positive
"a priori notions of reason," such as "the reality of a highest immaterial
being, or God," not to mention Kant's "categorical imperative."
Brecht then rather misleadingly concludes that "Kant's
a-priori principles of pure reason, then, were essentially negative.
They tell us what pure reason can not do " . s4 As negations "which
limit our possible knowledge," he finds them "in line with the basic
principles of Scientific Method that science must rely on
observation" (105). "In sum," he concludes, "there is no practical
conflict between Scientific Method and Kant's a-priori principles. "
Brecht never acknowledges the problem entailed in Kant's notion
of "synthetic a prioris," avoiding the use of that term; nor does he
question how Kant can properly speak about a world of " noumena "
34. (105). Brecht's emphasis. The apparent justification given for this conclusion is
that Kant indicates that "reason could not state with certainty" the truth of these more
positive "transcendental ideas."