ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

164 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
the simultaneous acceptance of mutually contradictory "facts" (48)
and which prohibit "arbitrariness" and absolute or final acceptance
(71). "Even the fundamental philosophical problem of the certainty
,and nature of reality is involved in every decision on the acceptance
of the results of observation as facts" (48).
In his brief and somewhat disjointed discussion of this fundamental
problem of the relationship between reported observations or
"facts" and reality or what really "is," Brecht chooses to divide his
discussion into four separate sections, dealing successively with
" Fact, " " Truth," " Proof " and " Reality. " Reality, of course, comes up
in all four sections, but receives inadequate and inconsistent treatment
over-all. In his discussion of "truth," he distinguishes between
the theoretical alternatives of "truth" (i.e., of "facts") as correspondence
with reality and, "truth" as the "warranted assertibility"
or the "empirical validity" of propositions. He quickly concludes
that "[t]he important point for us here is that Scientific Method is
not necessarily tied up with a definite choice among these views." 22
The individual scholar is free to accept "propositions about alleged
facts" as "true" in any one of several possible senses-as "corresponding
to reality, empirically valid, verifiable, or
warranted"-whichever he prefers. But his acceptance must be
"tentative or provisional" in any case (51).
In his discussion of "proof," he begins by noting that "[i]n the
strictest sense of the term, full empirical proof is never available
under Scientific Method" (51). Such "full proof" is restricted to
"analytical judgments." Consequently, "we can speak only of probability
of a high degree, or of plausibility" when dealing with "empirical
questions"-at least when we are dealing with "inductive
generalizations of observed events" or with "statements about causal
relations." But when dealing with "particulars," he tells us, "we
need not always be so shy." Here we can be certain of the truth or
reality of the "fact." "It would indeed be foolish and misleading if
with regard to every particular event social scientists spoke of there
being no more than a high degree of probability that it happened."
It is "both true and fully proved" that Hitler; Lincoln, Washington,
Caesar, Cicero, Plato, and Aristotle lived, etc. 23 Brecht tells us that
22. Cf.: " I...wish to make it clear that the scientific usefulness of a concept depends
not on analytical reasoning alone but on the truth of `synthetic' propositions that are
meant to reflect reality " (59).
23. (52). See also (508).