ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

ARNOLD BRECHT ' S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED 153
science is no child's play" (125).
But what does it mean to say that there may be "knowledge" of
objectively authoritative "oughts," but that such knowledge is "nonscientific"?
Is it really knowledge, then; or is it only a kind of
pseudo-knowledge indistinguishable from error, wishful-thinking,
and other flights of fancy? It is evident from the preceding quotation
that the immediate ground which Brecht repeatedly stresses in
justification of the scientific prohibition of "value judgments" is the
alleged intrinsic inability of "science" to provide "evidence of a conclusive
nature" or "absolute" proof of the authority of such values.
"This method does not enable us to state, in absolute terms, whether
the purpose pursued by us or by others is good or bad, right or
wrong, just or unjust, nor which of several conflicting purposes is
more valuable than the other." "In short, it does not enable the
scientist to render an unconditional scientific value judgment, and
especially not a moral one" (124f.). That means that it is not possible
for the claimant of "knowledge" of the authoritative "values" to
prove to others the authenticity or validity of that claim, "unconditionally,"
"conclusively" or "absolutely" (125). The question of the
precise status, as knowledge, of such "inter-subjectively nontransmissable"
items, as well as some of the further implications and
problems associated with this phase of Brecht's argument must be
deferred to a later point when we have had the opportunity to explore
his account of "Scientific Method" more fully.
More to the point of our immediate concern is the question of how
it is known beforehand that such "value and principles" cannot be
known "scientifically." Brecht does not provide as clear and crisp an
answer to this question as one would wish. It emerges piecemeal and
by implication from his discussion of other points. He seems, for the
most part, to take it for granted that it is simply obvious. He makes
no effort to build a case in its support on empirical grounds; there is
no doubt that he is clearly aware of the necessarily inconclusive
character of any such attempt. But his discussion of "analysis" and
"induction" provides, implicitly, a more conclusive proof of the
point, one which is derived from rules of logic and which is therefore
not apparently dependent upon the results of an empirical examination
of the question at issue.
Brecht tells us that "analytical deductions if correctly made can be
said to be `absolutely true'."