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ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

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<strong>ARNOLD</strong> BRECHT ' S <strong>POLITICAL</strong> <strong>THEORY</strong> <strong>REVISITED</strong> 163<br />

the observer and what is in it when he reports; it is contingent also<br />

on the mind of the report's receiver. Words may have a different<br />

meaning for the writer and the reader, the speaker and the hearer"<br />

(39). And some speakers, as in surveys or scientific interviews, may<br />

possess a "conscious or subconscious intent to deceive, to modify or<br />

to exaggerate." Refined techniques have been devised to avoid the<br />

most obvious pitfalls, but these produce, at best, a limited degree of<br />

success in avoiding the possible errors. The use of preformulated<br />

questions and answers, indirect questions, depth interviews, etc., all<br />

have their own particular sets of associated methodological problems.<br />

2<br />

In his account of the third "scientific step," measurement, Brecht<br />

acknowledges that at least some "qualitative values" "resist attempts<br />

to measure them in quantitative terms." And this resistance bears<br />

heavily upon "the possibilities of measurement in the social<br />

sciences," which are, "and will continue to remain, limited because<br />

of the great number of variables, all of which cannot be included in<br />

scientific analysis and, insofar as they can, are not all measurable"<br />

(43). But Brecht implies an even more serious limitation or defect of<br />

the results of the employment of statistical techniques in the social<br />

sciences when he comments, in the preceding section, that the<br />

results of depth interviewing "are not fit for statistical calculations<br />

unless they are first coded and thereby once more bereaved of all or<br />

some of their `depth"' (41). The loss or absence of depth in so many<br />

of the studies which have been produced by practitioners of the new<br />

"science" has, of course, been frequently remarked upon by critics,<br />

almost always to a cool reception.<br />

Brecht's account of the fourth "scientific step," acceptance as<br />

`fact," provides a continuation of the emphasis on insuperable<br />

uncertainties. "Even when an observation is accepted as exactly<br />

made and adequately communicated, it remains to be decided by<br />

science whether the conclusion can be drawn that the phenomenon<br />

which was subjectively observed corresponded objectively to an actual<br />

fact" (48). And that decision on "acceptance" is a matter of individual<br />

judgment for each "scientist." There are "no strict rules" to<br />

guide that judgment, other than a few negative ones which forbid<br />

21, Brecht gives only the briefest mention of some of these, but his constant stress is<br />

on the problematical character of the results achieved even with the greatest possible<br />

methodological care.

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