ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

156
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
dichotomy between " is " and " ought " type propositions or are afflicted
with the limitations inherent in inductive reasoning. But the
possible role of "science" in exploring this possibility is, at best, a
limited one. It is restricted to the possible demonstration of the
universality of certain opinions or inclinations in support of particular
"values" or moral "postulates." But it does not appear that
"science" could attest to the moral authority of such common inclinations
in support of particular "values" or moral "postulates" in
any case. It could, at best, only identify "universal opinions about
values" (132). To draw any conclusion concerning authoritative
"oughts" from such factual data would appear to violate the "Gulf
Doctrine. " ' s And that is to say that the drawing of the "ought" conclusion
would entail the drawing of an inference. And that, in turn,
implies that the "ought" is not simply perceived directly after all.' 9
Brecht does not address this issue directly; and he consequently
never seems to make up his mind whether the direct perception of
"oughts" is or is not possible. And that no doubt explains the ambiguity
of his position on the possible utility of the "scientific" search
for "universal values."
Brecht thus appears to have closed the door on all of the
possibilities of "absolute" or "unconditional" knowledge of " values"
which are "intersubjectively transmissable" and therefore a proper
subject of "scientific" inquiry. But it also appears that a double standard
has now quietly reared its ugly head. For "science," in Brecht's
account, deals primarily in "synthetic" propositions and inductive
reasoning, and is therefore intrinsically incapable of providing "absolute"
or "unconditional" knowledge of anything. It appears, then,
that "absolute" or "conclusive" proof and "scientific" proof are not
15. This would be to commit the ostensible error of traditional moral philosophy:
"Far into the nineteenth century, and in part even into the twentieth, writers on
ethical and legal questions derived their doctrines of what ought to be, or what ought
to be done, from the factual data on what is. Human beings are, therefore they ought
to be; they ought not to be killed. They have a natural impulse to preserve their lives;
therefore they ought to have the right of self-defense. They are born equal; therefore
they ought to be treated as equal. Society exists, and is useful to the maintenance of
life; therefore there ought to be society " (126).
16. The term "value judgment, " so commonly used by " scientific value relativists"
and others would itself suggest that the assessment of the moral authority or
"oughtness" or " value " of any possible object necessarily entails a mental operation
characterized by some form of inference rather than some simple form of direct
perception.