ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

182 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
(words, signs) used in communication and perform the operations, if
any, described in these communications" (114). Scientific
knowledge is, in this sense, "universally transmissible" (481). But it
apparently possesses this characteristic as a matter of principle (in
some unclear sense) rather than of practice, since his prior discussions
of "acceptance" stress the uncertainties and disagreements
which necessitate regarding "scientific" findings always as merely
"tentative." Hence, "[t]he body of science is living, not petrified. It
includes all tentative acceptances, or refusals to accept, that are
legitimately offered by any scientist. It embodies controversial
theories as well as noncontroversial ones; and the controversial
theories do not merely surround an otherwise firm and petrified
body of science like an atmosphere or aura but sometimes reach deep
down to its very core" (72). There is not even always to be found "a
`prevailing opinion' about what is the `established knowledge' at the
time; and if there were, to let numbers decide would make little
sense, although it would be logically possible" (70). He adds, in a
note, that: "Campbell goes too far when he defines science as `the
study of those judgments concerning which universal agreement can
be obtained,' and insists that although a theory may be doubted for
some time, ' in the end it is always either definitely accepted or
definitely rejected."This," he says, "is more than we can promise.'
But, of course, it might be called the ideal aim" (519). Thus,
however short of the "ideal" the actual results may be, we are encouraged
to think that somehow "science" is, in principle, what it
never can manage to be in practice. The "principle" entailed can be
nothing more than an idealization or expression of wishful thinking,
since Brecht's "theory of Scientific Method" does not justify such
high claims and expectations.
But if Brecht accords more than the benefit of the doubt to Scientific
Method, he concedes a good deal less to what we have termed
"value inquiry." He does concede the theoretical possibility that objective
"values" may exist and that some individuals may possess genuine
knowledge of them. But his manner of treatment of specific
accounts and claims of such knowledge and his tendency to refer to
their conclusions as "mere speculations," "personal opinions," and
the like, make it clear that Brecht is radically skeptical of all such
knowledge claims. He acknowledges this in saying that the "radical
skepticism" of modern science "begins where Scientific Method
leaves off" (168). And he raises the obvious question; "Why is its
skepticism so selective?" Why should it be willing to accept in-