ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

ARNOLD BRECHT ' S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED 147
Because "[a]ccording to Scientific Value Relativism, `ultimate,'
`highest,' or `absolute' values or `standards of values' are `chosen' by
mind or will, or possibly... ' grasped ' by faith, intuition, or instinct;
but they are not `proven' by science-excepting, however, that
science can help a great deal in clarifying the meaning of ideas about
such values and the consequences and risks entailed in their pursuit"
(117).
What, then, is the basis for this conviction that "science," when
properly conducted, is inherently incapable of proving the objectively
authoritative status of ostensible "ultimate values," of
discovering the intrinsic "value" of some possible objects of human
aspiration? There are several dimensions or layers to the explanation
which Brecht provides.
Brecht's primary reliance for the support of "scientific value
relativism" is placed on the argument from deductive "analytic"
logic which insists that there is a "logical gulf" between "descriptive"
and "normative" propositions. Brecht tells us, approvingly but
somewhat imprecisely, that the "chief technical ground for the
withdrawal of science from moral value judgments has been the
logical difference ('gulf') between Is and Ought" (125). The
technical logical argument insists that: (1) deduction or "analysis" is
simply a process of bringing to light or spelling out the various
meanings or implications which are contained in given propositions
or major and minor premises; and (2) "[i]nferences of what `ought'
to be, therefore, can never be derived deductively (analytically)
from premises whose meaning is limited to what ` is ' ; they can be correctly
made only from statements that have an Ought-meaning, at
least in the major premise" (126). But it does not directly follow
from this that it is logically impossible to derive "oughts" from observations
and explanations of what "is." The "withdrawal," if it is not
simply illogical, is based upon a further presupposition of a complete
disjunction between the "is" and the "ought" in nature, at least
insofar as "science" is concerned.
There is no doubt that the logical distinction between "is" and
"ought" type propositions is, on the whole, a meaningful and useful
one. But its usefulness varies from case to case. Some observers may
intend their propositions about the "is" and the "ought" to be completely
disjunctive. But not all observers do so. And the primary explanation
of this difference in intent is that it is generated by differences
of understanding of the relationship between the "is" and
the "ought" in nature-or, that is to say the difference between