ARNOLD BRECHT'S POLITICAL THEORY REVISITED Political ...

154 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
But this quality of absolute truth refers only to the analytical inference as such,
i.e., to the statement that the meaning of proposition a implies the proposition
b. Whether the proposition a is true, and consequently, whether b is true, is not
guaranteed by the fact that b is implied in the meaning of a. These are the most
elementary facts about logic. (57)
It is this capacity to produce "absolute truth" which "gives deductive
logic...its singular place in science," he points out. But it is a severely
circumscribed capacity. It applies only to the logical relationship
between the general and particular propositions per se, not to the
relationship between such propositions on the one hand and a real
world which they are attempting to describe, on the other hand.
Thus viewed in their "synthetic" character, the "truth" of which
such propositions are capable is of a different order. "Synthetic
statements, too, may be true; but whether they are depends on
something more than mere deductive, analytical logic, and this
`something more' is always subject to scientific challenge" (59).
Inductive inferences necessarily lack "this quality of absolute
truth." The process of generalizing from a limited number of particular
instances is one in which our generalized conclusion extends
beyond what is necessarily implied or proven by the particulars from
which it is inferred. Thus, after a brief review of the various attempts
of John Stuart Mill, Felix Kaufman, and John Dewey to
justify such inductive generalizations, Brecht concludes that "[f]or
our present purpose [of understanding the nature of Scientific
Method] it does not matter which of these theories we follow." The
important point, he stresses, is that "it is recognized today that inductive
reasoning can lead only to tentative hypotheses, whose truth
may always be exposed to scientific challenge" (62).
How does this bear upon the question of the possibility of "unconditional"
or "absolute" knowledge of "values and principles"? It
would seem that such "oughts" must either be perceived directly or
indirectly (inferentially). If they are perceived directly (via revelation,
intuition or other means") their authenticity or authority is
14. Including " pure practical reason," according to Kant. Kant, who is obviously
much admired by Brecht, receives much gentler treatment by Brecht than other
philosophers who have made less absolute claims for their "oughts." Brecht carefully
avoids directing any criticism at Kant ' s notion of " synthetic a priori " statements in
general or its application to the "moral law" in particular. See: pp. 55-63, esp. p. 59;
105; 368 f.; and 375. He concludes that "Once we accept his premises we cannot accuse
Kant, any more than we could Moses, of having made unwarranted inferences
from what is to what ought to be " (368 f.).