Relatório do Acidente ocorrido no Incêndio Florestal de Yarnel Hill

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the black,” and they will assess from there. As GM Lookout departs, he believes the crew is in the black and watching the fire, and DIVS A is scouting. BR Supt drops GM Lookout off at the Granite Mountain IHC Supt truck at about 1555 and then heads around the corner to get some of his crew to help move the Granite Mountain crew carriers. On the Granite Mountain intra-crew frequency, GM Figure 9. Wade Parker texted this photo at 1604 on June 30. Lookout hears DIVS A and GM Capt talking about their options, whether to stay in the black or to come up with a plan to move. Around this time, some crewmembers take photos and send text messages to family members. At 1554, one crewmember texts, “This fire is running at Yarnell!!!” Another texts a photo at 1604 and writes, “This thing is runnin straight for yarnel jus starting evac. You can see fire on left town on the right.” * * * * * As BR Supt is en route to pick up drivers to move the Granite Mountain crew carriers, SPGS1 contacts him to ask if they still have the option to burn out from the dozer line. BR Supt tells him no. DIVS A, hearing the transmission, agrees and says he believes the fire is almost as far as the Granite Mountain vehicles. A moment later, DIVS A says, “I want to pass on that we’re going to make our way to our escape route.” BR Supt attempts to clarify, “You guys are in the black, correct?” DIVS A responds, “Yeah, we’re picking our way through the black.” DIVS A then mentions a road in the bottom and “going out toward the ranch.” BR Supt thinks DIVS A is talking about heading northeast, through the black, to one of the ranches in that direction. BR Supt says, “DIVS A, to confirm, you’re talking about the road you saw me on with the UTV earlier, in the bottom.” DIVS A replies, “Yes, the road I saw you on with the Ranger [the UTV].” * * * * * Earlier that day, the YCSO issues pre-evacuation notices to area residents. In Northern Yarnell and the Shrine area, SPGS1 has three trigger points for evacuation. The first is on a Yarnell Hill Fire Serious Accident Investigation 24
idge one mile north of town. Resources in the area anticipate a one-hour window to evacuate the residents when the fire reaches this trigger point. SPGS1 establishes a closer, second trigger point for the firefighters themselves to start leaving the area. He has a third trigger point for making sure everyone is out. A task force with Structure Protection Group 1 is working in the area. They are cutting a piece of indirect line from the area near the youth camp on Shrine Road eastward to a boulder pile, expecting that they may need to burn off this line overnight. This piece of indirect line connects to the dozer line between Shrine Road and Sesame Street, which the Blue Ridge IHC have been prepping since about 1500. Between 1530 and 1545, winds pick up and gradually shift direction from the southwest to the west-northwest, and the fire becomes very active. There is some spotting, and heavy ash is falling onto fire personnel working in the youth camp area. By this time, the two-mile flanking fire looks more like a head fire and is starting to move southeasterly. Summary of Wind Shifts in the Afternoon Until about 1550, winds have been pushing the fire generally northeast. At about this time, pressure changes start happening ahead of the outflow boundary. These pressure changes cause the air to become more erratic, even before the outflow boundary itself reaches the fire. Personnel on the fire see significant changes in wind and fire spread direction, even before the outflow boundary arrives and brings its full increase in wind speed. These pressure changes caused wind shifts on different parts of the fire at different times. Then, the outflow boundary itself arrived at different parts of the fire at different times. This is why there are a number of conflicting accounts of when "the wind shift" occurred. Also, personnel at various locations saw the early wind shifts and may have interpreted them to mean the anticipated wind event was fully manifested. At the Granite Mountain IHC’s location near the anchor point, wind shifts began at approximately 1550. Before that, the fire was moving generally northeast. Around 1550, the fire shifted to moving southeast and aggressively pushing toward Yarnell. The outflow boundary itself had not arrived yet. It did not hit the southern perimeter of the fire until 1630. When the outflow boundary hits, winds drastically increase and drive the fire south. Fire reaches SPGS1’s first trigger point, and he requests YCSO to order an immediate resident evacuation for Yarnell. Around this time, drivers arrive at the Shrine area with the Granite Mountain crew carriers, and soon they are loading the Blue Ridge crewmembers and leaving the area. The fire hits the second trigger point five to seven minutes later so SPGS1 directs all resources at the youth camp to leave. The fire then spots a half mile beyond that and reaches the third trigger point—a ridge on the edge of town—covering about one mile in 15 minutes. SPGS1 reconfirms that crews are getting out. By 1622, the firefighters in the Shrine area recognize the fire has reached the second trigger point and they start moving out toward Highway 89. Blue Ridge has left and they try several times to contact SPGS1 about getting the rest of the firefighters out of the area. Some of the firefighters do not share their sense of urgency, so BR Supt and BR Capt drive back in to hurry them, urging them out of the Shrine area. As they follow the last firefighters out, the smoke column above brings darkness. Embers fall and ignite numerous spot fires, which quickly burn Yarnell Hill Fire Serious Accident Investigation 25
Page 1 and 2: Yarnell Hill Fire June 30, 2013 Ser
Page 3 and 4: Andrew Sterling Ashcraft Travis Cla
Page 5 and 6: Contents Executive Summary ........
Page 7 and 8: Executive Summary Nineteen firefigh
Page 9 and 10: included a doubling of fire intensi
Page 11 and 12: The Investigation Process Following
Page 13 and 14: Report Structure This report is in
Page 15 and 16: Figure 1. Land within the fire peri
Page 17 and 18: Part One: Factual & Management Repo
Page 19 and 20: The fire eventually jumps the two-t
Page 21 and 22: Sunday, 30 June 2013 At the 0700 br
Page 23 and 24: and State FMO, seeing that the comp
Page 25 and 26: Figure 6. Estimated fire perimeter
Page 27 and 28: with radios on the incident, noting
Page 29: Also, at about 1550, GM Lookout is
Page 33 and 34: with the stated intent of being bac
Page 35 and 36: traffic. He contacts ASM2 and assis
Page 37 and 38: hour after launching, they spot the
Page 39 and 40: Analysis There is a gap of over 30
Page 41 and 42: • Fire behavior observed by the G
Page 43 and 44: • Moving to Yarnell provides the
Page 45 and 46: • The fire was not below them. Th
Page 47 and 48: • They could not escape the box c
Page 49 and 50: • The Team found no indication th
Page 51 and 52: Part Two: Learning Discussion Discu
Page 53 and 54: Situational Awareness Wildland fire
Page 55 and 56: forecast or update is, the lower th
Page 57 and 58: • We found no indication that the
Page 59 and 60: One might view traveling through an
Page 61 and 62: Some Questions for Ground Crews and
Page 63 and 64: something they thought they heard.
Page 65 and 66: wildland and WUI focus to primarily
Page 67 and 68: Appendices Appendix A: Sequence of
Page 69 and 70: TIME EVENT June 30, 2013 ~0700 Brie
Page 71 and 72: Appendix B: Fire Environment & Beha
Page 73 and 74: Climate data indicates a non-typica
Page 75 and 76: directly affect the fire area altho
Page 77 and 78: At 1500 MST, the FAA radar showed a
Page 79 and 80: help detect trends in fire behavior
Page 81 and 82:
Figure 16. A more pronounced outflo
Page 83 and 84:
north to south affecting the fire a
Page 85 and 86:
Figure 20. Wind vectors around the
Page 87 and 88:
Figure 22. Yarnell Hill Fire Progre
Page 89 and 90:
DISCUSSION Deployment Site Preparat
Page 91 and 92:
Figure 6. The burned remnants of a
Page 93 and 94:
Temperatures: The table below lists
Page 95 and 96:
Individual PPE Analysis: Eric Marsh
Page 97 and 98:
2. PPE Items: a. Clothing: Back of
Page 99 and 100:
3. Body position: The firefighter w
Page 101 and 102:
John Percin, Jr., Granite Mountain
Page 103 and 104:
that the SEATs each made two retard
Page 105 and 106:
equested a second VLAT, an order SW
Page 107 and 108:
Table 2. Resource Ordering Resource
Page 109 and 110:
Flight Date ATKR Gallons Origin End
Page 111 and 112:
Appendix E: Work/Rest & Qualificati
Page 113 and 114:
Position Required Training FFT2 No
Page 115 and 116:
WFLC Wildland Fire Leadership Counc
Page 117 and 118:
Trigger Points: Geographic points o
Page 119 and 120:
Appendix H: Team Members & Signatur
Page 121 and 122:
Appendix I: Subject Matter Experts
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Relatório do Acidente ocorrido no Incêndio Florestal de Yarnel Hill

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