Relatório do Acidente ocorrido no Incêndio Florestal de Yarnel Hill

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together. By 1630, the fire is bearing down on them. The last firefighters reach Highway 89 at 1640 and they call SPGS1 on Tac 1 to confirm they are out. They drive south a few minutes, to the Ranch House Restaurant to regroup and to determine if it is a safe area or if they need to continue further south. SPGS1 gives direction for Air Attack to “drop at will” to keep the fire out of town. Later, he would say he felt they stayed too long. The fire outperformed their expectations even with many knowledgeable people there, and their trigger points were not valid, not even “by one half,” given the push by the weather. Figure 10. One of the VLATs, a DC-10, drops retardant on the Yarnell Hill Fire on June 30. Photo courtesy of Rick Tham. * * * * * Earlier, an Aerial Supervision Module (ASM2) arrives above the fire at 1447 to relieve the first ASM (ASM1), which had been on the fire since about noon. 8 The two ASMs have a 10minute briefing about the strategy and priorities for the fire then ASM1 departs for refueling 8 An Aerial Supervision Module is a fixed wing aircraft with two crewmembers who perform the functions of traditional air attack and low-level leadplane operations. Yarnell Hill Fire Serious Accident Investigation 26
with the stated intent of being back on scene at 1715. Air Attack’s pilot is getting short on duty time so he departs about 1600 after a brief handoff with ASM2. ASM2 is busy dealing with an arriving VLAT and with structure protection on the north end when the fire begins shifting, turning priorities to Yarnell. Radio traffic is heavy in the cockpit with the pilot giving directions to incoming airtankers on the air-to-air frequency, and with the air attack member of ASM2 talking to OPS1 and ground personnel on the air-to-ground frequency. He is also repositioning aircraft, planning a sequence of tanker drops for Yarnell, and coordinating helicopter operations. At approximately 1600, ASM2 overhears a comment on the radio referencing a crew and a safety zone. ASM2 calls OPS1 and clarifies, “I heard a crew in a safety zone, do we need to call a time out?” OPS1 replies, “No, they’re in a good place. They’re safe and it’s Granite Mountain.” They talk about flying over to check on the crew, but for now, they think the crew is safe in the black. Following this conversation, ASM2 hears DIVS A announce on the radio, “We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.” ASM2 asks, “Is everything okay?” to which DIVS A replies, “Yes, we’re just moving.” At 1637, ASM2 flies a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell west to east and apparently over DIVS A, turning northward to avoid high ground at the end of Yarnell. DIVS A, seeing the flight, calls and calmly says, “[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.” ASM2 again circles the south end of the fire above Yarnell to line up a final flight path for a tanker drop. The aircraft crew is in the middle of a discussion with OPS1 on the air-to-ground frequency and the pilot is talking to the VLAT on the air-to-air frequency when an overmodulated and static-filled transmission comes over the air-to-ground frequency at 1639: “Breaking in on Arizona 16, Granite Mountain Hotshots, we are in front of the flaming front.” 9 Following this is a very broken, with wind in the microphone, transmission: “Air-to-ground 16, Granite Mountain, Air Attack, how do you read?” Due to poor reception, ASM2 can only understand fragments of these communications. The fire’s rapid advance toward Yarnell is generating a lot of radio traffic about structure protection so ASM2 assumes the broken and unclear transmission is one of the structure protection units calling to request a retardant drop. He does not suspect it’s Granite Mountain since they were safe when he talked to them earlier. 9 Arizona 16 is the Airguard frequency, an emergency frequency that all aircraft have programmed into their radios and monitor. It appears the Granite Mountain crewmember thinks he is breaking in on Arizona 16 but he is on the air-to-ground frequency. Yarnell Hill Fire Serious Accident Investigation 27
Page 1 and 2: Yarnell Hill Fire June 30, 2013 Ser
Page 3 and 4: Andrew Sterling Ashcraft Travis Cla
Page 5 and 6: Contents Executive Summary ........
Page 7 and 8: Executive Summary Nineteen firefigh
Page 9 and 10: included a doubling of fire intensi
Page 11 and 12: The Investigation Process Following
Page 13 and 14: Report Structure This report is in
Page 15 and 16: Figure 1. Land within the fire peri
Page 17 and 18: Part One: Factual & Management Repo
Page 19 and 20: The fire eventually jumps the two-t
Page 21 and 22: Sunday, 30 June 2013 At the 0700 br
Page 23 and 24: and State FMO, seeing that the comp
Page 25 and 26: Figure 6. Estimated fire perimeter
Page 27 and 28: with radios on the incident, noting
Page 29 and 30: Also, at about 1550, GM Lookout is
Page 31: idge one mile north of town. Resour
Page 35 and 36: traffic. He contacts ASM2 and assis
Page 37 and 38: hour after launching, they spot the
Page 39 and 40: Analysis There is a gap of over 30
Page 41 and 42: • Fire behavior observed by the G
Page 43 and 44: • Moving to Yarnell provides the
Page 45 and 46: • The fire was not below them. Th
Page 47 and 48: • They could not escape the box c
Page 49 and 50: • The Team found no indication th
Page 51 and 52: Part Two: Learning Discussion Discu
Page 53 and 54: Situational Awareness Wildland fire
Page 55 and 56: forecast or update is, the lower th
Page 57 and 58: • We found no indication that the
Page 59 and 60: One might view traveling through an
Page 61 and 62: Some Questions for Ground Crews and
Page 63 and 64: something they thought they heard.
Page 65 and 66: wildland and WUI focus to primarily
Page 67 and 68: Appendices Appendix A: Sequence of
Page 69 and 70: TIME EVENT June 30, 2013 ~0700 Brie
Page 71 and 72: Appendix B: Fire Environment & Beha
Page 73 and 74: Climate data indicates a non-typica
Page 75 and 76: directly affect the fire area altho
Page 77 and 78: At 1500 MST, the FAA radar showed a
Page 79 and 80: help detect trends in fire behavior
Page 81 and 82: Figure 16. A more pronounced outflo
Page 83 and 84:
north to south affecting the fire a
Page 85 and 86:
Figure 20. Wind vectors around the
Page 87 and 88:
Figure 22. Yarnell Hill Fire Progre
Page 89 and 90:
DISCUSSION Deployment Site Preparat
Page 91 and 92:
Figure 6. The burned remnants of a
Page 93 and 94:
Temperatures: The table below lists
Page 95 and 96:
Individual PPE Analysis: Eric Marsh
Page 97 and 98:
2. PPE Items: a. Clothing: Back of
Page 99 and 100:
3. Body position: The firefighter w
Page 101 and 102:
John Percin, Jr., Granite Mountain
Page 103 and 104:
that the SEATs each made two retard
Page 105 and 106:
equested a second VLAT, an order SW
Page 107 and 108:
Table 2. Resource Ordering Resource
Page 109 and 110:
Flight Date ATKR Gallons Origin End
Page 111 and 112:
Appendix E: Work/Rest & Qualificati
Page 113 and 114:
Position Required Training FFT2 No
Page 115 and 116:
WFLC Wildland Fire Leadership Counc
Page 117 and 118:
Trigger Points: Geographic points o
Page 119 and 120:
Appendix H: Team Members & Signatur
Page 121 and 122:
Appendix I: Subject Matter Experts
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Relatório do Acidente ocorrido no Incêndio Florestal de Yarnel Hill

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