EIS-0113_Section_11 - Hanford Site

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3.5.1 .71
3 .5.1.21
July 29, 1986
Page
at Hanford for the period of 1945-19 70 is 28 em/ye. Sec-
Lion 4.19 states that recharge rates are uncertain, with some
au thors estimating up to 5 cm/yr. in unvegetated areas.
Given those discrepancies in the assessment of current conditions,
the document does not appear to adequately address
possible climates over the lifespan of the project.
Item E. The functional ability of the barrier system will
depend upon the suitability of the site soils.. The document
does not discuss th e nature, depth, or availability of site
soils. There is no mention of impacts to the site due to
excavation of soils, the ability of the soils to maintain d
vegetative cover over 10,000 years, or likelihood of erosion
under a drier for wetter) climate. All of these factors will
affect the efficiency of the barrier.
Item I. The protective barrier is assumed to be capable of
3 .5.1.57
providing the reavisfte protection without substantial technical
evidence of its suitability. Criteria for this ..sump-
, tion an d analysis of demonstration projects should be provided.
A
Item J. Resettlement of the region resulting in fatal doses
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to the elation "would not be realisti c" under tb=ndi^
fez to
notion alternative teinar discussed on page 3.64. No basis
fox this assumption or analysis
of potential for impacts is
provided.
3.3.5.4
4 . 1, 15
3.5.1 .86 UV
Item K. Me discussion is provided of potential future
developments in disposal technology, especially in the areas
of treatment and reprocessing. This could significantly
affect impacts, particularly under the "no action" alternative
and th e in place stabilization alte rn ative.
Item L. The 1990 population for the "Hanford environs" is
projected at 420,000. Section 3.4.1.1. This figure reflect.
a population wi thin 80 km of th e 200 areas. Section 4.8.2.
No rationale is provided for the determination of th is
affected area. It would san. to be more realistic to provide
data for the likely affected population, which would conceivably
result in a proportionately larger degree of impact.
Item M. The failure scenario postulated in section 5.20-5.21
suggests that a 10 percent loss of soil cover would result in
exposure of to percent of the underlying waste. In reality, a
larger volume of waste could be affected due to leaching of
wastes and moisture.
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July 29, 1986 AN- 8 1585
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Item N. The 50 percent functional barrier failure posed in
section 4.21 is projected to result in 0.1 ca/yr. in£iltration,
while also stating the barrier will preclude infiltration
of the burial grounds. The twostatements seem contradictory.
0.I cm infiltration based on the projected 5 ca
recharge potential use wetter conditions does not seem
Proportionate for a 50 percent failure scenario.
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3 . 5 . 1 . 9.1
Item 0. Section 3.3.4.1 mentipan the potential for release
of radioactive pa rt .
iculate matter as a result of the collapse
of tank dames. 3.1.4
What effect might such an occurrence have
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with respect to settlement and failureof the protective
barrier?
Item P. Section 3.4.1.2 does not include tr an spo rt ationassociated
accidents as a potential source of radiological
incidents.
3.4.2.2
Item 9. Estimates of cancer deaths provided on page 5.5 do
not state the population for which this number is estimated.
4. 1.15
CBR:ac
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