Gender Diversity on the Board - BI Norwegian Business School

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GRA 19001 Master Thesis there is no need for A2 control since A2 is rather small due to families carrying most of the costs. Based on the assumption that female directors function as independent directors, family firms may be less likely to include women on the board. On the other hand, in family-owned firms one may tend to recruit directors within the families that on average have 50% men and 50% women. If this is the case, we will obtain the opposite results. 3.1.3 Hypothesis 3 The share of female stockholder-elected directors increases when the CEO is female. Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) argue that executives’ characteristics only impact corporate outcomes when they have influence over decision-making. According to Berzins, Bøhren and Rydland (2008) the CEO is often the largest stockholder. Hence, we assume that CEOs in our sample have influence in decision-making. When the CEO is female, we expect a higher share of female stockholder-elected directors. 3.2 CCGR-database CCGR pays special attention to the private industry in general and to nonlisted firms and family firms in particular. The CCGR database is constructed from data delivered by CreditInform which specializes in credit ratings. The database includes every firm with limited liability registered in Norway. It covers the period 1994 to 2007 for accounting information and general firm information, where data on governance is for the years 2000 to 2007. The governance data includes both first-layer and ultimate ownership (family firms). It also provides group structure information, such as what subsidiaries a parent owns and what parent a subsidiary is owned by. The database is considerably more extensive than what has been available for research purposes in the past. (Berzins, Bøhren, & Rydland, 2008). 3.3 Filtering process We remove all observations before year 2000 in the first filter, and use data from 2000 to 2007 due to availability of governance data in this period. The data on listing status for 2007 are not complete, thus we make the assumption that listing status for prior years also apply for 2007. We assume it is likely to find the same board members in subsidiaries as in the parent companies. Hence we exclude all subsidiaries in the second 14
GRA 19001 Master Thesis filter. In the third filter we exclude all financial firms due to the different nature of these firms’ accounting data compared to the other firms in our sample. We then eliminate firms without positive sales and assets. At this point we separate listed and nonlisted firms since our main focus is nonlisted firms. We are left with an average of 176,905 nonlisted firms over the entire sample period when all filters are applied. In our base case model we study the largest nonlisted companies. 15
Page 1 and 2: Malin Berg Mathisen Linda Waldal BI
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