Gender Diversity on the Board - BI Norwegian Business School

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GRA 19001 Master Thesis Gjølberg, O., & Nordhaug, O. (1996). Optimal Investment Committee Size. Journal of Portfolio Management Vol.22 No.2 , 87-94. Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. (1998). Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review 88 , 96-118. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavioir, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 3 No. 4 , 305-360. Lorsch, J. W., & Carter, C. B. (2004). Back to the Drawing Board. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press. Lorsch, J. W., & MacIver, E. (1989). Pawns or potentates : the reality of America's corporate boards. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press. Petersen, T. (2004). Analyzing Panel Data: Fixed- and Random-Effects Models. In M. A. Hardy, & A. Bryman, Handbook of Data Analysis (pp. 331-345). London: Sage Publications. Schleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. The Journal of Political Economy Vol.94 No. 3 , 461-488. 30
GRA 19001 Master Thesis Appendixes Methodology Table 1.A1: Items used from the CCGR-database Item no. Description 2 CEO gender 11 Operating income 19 Operating profit 24 Other interest received 25 Other financial income 63 Fixed assets 78 Current assets 127 Return on assets 402 Listing status 602 Board size 608 Female stockholder-elected directors 11103 Industry codes 13420 Firm age 14504 is_Subsidiary 15302 Largest ultimate family owner Table 1.A2: Definitions of corporate finance variables Variable Abbreviation Definition Operating Earnings EBI Before Interest After Tax { [19 Results of operations] + [20 Income from subsidiaries] + [21 Income from other group entities] + [22 Income from associates] + [23 Interest received from group companies] + [24 Other interest received] + [25 Other financial income] + [26 Changes in marked value of financial current assets] } * { 1- ( -[34 Tax on ordinary result] / [33 Operating results before tax] or 28% if null )} Total Assets A [63 Fixed assets] + [78 Current assets] Sales S [11 Sum operating income] + [24 Other interest received] + [25 Other financial income] Return on Assets ROA ROA: [EBI]/IIf([A]=0,Null,[a]) Percent of female stockholder-elected directors Female stockholderelected directors {[608 Female stockholder-elected directors]/[602 Board size]} Percent largest ultimate Family {[15302 Largest ultimate family owner]/100} family owner ownership CEO gender CEO gender {1 if CEO is female, and 0 if CEO is male} 31
Page 1 and 2: Malin Berg Mathisen Linda Waldal BI
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