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Gender Diversity on the Board - BI Norwegian Business School

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Percent<br />

GRA 19001 Master Thesis<br />

share of observati<strong>on</strong>s in our sample. Therefore, we choose not to draw any c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s<br />

based <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>se findings.<br />

Figure 4.3 illustrates <strong>the</strong> distributi<strong>on</strong> of female stockholder-elected directors of all<br />

observati<strong>on</strong>s in our sample. Obviously, <strong>the</strong> distributi<strong>on</strong> is skewed to <strong>the</strong> right.<br />

Figure 4.3: Distributi<strong>on</strong> of female stockholder-elected directors for large n<strong>on</strong>listed firms<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

-2<br />

0<br />

2<br />

4<br />

6<br />

Female stockholder-elected directors<br />

Figure 4.3 shows <strong>the</strong> distributi<strong>on</strong> of female stockholder-elected directors in <strong>the</strong> sample for large n<strong>on</strong>listed firms. The<br />

Y-axis measures <strong>the</strong> number of observati<strong>on</strong>s, while <strong>the</strong> X-axis is <strong>the</strong> number of female stockholder-elected directors.<br />

4.2 Independent variables<br />

In this secti<strong>on</strong> descriptive statistics of all independent variables are presented to obtain a<br />

better understanding of our data set. The independent variables used are return <strong>on</strong> assets<br />

(ROA), fracti<strong>on</strong> held by largest family owner and CEO-gender. Firm age and firm size<br />

are used as c<strong>on</strong>trol variables. During our sample period, no governance codes are<br />

implemented for n<strong>on</strong>listed firms. As stated under descriptive statistics, we find an<br />

increase in <strong>the</strong> share of female stockholder-elected directors from 7% to 10%. Since<br />

<strong>the</strong>re are no indicati<strong>on</strong>s of substantial time effects, we do not c<strong>on</strong>trol for time in <strong>the</strong><br />

regressi<strong>on</strong>. In appendix 2.A4 we show descriptive statistics for all variables.<br />

20

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