Bruce Allen Scharlau PhD thesis - Research@StAndrews:FullText

187
these explanations are likely to be at work to differing degrees in the
'shift to extremity' process.145
The second process at work next to the 'shift to extremity' is that
of 'groupthink' f
a mode of thinking engaged in when people are deeply
involved in a cohesive ingroup, and when their "strivings for unanimity
override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses
of action.flU6 six features of groupthink can lead to 'bad' decisions:
(1) a very cohesive decision-making body r (2) inSUlation from outside
information r whereby experts are not utilised r and there is a selective
bias against factual information from outside sources that do not
support initial policy preferences r
(3) decision-makers not searching
systernatically through al ternati ve policy options f ( 4 ) time pressure
pushes the group to reach a decision urgently, (5) a group dominated by
a distinctive leader, and (6) little attention is paid to how policies
could be sabotaged or hindered by accidents. The result is a loss of
independent cri tical thinking supplanted by 'groupthink ' promoting
irrational, dehumanising activity directed towards outgroupS.147
These 'groupthink 1
conditions lead to symptoms of 'groupthink' which
manifest themselves in eight ways in terrorist groups: (1) an illusion
of invulnerability leading to over optimism and risk-taking;
assumptions are dismissed in collective rationalisation;
morality of the group is assumed;
(2) key
(3) the
(4) the enemy is perceived as evil
(which eliminates negotiation), and incompetent (which justifies risky
ventures); (5) key beliefs are upheld in the face of individual
members's challenges to these beliefs; (6)
differing views are not
expressed in the perceived group consensus; ( 7) the group believes there
is an unanimity of position; (8) members withhold information to
maintain the illusion of the group's positions on its decisions. 148
The symptoms are intertwined and affect one another: if the group
believes its members are unanimous in agreement f
then challenges to
decisions will not occur r or will be dismissed r and people will withhold
their voices and information supporting differing positions.
On some occasions these all apply to the Red Army Faction, at others
times they do not. For example, after the Stammheim suicides in 1977 the
leaders prepared retributive acts involving the deaths of many policemen
wi th mined target areas. However f
'When the leaders discussed these plans
with the other group members the leadership was dissuaded because this
145 ibid. 1
154, 157.
146 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Miffin
Co., 1972),9.
147 ibid. r 10 1
13.
148 ibid. r 197-8.