Bruce Allen Scharlau PhD thesis - Research@StAndrews:FullText

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and Schleyer episodes show that when a specific location for the
terrorists is unknown and when a long-term response is required, then
the responses are less effective. This was also true in the eighties and
nineties where the level of arrests has fallen.
the BKA
The sort of problems experienced during the Lorenz abduction led to
terrorism unit which was supposed to compile and store all
information on terrorism, with the Laender binding themselves to this
decision. The BKA
also introduced new computer programmes like PIOS
(persons, institutions, objects, articles) to bring together diverse
data from different files in new data combinations and,
answers to questions. 74
hopefully,
The Lorenz abduction was characterised by bad communication,
coordination and demarcation of responsibility problems between the
West-Berlin administration and the police units as well as within and
between the police units. For example, they wasted efforts to establish
Lorenz's fingerprints in the telephone box he used to call the police
after his release and neglected to check the mileage on the van used in
the kidnapping.
The police also missed an opportuni ty to follow or
capture involved terrorists or their accomplices, by not observing the
apartment of a woman who was to receive money from the terrorists.
Perhaps the single action which speaks volumes on the police
infrastructure at the time was the ability of three men successfully to
rob a bank of 45,000 DM in West-Berlin on the day after Lorenz's
release, when 4000 policemen were on duty.75
However, the implemented changes did not help the authorities in
1977 when their capabilities and organisational structures were tested
for coordination and effectiveness. The Hoecherl-Report found that they
did not perform effectively, and sought to uncover why a 'hot clue' that
was reported on 9 September, which could have led to Schleyer's
location, was left hanging in the system. The information flood
mentioned earlier which the police information system produced and by
which the security authorities oriented themselves, became a tidal wave
that produced 1200 telex messages in the first six days of the
abduction, and 24,000 in one month, more than occurred in all of 1976. 76
The Hoecherl report, which examined the authorities' efforts and
activities for 1977, stated, when published in June 1978, that the
authorities did not heed the warnings evident early in 1977 and failed
74 Krumm, 81; Busch et.al., 136-7, Boelsche, 27.
75 Dietrich stohmann, IIKeine Stadt der Angst" Die Zeit 7 March 1975,
3-4, 4; Joachim Narowki, "Ein Schlag ins Wasser" Die Zeit 14 March 1975,
2; -----, "Klagen nach dem Wasser-Schlag" Die Zeit 28 March 1975, 2.
76 Werner Maihofer and Dr. Wernitz in Das Parlament 25 March 1978.