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Bruce Allen Scharlau PhD thesis - Research@StAndrews:FullText

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249<br />

Both the Lorenz and Schleyer episodes were seen by the government as<br />

situations demanding police responses instead of balanced short and<br />

lang-term police and political responses. The short-term police response<br />

needed to be tempered by the long-term political reponse.<br />

At the time of the Schleyer abduction, Chancellor Schmidt and the<br />

rest of the crisis commi ttee- -wi th two exceptions-<br />

-all denied any<br />

ideological or political motives in the Red Army Faction activities, and<br />

held such thoughts to be held only by sympathisers. Only Horst Herold,<br />

the BKA president, and the Interior Minister, Werner Maihofer, believed<br />

the terrorists sought to bomb their way into society's political<br />

attention. Herold even respected the highly intelligent and moral<br />

terrorists, and saw the proper response as being the removal of the<br />

ground from which such ideas sprang. 99<br />

Arguably r<br />

because it broke a precedent, a case could be made that<br />

Federal Prosecutor General Rebmann overstepped himself by asking r<br />

and<br />

receiving permission fran, the Federal Constitutional Court to erect<br />

mobile control points wherever and whenever necessary during the IMP<br />

meeting in Berlin in September 1988. As a result all persons travelling<br />

into the city between 18 and 45 r who did not at first appear<br />

unsuspicious, were checked under 111 stPO. Normally this code can only<br />

be used after terrorist incidents. loo<br />

Earlier this chapter explained that the authorities reduced<br />

accuseds' rights and increased police manoueverability against<br />

terrorism. The two of these work together in terrorism with criminal<br />

codes providing justification for court procedure codes and vice versa.<br />

The government I s dilemma in framing legislation in these areas f as<br />

mentioned earlier, is balancing apprehension and speedy trials without<br />

framing special categories of legislation, which they arguably have with<br />

Para 129a StGB, as mentioned earlier. This means strengthening<br />

legislation where necessary and discarding or rewriting useless<br />

legislation. This was not always done as is shown below.<br />

Between January 1971 and Novemeber 1980 279 (left and right wing)<br />

persons suspected of committing and supporting those who committed<br />

terrorist crimes were arrested. Only in 24% of the cases were the full<br />

limits of court sentences required. (34.4% in juvenile cases.) Fines<br />

reached their limit 12% of the time. Crimes with sentences up to two<br />

99 "'Die Deutschen sing irrsinnig geworden" l Der Spiegel 36/1987,<br />

107-8; (I'Raben wir Fehler gemacht? III Der Spiegel 37/1987, 55-6.<br />

100 Blume, Maithes, Stern 41/1988, 262.

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