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Regional Alliances in the Context of a Maritime Strategy
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could be the development of doctrine, training and multilateral exercises aimed at
interdicting terrorists.
Combating a highly mobile enemy, such as terrorists, through interdiction and
intelligence gathering will require the RAN to be similarly mobile. In this case a
‘Fortress Australia’ mentality would be ineffective. RAN ships will need to be able to
conduct surveillance, shadowing and boarding operations. The navy’s experience in
the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) since 1990 and more specifically in the last
three years has provided the RAN with invaluable experience in these constabulary
type operations. Continued engagement with the US will be central to the success of
these operations. Not since the heady Cold War days of the 1960s have both Australia
and the US shared such a common enemy and thus this commonality lends itself
to sharing the burden with the United States Navy (USN). This could take the form
of mutually agreed upon spheres of maritime responsibility as the Radford-Collins
agreement 50 years earlier had delineated. If for no other reason, ANZUS should be
maintained over other alliances because of the sense of surety it brings. As Professor
Ian McAllister observed, ‘the public is generally positive in their attitudes towards the
US, and trust in the US to defend Australia increased significantly after the September
2001 attacks’. 31
RAN Capabilities
These new roles would require a range of capability enhancements. First, merchant
ships entering Australian waters would need to be equipped with a maritime style
Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) system in order to allow Australian Defence Force
(ADF) / Customs / police authorities to interrogate the nationality / nature of these
vessels. Second, a bilateral maritime information exchange network between Australia
and Indonesia should be enacted. Third, an improvement in the intelligence collection
capability for RAN ships would be essential. Fourth, linguists would need to be deployed
on most RAN ships. Fifth, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence (C4I) compatibility with the USN would need to be progressed. Finally,
unified interdiction doctrine and standard operating procedures between State, Federal
and ADF agencies would need to be developed.
Conclusion
Modern warfighting is not just an instrument of policy; it is an experience in itself. 32 It
does things to the practitioner, irrespective of whether he wins or loses. To that end,
it is time we stopped judging this warfare just in terms of formal victory or defeat.
Globally and regionally the omnipresent impact of such events as 9/11, Bali, Madrid
and Jakarta have forced a reorientation in Australia’s security thinking. In 1996, Kim
Beazley stated that ‘we have faced harder times, but never such uncertain times’. 33
I would argue that his comment is more relevant today. These uncertain times are