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264 AUSTRALIAN MARITIME ISSUES 2006: SPC-A ANNUAL
Strategic Implications of Sea Basing
Sea basing will strengthen international stability by reducing force protection
requirements and demands on allied and coalition partners’ infrastructure, will
enhance deterrence, and will provide the nation with unmatched operational freedom
of action. 9
US Naval Transformation Roadmap
Between 1991 and 2000, USN amphibious ships conducted 55 operations globally,
including disaster relief, evacuating US citizens or government personnel from
unstable countries, as well as normal combat operations. 10 Likewise, medium sized
navies conducted operations ranging from natural disaster evacuation operations in
the Caribbean, to rescue missions in sub-Sahara Africa, and to peace enforcement and
monitoring in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus for most medium sized navies the ability
to deploy and sustain forces on operations is of strategic importance. The US sea base
strategy is centred around the ‘10-30-30’ principle: 10 days to deploy to a hot spot, defeat
the enemy in 30 days and be ready to fight again in 30 days. 11 This principle provides
a very clear message of both intent and ability and while this may present a siren call
to many military planners, the strategic implications of sea basing are significant.
The sea base has no clear connection with operations related to the defence of a national
border but rather sends a very clear message of expeditionary intent.
For the medium military power, and particularly nations such as Australia, the
possession of an asset such as a sea base is likely to be viewed with considerable
regional suspicion and could easily complicate diplomatic initiatives. 12
Sea basing potentially provides military strategists with the reach and persistence
not possessed by most nations. By providing its military with strategic reach a nation
is able to position a decisive force off another nation’s coast as a means of coercion.
While the use of maritime power to coerce is not new, the power that is inherent in a
sea-based force is significant and overt.
For the medium navy the use of coercive force is problematic as it relies upon a
credible force to be effective. This means that the medium navy needs to ensure that
its forces are professional, well-equipped, well-armed and have the ability to strike
where directed. This capability comes at a cost. This cost extends not only to the cost
of the platforms used for sea basing, which we have seen could be considerable, but
also to the cost of developing, training and equipping the force.
The sea-based unit requires large stockpiles of logistic stores to be held at sea, and
these stores would generally be unable to be utilised by units other than those being
directly supported. This requirement incurs a large opportunity cost, as the national
requirement to retain stores may increase as the sea-based stores become effectively