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Medium Sized Navies and Sea Basing: Brave as Lions and Cunning as Foxes<br />

257<br />

Cost Effectiveness<br />

With most medium navies, there is a clear trade-off between strategic requirement<br />

and affordability. Whether developing an organic sea base capability or ensuring<br />

procurement of platforms that are interoperable with coalition sea base operations, cost<br />

matters. The complexity of sea basing development will be determined by budgetary<br />

constraints. Like most medium navies, the RAN would be faced with the problem of<br />

funding a relevant and versatile concept within available resources. Accordingly,<br />

medium navies view experience with the USN’s concept as a means ‘to influence rather<br />

than dominate [our] equipment programs in the future’. 26 Medium navies are limited<br />

to developing modest sea base capabilities comprising few, but effective, platforms<br />

with supporting joint offensive capabilities, and would have to adapt other approved<br />

projects to suit the concept in the future. Again, a future <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> Air Force<br />

(RAAF) STOVL JSF could potentially provide combat power to augment and sustain<br />

US-led sea-based operations. 27<br />

The other cost medium powers need to consider is that of ‘strategic cost’. Medium<br />

powers aligned with aspects of US foreign policy — such as Australia, Canada and Japan’s<br />

support for the International War on Terror (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) — have<br />

been subjected to a degree of political antagonism and access barriers in the conduct of<br />

military operations. Such strategic cost, through restricted access to conduct operations<br />

offshore, may prove to be an increasing trend that medium navies, as well as the USN,<br />

need to contend with in the future. Such fallout from aligning with US foreign policy<br />

may trickle down to become an issue with regards to regional diplomacy. Medium<br />

powers may be forced to adopt sea basing to achieve greater operational freedom when<br />

addressing regional hot spots. Conversely, the basing of forces at sea can support<br />

and enhance diplomatic effectiveness through a reduced footprint ashore, mitigating<br />

cultural sensitivities and force protection issues.<br />

Is sea basing just another term for doing what medium and large navies currently do<br />

well? At the end of the day, medium navies must consider a cost-effective analysis<br />

against current capability satisfying their strategic intent and that of significant time<br />

and investment in additional capability to develop and sustain sea basing operations.<br />

Parity with the US is clearly not viable nor relevant, however, development of niche<br />

capabilities to bolster current force structure and provide interoperability with US<br />

operations may prove a worthwhile investment.<br />

The Case for <strong>Australian</strong> Sea Basing<br />

The international security environment has undergone a transformational change. Since<br />

the <strong>Australian</strong> Government released the Defence Update 2003, increasing tensions<br />

between the US, China, North Korea and Japan; 28 global terrorism; and ADF operations<br />

in the Solomon Islands, Bougainville, Banda Aceh, Afghanistan and Iraq all have the

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