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The Journal of the Siam Society Vol. LXXII, Part 1-2, 1984 - Khamkoo

The Journal of the Siam Society Vol. LXXII, Part 1-2, 1984 - Khamkoo

The Journal of the Siam Society Vol. LXXII, Part 1-2, 1984 - Khamkoo

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114 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian<br />

insist upon this amended version. Swettenham, in particular, recommended that<br />

strong measures should be taken if <strong>Siam</strong> refused to agree to it.S7<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Siam</strong>ese answer to <strong>the</strong> amended Draft was presented in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a<br />

memorandum which stated that, "after a careful examination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposals <strong>of</strong> Her<br />

Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, that <strong>the</strong> acceptance <strong>of</strong> those proposals<br />

would not be conductive to <strong>the</strong> objec.t <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two Governments, namely <strong>the</strong> maintenance<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> integrity and <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>Siam</strong>, and <strong>the</strong>y <strong>the</strong>refore express <strong>the</strong>ir regret<br />

that <strong>the</strong>y are unable to accept <strong>the</strong>m."58 Tower wired in <strong>the</strong> same despatch recommending<br />

a tough stand by warning <strong>the</strong> <strong>Siam</strong>ese Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possible dash <strong>of</strong> force if<br />

<strong>Siam</strong> were to use force against <strong>the</strong> two States, namely <strong>the</strong> British support for <strong>the</strong> Malay<br />

chiefs. At this stage, Tower was fully supported by Swettenham who, in a separate<br />

despatch, urged <strong>the</strong> Secretary for <strong>the</strong> Colonies to overcome <strong>Siam</strong>ese tactics <strong>of</strong> not<br />

negotiating by affecting a direct deal with Kelantan and Trengganu "to protect our<br />

own interests and <strong>the</strong>irs".s9<br />

Finally Lansdowne decided to apply more pressure on <strong>Siam</strong> and instructed<br />

Tower by telegraq1 to present <strong>the</strong> matter to <strong>the</strong> King in such a way that His Majesty<br />

would understand clearly that it would serve his interest to accept <strong>the</strong> amended Draft<br />

without being compelled by British acts. Never<strong>the</strong>less, Lansdowne seemed to tone<br />

down his tough approach after his interview with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Siam</strong>ese Minister in London. Yet·<br />

to make certain that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Siam</strong>ese were not simply employing delay tactics, he informed<br />

Phraya Prasiddhi that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Siam</strong>ese would have to accept <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> British<br />

subjects as advisers to <strong>the</strong> Malay Raja and also ratify <strong>the</strong> Duff concessions to indicate<br />

that "<strong>the</strong> <strong>Siam</strong>ese Government were in earnest .... [and] unless this were done without<br />

fur<strong>the</strong>r delay, we should certainly be pressed to come to terms with <strong>the</strong> Rajahs without<br />

fur<strong>the</strong>r reference to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Siam</strong>ese Govemment."60<br />

Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> difficulties faced by <strong>the</strong> negotiators were so great that<br />

eventually <strong>the</strong> <strong>Siam</strong>ese found it impossible to continue <strong>the</strong> main negotiations in<br />

Bangkok as <strong>the</strong> British Minister was, in <strong>the</strong>ir opinion, totally under <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

Governor-General <strong>of</strong> Singapore. 61 <strong>The</strong>y requested to hold <strong>the</strong> main negotiations in<br />

London and, by <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> June, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Siam</strong>ese special envoy with full powers to conclude<br />

57. FO 422/56 Swettenham to Chamberlain, April 21, 1902, secret, namely British independent<br />

action to come to arrangements with Kelantan and Trengganu and put an end to <strong>Siam</strong>ese<br />

authority and pretension in <strong>the</strong>se States.<br />

58. FO 422/56 Tower to Lansdowne, May 15, 1902, (telegraphic).<br />

59. FO 422/56.Swettenham to Chamberlain, May 16, 1902, (telegraphic).<br />

60. FO 422/56 Lansdowne to Tower, June 5, 1902, (confidential).<br />

61. See Chulalongkorn to Suriya, R5. M62/79-89, March 17, R.S. 121 (1903), NAT.

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