The Journal of the Siam Society Vol. LXXII, Part 1-2, 1984 - Khamkoo

128 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian
to the Siamese to bear the stamp of the old trusted friendly relations of Great Britain
towards Siam." I 00 They likewise were determined to resist such extreme demands
which might bring about the downfall of the Siamese dominion, even in the face of
strong threats from the Foreign Office.
The distrust mutually entertained by both
negotiating parties which was caused by, in essence, the change in the attitude of the
FO and the ascendancy of the CO thinking over the British-Siamese-Malay issues,
became the main factor of the bitter and heated talks throughout 1902 and the early
part of 1903. ·
The Unionist-imperialist approach in the 1902 talks could have very likely led
to an end to the good relationship between Great Britain and Siam had Lord Lansdowne
not realised the extent to which Britain could exercise her influence and exert pressure
on her weaker ally. It was Lansdowne's ability to recognise the determination of the
Siamese leaders to resist what they regarded as "unjust demands", which helped to save
the negotiations and to bring about the 1902 Siamese-Kelantan/Trengganu Treaty.
However, it was also undoubtedly the CO approach adopted by the Foreign Office which
created more obstacles and difficulties to the negotiations, as well as to the implementation
of the Treaty, since such an attitude aroused the already .hyper-sensitivity of the
Siamese leaders concerning imperial designs on the territory of Siam. I 0 1 They then
threw in every possible excuse not to concede to the British demands, for fear of
conceding too much.
It needed the realistic handling of one of King Chulalongkorn's
most capable diplomats, namely Phraya Suriya, the Siamese Minister in Paris, to bring
the Foreign Office and Lord Lansdowne around to accept the justice of the Siamese
opposition to their extreme demands on the question of Advisers and thus diverted the
path mapped out by the Colonial Office and Swettenham.l 02
100. FO 422/57 Memo of the interview between Phraya Visutr Kosa and Sir Thomas Sanderson,
February 3, 1903; and Phraya Visutr Kosa to Lansdowne, February 20, 1903.
101. KT. 99.3/1-2, Prince Damrong's correspondence, Jan. 1902, NAT.; R. 5 M 62/79-89
Chulalongkorn to Devawongse, November 27, R.S, 121 (I 902), NAT.
102. K T. 93.3/6-1 I NAT., Sri Sahadheb to Devawongse, September 19, R.S. 121 (1902), reported
on the strong influence of the CO over the FO; "Nowadays the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs must Iiste.n to the advice given by Mr. Chamberlain. the Secretary for the Colonies,
about all matters concerning the Malay Peninsula. Mr. Chamberlain is one person who entertains
no sympathetic nor flexible sentiments towards Siam . .. Even if Lord Lansdowne wished
to be lenient and accommodating to Siam. he would find it hard to undertake such stand ... "
See also R. 5 M62!79-89, 90-101, Chulalongkorn-Suriya Correspondence between December
R.S. 121 (1902) and March R.S. 121 (1903), NAT.; FO 422/57 Monson to Lansdowne,
February 20, 1903, secret, and Lansdowne to Paget February 26, 1903. (confidential), which
recorded Siam's objection to the British attitude, "they thought it unfair that we should, by
the exercise of our veto, seek to force upon them the person of Mr. Campbell, whom we
had recommended as Adviser to Kelantan, an officer who was unknown to them, and whom
the Siamese Government naturally regarded with some suspicion on account of his connection
with the administration of the Straits Settlements ... "