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2014-04-22 - Socio Economic Review 2014 - Full text and cover - FINAL

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produce greater <strong>and</strong> more lasting prosperity than the collective decisions of the<br />

Irish people.<br />

Arising from this series of false policy conclusions <strong>and</strong> false assumptions, there were<br />

many resulting policy failures. Among these were:<br />

i) Failure to take action to broaden the tax base by, for example:<br />

a. introducing a site-value tax.<br />

b. removing existing tax exemptions which have no demonstrated cost-benefit<br />

advantage.<br />

ii) Failure to overcome infrastructure deficiencies, such as in broadb<strong>and</strong>, public<br />

transport, primary health care, water, energy, social housing <strong>and</strong> waste.<br />

iii) Failure to create a universal health service based on need.<br />

iv) Failure to address income inequality.<br />

v) Failure to appropriately regulate the banking, financial <strong>and</strong> professional services<br />

sector.<br />

vi) Failure to control the property bubble by providing affordable, quality housing<br />

for all.<br />

The European Con<strong>text</strong><br />

Rising defaults on subprime loans in the United States were the triggers for the<br />

Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Crotty (2009) has pointed to a fundamental cause in<br />

the underlying structural <strong>and</strong> theoretical weaknesses of a post-1980s ‘New Financial<br />

Architecture’ – created through financial deregulation - which accentuated asset<br />

price bubbles, concentrated risk <strong>and</strong> created incentives for financial institutions to<br />

become extremely leveraged. While deregulated global finance has often been<br />

stereotyped as an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ phenomenon, within the EU the liberalisation of<br />

the financial sector had also been pursued as good in itself <strong>and</strong> cross-border<br />

European financial flows were viewed as a benign result of monetary integration<br />

<strong>and</strong> capital liberalisation.<br />

Blankenburg, King, Konzelmann <strong>and</strong> Wilkinson (2013) have described the way in<br />

which the GFC revealed the structural distinctions between the core <strong>and</strong> the<br />

periphery that had emerged within the Eurozone. The common currency removed<br />

exchange rate risks <strong>and</strong> led to a convergence of interest rates <strong>and</strong> yields on<br />

government debt. From this balance-of-payments view – of which Martin Wolf of<br />

the Financial Times is the most influential exponent - of the origins of the Eurozone<br />

crisis, current account deficits within the Eurozone were financed in Irel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

Spain by large private sector deficits mitigated by smaller public sector surpluses,<br />

while in Greece <strong>and</strong> Portugal a combination of private <strong>and</strong> public sector deficits<br />

emerged (Blankenburg, King, Konzelmann & Wilkinson, 2013: 464).<br />

18 <strong>Socio</strong>-<strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2014</strong>

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