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THE ANNUAL REVIEW 2010 - PEI Media

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private equity annual review <strong>2010</strong> pa g e 103<br />

JUNE<br />

What a stable UK government means for<br />

private equity<br />

“With a certain level of clarity over the future<br />

– and £6 billion public spending cuts due this<br />

year – opportunity now knocks for private<br />

equity firms. Firstly, the need to find efficiencies<br />

across the public sector opens the<br />

door for any portfolio companies that offer<br />

products and services that can help with this<br />

task. Secondly – and more pertinently – is the buying opportunity.<br />

As part of a Herculean revenue raising exercise it faces, many<br />

expect the government to size up some of its trading entities and<br />

ask which can realistically be sold off. Assets such as the Tote, a<br />

sports gambling group currently owned by the government, and<br />

Northern Rock, the banking group which was nationalised in 2007,<br />

would certainly be on the block.”<br />

JULY/AUGUST<br />

Solvency II and Basel III threaten the industry<br />

“The draft Solvency II Directive – scheduled to be introduced in<br />

2012 – would create a more stringent capital adequacy regime for<br />

insurers and reinsurers, with the goal of preventing these institutions<br />

from taking on overly “risky” investments. The directive calls<br />

for higher capital adequacy requirements, leading to higher capital<br />

charges against unlisted assets. Criticisms at this stage centre on<br />

the fact that all unlisted holdings are treated as being equally risky,<br />

when in fact risk profiles vary between asset classes (hedge vs.<br />

private equity) and strategies (buyout vs. venture capital). At the<br />

same time the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is due to<br />

vote later this year on new capital adequacy proposals – dubbed<br />

“Basel III” – which would enforce similarly stringent capital adequacy<br />

requirements on the banking sector. Any noise around the effects<br />

of these two regimes has been drowned out by the rumbling juggernaut<br />

that is the AIFM directive.”<br />

SEPTEMBER<br />

Team up with a French sovereign wealth fund<br />

“The raison d’être of the FSI is clear: sovereign ownership of strategic<br />

assets, keeping French business French. As covered in this<br />

magazine previously, GPs on the ground in France consider the<br />

FSI to be an aggressive competitor in chasing deals. Last year it<br />

invested €800 million in 21 businesses of various sizes. The pairing<br />

with Apollo is, therefore, a curious one. Apollo also has very clear<br />

goals, but they all relate in some way to generating a return for<br />

investors, not protecting French industry. While the two entities<br />

are currently aligned in their aim to own Alcan, this situation could<br />

conceivably change. What if Alcan had to be restructured and jobs<br />

needed to be shed? What if it made fiduciary sense to locate certain<br />

business divisions outside France? It is doubtful that such measures<br />

would sit well with both sides of the partnership.”<br />

“The clock is ticking<br />

on funds’ investment<br />

periods, and money<br />

needs to get into<br />

the ground”<br />

OCTOBER<br />

On remunerating the ailing Candover<br />

team<br />

“Some LPs – and many public shareholders<br />

of Candover Investments – will be left with<br />

a sour taste in their mouths. If this is the<br />

team that got the funds into a hole, why<br />

should they be retained at all? Why should<br />

they be enriched, when investors’ capital has<br />

been eroded? Surely the assets could – and<br />

should – be transferred to a new manager with a more motivated<br />

and resourced team? But as one, more sanguine, Candover LP put<br />

it to <strong>PEI</strong>, any actions taken were designed to protect the interests of<br />

investors. To extract the value of what is left of LPs’ investments, the<br />

team needs to be both retained and motivated. These are the people,<br />

after all, who know the portfolio best.”<br />

NOVEMBER<br />

On a possible rise in the number of take-privates<br />

“The public markets have remained a marginal hunting ground for<br />

private equity firms. But will a new set of circumstances change all<br />

this? With funds ticking towards the end of their investment periods<br />

after what has been a relatively barren two years, private equity<br />

capital is more willing (let’s not say desperate) than ever to find<br />

opportunities. In secondary buyout deals, these willing buyers are<br />

finding equally willing sellers, but only the highest quality assets are<br />

finding their way onto the block and are often the subject of fiercely<br />

competitive – and hence expensive – auctions. Meanwhile, public<br />

stock markets have rebounded. With share prices looking less “bargain<br />

basement”, institutions may well be happier to entertain offers.<br />

If the same institutions fear a ‘double-dip’ recession threatens the<br />

share price in the short term, they may be even happier to cash out.”<br />

DECEMBER/JANUARY<br />

On 5 November: Guy Fawkes night<br />

“It was not Guy Fawkes but another Guy, Terra Firma’s founder,<br />

chief investment officer and figurehead Guy Hands, who occupied<br />

the headlines on 5 November this year. After just four hours<br />

of deliberation, a jury ruled that Citi investment banker David<br />

Wormsley had not tricked his long-time business associate and<br />

sometime friend Guy Hands into overpaying for music group EMI.<br />

At stake was a maximum payout of £1.5 billion (€1.7 billion; $2.4<br />

billion) in damages and considerable reputational risk. A win for<br />

Hands might have set an interesting precedent for other bankers<br />

to be sued where LBOs had gone awry. The ultimate verdict was<br />

unsurprising. Jurors were being asked by Terra Firma’s attorney to<br />

award against Citi purely on the basis of Hands’ testimony: nothing<br />

was offered in the way of documentary evidence. It always seemed<br />

like a long-shot at best or – at worst – a hopeless case for Terra<br />

Firma; a tactic to gain some bargaining leverage in debt renegotiations<br />

that went too far.” n

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