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THE ANNUAL REVIEW 2010 - PEI Media

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private equity annual review <strong>2010</strong> pa g e 81<br />

t e r m s & c o n d i t i o n s<br />

Terms tug of war<br />

The push-pull between fund managers and investors over<br />

terms and conditions may not have been as dramatic as<br />

some assumed, finds Nicholas Donato<br />

Limited partners’ rising negotiating power<br />

on terms and conditions was discussed frequently<br />

in 2009 and <strong>2010</strong>.Tougher fundraising<br />

conditions, more GPs needing to<br />

replenish dry powder and LP-friendly terms<br />

and conditions guidelines released by the<br />

Institutional Limited Partners Association<br />

were all said to have given LPs the upper<br />

hand in many cases.<br />

But a study released last year by New<br />

York-headquartered law firm Debevoise<br />

& Plimpton found there had been no<br />

“substantial shift” in terms in the past five<br />

years. The study examined more than 200<br />

buyout funds globally, comparing the key<br />

financial and legal terms of funds that had<br />

final closing prior to the financial crisis, with<br />

those closed post-crisis.<br />

“LPs and their advisors are vigorously<br />

negotiating fund terms these days, in many cases<br />

citing the ILPA [guidelines] to support their<br />

arguments,” the report acknowledged, adding<br />

there was, however, little evidence of an overall<br />

industry-wide shift of power towards LPs.<br />

The study measured nine key economic<br />

terms of buyout funds: the timing of<br />

carried interest distributions; carried<br />

interest percentages, preferred return<br />

rates; management fees both during and<br />

after the investment period; sharing of<br />

transaction and other fees; joint and several<br />

guarantees on GP clawback provisions;<br />

interim clawback provisions; and after-tax<br />

calculations on clawbacks.<br />

On most demands, including the timing<br />

of carried interest distributions and carry<br />

points, little concession was found to have<br />

been made on the part of GPs.<br />

giving way<br />

LPs did however gain ground on a few<br />

issues highlighted by ILPA – most notably<br />

on transaction and management fee reductions<br />

or offsets.<br />

The Debevoise study found many GPs<br />

gave way on management fee “step downs”,<br />

which had been long-demanded by investors<br />

who argue that reduced management fees<br />

after the wind-down of a fund’s investment<br />

period reflect lower operating costs.<br />

Large funds raised after the crisis – those<br />

of $2 billion or more – had post-investment<br />

period management fees of on average 1.1<br />

percent. Those raised before the crisis charged<br />

a fee of 1.24 percent. For smaller funds, the<br />

post-crisis funds charged 1.73 percent in<br />

management fees after the investment period.<br />

Pre-crisis funds charged 1.81 percent.<br />

Concessions were also made on the<br />

handling of fee offsets, which occur when<br />

a GP reduces or cancels management fees as<br />

a result of receiving income from break-up<br />

fees, transaction and/or monitoring fees<br />

Show of strength: GPs and LPs in<br />

<strong>2010</strong> continued to negotiate hard<br />

on terms<br />

charged to portfolio companies.<br />

Also found more prevalent in post-crisis<br />

funds were more LP-friendly clawback<br />

provisions, which allowed fund investors<br />

to recover money in the event GPs receive<br />

too much carried interest – such as when<br />

managers receive carry on successful exits<br />

early in the fund’s life. In noting ILPA’s<br />

recommendation that GPs should make any<br />

necessary clawback payments within two<br />

years, as opposed to waiting until the fund<br />

completes its last exit, the study revealed<br />

16 percent of the sample funds now provide<br />

for the provision compared to the lesser<br />

10 percent of funds offering the provision<br />

raised during the boom years.<br />

While many GPs have given in to LP<br />

demands on fees, however, it may not be<br />

enough. For instance the California Public<br />

Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS),<br />

a trendsetter in the LP community in terms<br />

of negotiations with fund managers, has<br />

indicated it may push for incentive-based<br />

fees rather than flat management fees.<br />

Should that proposal become policy,<br />

there will no doubt be further friction<br />

between LPs and GPs on the fee front. But<br />

is that such a bad thing? After all, a leaner,<br />

hungrier group of smart, hardworking<br />

managers who merit their fees is good for<br />

the industry as a whole – not just CalPERS.<br />

The squeaky wheel complaint from LPs of<br />

GPs growing fat on fees gets jettisoned and<br />

instead there is an unambiguous alignment<br />

of interest. No more “heads I win, tails you<br />

lose” as one fund formation lawyer recently<br />

put it to <strong>PEI</strong>. n

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