Air Mobility Plan, 2008 - The Black Vault

Air Mobility Operating Environment
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cognitive realm through proactive IFO. For example, the presence of an American flag, on the tail of
a MAF aircraft, can have a psychological effect upon an adversary.
The AF will conduct IO in the cyberspace domain, either solely
or in conjunction with kinetic weaponry in the atmospheric
domain, to affect the adversary’s behavior. Collaboration
between the MAF and the CAF for atmospheric operations
has become routine. In the cyberspace domain, MAF-CAF
collaboration will be just as important to ensure a strategy
complementary to atmospheric operations.
Greater Asymmetric Threats
Recent events throughout the world have highlighted the concern that asymmetric threats will pose
more danger to our air mobility forces than in the past, both at home and abroad. Terrorist strikes at
various locations around the globe, without regard for human life, demonstrate the dangers military
and civilians face in today’s environment. Attacks will be intended to cause high casualties, in an
effort to sway public opinion against an operation, and to force a withdrawal of military forces. We
should expect our enemies to attack undefended civilian or soft military targets in nontraditional
ways to avoid the direct confrontation with superior US military forces and allies on the conventional
battlefield. Weapons may range from improvised explosive devices and conventional weapons
to weapons of mass destruction. The growing international economy, global interdependencies,
interconnected systems, and rapid technological advances increase vulnerability to asymmetric attack;
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will increase their lethality.
Chemical attacks on aerial ports of debarkation could temporarily stall the deployment of our forces.
Biological agents may be spread in a manner similar to chemical agents, but it is more likely that they
will be deployed in more covert or subtle ways that are very difficult to recognize. Most likely, a
biological incident will probably emerge as an isolated illness until it spreads and gains the attention
of medical facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (one of the major
operating components of the Department of Health and Human Services). Regardless of the delivery
mechanism, we must be able to transit contaminated areas, pick up contaminated patients, and then
be able to sanitize aircraft, equipment, and living areas. The MAF must also be capable of continued
operations, following the spread of radioactive material through the use of conventional explosives,
referred to as radiation dispersal devices or radiological weapons. Information warfare attacks can be
expected to sow confusion and leave our forces vulnerable to further attack.
Adversaries will increasingly attempt to deny MAF access to certain regions of the world. Their antiaccess
strategies may include threatening MAF aircraft operations with advanced man-portable air
defense systems at forward airfields, major CONUS bases, or at major transload sites; massive attacks
by cruise missiles on forward bases; and a robust air defense system over the area of responsibility
precluding entry into the area of interest. While improved aircraft defensive systems are planned, the
increased range and lethality of future systems will deny all mobility aircraft from operating in/from
all but low-threat environments. It is imperative that the MAF continues to field defensive systems,
become less dependent upon en route bases, and work for a smaller, more-agile footprint to support
operations around the globe.
High Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO)
Since the end of the Cold War, the trend has been toward greater use of air mobility forces in smallscale
contingencies (SSCs), ranging from rapid deployments of forces to Southwest Asia to global
humanitarian relief operations like the tsunami catastrophe in the Indian Ocean/Southeast Asia. The
MAF relies upon active duty forces, the volunteerism of the Air Reserve Component (ARC), and
commercial carriers that are under contract to move personnel during SSC operations. For larger
operations, the ARC forces become fully available when units are activated; the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet may be activated in three stages depending on the airlift requirement. Absent activation, the
OCT 07