The Timaeus of Plato

Plato's
48 INTRODUCTION.
of the philosopher's attention; she must be studied that her
meaning may be revealed. Viewed in this light, the physical
portions of the Timaeus have a genuine bearing on philosophy;
and the very minuteness with which Plato has treated the subject
to it.
proves that he attached no slight importance
The scientific value of these speculations is naturally but
small: many of them are however very interesting, both intrinsically,
for their ingenuity and scientific insight, and historically, as
showing us how a colossal genius, working without any of the
materials accumulated by modern science, and without the instruments
which it
employs, endeavoured to explain
constitution of the material universe in which he lived.
to himself the
cerning the bearing of physical inquiry upon metaphysical know-
47. From the question that has just been raised, conopinions
concerning ledge, naturally arises another question which should not be left
ledge." altogether unnoticed. What did the Plato of the Timaeus conceive
to be the province of human knowledge, and what sort
of knowledge did he conceive to be attainable? We have already
seen reason to believe that he had more or less altered his
position with regard to this point since the Republic and Phaedo
were written. This was to be expected: for, as the Theaetetus
showed, ontology must precede epistemology; before we can say
definitely what knowledge is, we must find out what there is to
know. Therefore, since Plato's ontology has been modified, it
may
well be that this modification had its effect on his views of
knowledge.
The object of knowledge is plainly the same as ever. Only
the really existent can be known: and the only real existence
is the ideas, and ultimately the auro aya06V. Knowledge then, in
the truest and fullest sense of the word, signifies only the actual
cognition of the supreme idea as it is in itself. Now in the days
of the Phaedo and Republic we know that Plato actually aimed at
such cognition. However remote the consummation might be,
however despondingly the Sokrates of the Phaedo may speak of
it,
that and that alone was the end of the philosopher's labours
an end regarded as one day attainable by man. But now, both
in the Parmenides and in the Timaeus, Plato disclaims such absolute
knowledge as lying beyond the sphere of finite intelligence.
And he is right. For he who should know the Absolute would
ip so facto be the Absolute. Only the All can comprehend the All.
And if the supreme idea cannot be absolutely known, neither can