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SUB-COMMITTEE ON STABILITY AND LOAD LINES AND ON ...

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Ref.: 391/09 and 520/09<br />

BSU<br />

Bundesstelle für Seeunfalluntersuchung<br />

Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation<br />

accelerations will still occur, but no longer quite so high. Consequently, the partial<br />

filling of the tank makes a generally positive contribution to safety.<br />

With that being said, the calculations also show that it would not have been possible<br />

to prevent the accident by filling tanks partially. While the effect of the tank<br />

considered above can be quantified physically and also makes a discernible<br />

contribution to safety, the accelerations are still very high and with the effect of the<br />

tank are also on a scale that is not acceptable. With pipe tunnels and divided tanks,<br />

the vessel's real tank geometry means that partially filling the real tanks would not<br />

have achieved any measurable success because the moments are too low.<br />

3.2.9 Condition of the bridge<br />

Based on the testimony of the crew and photos, the whole of the bridge floor was<br />

covered with papers, folders and various material. These objects had fallen out or off<br />

of the bridge cabinets (see Fig. 9). On the one hand, this is an indication of<br />

improperly secured equipment on the bridge; on the other hand, some of the cabinet<br />

doors may not have been suited to the sea conditions from a structural perspective<br />

and did not close sufficiently. On the bridge, there were only four hand bars mounted<br />

with sufficient strength at the ship’s conning position (marked in green on the<br />

following sketch). No hand bars or the like are fitted at the radio workstation or, in<br />

particular, the cabinet at Pos. I.<br />

Figure 32: Top view of the bridge<br />

The fatally injured third officer was situated at Pos. I amidships next to the radio<br />

workstation. During the accident he slid about 5.50 m to port and then 14.30 m to<br />

starboard before the master was able to take firm hold of him at Pos. II while he was<br />

sliding back to port again.<br />

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Page 40 of 71

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