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SUB-COMMITTEE ON STABILITY AND LOAD LINES AND ON ...

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Ref.: 391/09 and 520/09<br />

Sig. wave length 113 m<br />

Period 8.5 s<br />

Head sea<br />

BSU<br />

Bundesstelle für Seeunfalluntersuchung<br />

Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation<br />

Beam sea<br />

Beam sea<br />

Vessel<br />

Figure 41: Polar coordinate diagram up to 12 kts, period 8.5 s – FRISIA LISSAB<strong>ON</strong><br />

On the above three diagrams, the different speeds and courses up to a roll angle of<br />

30° are shown with the corresponding periods of 8.5 s to 9.5 s for the significant<br />

wave lengths of 113-141 m.<br />

Certain parallels with the accidents involving the CCNI GUAYAS and the CHICAGO<br />

EXPRESS can be seen in the polar coordinate diagrams. Parametric rolling is not<br />

dominated and resonances are not visible, therefore, the cases are comparable.<br />

However, in the case of the FRISIA LISSAB<strong>ON</strong> a large angle range is present in<br />

which large roll angles do not occur with such long waves. The calculations fit very<br />

well with the statements. The accident occurred in a head sea at an encounter angle<br />

of 60°, which equates to an angle of 120° on the radial axis in the above polar<br />

coordinate diagram. However, it also reveals that the accident could have been<br />

avoided had the vessel been steered into the sea, which was not possible owing to<br />

the draught and fairway conditions leading up to the scene of the accident. Due to<br />

the high level of swell, the weather situation was worse than during the accidents off<br />

Hong Kong. The calculations relating to the FRISIA LISSAB<strong>ON</strong> show clearly that the<br />

rolling of the vessel could have been significantly minimised and the accident thus<br />

avoided if it had been possible to steer the vessel directly into the sea at a sufficient<br />

speed of about 5 kts. However, the data from the polar coordinate diagrams are not<br />

available in the required stability information on board since such calculations are not<br />

made in this regard. Accordingly, the crew had no knowledge of this information. The<br />

frequency distribution of the transverse acceleration on the bridge at a speed of 5 kts<br />

is shown on Figure 42 below.<br />

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Page 52 of 71

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