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Oxford University Prss
:OXFORD NEWYORK TfONFO
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© 1994 The International Bank
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E-- -Foreword
World Development Report 1994, the seventeenthi in eration, and maintenance of. infrastructure is also
this annual series, examines the li-nk between infra- key to' better performance, particularly in areas
structure and development and explore ways in where competition is constrained.
whichL developing countries can imnprove both the Several trends are helping to imnprove the perforprovision
and the quality of infrastructure services. mance of infrastructure. First, innovation in tech-
Like the health and environment topics -of the two nology and in the regulatory, managementt of mar-.
previous reports in this. series, infratructur is an kets makes more diversity possi'ble in-the supply of
area in. which governument policy and finance have services. Second, an evaluation of the role of govan
important role to play because of its pervasive emnment is leading to a shift from direct governimnpact
on econom-ic development and human wel- ment prvson of services to increasing private sechire.
. ~~~~~~~tor provision-and recent experience in many
In recent decades, developing countries have countries with public-private partnerships is highmade
substantial investments in infrastructure, lighting new ways to increase efficiency and exachieving
dramatic gains for households and pro- pand servces. Third, increased concern about social
ducers by expanding their access to services such as and envirornmental sustafinability has heightened
safie water, sanitation, electric power, telecomnmuni- prublic interest in infrastructur design and perforcations,
and trainsport. Even more infrastructure in- mance.
vestment and expansion are needed in order to ex- Differences between and w ithin infrastructure
tend the reach of services-especially.to people sectors, together wfith major vanlations in country
living in rural areas and to the poor. . .~~~~~~7. needs and capacities, mean that the detailed design~
But as this report shows, the quantity of invest- and implementation of policy reform must be.tai--.
ment cannot be the exclusive focuis of policy. [in- lored to specific cases. But there is no question that
proving the quality of infrastructure service also is. the overall benefits, fr-om improving infr-astructure
vital. Low operating efficiency, iniadequate mainte- are large. Roughly $200 bilion is invested in the secnance,
and lack of attention to the needs of users tor annually in the developing world, and the sayhave
all played a part in reducing the development ings that would accrue from better provision and
impact. of infrastructure investments in the past. performance would be substantial. More efficient,
Both quantity and quality.improvements are essen- more accesil,and less costly inratrutuesertial
to modernize and diversify production, help vices are also, of course, essential to more effective
- an because important of role it o pervasive play
ertunentis leading to a shif from direct govern
countries compete internationally, and acoonmuo- poverty reduction.
date rapid urbanization. Future success means As in the past, World Deuelopment Report 1994 in--
building on lessons leamned
cdudes the World Development Indicators, which
The report identifies the basic cause of poor past. offer selected social and economic statistics foDr 132
performance as inadequate inLstitutional incenttives countries. Tfhe Report is a study by the Bank's staff,
for improving the provision of infrastructure To pro and the judgments made herein. do'not necessarily
mote more efficient and responsive servce delivery, reflect the views of the Board of Directors or of the
incentives need to be changed through.commercial governments they irepresent.
management, competition, and user involvement.
Commercial management-including financial autonomy,
accountability, and well-defined -objec-/
C
tives-focuses providers of infrastructure services4 w-7 ,j # -
on i-ncreasing efficiency andR meeting customer demtandL
Competition provides users with choices that
Lewis T. Preston
car better meet their needs and compels providers
President
to become more effiient and accountable. Involve-
T.he World Bank
ment of usi and other stakeholders in the desigi, op- May 31, 1994

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~AnbnioEtacheCItistineKesside'sPeterLanjow 'Ashoka Mody and Lant Pritchett Valuable contri-,
tA :iitonsand afdvice-werke:uvdedbysra.Beninathan, Koji]Kashiwaya MgeKiguet Ln Suire.n
-aIva4DaCun-Assit- -li team- were Rita. Basu, Leslie Citroen Maian FaChristne
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B"o IV a eerna - conomlics :. D)epartm ent contributed to the data appendix and
* ~ as#p631spbie ;-Woiirki DvlpetIdicators. The tdconstaff fr h Report -indluded
~~tAai'Bea-Ytthyfli a,Stephane GeraM AuryX elgun athe Kocak, Jfry
LeckeIl,Naiqr
LvineiD~zch- t urph,~ Hgh ees,Katy Roseni, -Walton Rose-nauistL David
$~hdMicu1iia4 The suport saff washeadedby RhodaaBlad e--Chiaret te Rbecca
indfiidtita-A]1 Mihael Gellei, anid-Pauil Holtz. Bmuce ROSS-Larson'poie dtra
ad~c~nCis~stace~Triida S.Angles s-erved asTadinhnistrative-assistant.Antho'ny Rwly ya
~~ & the~~l Reot wasgratly dddby bacgrud apr adycontributions. frmpar-
~ tiipans c~n~ftat6n eetigs,both of wbichwresuprted' ipAr byr the PolCY and uman Re.-
sourts LŽvelomeiatFundfinaced b theJapaese government- The nawmes~ of participaIntsi te.

Def initions and data notes
Content
Overview
hinfrastructure's role and record 2
* ~~iagnosing the causes of poor performance 6
New opporftunities and initiatives 7
Oans fof the future 8
.'--
P. _ linplemnenting
hifrastructure'soenrcr reform 10
Pobetilpayoffs from reformn 21
ix
1 Infrastructure achievements, challenges, and opportunities 13
Al-Irtt'simpactondevelopment 14
Origins of the public sector role in infrastructure 22
'- Tie record of performance 25
Diagnosis and direcons for diange 32
2 Running public entities on commercial principles 37
iLessons of success and failure 38
Corporatization 40
Fouegoals and accountable management 41
ricing for financial independence 47
e need for a political com- itment to reform 51
3 Using markets in infrastructure provision 52
Unbundling services for competition 53
The range of market altenatives 55
-Paths to market provision 64
Conclusion 7 4I
4 Beyond markets in infrastructure 73
De nrinand partidpation: involving users 73
Improving budgetary allocations 79
Subsidies and transfers to the poor 80
Addressing oextralities 82
Elements infrastructure planning '84
Conclusion 88
5 Financing needed investments 89
Old ways of financing infuratructure-and new 89
Thespread of project finandcing. acievements and lessonns 93
nStitutions and instruments for resource mobilization 102
Prospects 108
V

. 6 Setting priorities and implementing reform 109
Choosing among alternatives: institutional options and country conditions 109
Sectoral agendas for reform 114
Payoffs from reform 121
Bibliographical. note 123
Appendix: Infrastruchure data 139
World Development Indicators 151
Boxes
1 What is infrastructure? 2
2 Main messages of World Development Report 1994 2
1.1 Returns on infrastructure investmernt-too good to be true? 15.
X1v The importance of infrastructure to economic development an example from China I8
. - 13 Throwing infrastructure overboard 19
1.4 Infrastructure's directand indirect effects in rural India 21
1.5 . Households' responses to unreliability of water supply 30
1.6 Public failures raise pnvate costs 30
1.7 Infrastructure activities threaten the Black Sea environment 34
2.1 The right way to run a public utility: a look at Botswana's Water Utility Corporation 38
2.2 Severance pay eases layoffs in Argentina Railways 40
.2.3 It took ten years to corporatize Indonesia's main ports 41
2.4 : What's special about Korean performance agreements? 43
2.5 Management contracting in Guinea-Bissau-a success story?, 44
2.6 AGElTPs: involving the private sector mi Africa's urban infrastructure 45
2.7 Designing tariffs to achieve financial autonomy while addressing multiple goals 48
2.8 Can earmarldng improve highways? 50
. 3.1 Divided they stand: unbundling railway services 55
3.2 Regulatory cycles in the United States 57
3.3 Tailoring concessions to sectors and government objectives 62
3.4 Success of a lease contract-Guinea's water supply 62
3.5 Cote d'Ivoire's exprience with a concession for water supply 63
3.6 Telecom privatization: the case of Venezuela 66
3.7 The evolution of private power in the Philippines 67
3.8 Regulation and-privatization: which comes first? The case of Malaysia 68
3.9 Development of regulatory capacity in Argentina 69
3.10 Jamaica's regulatory roller coaster for telecommunications 69
3.11 Participation as regulation: an initial step in' Bangalore 71
4.1 Mexico's municipios help themnselves 74
4.2 Applying innovative approaches to water and sanitation planning 77
4.3 Power in Purang and roads in.Ethiopia 78
4.4 Centralized and decentralized infrastructure planning in Malaysia 79
4.5 Assessing a projects reach: water in Kathmandu 82
4.6 Women can benefit from infrastructure, but success lies in the details 88
4.7 Donor coordination in inriastructure: the African experience 86
4.8 The World Bankrs experience with project evaluation 86
4.9 Incorporating environrmental concerns early in planning: some recent lessons frun Sri Lanka 87
4.10 Population resettlement and project design: Thailand's Pak Mun hydropower project 88
5.1 Is there a free lunch?-linits to government finance 91
'52 Tapping intemational capital markets 93 -
vi

5.3 Warning signs from the nineteenth century 94
5.4 A successful first step in Guatemala 97
5.5 Land grnts and em'nent domain 98'.
5.6 Mexico's tol roads: a big push that faltered 99
.5.7 Leveraging t lroghe guarantees in Thailand 100
5.8 Look before you leap: limiting government exposure to contingent liabilities 101
5.9 Successful municipal credit in Colombia 103
6.1 Ingredients of good performance under alternative institutional forms I11
Text figures
1 As a country's income grows, the amount of infrastructure increases 3
2 The compositioni of infrastructure changes with country income level 4
3 Infrastructuire has expanded tremendously in recent decades -5
4 Urban populitions have better access to safe drining water than rural populations 6
- .. 5 Annual gains from eliminating mispicing and inefficiency are large relative to.investment 11
1.1 Public infrastruchure investment is. a large fraction of both total and public investment in developing
countries 14
1.2 Per capita availability of major infrastructure is dosely related to income levels 16
1.3 Infrastructure services differ substantially in their economic characteristics across sectors, within sectozs,
and between technologies 25
1.4 The mrual-urban gap in access to power and water in developing countries narrowed over the past
decade 27
15 Efficient and effective delivery of infrastructure services does not always accompany increased
availability 28
1.6 There is very high unmet demand for telephone connection 31
1.7 Walking is a transport mode used frequently by the poor 33
2.1 The adoption of commercial principles in 1984 allowed Togo's water utility to increase coverage and
production.. . but a performance agreement in 1989 was needed to impiove financiai outcomes. 46
-2.2 Costs are seldom fully recovzered in infrastructure 47
3.1 Unbundling activities increases the options for competition and private sector involvement 56
3.2 Leases and concessions in infrastructure sectors are common, even m low-income countries 60
33 Privatizations in telecommunications can lead to large gains 65
4.1 Countries with decentralized road maintenance'have better roads 75
4.2 Partcipation increases water project effectiveness by improvmg maintenance 76
4.3 In water and sewerage, the better-off often get more subsidies than the poor 80
4.4 Even in some formerly centrally planned economies, infrastructure subsidies went mainly to the
better-off 81
51 Large shares of official development finance for infrastructure go to energy and transport 90
- 5.2 ,Official lending for infrastructure has increased, but publidy guaranteed private'loans have
fallen 90
5.3 Infrastructure is a large share of priva ization proceeds; foreign financing of infrastructure
privatization is important in Latin America 105
5A Infrastructure equities are contnbuting to the growth of Argentina's capital market 106
5.5 Infrastructure equities have outperformed other stocks by a huge margin 107
5.6 Options for financing incrase with admiistrative capacity and maturity of domestic capital
markets 108
Text tables
1.1 Value added of infrastructure services by country groups 13
* ' 1.2 .. Average economic rates of rermn on World Bank-supported projects, 1974-92 27
1.3 Expansion of infrastructure coverage in low-, middle-, and high-income economies,
recent decades 26
1A Percentage of the poorest and richest population quintiles with access to infrastructure, various
countries 32
2.1 Common managernent problems in public sector infrastructure entities, 1980-92 39
vil

3.1. Contractual anrangements for private water supply 61
3.2 Value of inftastructure privatizations in developing countries, 1988-92 64
.5.1 Portfolio and foreign dirct investrnent in developing countries, 1990-93 92
-5.2 Infrastructure project financing for projects funded and in the pipeline, October 1993 95
.5.3 Project financing of funded infrastruchre projects, by sector, October 1993 95
6.1 The main institutional options for provision of infrastructure 110
6.2 Country infrastructure coverage and perfonnance 112
6.3 Feasibility of private sector delivery varies by infrastructure components 115
.6.4 Options in telecommunications and energy- 116
6.5 Options in water and waste 118
6.6 Options in transport .119
6.7 Fisal burden of.underpriced infrastructure 121
6.8 Savings from increased efficiency, 122
Appendix tables
A.1 Physical measures of infrastructure provision 140
A.2 Access to ddnidngwaterand sanitation 146
A3 IBRD and IDA commitments 149
A.4 Official development finpnce commitments 149
viii

De;finitin and data notes
Selected terms used in this Report
vestments in. fixed assets. (A lease may sometimes
be called a "service concession," and a BOT is some-
BOT (build-operate-transfer). A fo.-m of concession times called a "public works concession.")
usually referrng to totally new projects. Typically in Management conitractL An arrangement whereby a
aBOT, a privte party. (or consortium) agrees to fi- private contractor. assumes responsiblt fora full
nance, construct, operate, and maintain a facility for range of operation and maintenance functions, with
a specified period and dthen transfer the facility to a authority to: make day-to-day management decigovernmentor
other public authority. Variations in- sions. Compensation may be based partally on
dude BOOT (build--own--operate-transfer) and services rendered (as for service contracts) and
BOO (build-own-operate); in the last case, the con- partially on performance achieved (as in profit
tract accords the right to construct and operate the sharing).
facility, but the facility is not transferred back to the. Natural monopoly. An economidc activity.that is.
public sector.
most efficiently carried out by a single producer.
Concesion. -An arrangement whereby a private Parastatal (also.public.or state enteqnrie). An organparty
leases assets for service provision from a pub- nization. engaged in productive activityr that is
lic authority for an extended period and has respon- owned and controlled in majority by the state.
sibility for finaricing specified new fixed invest- .Perfonnance agreement. An agreement negotiate d
ments during. the period; these new assets then between the government and the public manager of
revert to the public sector at -expiration of the a public utility or a government department. It usucontract.
ally defines explicit commercia goals (such as de-
Contesfbzbilty. The vulnerability of an activity to gree of cost recovery) and may define noncommercompetition
from new enLtrants in a miarket.fThe key cial' goals (such as increases of services to poor
criterion for contestability is that costs of entering a neighborhoods). Its main purpose is to increase- the
market be recoverable (eg., through a sale of assets). accountability of both the government and the pub-
Corporatizationl Tfhe transformation of. a state- 1k managers by sharpening and clarifying the goals
owned eniterprise or agency into a legal entity suib- .of public entities.
ject to company law, incuding formal separation of, Service contract (or contracting out). An arrangeownership
and management responsbilihties, for ex- ment with the private sector to perform particular
ample, through a board of directors or other body. operating or maintenance functions for a fixed pe-
EconoTbi of scale. A characteristic of a production riod and for specified compensation.
utechology whereby - ;-: unit ; zontract. costs - '-- decline - with increasing
ally defines explicit comercial goals (such as de-
output over a large range. Economies of scale Co ntragoups
are a major source of natural monopoly i For operational and analytical purposes the World
Leasping An arrangement whereby a pivate party Bank's mami criterion for ldasfying economies is
(lessee)-contracts with a public authority for the gros ntioal prouct (Gm ) e capia Every
right to operate a facility (and the right to a flow of economy is pclassified
low-income, middle-inrevenues
from. providing a specific service) for a come (subdivided into lower-middle and upperspecified
period of time The facility continues to t be .nmiddle), or, high-incor. Other analytical groups,
owned by the public authority. Unlike in a conces- based on geographic regions, exports, and levels of
* - sion, the lesseel doesnot have responsitbilty for i- exteral debt are also used.

Because of changes in GNP per capita, the coun- * Dollars are current U.S. dollars unless othertry
composition of each income group may change wise specified.
from one edition of World Development Report to the * Growtht rates are based on constant price data.
: next. Once the classification is fixed for any edition, and, unless otherwise noted, have been computed
all the historical and projected data presented are with the use of the least-squares method. See the
based on the same country grouping. The country technical notes to the WDI for details of this
groups used in this edition are defined as follows. method.
-* Lo-incomeeconomnies are those with a GNP per .The symbol J in dates, as in "'1990/91,' means
capita of $675 or less in 1992.
that the period of time may be less than two years
- Middle-income economnies are those with a CNP but straddles two calendar years and refers to a crop
per capita of more than $675 but less than $8,356 in year, a survey year, or a fiscal year.
1992. A further division, at ONP per capita of $2,695 * The symbol.. in tables means not available.
in 1992, is made between lower-middle-income and * 77w symbol - in tables means not applicable.
upper-middle-incomeconomies.
(In the WOI, a blank is used to mean not applicable.)
* High-incomeconomies are those with a ON? * The number 0 or 0.0 in tables and figures means
per capita of $8,356 or more in 1992.
zero or a quantity less than half the unit shown and
* World comprises all economies, including not known more precisely.
economies with sparse data and those with less than .The cutoff date for all data in the World Develop-
1 million pDpulation; these are not -shown sepa- ment Indicators is April 29,1994.
rately in the main tables but are presented in Table Historical data in this Report may differ from
la in the teclnical notes to the World Development those in previous editions because of continual up-
Indicators (WDI).
dating as better data become available, because of a
Low-income and middle-income economnies are change to a new base year for constant price data, or
'sometimes referred to as developing economies. because of changes in country composition in in-
The use of the term is convenient; it is not intended come and analytical groups.
to imply that al economies in the group are expen- Economic and demographic terms are defined in
encing similar development or that other economies the technical notes to the WDI.
have reached a preferred or final stage of development
Classification by income does not necessarily Acronyms and initials
-reflect development status. (In the WDI, highincome
economies classified as developing by the AGETIPs Agences d'Execution des Travaux d'In-
United Nations or regarded as developing by their
ter&t Pubic
authorities are identified by the symbol t). The use BOT Build-operate-transfer
of the term "countries" to refer to economnies implies DAC Development Assistance Committee
no judgment by the Bank about the legal or other GDP Gross domestic product
status of a territory. GNP Gross national product
For some analytical purposes, other overlapping IPP Independent power project
classifications that are based predominantly on ex- NGO Nongovernmental organization
ports or external debt are used, in addition to in- NTC National Telecommunications Commis
comes or geographic groups. Countries with sparse
sion
data and those with less than I million population, OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation
although not shown separately, are included in
and Development (Australia, Austria,
group aggregates.
Belgium, Canada, Deenmark,' Fmland,
The table "Classification of economies" at the
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, reend
of the WDI lists countries by the WDrs income,
land, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherregional,
and analytical classifications-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Data notes
United Kingdom, and United States)
USAID United States Agency for International
* Billion is 1,000 million.
Development
T* rillion is 1,000 billion.
9.* Ts are metric tons, equal. to 1,000 kilograms,
or 2,204.6 pounds.
x

Overview
Developing countries invest $200 billon a year in performing power sectors in low-,; middle-, and
new infrastructur-4 percent of their national out-n high-income countries. Half. he labor in African
put and a fifth of their total investment. The result and Latin-American railways is etimated to be e-
has been a dramatic increase in infrastructure ser- dundant. And in Africa and elsewhere, costly invices-for
transport, power, water, sanitation, tele- vestmnents in road' construction have been wasted.
COnMMunications, and irtgation. During the past fif-. for lack of maintenance.
teen years, the share oC households with access to This'po performnr.ce provides sftrng reasons
dean wvater has increased 5 :. *'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by half, and power pro- for doing things differently-in more effective, less
duction and telephone lines per capita have dou- wasteful ways. In short, the concern needs to
bled- Suc-h increases do much to raise productivity broaden from increasing the quantity of infrastruc-.
and improve living standards.
tare stocks to improving the quality of infr-astructure
Tfhese accomplishments are no reason for corn- srie.Fortunately, the time is ripe for chage. in
placency, however. One billion people in the devel- recent years, there has been a revolution in thinking
oping world still lack access to clean water-and about who should be responsible for providing in-'
nearly 2- billion lack adequate sanitation. In rural frastructuire stocks and services, and how these serareas
especially, women and children.often spend vices should be delivered to the user.
long hours fetching water. Already-inadequate Against this background, World Development Retransport
networks are. deteriorating rapidly in port 1994 considers new- ways of meeftig public
many countries.-Electric power has yet to reac-h 2 needs for services from infrastructure (as defined in
billion people, and in many countries unreliable Box 1) -ways that are more efficient, more userpower
constrains output The demands for telecom-, responsive, more envizronment-friendly, and more
munications to modernize production and enhance resourceful in using both the public and private secinternational
competitiveness far. outstrip existing tors. Tfhe report reaches two broad conclusions:
capacity. On top of all this, population growth and *Because past investmnents in infrastructure
urbanization are increasing:the demand for infra- have not had the development fimpact expected, it is
structure.
essential to improve the effectiveness of investmnents
Coping with infrastructure's future challenges and the efficiency of servce provisionL
involves much more than a simple numbers game h Inovations in the means of delivering infraof
drawing up inventories of infrastructure stocks structure services-along with new technoloand
plotting needed investments on'the basis of gies-point to solutions that can imnprove perforpast
patterns. It involves tackling. inefficiency and mance.
waste-both in investment and in delivering ser- This Report marshals evidence in support of
vices-and responding more effectively to user these conclusions-idnifigcauses of failure
demand. On average,.40 percent of the power-gen-. and examining alternative approaches. The main
eratmng capacity in developing countries is unavail- messages and plcy options are sum-marized in
able for .production, twice the rate in the best- BOX 2.

- - Infrastruckure's roleand record
Box1 What is infrastructure?
T.-lhis Report focuses on co,wmki infrnslnsctuT and The adequacy of infrastructhre helps detemiine one
includes services fro . - country's success and another's failure-in diversi-
-Public utilities-power, telecommunications, fying production, expanding trade, coping with
..piped .water supply, sanitation and sewerage, solid population growth, reducing poverty, or improving
waste collection and disposaLt and piped gas.
environmental conditions. Good infrastructure
. - ; -:*-Public :. Public
works-rloads:
wors-roads
and
and
-mapDr
maor ..
dam
dam
and
and raises
-
productivity and lowers production costs, but
. . -canal vworks for bimgation and drmiage .
-cana--. orks- rertriansotietors-band drainage lnterur-:- .it
*Other tranport sectors-- urban.and interurhas
to expand fast enough to accommodate
:..- ban -railways, urban transpor, ports anid -wae growth. The precise linkages between infrastructure
ways, and airports.
and development are still open to debate. However,
: Infrastructure is an umbrella term for many ac-. infrastructure capacity grows step for step with eco
t-ivties referred to as T sodil overhead. capital" b - noic output-a 1 percent increase in the stock of
such development economists as Paul Rosenstein- infrastructure is associated with a 1 percent increase
-. Rodan, Ragcnar Nurkese, and=Albert Hhs5chn,anL .. in gross domestic product (GDP) across all countries
-Neither term is precisely defined, but both encom- - (Figure 1). And as countnes develop, infrastructure
pass activities that share techmical features (such as
economies of scale) and economic features (such as must adapt to support c.hanging patterns of de
. spillovers - ; from uisers to nonulsers). -n---xmand, as the shares of power, roads, and telecommunications
in the total stock of infrastructure m-
Box 2 Main messages of World Development Report 1994
Infrmstnrchre cnn deliver major benefits in economic gowt, meeting their demands and puts pressure on suppliers
po:very aUleiaaion, and environmitntaI snstaitsabitily-b t to be efficient and accountable to user Competition can
.onlywhien-itmrovidesserurs that respond toeffective demand be introduced directly, by hlbalizing entry into activian:
d does so efficiemfy. Service is the goal and the measure ties that have no tehnological barfiers, and indirdy,
of development :m infrastructure. Major investments through competitive bidding for the right to provide ex-
.have been made in infrstructure stcks, but in too many clusive service where nauhral monopoly conditions exist
developing countries these assets are not-generating the and by liberalizing the supply of service substitutes.
quantity or the quality of services demanded. The costs * Gire userss and otl7er staktolders a strong vice and
of this waste-n foirgne economic growth and lost op- real rspvnsibility. Where infrastructure activities involve
portunities for poverty reduction and envirofnmental im-- important external effects, for good or bad, or where
provement-are high and unacceptable-
market discipline is insufficient to ensure accountability
-*. S Te cses of past poorperfornnce, antd [ise sotnr of in- to users and other affected groups, governments need to
prv pefonnance, lie in tte incentites finicJg pvider. To addrs their concerns though other means. Users and
ensure efficient, responsive delivery of infrastructure other stakeholders should be represented in the plan-
. servics incentives need to be changed throutgh the ap ning; and reguation of infrastructure services, and in
-plication of three instniments-commercial manage- some cases they should take major initiatives in design.
ment, competition, and stake] older involvement The operation, and financinroles
of governent and the private sector. must be Public-private partnerships in financngS lravepromise.
transformed as welL Technological innovation and ex- Private sector involvement in the financing of new caperimeints
with alternative ways of providing infrastruc-- pacity is growing. The lessons of this experience are that
ture indicate the folowing principles for reform:
govenumentshould start with simpler projects and gain
- Manage infrastnrdire like a. business, not a buirnm;- experience, investors' returns should be linked to project
cac. The provision of infrastructure needs to be con- performance, and any government guarantees needed
ceived and run as a service industry that responds to should be carefully scrutinized.
:customer demand. Poor performers typically have a con- Govermnenats zlri Imue a continuing, if dianged, role in
furi.on ofobjectives,littlefinancialautonomyorfinancial infmstnsccht In addition to taking steps to improve the
discipline, and no "bottom line' measured by customer performance of infrastructure provision under their di-
:satisfaction. The high willingness to pay for most infra- rect controL govenments -are responsible for creating
-structure services, even by the poor, provides greater o policy and regulatory frameworks that safeguard the in-
- portunity for user charges- Private sector involvement in terests of the poor, improve environmental conditions,
management, financng, or ownership will in most cases and coordinate cross-sectoral interactions-whether ser- -
be needed to ensure a commercial orientation in.infra- vices are produced by public or private providers. Covstructure.
ernments also are responsible for developing legal and
Introduice competition-directly iffeasible, indiretly if regulatory frameworks to support private involvement
not. Competition gives consumers choices for better in the provision of infrastructure services.
2.

crease relative to those of such basic services as labor force) and produce more than a third of nawater
and irrigation (Figure 2).
tional output.
T.he kind of infrastructure put in place also deter- Infrastructure services that help the poor also.
mines whether gmwth does all that it can to reduce contribute to environmental sustainability. Clean
poverty. Most of the poor are in rural areas, and the water and sanitation, nonpolluting sources of
growvth of farm productivity and nonfarm rural em- power, safe disposal of solid waste, and better mnanplovment
is linked closely to infrastructure provi- agement of traffic in urban areas provide environsion.
An important ingredient in China's success mental benefits for all income groups. The urban
with rural enterprise has been a minimum package poor often benefit most directly from good infraof
transport, telecommunications, and power at the structure services because the poor are concentrated
village level. Rural enterprises in China now em- . in settlements subject to unsanitary conditions, hazploy
more than 100 million people (18 percent of the ardous emissions, and accident risks. And in many
- 4 . -~~~~~Z.> - .- .-. . --.
- t-1 - g ' - .-
.,r, - -
.4-
{i-.-~~~ .Q
-~ .SO diuri N
an v-' 400 si.1omtIOOO.J.rmg.li- . ..3 000 ... .>-i,r
r...uvt". -
0:f~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~z : : :
el!J
PQ ~~20:7. I mi%tI I -l-
5 !4- .i 3.
: - .- >ok :-iz arelcc mfmdudes-:roadsF=l,st.i
i y. p %tts .. gdrt nd*telphn4. .-- '-:.-# E-- . -. S -q
.
%iJ l xi - 1!.. T
--
fl Z' ,; trS-~U
4
ww.
Nat&-Aies arek~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~arithmicinfrasflcturtmcludesroads4aiLpowerArrigaU
and~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
'b p y 'r Loir ri SmiMdliso95 n&abatne. j
.:. - ,- . ::, :. g - . Q
3

L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ C- l'
__ a.~~~~g ~~ vestments have often been misallocated-too much
t~EiereSThcoa(bsithnohnfrstrucure~' to new investment, not enough to maintenance; tDo
i tdmi{Etcoutsici,'! much to low-priority projects, not enough to essen-
1ial evcs The delivery of services has been hamp-r
by technical inefficiency and outright waste.
0- 9And too few investment and deiverv decisions
have been attentive to meeting the varied demands
.~ - different M.of user groups, or to the consequences for
the environment
.* R a ;ffi2 X Inadequate mnainitezance has been an almost uni-
*- - versal (and costly) failure of infrastructure pro-
: m .- s 1 _ g viders in developing countries. For example, a well-
'm~ _1 # -maintained paved road surface should.last for ten to
fifteen years before-needing resurfacing, but lack of
main tenance can lead to severe deterioration in half
* 4 t- -that time- The rates of return from World Bankassisted
road maintenance projects are nearly twice
* 3
jcxC _4zJ ..
those of road construction projects. Timely mainte-
: . _ g 1t. cnance expendi t ures of $12 billion would have saved
4l:h- x road reconstruction costs of $45 billion in Africa in
. -ow -r. &tMi fthe past decade. On average, inadequate mainte-
*nom eŽ-j ct; -.- ,S income #' -ls 'm=ome- nance means that.power systems. in developing
* - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~countries
have only 60 percent of their generating
* r4 nSt.-~ .~ ... w .. t ~ age of 70 percent of their output to users, compared
-El -gation, _-. -g with best-practice delivery rates of 85 percent Poor
* xr. g - maintenance can also reduce service quality and ine~~~
~ Sow ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ crease the costs for users, some of whom install
-, backup generators or water storage tancs and private
wells
Fa-.-ilgs in maintenance are often compounded
rapidly growing cities, infrastructure expansion is by il-advised spending cuts Curbingcapital spendlagging
behind population growth, causing local ing is justified during periods of budgetry austerenvinonments
to deteriorate. . it, but reducing maintenance spending is a. false
In developing countries, govenunents own, op- economy. Such cuts have to be compensated for
erate, and finance nearly all infrastructure, prinar- later by much larger expenditures on rehabilitation
ily because its production characteristics and the or replacement Because inadequate maintenance
public interest involved were thought .to require shortens the usefud life of infrastucture facilities
monopoly-and hence govermnent-provision. and reduces the capacity available to provide ser-
The record of success and failure in infrastructure is vices, more has to be invested to produce those serlargely
a story of govremment's perfornance.
vices. Donor objectives (such as seeldng contracts
: . hifrastructures past growth has in some respects for capital-goods supply or consultancy services)
been spectacular. The percentage of households and may also play a part in the preference for new inbusinesses
served has increased dramatically, espe- vestment over maintenance- In many low-income
. dciaily in telephones and power (Figure 3). The per countries, donor financing underwrites nearly half
capita provision of infiastructure services has in- of all public investment in infrastructurecreased
in all regions; the greatest improvements Project invetstents misalloated by many countries
have been in East Asia and the smallest in Sub- have created inappropriate .infrastructure or pro-
- Saharan Africa, reflecting the strong association vided services at ; _rong standard. Demands of
between economic growth and inastructe-
users for services of varying quality and affordabil-
In other important respects, however, the perfor- ity go unmet even when users are willing and able
nmance has been disappointing. Infrastructure in- to pay for them. Low-income communities are not
4

:-*- ~ -- " - -.. -p3 :
t-t ,
:S
rrign#3[ 4 ~tricture1isepne rnedula eetdcds
: k
.* ~~Z§ 217r?s 2 5W -6
2 h wAivexrateof g4rowh(erent)'m es5
- ~ .1 - _pandodrir'tke4O tcn 10'eSi
'-:
.Ca
:p:oductin
* .'-- -. o &--t -,-4 t
*S''~~~~5-
Odde-b-oecTwleo
:s eanitationa
X"? - 2';fi,'y-n,
ardpcyweda:
offshad sfouialeatuoportkandesanttospin)eesadhvehnmsinaddsnbto
i 2 ' _;'r ~~~~5-
---
'-~ ~~~~~~~~~
: 'ro"
that provoide seioces they value s and an afford. P losses two to four times greater. Port failities in de-
*miature dnestments m capacty-especily i velopig countnes, on average, move aogo fnte
water supply, railways, pcower, ports, and irrnga- ship to shore at only 40 percent the speed of the
tion-have oftern absorbed resources that could oth- most efficient ports. Labor misallocations present
erwise have bee devoted to maintenance, modemn another source of ineffidiencv . Overstafing is far too
ization, or.improvements in service quality. Because -con-unon in many activities, especially railways,
many infrastrucdtre investments are immobile and -while others, such as roid matenance, warrant
s;erve local markets, excess capacity cannot serve greater useof labor-based - methods -
other markets tand it remains underused. In some These faindngs hv tnvestment and operiting efficases,
large public projects have been overambi- loenss are not compensated for by success in adtious,
plaing acsmtly burden on the economy. dressing povuris or engironental concergs-for
Wate spl raiway powet. ports,and ri- shere, too, the iniy4struc0pe record isweak. Badly
sourc- that ofuld be used for delivering infrasttuc- odesigned and managed inf.rastructure is a mapr
ture services. A review of power uncties in fifmy-one source of envirorfnental degradation in both urban
developing o ountries showed that tchnicalu eff- and rural aieas. The poor often consume fewer inciency
has actua declined iy over the past twenty faastructure services and pay ghere pnces tran do
years. Olderpower plants consumenbetween 8 and the nonpoor. For eiample, households obtaining-
44 percent moe fubl otlowatt-hour per
ovean do water fnom vendos pay mucfh more than those
plants in pacwer sydtems operating at best-practice households connected to water systems tn most
- ~~~~~~5-

Diagnosing the causes of poor performance
flgure4jlrbmnpo
- accestt-ok
tiahoslifavebetter
w The problems of insufficent maintenance, misallofc:l
9iu .- 9- cated investment, unresponsiveness to users, and
tm~~~ ~~
______________________________
te~chnical inefficiencies present daunting challenges
for future reforms-challenges compounded by
: s &st' ?~o - new demands and constrained resources The solutions
lie in the successes and failures of policy and
~~~~aoo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~i telessons fr-om recent pohicy experiments.
g _ s.ix-
-- M.=ilThere is great variation both within and across
- countries - . S -; in - the efficiencv of providing infrastrucmtue
services. Moreover, good performance by a
.~ _ 1> = Z

Second, those charged with responsibility for de- to be more efficient and more responsive to the
livering iifrastructure services are rarely given the needs of users is clearly the challenge But is it posmanagerial
and financial autonomy they need to do sible? Three converging forces are opening a win-
-their workproperly. Managers are often expected to dow of opportunity for fundamental changes in the
meet objectives at variance with what should be way business is done. First, important innovations
their primary function-the efficient delivery of have occurred in technology and in the regulatory
high-quality services. Public entities are required to management of markets. Second, a consensus is
serve as employer of last resort or to pmvide pa- emerging on a larger role for the private sector in intronage.
They are compelled to deliver services frastructure provision, based in part on recent expebelow
cost-often by not being allowed to adjust rience with new initiatives. Third, greater concern
prices for inflation. The other side of the coin is that now exists for environmental sustainability and for
public providers are rarely held accountable for poverty reduction.
their actions. Few countries set well-specified per- New technology and changes in the regulatory
formance measures for public providers of infra- management of markets create new scope for introstructure
sevices, and inefficiency is all too often ducing competition into many infrastructure seccompensated
for by budgetary transfers rather than tors. In telecomtunications, satellite and micromet
with disapproval.
wave systems are replacing long distance cable
Third, the users of infrastructure-both actual networks, and cellular systems are an emerging
and potential-are not well positioned. to make alternative to local distnrbution networks. These
their demands felL When prices reflect costs, the changes erode the network-based monopoly in
strength of consumer demand is a clear signal of telecommunications and make competition possiwhat
should be supplied. Through the price mecha- ble. In power generation, too, combined-cle gas
nisi, consumers can influence investment and pro- turbine generators operate efficiently at lower outduction
decsions in line with their preferences. But put levels, while other innovations are reducing
prices of infrastructure services typically do not re- costs. New technology makes competition among
flect costs, and this valuable source of information suppliers technically feasible, and changes in reguabout
consumer needs is lost For example, power lations are making competition a reality by allowing
prices in developing countries have generally fallen, competitive entry in activities such. as celiular
while costs have not As a result, pnrces now cover phone service or power generation. Technical and
only half the supply costs, on average. Water regulatory change in other infrastructure sectorsdharges
and rail passenger fares typically cover only ranging from transportation to water supply and
a third of costs. Excess consumer demand based on drainage and irrgation-also make therm more
below-cost prices is not a reliable indicator that ser- open to new forms of ownership and provision.
vices should be expanded, although often it is taken Alongside such changes are new perceptions of
as suchk the role of government in infrastructur An aware
Users can express preferences in other ways, ness is growing in many countries that government
such as loal participation in planning and imple- provision has been inadequate. Brownouts and
menting new infrastructure investments. But they blackoutsinpowersystems,intermittentwatersupseldom
are asked, and investment decsions are all plies from municipal systems, long waiting periods
too often based on extrapolations of past consump- for telephone service connection, and increasing
tion rather than on true assessments of effective de-. traffic congestion provoke strong reactions. Reforms
mand and affordability.
in some industral countries have increased the
Individually, each of these three points is impor- competition in telecommunications, in road freight
tant Together, they go a long way toward explain- and airline transport, and in power generationing
the disappointing past performance of much prving that alternative approaches are possible.
mifrastructure. Rival suppliers and infrastructure The puor performance of planned economies has
users might have exerted pressure -for better ser- also provoked a reassessment of the state's role in
vices, but they were prevented from doing so. Gov- economic activity.
ernuents-by confusing their roles as owner, regu- These developments have led govermnents to
lator, and operator-have failed to improve sennce search for new ways to act in partnership with the
delivery-
private sector in providing infrastructure services.
Most dramatic have been the privatizations of such
New
New
opportunities
opportunities
and
and
initatives
initiatives
-
enterprises as the telephone system in Mexico and
Creating the institutional and organizational condi- the power system in Chile. Elsewhere, various
tions that oblige suppliers of infrastructure services forms of partnership between government and the
7

private sector have evolved. Port facilities have bidding for the exdusive right to operate a port for
been leased to private operators-the Kelang con- ten years), for customers within a market (teletainer
facility in Malaysia being among the first phone companies competing to serve users), and
Concessions have been granted to private firms, for contracts to provide inputs to a service providparticularly
in water supply; Cote d'Ivoire is one of er (finns bidding to provide power to an electric
the earliest examples. Contracting out services, as utility)--
Kenya has done with road maintenance, is well Inwluing msers more in project design and operaunder
way in many countries. Private financing of tion of infrtructure activities where commercial
new investment has grown rapidly through build- and competitive behavior is constrained provdes
operate-transfer (BO)Darrangements under which the information needed to make suppliers more acprivate
firms construct an infrastructure facility countable to their customers. Users and other stakeand
then operate it under franchise for a period of holders can be involved in consultation during proyears
on behalf of a public sector client This ap- ject planning, direct participation in operation or
proach has been used to finance the construction of rnaintenance, and monitoring. Development protoll
roads in Mexico and power-generating plants grams are more successful when service users or the
in China and the Philippines.
affected communuitv has been involved in project
An increasing regard for the environmental sus- formulation. User particpation creates the approtainability
of development strategies and a deepen- priate incentives to ensure that maintenance is caring
concern for poverty reduction after a decade of ried out in communitv-based projects.
stagnation in many regions of the world also give These elements apply whether infrastructure serimpetus
to infrastructure reform. Creating pressures vices are provided by the public sector, the private
for change, environmental issues are coming to the sector, or a public-private partnership. To this exfore
in transport (traffic congestion and pollution), tent, they are indifferent to ownership- However,
irrigation (increased waterlogging and salinity of numerous examples of past Thilures in public proviagricultural
land), water supply (depleted re- sion, combined with growing evidence of more effisources),
sanitation (insufficient treatment), and cient and user-responsive private provision, argue
power (growing emissions). At the same time, a for a significant increase in private involvement in
decade of reduced economic growth-especially in financing, operation, and-in manv cases-owner-
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa-shows ship.
that poverty reduction is not automatic and that All countries will not be able to increase private
care must be taken to ensure that infrastructure both involvement at the same rate. Much depends on the
accommodates growth and protects the interests of strength of the private sector, the administrative cathe
poor..
padty of the government to regulate private suppliers,
the performance of public sector providers, and
Options for the future
the political consensus for private provision. With
this in mind, the Report sets out a menu of four
To reform the provision of inrrastructure services, main options for ownership and provision:
this Report advocates three measures: the wider application
of commercial prnciples to service pro- Option A. Public ownership and operation by
viders, the broader use of competition, and the in-
enterprise or department
creased involvement of users where conmmercial Option B. Public ownership with operation conand
competitive behavior is constrained.
tracted to the private sector
Applying comnmercial principles of operation in- Option C Private ownership and operation,
volves giving service providers focused and explicit
often w.vith regulation
performance objectives, well-defined budgets based Option D. Community and user provision.
on revenues from users, and managerial and financial
autonomy-while also holding them account- Far from exhaustive, these four options merely illusable
for their performance. It implies that govern- trate possible points in a broader array of alternaments
should refrain from ad hoc interventions in tives.
management but should provide explicit transfers, Option A. Public ownership and piblic operation.
where needed, to meet social objectives such as pub- Public provision by a government department, public
service obligations.
lic enterprise, or parastatal authority is the most
Broadening comtpet.tiont means arranging for sup- common form of infrastructure ownership and op
pliers to compete for an entire market (e.g., firms eration. Successful public entities run on commera

eal principles anid give managers control over oper- vided, and many others allow private firms to conations
and freedom from political interference, but struct electricity-generating plants and sell power to
they also hold managers accountable, often through the national power grid. Where competition among..
performance agrements or management contracts. suppliers is possible, private ownership and opera-
And they follow sound business- practices and are tion require little or no economic regulation beyond
subject to the same regulatory, labor law, account- that applied to all private firms. The necessary coalng,
and compensation standards and practices as petition can also occur across sectors-between
private firms. Tariffs are set to cover costs, and any. road and rail, or between electricity and gas. For exsubsidies
to the enterprise are given for specific ser- ample, because it competes with suppliers of other
-vices and in fixed amounts. Water authorities in energy sources, the private gas company in Hong
Botswana and Togo and national power companies Kong has no special economic regulation.
in Barbados and Thailand perform well. The high- Where systems are being fully or partly priv-&
way authorities in Ghana and Sierra Leone and the tized and there is no cross-sectoral competition,. regrestructured
road agency in Tanzania are promising ulation of both private and public providers may be
examples of this approach. But few successful ex- required to prevent the abuse of monopoly power.
amples of Option A persist because they are vulner- Experience with regulation and with systexmwide
able to changes in goverrnmental support. Many privatization in developing countries is still very
public entities perform well for a time and then fall new. The Chilean form of regulation, which involves
victim to political interference.
regular, automatic price adjustments and a well-
Option B. Putblic ownershtip. witih private opertion. specified arbitration systemr, appears to be working
This option is typically implemented through lease welL And systems that have been privatized have
contracts for full operation and maintenance of pub- been very successful at expanding service. Venezuelidy
owned infrastructure facilities, or through con- la's telephone company expanded its network by 35
cessions, which indude responsibility for construc- percent in the first two years after its privatization;
tion and financing of new capacity. Arrangements Chile's by 25 percent a year, Argentina's by 13 perbetween
the owner (government) and the operator cent a year, and Mexico's by 12 percent a year-
(firm) are set out in a contract that indudes any reg- Option D: Commutnity and utser pmvisioni. Commuulatory
provisions. The private operator typically nity and user provision is most common for local,
assumes all commercial risk of operation and shares small-scale infrastructure-suci as rural feeder
in investment risk under concessions. Leases and roads, community water supply and sanitation, discDncessoins
are working well for railways in Ar- tribution canals for irrigation,. and maintenance of
gentina; for water supply in Buenos Aires and local drainage systems-and it often complements
Guinea; and for port facilities in Colombia, Ghana, central or provincial services. Successful community
and the Philippines. Concessions also indude con- provision requires user involvement in decisiontracts
to build and operate new facilities under the maling, especially to set priorities for expenditures
BOT arrangement and its variants. Proliferating in and to ensure an equitable and agreed sharing of the
recent years, concessions to build and operate facili- benefits and costs of service provision. Technical asties
indude toll roads in China, Malaysia, and South sistance, training, and compensation of service oper-
Africa; power plants in Colonbia, Guatemala, and ators are also very importanL When these elements
Sri Lanka; water and sanitation facilities in Malaysia are present, community self-help programs can sucand
Mexico; and telephone facilities in Indonesia, ceed over long periods. A community organization
Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Each has brought private in Ethiopia devoted mainly to maintaning roads
financing to support new investments.-
(the Gurage Roads Construction Organization) has
Option C: Private ownership and private operation. worked well since 1962 because it sets its own prior-
The private ownership and operation of infrastruc- ities and allocates its own financial and in-kind reture
facilities is increasing-both ffirough new entry sources.
by private firms in infrastructure markets .and Financing: essetial for all options. Imnplementing
through divestiture of public ownership of entire the foregoing institutional options and mobilizing
systems. Private ownership is straightforward when funds to expand and improve services require careservices
can be provided competitiveLy, and, in fully designed financing strategies. Foreign and domany
infrastructure sectors, it is possible to identify mestic sources of finance will need to be tapped, but
such activities and to allow private provision. For there are limits to the capacity of any economy to
example, twentyseven developing countries allow obtain funds from abroad, especially debt finance.
cellular telephone service to be competitively pro- Balance of payments constraints, and the limited
9

tradability of infrastructure services, mean that for Activities that can be competitively provided
most countries an ongoing infrastructure program should be separated and opened to private supplihas
to be sustained by a strategy for mobilizing do- ers and contractors. Where possible, entire sectorsmestic
funds.
telecommunuications, railways, power generation-
Private financing in one form or another at pres- can be privatized, but with regulatory oversighL
ent accounts for about 7 percent of total infrastruc- Sectors that are unlikely to be privatized (such as
turn financinlg in developing countries (the share roads) can be operated on commercial princples,
may double by the year 2000), while bilateral and using contracting for construction and periodic
multilateral foreign aid accounts for around another maintenance. Leasing or concessions can be used to
12 percent Although an increasing share of the do- operate facilities that may be difficult to privatize
mestic savings needed to finance infrastructure pro- for strategic reasons, such as ports or airports. Morevision
can come from private sources, governments over, technical and managerial capacity at the
will continue to be a major source of funds for infra- provincial and local level is likely to be sufficient to
structure, as well as a conduit for resources from the realize the benefits of decentralization. Responsibildonor
community. As transitional -measures to pro- ity for local senrices-such as urban transport,
vide long-term financing where sufficient private water supply, sanitation, and local roads-can be
support is not likely to be forthcoming, govern- turned over to local governnents.
ments are revitalizing existing lending institutions Low-income countries with; miodest capacity. In these
for infrastructure and creating specialized infra- countries, commercial principles of operation can
structure funds.
form the basis for reform in several sectors. Com-
In the future, governments will often need to be mercial approaches can be supplemented with repartners
with private entrepreneurs. The task for forms in procurement and contracting practices that
both the public and private sectors is to find ways to foster competition and develop the domestic conroute
private savings directly to those private struction industry. Many activities (such as road
riskbearers that -are making long-term investments maintenance and the collection of solid waste) can
in infrastructure projects-projects that have vary- be contracted out to the private sector. Contracing
ing characteristics and for which no smgle financing can have a salutary effect on all infrastructure bevehicle
is appropriate. Official sources of fnance, cause, as experience shows, public providers besuch
as multilateral lending institutions, can facili- come more efficient when they are exposed to comtate
the process by supporting the policy and insti- petition from private contractors.
tutional reforms needed to mobilize private financ- Concessions or leasing arrangements are proven
ing and use it more efficiently.
ways for a low-income country to draw on foreign
expertise, as are the various BOT options that can be
Implenenting reform
used to increase the capacity of systems. Concessions
and leases have been widely used in water
Just as the differences across infrastructure sectors supply, ports, and transport sectors. BOT schemes
imply that no single option can be applied to all sec- have been extensively used in middle-income countors,
infrastructure provision must be tailored to tries, and their application is now spreading to lowcountry
needs and circumstances, which vary income countries. These arrangements help develop
widely. To see 10ow, consider a middle-income coun- local expertise and foster the transfer of new techtry
with a thriving private sector and well-devel- nology, but they do not require the establishment of
oped institutional capability, and a low-income independent regulatory bodies because regulatory
country with a small private sector and relatively procedures are specified in the underlying contract.
undeveloped institutional capacty.
Community approaches, with technical and fi-
Middle-income countries with good capacity. The nancial support, can be efficient and sustainable in
four major options can all work well in these coul- supplying services using intermediate technologies
tries. The broad reform instruments for such coun- in rual areas and in the low-income settlements
tries are clear: apply commercial princples, increase that often develop outside existing urban service
competition, and involve users. These actions lead areas. Competition is possible in many activities but
to an increase in private involvement and finance, may be impeded by unnecessary regulations. Truckand
to a reduction (or decentralization) of activities ing and many types of urban passenger transport
remaining with govemment Some countries are fol- can be provided privately, under regulations that
lowing this path for a wide range of sectors, and deal only with safety and service standards.
many more for only a few sectors, especially tele- Some countries may benefit fom arrangements
communications, power, and roads.
that increase the effectiveness of aid by coordinating
: . 10

the efforts of donors to focus on common objectives. -
For exAmple, tie Sub-Saharan Africa Trasport Pol- FAnnii gai elia
icy Program coordinates donor assistance for road -ndmspr a id e ency are,large .
maintenance and in several countries lias supported ;rlitive to.m vesbnehL
the estabishment of road boards that oversee execution
of road maintenance. More generally, external B of U dollars
assistance should im to build institutional capacdty =
in those countries where it poses a serious constraint _ _ - -; _-
cooperation, as well as efforts to collect and dissem- 200
Well-designed programs of training and technical
'
lnve. i estm n.
iate information on policy options and performance
across countries, can supplement donors'
siscal
advice and financial assistance in creating an appro-
b-rde;
priate enablng envionment for successful reform J'' 123
and development of infrastructure. A ¢2 <
st
Potential payoffs from reform
.
Because of the great variatio n performance, the
payoffs from increasing the efficiency of infrastruc- 0_
ture provision wil differ from coun to country - S d - . cos,t A;n:l -i
and from sector to sector. But the rewards are poten- -_zr incued'hm - kfastructure-'
n_
tialy large across the spectrum, maing the co t- =. technical- t
ment to reform imperative and worthwlile.
.enc
Reform wil produce three types of gains: reduction
in subsidies, technical gains to suppliers. and
Wevelopmentfinance
gains to users. It is possible to make rough estimates
of the first two types of gains. The first source of
gais is the reducion in the fiscal burden of service
5
j
.
provision-costs not recovered from users. Although
a. conservative estimate can be made for ,- U ix
onlv three sectors (power, water, and railways), tie
total savings are nearly $123 billion annuallynearly
10 percent of total govenunent revenues in a. iCostsforthewatrsectoraredue to leakages,for
railays-fuel iefficiencx. overstaffin&~ andc locomotive
developing countries, 60 percent of annual infra- ninfvejstment causedby
structure investment, and approximately five times i=mu.oe°rn-s:.
annual development finance for infrastructure (Fig- iossesz- 7
ure 5). Eliminatg underpricing would not produce - -
W A
a net resource savings to the economy (as the costs -- : "'''
would be covered by users), but the fiscal relief
would be substantial.
The payoffs from better infrastructure services go
The second source of gains is the annual savings beyond reducing technical inefficency and financial
to service providers from improved technical effi- losses. Improvements -in productivity and pricing
cdency. The savings possible from raising operating would permit more effective delivery of service in
efficiency from today's levels to best-practice levels response to demand. They would also enhance the
are estimated at around $55 billion a year-pure growth and competitiveness of the economy. And
savings equivalent to 1 percent of all developing they would allow vastly greater mobilization of re-
- countries' GDP, a quarter of annual infrastructure sources for needed new investments-by generatinvestment,
and twice annual development finance ing higher revenues and by creating a policy envifor
infrastructure. Looked at another way, if the an- ronment conducive to the inflow of new investment
nual technical losses of $55 billion could be re- resources.
directed for three years-at cunrent costs of roughly This Report's agenda for reforming the incen-
$150 per person for water systems-the I billion tives and institutional frameworks in infrastructure
people without safe water could be served.
poses major challenges-but promises major bene-
- --.- - .' - '- - '- - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~

fits. The way ahead is one of 'continuing innovation emphasis needs to be on improving environumental
and expeimentation, and both industrial and de- conditions. hIcreasingly, infrastructure needs to
velopng countries wiI learn from each other. In match new demands as developig countries besome
countries, the challenge is to keep pace with come more dosely integrated into the global econrapid
economidc growth and urbanization. In others, omny. Infrastructure is no longer the gray backdrop
it is to restore growth in ways: that also provide of economic life-underground and out of mind. It
greater opportunities to the poor. Everywhere, the is frpont and center in developnnt.
12

Infrastructure: achtevements,
challenges, and opportunities
Infrastructure services-including power, trans- and facilities, and the services they provide that are
port, telecommunications, provision of water and used in economic production and by households.
sanitation, and safe disposal of wastes-are central This infrastructure includes public utilities (power,
to tde activities of households and to economic pro- piped gas, telecommunications, water supply, saniduction.
This reality becomes painfuUly evident tation and sewerage, solid waste collection and diswhen
natural disasters or civil disturbances destroy posal), public works (major dam and canal works
or disable power stations, roads and bridges, tele-- for irrigation, and roads), and other transport secphone
lines, canals, and water mains. Major in- tors (railways, urban transport, ports and waterfrastructure
failures quicldy and radically reduce ways, and airports). Social infrastructure, often encommunities'
quality of life and productivity. Con- compassing education and health care, represents
versely, improving infrastructure services enhances an equally important although very different set of
welfare and fosters economic growth.
issues that are not analyzed in this Report (see World
Providing infrastructure services to meet the Deueloprnent Report 1993: Investhig in Healt1).
demands of businesses, households, and other users As defined here, infrastructure-covers a complex
is one of the major dcallenges of economic devel- of distinct sectors that, by any measure, represent a
opment The availability of infrastructure has in- large share of an economy. Taken together, the sercreased
significantly in developing countries over vices associated with the use of infrastructure (meathe
past several decades. In many cases, however, sured in terms of value added) account for mughly 7
the full benefits of past investments are not being to 11 perent of GDP (Table 1.1), with transport
realized, resulting in a serious waste of resources being the largest sector. T-ansport alone commonly
and lost economic opportunities. This outcome is absorbs 5 to 8 percent of total paid employment A
frequently caused by inadequate incentives embod- sample of developing countries shows that infraied
in the institutional arrangements for providing
infrastructure services. While the special technical
and economic characteristics of infrastructure give
government an essential role in its provision, domi- Table 1.1 Value added of infrastruchtre services
nant and pervasive intervention by govemments bYcOuntrygroup
has in many cases failed to promote efficient or responsive
delivery of services. Recent changes m Seifn Low ronnb*s wuzties
thinking and technology have revealed increased
scope for commercial principles in infrastructure storage, and 534 6.78 9-46
provision. These offer new ways to haness market communications (9) C26) (3)
forces even where. typical competition would fail, -e, 1e9 224 1.87
and they bring the infrastructure user's perspective and water (22) (36) (5)
to the forefront. MoAt market prices. At factor cost (or which fewer obnervations ai
This Report focuses on economic infrastructure: avaflable), the values are slightly higher. Figures in parentheses are
number of observations. Data ale for 1990 orlatestavailableyear
the long-lived engineered structures, equipment, .S.'n Wobrld Bank national accounts data.
13

Eior - 1 a iX for.
- '1~t'*%~
E 6
-JX
tn,; Z.;
nearly every sector, and transport is an input for
Fix11u blidnfradure investment., every commodity. Users demand infrastructure ser-
-ratiniifb?ithtotalnd;pubhc
vices not only for direct consumption but also for
investment -n - v0l;fpixijcountnes. ¾ raising their productivity by, for instance, reducing
5i^ W : . - thle time and effort needed to secure safe water, to
~J~* -m 1Fq bring > K crops > to market, or to commute to work.
Pe-rentage of inivestnentallocated r a.- Much research in recent years has been devoted
8ivshnet octe,vsmns(o .) an tde tepigt
to.infrastructur e h +- P+S"-to estimating the productivity of infrastructure in-
S;t-->W;Xffi^s;=l;^e= 4S-j- - < :ttt--link aggregate infrastructue spending to growth of
-X-
- -} a; W ^ GDP show very high returns in a time-series analysis.
Some cross-national studies of economic growth
and infrastructure-notably, one using public in-
4:#--.i>-&''=] %'
, vestments in transport and communications and anz
-t ¼ e < r -__ ^ ^ ; 2 a - other using capital stocks in roads, railways, and
-> * .- , ; i i telephones-also show that infrastructure variables
are positively and significantly correlated with
-20----s= s
-X.- . --.'... growth in developing.countries. In both types of
studies, h y [ - however, whether infrastructure investm
.... _
- ment - . causes - - 0 . growth . . or growth causes infrastructure
investment is not fullv established. Moreover, there
ID. : may : . be j other , -;! factors driving the growth of both
-GDP and infastrcture that are not fully accounted
Neither the- time-series nor the cross-sectional
- S
r W >

Bx1.1 Returns on infrastructure investment--too
good to be true?
Recent studies In the United Stae sgetthat thle mni- frawtructure on production costs. Studies (summarized
pact of Infrastructure Investments on economice growth in Asehauer 1993) found that infrastrcture significantly
represents startlingly high rats of retumn (up to.60 per- reduces production costs in manufacturing In Germany,
cent). Toogood tobe true? Possibly. Thie resuitspresented Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the.
In Box taible 1.1 may overestimate the productivity of In- United States. One estimate suggests that threeupnrters
frastructur for two reasns. First, there may be a cam- of ULS. federal Investmnent
highways In the 1950s and
rmon. factor thant causes growth In both output and infra- 1960s can be justified on the basis of reductions in truck-.
structure fithtL risnt Included In the study. Second, it may lag costs alone.
be that growth leads to infrastru tur tIvesTmet, and While there Is still no consensus on the magnitude or
~no t thant iivestment-produces growth. A niumber of stud- on the exact nature of the Impact of infrastructure on
les have found that causation runs In both directions. Yet -growth, many studies an the topic have concluded that
more sophisticted estimates that address these Issues el- the role of Infrastructure In growth Is substantial signifi-
-ther have concluded that the positive msuits were not cant and frequently greter than that'of investmnent In
much affected by different econometric methods or have other (rnus of capital. Although the indications to date
found no -noticeable impact of infrastructur on growth. are suggetive, ther'e is still'a need to explai-n why the
Neither finding--.of an extremely~ high impact or of a findings vary so much from study to study Until this
neglgble imnpact-is entirely credible, and research ef'- problem is resolved, results are neither specific nor solid
forts continue in an attempt,to refine the methodology.
.enough to serve as the basis for designing policies for in-
An alterntive approach estinates the impact of in- frastructure investnienL.
Box table 1.1 Results from studies of infrasiructure productivity
NIaplfed rate
Sample - Ekslkilyj o~~~f nrtumpb AaIlwr/ysrrr . 1sf rastrucdtureemmure
United States 0.39 60 Aschauer 1989 .Nonmilitary public capital
United States, 0.34 60 Munnell 1990 Nonmilitary public capital
48 states, United States 0 0 Hot-ai 92Publiccapitol
5metro area, United States 0.08 - utrDn n brs19 ulc capital.
FRigions,japan 0.20 96. Mera 1973 Industrial infrastructure
Regions, France 0.08 12 Prud'homrnr1993 . Public capitld
Taiwan, China 0.24 77 Uchimunand Gao 1993 Transportation, water, and
Korea. 0.19 5i.. Uchimuma and Gao 1993
l[srael 0.31-0.44 54-70 Bregmnan and Marom 1993
Mexico 0.05 ~~~~~~5-7 Shah 1988,1992
-commnunication
Transportation, water, and
communication
Transportation., power, water, and
Poe,communication, and
transportation
Multicountry,-OECED 0.07 19 Canning and Fay 1993 -TrnmsPortation
Multlcointzy, developing 0.07 95 Canning and Fay 1993 Transportation
Mu1tiwuntry, OECD 0.01-0.16 - Bafies and Shah 1993 Infrastructure capital stodcks
and deveoping.
*MUtidCOuntry,~ developing 0.16 63 Easterly and Rebelo 1993 Thmsportation mid comimunicatio
Percntage dhanges in output with impect to. a1 percet change In the level of(Infrastructume
b. Ratio of discounted value of inemnse in depmenden variable to discounted value of InvestnienL
infrast,ucttu.
-a.
strLucture stodcks indicates that their composition ture stocks becomes even greater in high-income
* ch~~danges significantly as incomes rise. For low-in- countries. Data for 1990 indicate that, while total in-
-come countries, more basic infr-astructure is impor- frastructure stodcks increase by 1 percent. with each.
tant-such as water, -irrigation, and (to a lesser ex- 1. percent increment in per capita ODP, household
tent) transport. As economries mature into the access to safe water increases by 0.3 percent, paved
middle-income stage, most of the basic consump- roads increase by 0.8 percent, power by 1.5 percent,
lion demands for water are met, the share of. agri- and telecommunications by 1.7 percent.
culture in the economy'shrinks, and more transport These relationships suggest. that infrastructure
infrastructure iLS provided. The share of power and has a high potential payoff in terms of economic
telecommunications in.investment and infrastrw got,ythedontpviea basis for prescrib

;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~W.:- _.; M-r
; -' " . u f . - . - - ' ' '-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 '
|~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~iell
- Peru. a
'. Sene l 'ta C:
- RLE '. .'a
Ionian c 0 0 - . , e .
OC-P~~~~~~-
4.
- -: -.
Z=*1a .9- -- - "-f 0 .m 4 A X l
f ' t -'~~~~~~~~~~a'
' ''.',' 6w0 ggf'.','
differences in the efficency of ivestment across
countries and over time. For example, a study of the
economirc returns; to individual World Bank projects
shows that, when overall economic policy condi-
lions are poor, the returnis to infrastructure invest-
meat decine. Retn's are lower by 50 percent or.
more in countries with restrictive trade policies thian
ng appropriate levels, or sectoral allocations, for -
fr-astructure investment Other evidence 'confirms
that inveStment in infrastructure alonte does not
guarantee growth. Many studies reveal much
smaller retumts for. infirastructure than those SUgg'ested
in Box 11-doser, in fact, to the return ow
private investmnents. These disparities may be due to
16

in countries where conditions are more favorable. Table 1.2 Average economic rates of retum
Inifastructure spending cannot, therefore, overcome on World Bank-supported projects, 1974-92
a weak climate for economic activity. Nearly twentyfive
years ago, the Broolings Transport Researh Secor 1974-2. 1983-92
Project evaluated the impact of tansport projects in Irrigation and drainage 17 13
several developing countnes and concluded simi- Telecommunications 20 19
larly that, although the investments geneay had Transport 18 21
reasonable rates of return, success depended largely Airports 17 13
on economic policy. Hghways 20 29
Another approach to assessing the economic re- Ports 19 20
turns from infrastructure investment is to examine safliays 16 12
the rates of return m a large sample of completed Power 12 11
World Bank projects. The average economic return Urban development - 23
on infrastructure projects, reestimated after loan dis--
Water and sanitaton' 7 9
busement (completion of project construction), has Water py 6
been 16 percent over the past decade-just above 1
the World Bank project average of 15 percent (Table -n.as e prects 18 16
12). Returns have been lowest (and dedining) fork - . oebis 17 I5
rigation and drainage, airports (for a very small Not available.
a.Rates are fiknanoaL not economz4m rtasof retuni.
sample), railways, power, water supply, and sewer- Swnare1iWId Bank data.
age. Why should this be so, given the expected benefits
of such investnents in developing counties?
Some of the causes relate to implementation
poblems (discussed below under '"he record of ments of other resources must be present as welL.
performance") and others to project identification The growth impact of infrastructure investments
and design. A common pattern discovered in proj- also depends on the timing and location of addiect
completion reviews of water, railway, and power tions to capacity, and on the existing imbalance beprojects
is the tendency it the time of appraisal to tween supply and demand. Because much irfraoverestimate
the rate of growth in demand for new structure consists of networks, relieving bottlenecks
production capacity and, therefore, of revenues. For at certain points of the system can produce very
the power projects in the sample, demand was over- high returns. Box 12 illustrates the repercussons in
estimated by 20 percent on average over a ten-year China's economy from critical constraints in the
operating period. In water projects, overestimation transport of coal needed for power generation.
of rates of new connections and per capita con- Adequate quantity and reliability of infrastrucsumption
also averaged about 20 percent In the ture are key factors in the ability of countries to
case of railways, until recent years projects often.as- compete in international trade, even m traditional.
sumed recovery mI demand even where railways commodities. In part because of infrastructure proW
were continually losing traffic to roads offering bet- lens, shipping costs from Ahica to Europe are 30
ter service. In twenty-rnne of thirty-one cases, percent higher for plywood (and 70 percent higher
freight traffic failed to reach its projected level, and for tuna) than those from Asia to Europe. These
in one-third, traffic actually decined.
costs have to be borne by exporters.
One important explanation for the misjudgments The competition for new export markets is espeduring
appraisal is inadequate procedures for as- cially dependent on high-quality infrastructure.
sessng demand (induding the effects of tarff in- During the past two decades, increased globalizaceases).
Oversizing and inappropriate design of in- tion of world trade has arisen not only from the libvestments
then occur, resulting in financial burdens eralization of trade policies m many countries but
on the project entities concerned. Although Bank also from major advances in communications, transprojects
may not be entirely representative, they are port, and storage technologies. These advances censubject
to more careful evaluation than many infra- ter on the management of logistics (the combination
structure investments in developing countries and of purchasin& production, and marketing funcso
may have achieved better performance than av- tions) to achieve cost savings in inventory and
erage public investments in these sectors.
working capital and to respond more rapidly to cushifrastructure
is a necessary, although not suffi- tomer demand. About two-thirds of productionand
cient, precondition for growth-adequate comple- sales in the- OECD countries are processed directly
17

BoxL12 The importance of infrastructure to economic development an example
fErom China
The fact thiat infrastucture provides critical support to ture, as tratiifeste by thie growth of bottlenecks in the
the growth of an economy can be clearly seen when bot- railway network the severe rationing of transport capactieneciks
arise One of the mast striking examples is that ity on railway lines, and the poor quality of service expeof
China's intercit transport system. with its links to th.e rienced by shippers and passenger.
Supply of raw materials, coal, and dectricity.
Transport shortaes have adversely affected the SUP-
'The coverage of China's intenrity transport.networks ply of coal hin particular. Coal is the source of some 73
is one of the thinnest in the world the total route length percent of China's comumeria energy and represents
per capt or per unit oF amable land-for highways. or about 43 percent of the total tonnage of freight handled
raiways-is similar to, or lower'than, thiat in Brazil. by the railways. The shortage of coal has in turn ad-
India, and Russia. This has. res-ulted mainy from chronic versely affected suppli'as of electricity, about 76 percent
underimnvestment in China's transport infrastructure. of which is generated by thermal plants. In 1989, China
China's transport investments amounted to only 1.3 per- was experiencing: a shortfall in available porwer of about
cent of GNP' annually during 1981-90, a period of rapid 20 percent of industrial electridity requirements. Central
growth in transport demand,
and local authorities established quotas for allocting*
Since the oniset of China's open door policy in 1979, electricity and rationed new connections, but power cuts
economic growth averaging 9 percent a year has resulted have nevertheless been frequent.
in an unprecedented expansion in interdity traffic--with A conservative estimate is that the annual ecoonomic
growth averaging 8 percet a year for freightand 12 per- costs of not having adequate tr:ansport infrastructure in
cent a- year for passengers. This traffic growth has imn- Ch'ina during the past several years amount to about I
posed tremendous strains on'the transport infrastruc- percent of China's ONP
to order, and "just-in-dine" delivery of products has adapt to containerization and are subject.to regulabecome
the norm innmany sectors. Because about 60 tory delays, freight transport to the United States is
percent of their exports are directed to OECD mar- one-third more expensive from Indian ports than
-
kets, developing oDuntres must meet these stan- from Bangkok or Singapore.
1
dardsrmCia--8
Virtually all the improved practices designed The availability of infrastructure services valued
to reduce logistics costs, induding those in trans- by users is also critical for the modernization and
port, have been based on informationL technologies diversification of production. The growth of elecusing
telecommunications infrastructure. Cost re- tronic data exchange involving telecommunicaductions
and the increased speed of fr-eight move- tions-informnatics-is central to efficient opera.--
* ~~ments over the past few decades have also been in- Etons in manufacturing, servies, the financial sector,
creasingly based on multimodlal transport involving and government. -Availability of power alows subcontainerization,
which requires intensive coorclina- stantial improvements in workers' productivity (for
tlion by shippers across rail, port. air and road example, in the transition frOmn fDoot-powered to
freight modes.
electrically powered sewing), whie international
For developing countres wishing -to compete in telecommunications, facsimile sevcs - and rapid
global markets, or to particip;ate in "global sourc- transport of goods permit the artisan to produce to
inc (the fimIting of businesses in several countries order for a computerized global market. A hiher
*producing different compo:ments for a final prod- qualit of water anLd sanitation is required to s-hiftuct),
not just any kind of taunsport and teleconmmu- from production of raw agriculturl commnodities to
nications infrastruLcture will do. Manufacturing as- processed foods. Surveys of prospective foreign
sembly operations in Mexico and horticultural investors over a wide range of countries show that
exports from Kenya are examples of the diversifica- the quality of infrastructure is an important factor
don of trade permitted by appropriate logistical in ranking potential sites for location of direct
support and multimodal facilities. During the 1980s, investmnent.
* the proportion of garments, shoes, and handhcraft Tfhe nature of an economy's infrastructure is cenexports
shipped by air from northiern India quintu- tral to its ability to respond to chanAges in demand
pled because land and ocean transport systems and prices or to take adveantage of other resources.
were no longer able to meet demanding delivery re- TIhe formerly socialist countries (particularly those
- -cqirements. Because India's vorts have been slow to in Central and Easten Europe and the-former So

viet Union) provide a dlear iMustration of how the
patterns of supply and demand mnposed by cenitml o . hoigifatutr
planning affect infrastructur developmenit These overboard
countries showed an extremely high trnsort and
infonUt, to nnrnn,m, niaAn
-lnn.aneWhen times are hardi, capital spending on. inraenergy
tnit own to noneconoltnic dedsions structure is the first iteni to go, and operations and
on location of production units, underpricing and mitnneaeotnds eid ept h
inefficient use of energy, and an emphasis on heavyiogerecoiccssoslhngnfatuue
industry and raw materials production). They also spndn gpe find it les politically)cosly
showed a greater reliance on rail than on road trans- tdun redtucing public employment oDr wages. Studport
thian did countries with siminlar conditions, and ins Of fiscal adjustment and expenditure reduction
on long- over short-hauil public t-ransport facilities. find that capital expendiftues are cut morfe than
Withi market reforms, the location and composition cretexpenditures widit infmtruct pir a
of demand will alter, giiga greater role in these p~~rtanghebgstedci.Moeconon-des
indus to light
~~~~~over to within. 70 pe: crret expendtures, nortwage expen
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rs
econoies inustr, o liht toservies sch ~dirums (which include opemations and maintedomestic
distribution, and to the diversification of nance) are cut by more than the wage bilfL
external trade. Small enterprises and consumers The dedline in investment, at.least inL the initial
will become a more important source of demand. phss snot altogether undesirable as it often in!-
These treds require cor responding modifications duces a rationaliztion and strengthiening of courtin
infrastructure, with greater attention to the qual- b' pr 0e portfolios. Cutbacks in. operations and
maintenance expenditure, however, areworrisomea
ity services. and variety of
~~A World Dank review of countmies adjustment ex-
Public spending on inf~rastructure c onstruction ~* nnnaeoea
antd maintenance. can. be a valuable'policy tool to tions and mnaintenance and a marked deteioration
providle economic stimulus durintg recessions- As in infrastructure services were common. For inlong
as quality and cost-effectiveness are not corn- stance. in Costa Rica during the ISO current non-*
promis!ed, labor-based approaches to infrastructure wage eqxpeditures (principally operations and
dlevelopment can also be an important instrument manuance) fell 6om 1.6 percent of GDP to a mere
for employment-intensive economic growtlh. In de-0.pirnaddesheofteainlan
tonal red network in poor to very poor condition.
ciding on public spending for infrastructure, policy-
-ecet
makers have frequently not looked sufflaiently
beyond the near-term imlpacts, and many governmernts
have been attracted to the political benefits of
the highly visible structure created. When public
spending on infrastructure is notwisely deployed, it trasportmfrastructure on an interational corridor
can crowd out more productive investent in other is. less of a problem tha are institutional consectors-
At the same time, short-term fiscal con- straints. For example, one-thdird of the time teired.
straints have often led to disproportionate cutbacks to ship height between landlocked Mai and nei-ghinm
rastructre, thereby sacrificg an important boring ports n Lo ind itogo) and Abidjan CoCte
impetus to renewed growth following adjustment d'Ivoire) is, due to delays in customs clearance. Re-
(BoX 1o3).
moving inefficient regulation of rad transport and
Sometimes the least-cost approach to imiproving privatizing tranport operations, and deregulating
thei supply of infrastructure services would require power generation and'distribution (as discussed in
interegional (cross-country) iutegration of infra- later chapters), may facilitate some interational exstructure
networks, for example, power grids. Such change of services in these sectors.
an agreement would call for not only coordination To summarize, itfrastructure investment is not
of investnewts but, equally important, cooperation sufficient on its own to generte sustained increases
to maintain-efficient policies governg the trade in in economriic growth. The demnand for infrastructur
serces. Most countres, however resist dependig services is itself sensitive to economic growth,
on others for a supply of services deemsied to be of which is notoriously difficult to predict The ecostrategic
importance; therefore, importing power to. noric impact of infastructure investment vmit es
meet the base load demand is less acceptable than not only by sector but also by its design, location,
acquirig only peak load from abroad. Interational and timeliness. The effectveness of inofastructure
agreements have been more cornmmon for cross-bor- investment-whether it provides the kind of serder
ansport, which is a particularly important vices valued by usei (responding to "effective de--
nsse for landlocked counties. Often the quality of
-depends on charactedstics such as quality
19

and reliability, as well as on quantity- Matdhing sup- both an increase in the incomes of ruralworkers-and
ply to what is demranded is essentiaL Finly, tie ef- a reduction in food prices for the urban poor can be
ficiency with which infrastructure services are pro- achieved. The green revolution (with imigation
vided is also a key to realizing potential return. playing a central role) demonstrated that the wages
of, and demand for, low-skilled agricultural laborers
Links to poverty
rise in step with more intesive cultivation and increased
yields. Over twenty years, one dosely obhifrastructure
is important for ensuring that served Indian village saw yields increase almost
growth is consistent with poverty reduction, a topic threefold and agricultural laborers' wages rise from
covered extnsively in World Deuelopment Report 2.25 to 5 klogms of wheat a day. Improved rural
1990; Poverty. Access to at least minimal infrastruc- stranport can also ease the introduction of improved
- tre services is one of the essential criteria for defin- farming practices by lowering the costs of modern
ing welfare To a great extent, the poor can be iden- inputs such as fertilizer. An adequate transport nettified
as those who are unable to consume a basic work reduces regional variations in food prices and
quantity of clean water and who are subject to un- the risk of famine by facilitating the movement of
sanitary surroundings, with extremely limited mo- food from surplus to deficit areas.
bility or communications beyond their immediate The benefits of tawsport and commuriications insettlement.
As a result they have more health prob- clude the access they provide to other goods and
lems and fewer employment opportunities. The services, especially in cties. Where the poor are conburgeoning
squatter communities surrounding centrated on the periphery of urban areas, as in
most cities in developing countries typically lack many developing countries, the costs and avai]ai3flformal
infrastructure facilities, a condition arising ity of public ansport become key factors in their
from their nonpermanence of tenure. In India the ability to obtain employment Access to secure and
proportion of the urban population living in slum reliable public transport has been identified in
areas grew during 1981-91, while the share of the household surveys in Ecuador as influential in depopulation
living in poverty (estimated using tradi- ternining the ability of low-income girls and
tional poverty measures based on income and food women to participate in evening training dasses.
consumption) declned. The lack of access to infra- The construction and maintenance of some infrastructure
is a real welfare issue. structure-especially roads and waterworks-can
Different infrastructure sectors have different ef-. contrbute to poverty reduction by providing direct
fects on improving the quality of life and reducing employment Civil works programs (as carried out
poverty. Aocess to dean water and sanitation has in Botswana, Cape Verde, and Jndia), which often
the most obvious and direct consumption benefits involve the provision of infrn.rructure, have also
in reducing mortality and morbidity. It also in- been important m strengtherimg famine prevention
creases the productive capacity of the poor and can and providing income.
affect men and women differently. For example, the
poor-women in particular-must commit lage Links to the environment
shares of their income or time to obtaining water
and fuelwood, as well as to carrying crops to mar- Infrastructure provision results from the efforts of
ket This time could otherwise be devoted to high- individuals and communities to modify their physipriority
domestic duties, such as childcare, or to in- cal surroundings or habitat in order to improve their
come-earning activities. Such gender-specific effects comfort, productivity, and protection from the eleneed
to be considered in the evaluation of proposed ments and tD conquer distance. Each sector-water,
projects. power, transport, sanitation, irrigation-raises is-
Access to transport and irrigation can contribute sues concerning the interaction between man-made
to higher and more stable incomes, enabling the structures (and the activities they generate) and the
poor to manage risks. Both transport and irrigation natural environrment Environment-fiendly infra-
-infrastructure have been found to expand the op- structure services are essential for improving living
portunities for nonfarm employment in rural areas, standards and offering public health protection.
often in indirect.ways (Box 14). A seeming develop- With sufficient care, providing the infrastructure
merit dilemma is that while rural poverty eduction necessary for growth and poverty reduction can be
requires higher -inoDmes, raising farmgate food consistent with concern for natural resources and
prices could make urban poverty worse. By raising the global environment (the "green" agenda). At the
- - the productivity of farms and of rural transport, same time, well-designed and -managed infrastruc-
20

Box IA 'Infrastructure's direct and indirect effects in rural India
A study of two villages in rural Karnatakca state~, south- lages! sugarrane to the milL DaIena quiddy established
emn India, offers a glimpse of the ful impact that infra- itself as a service cente in the region, and its residents
structure can have on rural flin standards. The re- integrated themselves into a miuch wider economic
searcher, who studied the Wangala and Dalena villages sphere than did those in Wangatla.
in the 1950 and 1970s, described how-the two. villages The research emphasized how many Dalena vilagers
had been similarly poor and backward until a Large-scale traveled daily between their homes in the village and
irrigation, project brought Wangala into a canal network their place of work in nearby towns. This observation,
while Dalena's high elevation left it unirrigated. echoed in other studies, suggests that the developmnent
Although canal irrgation direcly promoted rapid in- process need not entail migration from rural areas to
tensification of cultivation in Wangala, institutions and urban centers. In the Uttar Pradesh village of Palanpur,
the villagers way of life were relatively unaffected oth- per capita living standards rose, between 1957 and 1993
erwise [n contrast .Dalena did not benefit directly from in the fhce of population growth, in part because of exthe
canaL Its villager were compelled to adjust their panding nonfarm employment Residents of Palanpur
way of Iffe significantly in order to capture the indirect commute daily to the towvns of Chandausi and Moradeconomic
benefits from the irrigation project The vii- abad, largely by rail. This typ of rural commuting more
lagers purchased land outside Dalena, sought positions commonly occurs along roads by foot, bicyde, motorcyin
the Public Wobrks Department and a nearbysugar mill, cde, bus, or car.
and became involved in the transtport of. irrigated vilture
can promnote the environmental sustainability of Power plant and vehice emissions are important
human settlementts (the "brown"r agenda). World De- contributors to air pollution, so their air quality 'imvelopment
Report 19-92 focuses on environumental pacts deserve careful analysis when facilities are exissues,
including those of infrastructure sectors, in panded. In developing countries, almost one-third
detail
Of commerc-ial energy is devoted to electricity gener-
The relationship betweent each hinfrastructure sec- ation, which is the fastest-growing component of the
tor and the environment is complex. The most posih energy sector. By the year 2000 Asia may well suirtive
impacts of infrastructure on the environment pass all of Europe in sulfur dioxide emissions, and
concern the removal and disposal of liquid and by 2005 it may surpass Europe and the United States
solid wastes. But much depends on how disposal fa- combined in power plant emissions. Vehicles are a
cilities are planned and executed. Underinvestment significant source of airborne toxic pollutants~, acin
municipal sewerage relative to water supply in counting for up to 95 percent of lead contamination.
densely populated cities such as Jakarta has been In Central and Eastern Europe, road transport is esfound
to lead to harmful contamination of water re- timated to account for 30 to 40 percent of total emitserves,
to exacerbate flooding, and to) reduce the ted nitrogen- oxides and hydrocarbons. Although
health benefits from water investments. Provision of OECD countries account for three-quarters of the
sewerage without wastewater treatment can lead to world stock of motor vehicles, a rapid increase mnvesevere
downstream pollution and prublic health hide use is expected in parts of Central andEatr
problems where receiving waters are used for Europe, East Asia, and South America. In large and
d:rinking-water supply or for recreation, irrgation, growing developing country cities, such as Bangkok
and fisheries--as ilustrated by the cholera out- and Jakarta, vehicle congestion already gives rise to
breakcs in Peru and neighboring countries in recent considerable envirornmental and economic costs. For
years. Poor management of solid waste complicates Bangkcok, it is estimated that if reduced traffic conurban
street drainage and has been linked with the gestion permnitted a 5 percent increase in peak-hour
proliferation of disease-bearing mosquitos in stand- vehicle speeds, the value of travel time saved would
ing water. The growing problem of hazardous and amount to more than $400 million a year A 20 pertoxic
wastes as countries industrialize poses partic- cent fimprovement in air quality in Bangkok, as a reular
concerns about safe disposal. For example, tin- sult of a reduction in pollutan ts related to vehicle or
controlled dumping has'led to soil contamination in power plant emissions, would produce annual
the Upper Silesian industrial region of Poland and health benefits valued at between $100 and $400 per
to subsequent food crop contamination,L
capita for Bangkok's 6 million residents.
21

Expansion of transport infrastructure can reduce sectors are the result of a technology-driven -infratotal
pollution loads as congestion falls, average ve- structure revolution" that has changed the way in
hide speeds rise, and routes are shortened. But road which age-old demands for water, lighting, commuimpmvements
can also encourage vehicle use and nications, and waste disposal are met
increase emissions. Therefore, additions to infra-. Not until the invention of cast-iron pipes and
structure capacity are only part of the solution. Im- steam-diven pumps did extensive water infrastrucproved
management of traffic and land use and pro- ture spread, beginning with a piped water network
motion of nomnotorized modes, cleaner fuels, and in London in the 1850s. This lowered costs (espepublic
trarnsport are also needed (see Chapter 4). In- cially in urban areas) and dramatically increased
tegrated urban planning and transport policy can use. Before the development of gas networks at the
lead to more efficient use of both land and ransport start of the 1800s, infrastructure for lighting was
capacity; with favorable environmental results. In rare. The invention of alternating-current transisthe
city of Curitiba, Brazi, an emphasis on encour- sion near the end of the centuy lowered costs of
aging enterprises and residential developments to electricity and led to new and expanded uses of
locate around caefuly designed public transport electric power, especiallyin urban tansport
ro-utes has contributed to low gasoline consump- The history of other infrastructure sectors is simtion,
low transport casts relative to household in- ilar. The public telegraph and telephones replaced
comes, and very low rates of traffic aocdents-de- hand-carried messages, and piped sewerage respite
one of the highest rates of private vehidle placed individual disposal of wastes in many comownership
in the country
munities. rrigation and transport have for centuries
Beyond urban areas, overuse of water for irriga-- utilized networks of irrigation canals and roads, altion
(which accounts for about 90 percent of water though development of altemative modes of tanswithdrawals
in most low-income countries) dam- porl (induding inland canals and railroads) has proages
soils and severely restricts water availability ceeded since the early 18OOsfor
industry and households, which often have a The most general economic characteristic of
higher willingness to pay for the quantities of water modem infrastrucure is the supply of services
they use. The inefficient burning of biomass fuel through a networked delivery system designed to
(plant and animal waste) for household energy con- serve a multitude of users, particularly for public
tnbutes to deforestation and thus to erosion and loss utilities such as piped water, electric power, gas,
of soil nutrients, as well as to indoor air pollution. telecommunications, sewerage, and rail services.
Some ifrastructure investments, especially road The delivery system is in most cases decicated, that
construction, can put unspoiled natural resources at is, it carries only one good. Investments in the delivrisk
and threaten indigenous communities. Reser- ery system (such as underground water pipes or
vons associated with hydroelectric projects, flood electric wires) are mostly irecoverable because they
control, or irrigation can give rise to environmental cannot be converted to other uses or moved else
problems, both upstream (inundation of land) and where-unlike the investment in a vehicle, for exdownstream
(sedinentation).
ample. Once paid, these costs are said to be `sunk"
Because the delivery system is networked, coordi-
Origins of the public sector role in infrastructure nation of service flows (traffic, electricity, conimunications
signals) along the system is critical to its effi-
Infrastructure's large and varied potential impacts dency. This interconnectedness also means that theon
development derive from certain technological benefits from investment at one point in the netand
economic characteristics that distinguish it work can depend significantly on service flows and
from most other goods and services. These charac- capacities at other points.
teristics make infrastructure subject to special pol- The scope for competitive supply of infastrucicy
attention.
ture varies greatly across sectors, within sectors, and.
between technologies. Where the unit costs of serv-
Production characeristics
ing an additional user decline over a wide range of
-output, economnies of scale are created-an impor-
Historically, society's needs for water supply, irriga- tant source of "natural monopoly." This is a comtion
and flood control, and transport have led to the mon term, although one best used cautiously beconstruction
of engineered physical works-many cause many infrastructure monopolies are in fact
of them quite large, elaborately designed, and en- unnatural, driven by policy and not tedhnology But
during Today's distinctively modem infrastructure sectors differ greatly in the range of declining costs-
22

For example, the optimal dimensions of a high-volt- steel mill and a residential community may both deage
transmission gnd may well be national, but the rive water from the same supplier,- but each user
volume-related unit cost savings for water can be group values the quality of the water in quite differrealized
at the municipal or submunicipal leveL ent ways. Yet, because many infrastructure faclities
Even within sectors, different production stages are locationally fixed and their products are nonhave
different characteristics. In power, size savigs tradable, users cannot readily obtain substitute serfor
generation are often exhausted at a capacity that vices that oetter suit their needs. Moreover, it is
is small relative to the size of a well-developed mar- often difficult for users to obtain information about
ket. Activities also differ in the importance of sunk service alternatives or characteristics. They cannot,
costs, another potential source of natural monopoly. therefore, "shop around" for the best source of suP-
In rilways and ports, for example, sunk costs are ply and are vulnerable to any abuse of monopoly
less significant for investments in rolling stoclk or power. With many infrastructure activities, howfreight-handling
equipment than for the fixed facili- ever, supply can be better tailored to differences in
ties. It is easier for firms to enter and exit activities demand once suppliers understand them-for exwith
a relative absence of sunk costs and thereby ample, transport can be offered at varying service
challenge one another's potential market power. and fare levels-and provided that consumers have
Such activities are said to be "contestablea" Techuo- adequate information to declare their choices. Serlogical
and econominc differences in production cre- vice markets can also be opened to alternative supate
the possibility of "unbunding" the components pliers and technologies in order to provide a differof
a sector that involve natural monopoly from entiated product (such as cellular and enhanced
those that can be provided more competitively- services in telecommunications)..
Many infrastructure services can be produced by Many infrastrucue services are almost (alvery
different technologies. Sanitation based on' though not perfectly) private goods. Private goods
improved latrines or septic tanks provides the can be defined as those that are both "rival" (consame
underlying service as does sewerage-dis- sumption by one user reduces the supply available
posal of wastes, but without networked invest- to other users) and "excludable" (a user can be prements.
Small-scale irrigation-particularly irriga- vented from consuming them). In contrast, "public
tion based on wells or boreholes-and small-scale goods" are neither rival in consumption nor exdudrenewable-enae-based
power generation (such as able. Markets work best in providing pure private
micro-hydro schemes) also need not involve inter- goods or services. Most of the services that the infraconnections
with large networks but can provide structure sectors produce are excludable in a specific
service highly responsive to users. Telephone ser- sense-their use depends on gaining access to a favices
can be provided over wire-based networks or cility or network, for example by connection to the
through radio-based systems.
piped water, gas, or sewer system, and service use
may be metered and charged for. In the case of rail-
Consumption chamictenstics
ways, ports, and airports, access to the entire infrastructure
can be testricted. However once a user is
As seen earlier, the demand for infrastructure ser- connected to the network utility or gains access to
vices derives from the activities of both industries the transport facility, the degree of rivalry with other
and individuals. Ensuring a flow of services of at users depends on the costs (including congestion)
least mnimium quality and quantity is often consid- imposed on existing users or on the service supplier
ered by governments to be of strategic importance, when an additional service unit is consumed.
since any interruption or restriction of supply It has been common in many countries not to
would be seen as a threat to sodety. However, be- charge users for the volume of some utility services
cause infrastructure investments are often "lumpy' consumed because the marginal supply cost was
(new capacity must be created in large increments), considered negliglile, congestion was absent, or
it is difficult for planners to match the availability of technological constraints (such as the absence of
supply with demand at all times. Costly episodes of water meters) prevented volume pnrcing. However,
over- or undercapacity often result.
recent developments, such as the increased scarcity
Beyond consuming an "essential minimum" of (and supply cost) of water, growing congestion as
certain infrastructure services, users have very di- network capacity becomes ully utilized, and techniverse
demands-although the output of large-scale, cal innovations in meterng consumption, have
monopoly providers is often not sufficiently differ- made it possible and desirable to price these serentiated
to meet these demands. For example, a vices like other private goods.
23

Roads are not private goods, although for rea- Infrastructure activities that create extenalities or
sons that differ with the type of road. Rural roads (a produce essential services to captive uses may also
typical public good) and uncongested interurban warrant some regulation, but this can be narrowly
roads are not completely rival because an additional fooused on these market imperfections while perdrver
does not reduce the value of anyone else's mitting wide scope for competition in other compouse
of the road. Access to some interurban roads nents of the sector.
can be prevented by making them toll roads (a das- Certain characteristics of infrastructure also cresic
"dub" good, i.e., a good tthat is excludable but ate challenges in financing. Where a minimum level
nonrival). By contrast, urban roads are congested of consumption of a particular service (such as
during peak perods, but until recently it has been water, heating, or power) can be identified as a lifedifficult
to exclude users from urban roads or to line' for some users, society may judge that they
charge users different amounts durngpeak and off- should not be excluded if they cannot afford to pay.
peak periods. New electronic techniques of moni- Financing strategies also have to be designed to take
toring road use may eventually make it technically account of the risk that arises because many infrafeasible
to treat many urban roads almost as private structure investmnents are large and long-lived,
goods.
while the revenue stream is often slow to develop.
Water outside of piped networks is often-in. Such characteristics can justify some public financpractice
and in principle-a xcommon property' ing of infrastructure from general revenues, but to
resource. While water consumption is rival between supplement-not entirely substitute for-the revusers,
monitoring the use of groundwater from un- enues obtained from users and conmunercial sources
derground aquifers or from other natural sources is of finance.
difficult and costly, and therefore groundwater use
is rarely exdudable. By the same tokeni, controlling Public sector dominanice
infrzstructure
the consumption of common property resources is
also difficult How mudc the extraction of water hifrastructure dearly represents a strong public in-
(from aquifers or natural flows) affects other poten- terest, and so merits the attention of governments.
tial users depends on location-specific hydrological However, the special characteristics of infrastrucfeatures
that are important in water policy.
ture do not explain or justify the fact that govern-
Although most infrastructure goods are private, ments and public sector agencies have dominated
they produce spillovers or external effects-mnany almost all aspects rf this sector in developing counof
which (as shown earlier) affect the environment tries in recent i .ddes. Private participation was
Ignoring the important negative externality of emis- important in the nineteenth century and the first
sions from fossil fuel power generation could lead half of the twentieth century in many countriesto
excess power being produced with the wrong and some pockets of private provision still renix
of fuels. By contrast,some cities have neglected main-but the overwhelming trend until the early
to develop a well-designed public transport system, 1980s was government or parastatal provision,
even though such a system can have positive envi- largely through verticaiiy integrated, monolithic enronmental
effects and also promote social equity. To tities. By then, only a small percentage of the power
ensure that society obtains positive benefits-such sector was in private hands. Virtually no private
as public health benefits from water and sanita- telecomznunications firms existe-i, and most early
tion-the private goods must also be delivered ef- private railways had disappeared with nationalizafectively.
tion. Although toll roads played a part in the early
Thus, although infrastucture services differ from history of many countries, they also became rare,
other goods, they also differ among themselves and road construction (and especially maintenance)
(Fgure 1.3). The characteristics of various infra- was executed largely by government employees, or
strucure activities have important implications for force account. Other services-water, sewerage,
how services should be provided. To the extent that waste disposal-alsa tended to be both owned and
specific infrastructure activities entail natural mo- operated by govemments at either the national or
nopoly or depend on a network characterized by the local leveL
natural monopoly, they will not be provided effi- The dominant public sector role in ifrastructure
ciently by an unfettered market. The network com- has arisen for a number of reasons: recognition of
ponent can, however, be separated (unbundled) ifrastruchtre's economic and political importance;
from the more competitive activities of the sector, a belief that problems with the supply technology
with regulation to ensure fair access to the network required a highly activist response by governments;
24

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.i s 3.n 4 ;ti CS&V
:~~~~*~ f f : . *&w : p-
-t
-4 M V4VIL-4-r-'II--46V--
4
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Table 1.3 Expansion of infrastructure coverage in low , middle and high-income economies,
recent decades
Anmud
Annual atnemiks:
-. - - -C"e Gepaanage C5 p.rnag wn
Seder 1975 1990 ia 975 2990 incrte 199. .
Power-geatingcapacity (thousand kIlowatts per
milon persons) 41 53 1.6 175 373 4.7 2,100
Telecommunicatio (Onain lines per thousand persons) 3 6 32 33 81 5.6 442
Sanitation (perCentage of population with access) 23 42 - 3.8 44 68 2.7 95-
Paved troads (klometers per millio peron) .308 396 1.6 1,150 1335 0.9 10106
Water (percentage of population with access) 40 62 27 54 74 2.0 95.'-
-No- Percentage increases ar compound grwh rtesh
Soarc Appendix tables Al and AZ
capacity more thian doubledl between.1975 and 1990.
Even in midddle-inComecoDnomies, however, access
to water and sanitation is stil lacking for significant
shares of the population-for water, one-quarter of
the population in thiis group remains uns erved, and
foDr sanitation, one-third. The most dramatic expansions
in paved roads occurred during 1960-75 for
both groups, atrwihgohsled.
hInfrastructure coverage has increased in both
rural and urban areas. Urban populations are significantly
better served than rural populations in access
to drinldng water, sanitation, and power. The
gaps in coverage for water and power have been
narrowing (Figure 1l4). Rural and urban areas do
not have the same effective demnand for infrastructure
services and thus may require different rates of
infrastructure coverage to achieve desired developnment
benefits. There is an economnicase for providing
relatively more power and telecommunimcations
connections, and more extensive transport networks,
in locations with a higher density-of populalion
and industry.
Urbanization in itself is anr imponrtant factor stimulating
demand for infras-,tructure. When finfastructure
capacity in water supply, sanitation, power,
telecommunications, roads, and public transport is
inadequate in expanding urban areas, serious constraiuts
on (environmentally msusanable) econom-ic
growth and on poverty reduction result In the
rapidly growing periurban (and, in many cases,
unauthorized) settlements that ring m-any cities,
conventional delivery of formal services is often
prevented by legal, topographical, or eConomic constraints.
Projecte growth in urbanization inL coming
decades-especially in Africa and South and East
Asia-will inevitably increase pressures for greater
access to infr-astructure. H-owever; some rural-to-
urban migration may be forestalled through policies
that provide appropriate hinfrastructure 'in rural
areas and that prevent the degradation of naftural re-
sources (especaly soils, forests, and water SUP-
plies).
An analysis of how countries measure up onin
fr-astrucure coverage compared with other mea-
sines of performance is revealing. Although cover-
age tends to be correlated with GDP, efficiency and
effectveness -of infrstructure -provision are. not
Plots of -coverage against performance in water,
power, telecommunications, roads, and railways
show little relationship across a wide sample of low-
and middle-income countries (summarized in Fig-
ure 1.5). Moreover, there is no close conrrlation be-
tween a country's efficiency of provision in one sec-
tor and its performance in another. These findings
indicate that efficiency and effectiveness of infra-
structure provision derive not from general condi-
tions of economi'c growth and development. but
from the institutional environment, which often
vanes across sectors in individual countries. This
suggests that changes in the. institutional environ-
ment can lead to.improved performance, even when
incomes are low, because in each sector some low-
income countries perform welL As a corofLauy, a re-
cent QECD review of infrastructure noted that even
many high-income countries encounter the perfor-
mance issues described below.
Challenges
To detem-ine future demand for infrastructure, it is
necessary to consider the efficiency with which ex-
isting capacity is being used and how well the services
generated are responding to users. Although
each sector has special problems, there are com-
26

* iW- . ... .- African countries, spending $1 million to reduce
F-r- iacces -a:
E line losses could save $12 million in generating ca-
- e i- dvel g c r es paity. Irrigation efficiency (the proportion of water
iwrrowed over the -pastdecade. - - delivered to the field) in developing country projects
is typically 25 to 30 percent, compared with 40
- . to -- 45 -j percent ->g < under .r;- best practice.
- *ge ulatin iih.-;-- Inefficient use of labor is especially common and
'- ,' 1 costly in infrastructure. At various periods, twoithirds
of thelabor inrailways inTanzania and Zaire,
ZV_M 4- percent | liO8 of port staff in Argetina (before recent
privatiations), and one-quarter of highway depart-
-ment staff in Brazil have been estimated to be redundanL
The combination of overstffing and -underpricing
of railwuay services. produced a wage bill
-. S > ; .*; Si - -- - almost as large as (and sometirnes larger tlhan) total
,i- fP lisr; W r S railway reven.ues in Aentina(before rect re
£ ~~~~~~~~~forms) and in Colombia, Egypt, NVigeria, Tur-key,
and Uruguay, Overstaffing is also common in
water, power, and telecommunications. At tei
same time, in the production of public works and
rural infrastructure, developing counties often
use equipment-based methods of construction and
maintenance rather tain employment-mtenve ap
proaches that can produce high-quality results,
while being more consistent with relative capital
*90 190 i and labor costs.
ADEQUAX rMcANE. aoselyrelated too
-E .Pow .:er> - -.-....... inefficiencies :..-^--......erating is lack of maintenance roads
*6 - deteriorate, f irrigation canals leak, water pumps
f1X J;si-Cd. n . -break down, sanitation sysems overflow, installed
-, . . = phone lines fail, and power generators are not available
when needed. Capacty is hen lost, output deines,.
and substantal additional investment is
needed simply to sustain exsting levels of service
.In the road sector, inadequate maintenance immon
patterns-operational inefficiencies, inade- poses large recurrent and capital costs. The engiquate
maintenance, excessive dependence on fiscal neering and physical properties of paved roads are
resources, lack of responsiveness to users'. needs, such that, as a road begins to deteriorate, lack of reglimited
benefits to the poor, and insufficient envi- ular routine maintenance will hasten deterioration.
-onmnental responsibility.
Neglect of (relatively inexpensive) routine maintenance
can compound problems so much that the en-
INEFlCaENCY OF oPERAMONS. The broadest indica- tire surface of a road has to be replaced. Examinator
of inefficient performance by an infrastructure tion of completed -Bank highway projects shows
system is the extent of output lost in delivery. Unac- that, on average, estimated retums on projects incounted-for
water (that portion of supply for which volving primarily maintenance are almost twice as
consumption is not. recorded, largely because of high as those on projects involving mainly new contechnical
and managerial failures) is typically two to struction. Yet, in Sub-Saharan Africa, almost $13 bilthree
times higher in developing country systems lion worth of roads-one-third of those built in the
than in countries that achieve the industry stan- past twenty years-have eroded because. of lack of
dards. In 1987 one-quarter of the power utilities in maintenance. In Latin Ameica, for every dollar not
developing countries had losses of electricity in the spent on maintenance, $3 to $4 are estimated to be
transmission and distnrbution network that were required for premature reconstruction. Maintenance
twice those in efficiently operated systems. In some expenditures often are not allocated by economic
r

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priorities. For example, Cameroon,.which still has a, water treatment plants, or inappropriate location,
predomninantly rural population, has neglected its make it difficult to carry out operations and mainte-
30,000-kilometer unpaved. road network over the nance and to meet environmentrJ objectives. There
past ten years in favor of investment in and mainte- are also many examples of investments that were
nance of 3,700 kilometers of interdty paved roads. economically nonviable to begin with and that
The result is that some 80 percent of the unpaved should never have been made-such as overnetwork
requires either complete reconstruction or designed or "gilt-edged" roads and power plants.
heavy reshaping and compaction.
Procurement problems are often a factor in weak
In railways, inadequate maintenance (as well as operalional performance. Systematic delays in purother
operating.deficiencies) is evident in the small dcasing by sector entities and inadequate supervishare
of locomotives available for service. In 1991 sion of contracts are estimated to increase costs of
only 60 percent of all locomotives were available for imported materials to some African countries by 20
service in Latin Amenrca and 70 percent in the Mid- to 30 percent. Contracting and bidding procedures
dle East and North Africa region, compared with 9 may also favor large-scale enterprises, which tend
percent in North America. Such deficiencies cause to use more equipment-based methods of construcsome
railways to turn away freight traffic, which in tion and maintenance than is appropriate given relturn
compounds the sector's financial difficulties. ative factor costs. The lack of standardization of
In irrigation, too, poor maintenance is costly and equipment, such as water pumps obtained from diresults
in distribution channels filling with silt and verse foreign donors, creates delays in repair and inweeds,
canal linings cracking at an increasing rate, creases the costs of replacement parts. There is need
and outlets breaking or being bypassed. Drainage for donors to standardize their procurement rules to
also fails, causing salt buildup in the soil. In China ease the administrative burdens on recipient.counalnost
1 million irrigated hectares have been taken tries. Donor aid that exdudes finance for local costs
out of production since 1980, and in the former So- can also bias the choice of technology for public
viet Union, even with continuing investment in irri- works in favor of capital-intensive methods that are
gatlion, almost 3 million hectares were lost between unsustainable for the recipient country.
1971 and 1985-one-quarter of the new irrigated
area. Worldwide, works covering 60 percent of the FINANCIAL iNEFFICIENCY AND FISCAL DRAIN. Poor
irgated area requre upgrading to remain in good infrastruchre policies and inefficient provision abworking
condition.
sorb scarce fiscal resources and damage macroeco-
In both rural and urban water supply and in the nomic stability. Because prices are often held well
power sector, inadequate maintenance is a common below costs, the subsidies flowing into public infraproblemn.
A study of water and sewerage in Bogota structure enterprises and agencies have been enorfound
that the costs of unaccounted-for water- mous in many counties. In Bangladesh. India, Inarising
in part from. poor maintenance of the distib- donesia, Pakistan,. and the PhiIippines, irrigation
ution system-were 42 percent of the supplier's receipts have been well below the costs of operatotal
operating income. Poor maintenance practices tions and maintenance. During tae 1980s power taraccount
for some of the low availability of power- iffs in developing countries were on avenge about
generating capacity which averages less than 60 one-half the costs of new supply and were much
percent for thermal plants in many developing lower than in OECD countries. (The record on priccountries,
compared with more than 80 percent in ing is discussed further in Chapter 2.) In recent
systems operated at best-practice standards.
years, 60 percent of Ghana Rai; way revenues con-
Sometimes problems of operation and mainte- sisted of government subsidies-a not-uncommon
nance are rooted in the initial design or construction performance for this sector-u!d recurrent subsiof
infrastructure; For example, a recent review of dies to rilways haveamounted to as much as 1 percompleted
World Bank irnigatiDn projects found cent of GDP in a number of countries. In Zambia the
that basic design flaws (such-as inappropriate trans- total cash shortfall in transport absorbed 12 percent
fer of desert technologies to tropical monsoon cli- of the government's current revenue in fiscal 1991.
mates) were widespread. Operations and mainte- Telecommunications tends to be an exception to the
nance can be made more difficult by inappropriate generally poor cost recovery elsewhere in infradesign
standards that increase the requirements for structure, although its revenues are often siphoned
sldlls in short supply or involve heavy dependence off by govenmment for other uses, leaving the sector
on importedspare parts where foreign exchange is underfunded. Inadequate tariffs are often comscarce.
Poor construction and design of power and pounded by poor financial management. In a sam-
29

pie of Latin American water utilties, collection of UNRSMPON5IVENIISS TO USIIR DEMAND. The result of
* ~~~accounts receivable took almost four months on av- ineffidency anid poor.maintenance is Ioiw-quality,
erage, compared with good-practice standards of unreliable service, whiuch alienates users. Reliability
four to six weeks. In addition to creating an added is a critical aspect of user satisfaction that is often igburden
on taxpayers, poor financial perfonnance by nored. Even where users have telephones, high call
* nin~mny infrastructure provider-s means a loss of failure rates (more than 50 percent in many cases)
credi'worthiness for the entity concerned. It also and high fault rates drastically diminish the value of
results in a low reliance on internal revenues to. if. the service. Unreliable quantity or quality of water
nance investment-and therefore an inability (antd leads to enormous i-nvestments in alterna tive sources
lack of incentive) to expand or imnprove service. that are espeially costly to those who can least af-
Box LS Households' responses to untreliability of water supply
In 1991, micro-level research on household responses to Ini Jamshedpur, the c'onnection charges far piped
deficient water supply by public.utilities was under- water vary between 51.66 and S16.6& The residents Of
takenr in Faisalabad (Pakist. ni), Istanbul (rturkey), and the periurban areas, served by the local mutnicipal au-'
Jamnshedpur (Endia). Theser cveys revealed that nearly thouities, incutr capital costs of 550 to 565 in installing
ani ouseholds in the thee cities are dependent on multi- tubewells and $150 to $300 in digging wells to avoid depie
sources of Watei, including ho-use taps, wells, tube- pendence on the (unreliable) public water supply. Diewells,
public taps, rivers, and stzeet vendors. Not all al- spite the existence of a piped water systemi, at least 17
ternatives are available to all households. Because access percent of the population meets 90 percent.of its wateri
to a source increases with income, poorer households needs from. wells and handpup Over andl above the
bear a disproportionate share of the burden of deficient monetary costs that consumers bear, households in
'~~~~~ infrastruicture The priv'ate expeiiditures incurred for
wrater supply indicate consumners' willinnesto pay for
Jamshedpur spend, on a average, two hours- a day fetch-
iri adstorin wtrThe b'urden of these activities fulls
reliable water
in nearly ail cases on women.
In Istanbul, the poorest househblds surveyed spend a' The pattern of private augmentation of the public
larger share of their income (abovut 5 -percent) to supple- water supply at s'ubstantial private costs to consumers zs
ment iniadequate water supply than. do wealthier ones observed also in Faisalabad, Pakistan. Less than 20 er
(which spend about 1 percent). Thh ese expenditures on' cent of the households with piped water use this source
informal sources- of water, includintg self-provision fromi exdlusivelr; 70 percent have motor pumps and 14 perweli
orstorge aciitie, ae i:addition to the user centhave handpumnps.
chagesforpubicl suplid wter, which amount t6 I
Box 1..6 Public failures raise private costs
A~ccording to a 1988 study of Nigerian manufacturers, 92 supply. Indonesia's largest companies invested as much
percent of the 179 ffirm surveyed owned electricity gen- as 18 percent of their capital in private infrastructureerators.
In the face of chronically unreliable public ser- almost twice Nigerian -najiufactureise level of 10 pervices,
many had also acquired radio equipment for corn- cent-yet their generators, too, were underused and opr
munications, vehides to transport personnel and freight, era ting at abdut50 percent of capacity.:
and boreholes to assure their o-wn p-rivate, water supply. Today in Indonesia, as in Nigeria, firms too small to
Far firmnswith fiftycor mor emplcdyees that could prac- affordi private power or water are at the mercy of unrelitice
econoibiues of scale, these extra costs amounted to. able public utilities and subject to chronic ajid costlyin
some 10 percent of the total machinery and equipment terruptions in servic Yet while the largest hIndonesian
budget. For sm&il finns, the burden could be as high as ffirms pay SO-07 pe!r koioatt-hour to produce electricity
25 percenti Yet. because Nigeriain regulations prevent (not far above interntional normis), self-provided elecfrnms
fromn selling their excess power capacity, busi- tricity costs the smallest firms $1.68 per kilowatt-hournesses
both large and small were operating private c=- twenty-four timres as much.
esators and.w-ater systemsron averageatno more than25
perceni of cap-acity. * *
*Thailand-where public electric utilities are fi
iently rnm-has been able to) break.this pattern. Of the
Of 306 Indonesian manufacturers recently polled, 64 3o 0 manufacturers poled, only 6 percent had private
percent had generators'and 59 percent (compared with * generatorsand4 percent hid privatewatersupplies.
Nigeria's 44 pewrent) had boreholes lbr theer own water
.
30

ford it (Bcx 1.5). In Indonesia and Nigena, prvaLe g;L&-,jtr .'-
businesses incur heavy costs in order to guarantee
igiit67he, ir g Unme
power su,pply: 92 percent of firms sampled in Nige- demand1 fri `telepho coxo_
ria and 64 percent in Indonesia had installed private N -st
generating capacity (Box 1.6); in Thailand, only 6 -i--
=
percent of companies needed generators. These large 5 -.-
differences in self-provision reflect the performance
of the formal suppliers. In Nigeria, only 43 percent of
installed capacity was in service by 1990 (despite 20
massive overinvestment in public power-geerating
@ t:-,
capacity throughout the 1980s); in Thailand, the 15
power utility is efficiently run.
In telecommunications, unmet effective demand .i
can be roughly measured, because in many countries
users must apply for connection, which often 77
involves paying a heavy initial fee. Of ninety-five.
developing countries, more than one-third were r
found to have a waiting period of six or more years 0 _ _ _
for a connection, compared with less than a montlh
'i 6g it2.O 1j:ssB&1
in most industrial countries (Figure 1.6). Corntries . t
that can deliver service in less than a year include
- . . - . . ~~~~~~~aiti 4Wlngtimepiid6firbtaihn e%__me>92-^
some with little current pressure on available capac- W te temi
ity (such as Bolivia) as well as others in which in- - - (-
vestment is pLoceeding rapidly (Malaysia). In addi- = - v A
bon to the shortage of basic connections, in many e ninWVK
countries providers fail to offer differentiated ser- :
vices matching types of use. For example, businesses
inmeasingly require telecommunications facilities
that accommodate high-speed data
transmnission as well as voice signals. A much poor's access to infrastructure services but most of
higher priority could be given in many developing these subsidies have b captued by middle- and
countries to the provision of pay phones to exted high-income households (as documented in Chap-
- ; access basic to improved communications to a ter 4). In addition, the providers often are not adelarger
Exes share she d of the hemand population. forinfrastructur coupled -.th quately compensated for the subsidies, so that over-
Exccess demand for infrastructure, coupled weith
of compensation to infrastructure all expansion of service is constrained. The structure
very low rates of compensation to infrastructure of tariffs can be an additional barrier. In Brazil, local
staff breeds corruption in both service and invest-
-. '
. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~telephone
call rates are low, but connection c-harge
ment decisions. Where connections are rare and -. -T p
- - . ~~~~~~are lugh. Tlus preventS lower-income users from
:- service is poor, emnployees often demand side pay- getting service. Flat-rate electricity charges in rural
ments from users to install or repair connectionsespecially
in telecommunications, irrigation, and India have benefited mainly richer households, beespecaall
in telecommunications, idation, and
water su.pplvycause
the poor lack the income to purchase the
water sulpply.-
pumps and consumer appliances that account for
* E: NECLECr OF THE POOL The poor typically use most electricity use.
fewer infrastructure services than the nonpoor, but While failure to reach the poor has often been as-
* . not only because of low incomes-they also have sociated with flawed infrastructure pricing policies,
very low access. In Peru; for example, only 31 per- too little emphasis has been placed on providing the
cent of the poorestfifth of households are connected poor with suitable options for the kinds of services
to a public water network and 12 percent to a public of most value! to them (and for which they are willsewer-compared
with 82 percent of the top fifth ing to pay). For example, municipal sanitation agen-.
for water and 70 percent for sewerage. The poor cies often promote technical designs for convengenerally
have less access than the rich in urban tional sewerage that are unaffordable and even
areas as well (Table 14).
environmentally unsuitable in some low-income
Many countries have introduced subsidies settlements. In large cities such as New Delhi, the
through low tariffs with the aim of improving the reliance of the poor on foot travel is a serious con-
31

straint to their mobility (Figure 1.7) A study of tracted understandable publicattention Yetequally
transport. options in Latin American cities found serious, and more pervasive, is the damage or loss
that in Sao Paulo, Brazil, personal travel by the poor of potential benefits to the environment because of
lad declined more sharply than for any other in- failure to control unnecessary emissions and wastecome
group over a decade-partly because public ful consumption of water. This is due in particular
transport services wvere ill designed for low-income to the underpricing of power, vehicle fuels, and
users. The poorest residents on the periphery of Rio water for irnrgation and municipal uses and to the
de Janeiro spent more of their income than the rich neglect of maintenance. Inadequate maintenance
for transport, with longer waits, less frequent ser- practices leading to inefficient thermnal power genvice,
and more time spent in crowded vehicles. eration account for a large share of energy-related
Appropriate services for the poor are often lack- pollution. Neglect of sound environmental manageing
when decisions on investment and service are ment practices m trmnsport-inlduding safe handriven
by assumptions about a "needs gap' rather ding of hazardous cargos and appropriate disposal
than by an assessment of effective demand. In the of waste from ships, port dredging, and vehide
Makete District in Tanzania, a survey of households maintenance-is a common failing. Unregulated,
undertaken to determine their transport needs in badly designed, or poorly managed municipal
preparation for a proposed investment project re- water and sanitation infrastructure has often been
vealed that improvement of the road network alone one of the biggest sources of urban environtmental
would benefit only a few residents and that com- pollution. The focus of public spending on urban
plementary measures were needed-including solid waste management often stops at collectionsupport
to transport services (the introduction of few developing country cities meet environmental
nonmotorized means of transport to replace head- standards for sanitary landfills.
loading), simple improvements to paths and tracks, Many of the problems in infrasucture perforand
rehabilitation of grinding mills. A retrobpective mance are mutually reinforcing, creating serious
evaluation canied out after completion of the proj- economic and financial costs that make it more diffiect
found that these low-cost improvements were cult for countries to achieve greater coverage and
highly successful-and would likely have been left'. more modem services to better meet social and enout
of the project if no inquiry into tme actual de- virorimental goals. Systemic problems point to sysmand
of the communities had been undertaken. temic causes-and solutions.
NEGLCr oF Tm EsvIRoNmar'r The impact of in- Diagnosis and directions for change
frastructure on the environment has often been very
negative (Box 1.7 recounts one of many examples, T7ie conditions for improved performance: causes
and one where regional cooperation is needed to de- and czares
velop a solution). The highly visible effects of cer-
- -tain large-sce facilities-such as dams and roads Where nastruciure is operated inefficently and
in sensitive ecological areas or where resettlement delivers poor service, the solution cannot be simply
options are unsatisfactory to populations-have at- to tell suppliers to do more maintenance and to
TzIcWe IA Percentage of the poorest and richest population quintiles with access to infrastructure,
various countries
Accss to pubcir wnaer supply Acess to sras Access to electriisy
Pourest Ridicest Powrest Rihest Pcorcst Richest
Cornhtryla/n quintile qintile quintil quintile qurintile quintile
National areas
C6te d'lvoire (1985) 2.4 62.1 3.4 57.0 13.2 74.8
Ghana (1987-88) 105 30.6 0.5 14.6 5.6 46.0
Guatemala (1989) 46.9 86.8 - .. 16.1 86.1
Mexico 0989) 50.2 95.0 14.2 83.2 66.2 99v0
Peru (1985-86) 31.0 82.0 12.3 70.0 22.8 -825
Urban arras
Bolivia (198%9 84.8 89.9 52.6 87.4
. Paraguay (1990) 53.7 88.8 IOA 62.2 94.5 992
- Not available.
SonerCGlewwe 1987a, b; Clewwive and Twum-Baah 1991: World Bank 1993e.
32

: :: ::-
:- E : :
.
:: -i
: . :r
ItW Ef.- - -- a-.c.
-"-w' U -: u iaarni
gE.4-atters-. m coe-L: idl-,
- e
.-- ,t g
zq-;ncm icm
consult users. The weaknesses mn infirastructure pro- mng for costs or financial risk, and which put hitte
vison are inherent in the incenti-ves built into cur-. emphasis on revenues collected and the quality of
rent institutional and organizational arrangements, service delivered. Managers have little motivation
in which outputs and inputs are not closely mea- -in such circunnstances to satisfy customers or to
sired, monitored, or managed, and suppliers do achieve a reasonable return on assets through effinot
depend on user satisfaction for reward. A dent operation and adequate maintenance. Typical
prprset of incentives would make managers ar- providers of infr-astructure are subject to pervasive
countable to users and to others who own and fi- interference by political authorities, which adnance
infr-astructure facilities. It would also giLve versely affects operational decisions on investment,
managers autotnomy in making decisions---and re- pricing, labor, and technological choicest It is cornsponsi-bility
for success or failure. This Report's re- mon to view certain infrastructure services (such as
v-iew of experience with infr-astructure, in both the power, water, ports, railways, airports, and telecompublic
and the private sectors, suggests that three munications) as potentially "commrercial" because
elements are essential in creating the right incen- these are the services for which it is easiest to retives
for efficient and responsive delivery of ser- cover the costs of provision through user charges or
vices. These are management based on commrercial. tariffs. In fact, almost all infrastructure (even roads
principles, competition, and involvement of users and sani tation) can be operated with a business oriand
other stakehokiers.
entation. The basic conditions for this are limited
and well-focused performance objectives, financial
COMM~ERCIAL PRINCIPLEs. Infrastructure must be -and managerial autonomy (with a hard budget conconceived
of as a "service industry' providing s-staint), and dear accountability both to cuStomers
goods that meet customers' demands. Such a corn- and to providers Of capital.
merdial orientation contrasts sharply with the situiation
in most government departmnents and state- Com'sTrnmoN Competition promotes efficiency
owned public utilities, which stiffer from multiple and provides users with options that, in turn, make
a-nd conflicting objectives and inadequate account- infrastructure providers more accountable. Govern-
33

Box 1.7 Infastiucture activities tireaten the Black Sea environment
The Black Sea is fed by a basin of more than 2 million. dedine in the once-productive Black Sea fishery over the
square kilometers;-covering parts of seventeen countries last thirty years.
in Central and Eastem Europe, the forner Soviet Union, With assistance from the Global Environment Fadland
Turkl It receives the inflows of several major ity the six Black Sea countries (Bulgaria, Georgia. Romarivers,
including the Danube, Don, Dnieper, and. nia, Russia, Turke, and Ukraine) have begun a reional
Dnieste= As an almost fully endosed water body, the program to analyze the causes of observed environmen-
Black Seais especiallyvulnerable to changes in the quan- tal degradation and to propose solutions. Actions in the
lity and quality of inflows from these niverm The Don basin to regulate fertilizer use -and to control point
and Dnieper, in partitalar, have been highly developed sources of pollution ar expected to result in reductions
for irrigation and other purposes through a dhain of of nutrient-inflowss Pilot projects are proposed to restore
reservois- : fish production under the new salinitv conditions.
Increasing pollutant loads from these rivers-espe- Under the Bank-supported Environmental Management
dialy the nutrients ntrogei and phosphorus-have led Project for Russia, a study of the Lower Don Basin will
to algal blooms and the destruction of important nurserv investigate ways to alter the operating rules -for the
areas for fish. In addition, damming of the major rvers major reservoirs to promote greater fish regeneration
for navigation, flood control, water supply, and, above downstreamall
for irrigation, has considerably altered the seasonal Given the size of the problern and the importance of
flow patterns of these rivers The damming has also de- these reservoirs in the agricultural economies of Ukraine
creased the total inflow to the Bladc Sea, resulting in an and Russia, it would be unrealistic to expect dramatic
increase in salinity in critical coastal and estuarine areas, changes Nevertheless, recognition of the problem and
especially in the Sea of Azov, wthich creates further prob- the development of mechanisnis for regional cooperalems
for fish breeding. The overall result is a 90 percent tion now make progress much more likely.
ments in most countries have not taken advantage in such circums ances, other means of making supof
the potential for competition, even in activities pliers accountable to users are needed. Through
where a natural monopoly does not exist, such as various mechanisms designed to broaden participa--
road freight transport or solid waste collection. tion in decisionmaking and to provide wide access
Today competition can be used directly in more in- to information on infrastructure provision, users
frastructure activities because of technological and other key stakeholders can be represented in
changes. In telecommunications, satellite, mi- (and sometimes take responsibility -for) the plancrowave,
and cellular radio transmission of tele- ning, financing, and delivery of services.
phone signals is revolutionizing the industry, making
the economies of scale with cable-based Opportunity knockstransmission
less important. In power generation,
combined-cycle gas turbines operate efficiently at Many of the above notions are not new, and some
lower output levels -than other generation technolo- have been accepted in principle by policymakers if
gies. While open competition for users in the market not yet put successfully into practice. Three facis
still not feasible in many infrastructure areas, tors-technological change, more pragmatic attithere
are other ways of obtaining the benefits of tudes, and a greater sensitivity to infrastructure's
competition. For activities with high sunk costs, implications for poverty and environmental suscompeting
for the right to operate a monopoly can tainabiLity-have created a new climate for recapture.
many of these benefits. Even where the form. Innovative techniques for drawing on prinumber
of operators is necessarily limited, regula- vate financing for investment create a further
tion can compel them to compete against perfor- challenge to traditional ways of providing inframance
benchmarks ("yardstick" competition)- structure. Many countries are now taking advantage
of all these opportunities to test new ideas
INVOLVEMENT OF USERS AND OTE{R SrAKEHOLDERS. and approaches, discussed in later chapters of this
In many infrastructure activities, market signals Reportcannot
be relied on to provide information about
demand or to gauge performance. Where users are TECHNOLOGY. Technological changes are creating
locked into a delivery network, they cannot express a varety of new opportunities for changing the way
their preferences or dissatisfaction through choice. infrastructure is provided in almost every sector-
34

in particular, by naking the unbundling of diverse same time, increased efforts are being made to deactivities
more feasible. Microelectronic monitoring volve responsibility for infrastructure provision to
devices and nondestructive testing techniques can local governments, to increase participation, and to
facilitate the assessment of infrastructure facilities foster self-help.
(at reduced cost), often permitting testing by an Awareness that the poor (and future generations)
agent other than the operator-such as the owner are constituencies that must be answered to has
or regulator. Remotely controlled devices for in- stimulated a search for alternatire ways of providspecting
pipe networks and the shift from analog to ing services or managing demands so as to broaden
digital telephone switching have greatly simplified access while avoiding environmental problems. Reland
reduced maintenance costs. Electronic informa- atively simple changes in design parameters for
tion systems, including geographic mapping, im- sewerage and improved design of latrines have
prove the planning and design of investments and made sanitation affordable to low-income commuthe
coordination of network operations. Technolo- nities while permitting private initiatives in financgies
tHat are dearly more efficient robust, and flexi- ing, maintenance, and manufacture of parts. An
ble than earlier methods enable developing coun- increasing range of technical, economic, and institutries
to "leapfrog" sectoral transitions experienced tional alternatives to conventional wastewater treatearlier
by high-income countries. Fcr example, ment can reduce the need for costly filtratior. plants.
Brazil based its telecommunications expansion in Countries are adopting alternatives to large-surface
the 1970s on emerging digital equipment and schemes in irrigatiorn-such as drip, bubble, and
thereby facilitated the development of information- sprinlder systems and low-level canals with low-lift
based industries. Policy-induced inefficiencies pumps-that are highly responsive to farmers'
slowed the modernization of the sector in the 1980s, needs for water and are also environmentally sushowever.
taiable. There is renewed interest in nonmotorized
means of transport, including bicycles and hand
NEw PRAGMAISM. A new attitude, stemming carts, and simple road improvements that enhance
from an enhanced understanding of the relative mobility in both rural and urban areas; Recognition
strengths and weaknesses of governments and mar- of the need to conserve scarce resources has led to
kets, is also creating opportunities for reform of in- efforts to avoid unnecessary infrastructure investfrastructure
provision. In the 1980s, the efforts of ments-for example, by promoting recycling and
many countries to reduce the size of their over- recovery of solid waste materials; reducing waste
extended public sectors led to a better realization of and effluents at the source; and managing demand
what govemments and markets can and cannot do. for water, power, and transport (Chapter 4). Indus-
Worldwide liberalization of markets and experi- trial and developing countries are leaning from
ments with different forms of private sector partici- each other in these areas.
pation in many sectors have provided a new. body of
experience to reinforce this pragmatic attitude. Theo- The -ay ahead: a road map of reformn
retical and institutional advances have also revealed
when regulation is necessary and how to refine its Awareness of past mistakes, together with new opapplication.
All this leads to two main conclusions. portunities, demands that a fresh look be taken at
First, there are fewer infrastructure activities requir- the roles that governments or other public agencies
ing government intervention than once believed, and the private sector should play in providing a
Second, when required, goverment intervention mor efficient and more responsive infrastructure.
can be exerted through less distorting instruments of The challenge is to determine those areas in which
public policy than those traditionally used.
competitive market conditions can work and those
that require public action. Within these broad pa-
RENEWED COMMrTMENT TO SOCIAL AND ENVIRON- rameters, there is a menu of institutional options
MENTAL CONCERNs. Political developments-includ- that allow governments, public sector agencies, and
ing the trend in many countries toward democra- private groups (both for-profit and nonprofit) to astization,
pluralism, and decentralization-have sume responsibility for different aspects of service
fueled a concern with finding more affordable and provision. The choices among the options will vary
environmentally friendly solutions in infrastruchtre. among countries, on the basis of thleir economic, in-
This conmmitment has led to greater- appreciation of stitutional, and social characteristics. The spectrum
the need to consult local communities, the poor, and of options is broad, but four main approaches can be
groups affected by environmental factors. At the identified:
35

* Option A: Public ownership and operation, these arrangements require appropriate sectoral rethrough
a public enterprise or government depart- structuring to maximize the opportunity for compement
tition and to ease the regulatory burden.
* Option B: Public ownership but with private Chapter 4 examines issues that neither ommerresponsibility
for all operation (and for financial cialization nor competition alone can addressrisk)
problems of externalities (particularly environ-
* Option C Private ownership and operation mental), distributional equity, and the need for
* Option D: Community and user provision. coordination of investments. It discusses ap
Tfhe remainder of this Report discusses how proaches for assessing and creating accountability
more efficient and responsive provision of infra- to social and environmental concerns, through destructure
can be achieved by improving. incen- centralization of governmental responsibilities, partives-tlrough
stronger mechanisms of account- ticipation by users and stakeholders (including
ability and autonomy. Chapter 2 discusses ways to rough self-help' schemes, Option D), and plancreate
accountability in a public agency or gov- uning. Chapter 5 reviews how mechanisms of financernment
department (Option A) by establishing ing infrastructure can create incentives for efficiency
commercial principles and through organizational by providing the disciplinary pressure of private firestructuring
(corporatization). It also reviews con- nandal markets. Because different aspects of infratracting
instruments to permit better monitoring structure provision involve different kinds of risks,
and performance of operations, and appropnate the chapter considers how a suitable packaging of
mechanisms for achieving financial autonomy. finance using alternative sources and instruments
Commercial prindples are often very difficult to (private and public) can lead to better risk manage-.
instill permanently in the absence of effective com- ment-in addition to mobilizing increased funds
petition. Chapter 3 discusses the scope and tech- for infrastructure investmenL Chapter 6 returns to
niques for marshaling market forces to create the menu of options and shows how these can be
accountability thomugh competition and-where applied in different infrastructure sectors and councompetition
alone is insufficient-regulatior. Chap- tries. The conditions for successful implementation
ter 3 also examines experiences with public owner- of these options axe also outlined. The chapter closes
ship and private operation (Option B), in which with a broad assessment of the economic and financompetition
for the market is used, as well as pri- cial benefits that countries can gain by follo dng the
vate ownership and operation (Option C). Both of reform agenda presented in this ReporL
36

Runpublic entities on
commercial principles
Successful providers of infrastructure services, in frastructure services in most countries and most
the public or private sector, are generally run. on sectors in the foreseeable. future. In the poorest
business lines and have three basic characteristics: countries, today's weak private sector capabilities
They have clear and coherent goals focused on will improve only slowly. Second, even with dydelivering
services.
namic private sector involvement, some sectors-
* Their management is autonomous, and both such as road networks and major public worksmanagers
and employees are accountable for re- will remain predominantly in the public domain.
suits.
Third, only an effective public sector will facilitate
* They enjoy financial independence. private sector involvement-a dispirited and inef-
The princples underlying these characteristics ficient public works.department is unlikely to mocome
naturally to a private business, but by no bilize the will or the ability to contract out road
means always to organizations in the public sector. maintenance. Fourth, many developing country
Governments are forced to balance many different governments will decide (for strategic, regulatory,
economic, social, and political objectives, and it is or political reasons) to retain much of the responsicommonplace
for these goals to spill over into the bility for building and operating infrastructure in
activities of all public sector organizations, includ- the public sector, as many high-income countries
ing infrastructure enterprises. Similarly, manage- have done.
ment of public sector employees is often hampered Improving the effectiveness of public sector inby
numerous restrictions on establishing account- frastructure providers (Option A in Chapter 1) is
ability and rewarding good performance. In addi- thus critical. It can be done by applying three core
tion, the financial status of public agencies and en- instruments to reinforce commercial operation in
terprises often depends on budgetary decisions that the public sector
are unrelated i": performiance and on pricing deci- v Corporatization, which establishes the quasisions
that are cziven by politics. These fadors often independence of public entities and insulates infrawork
against rational management.
structure enterprises from noncommercial pressures
Many argue that endemic organizational fail- and constraints.
ures and poor performance are compelling argu- * Explicit contracts between governments and
mnents for abandoning efforts to reform the public (public or private) managers or private entities insector
and for relying instead on the private sector volved in infrastructure services, which increase
to provide infrastructure services. Increased re- autonomy and accountability by specifying perforliance
on the private sector, discussed in Chapter 3, mance objectives that embody government-defined
may be right for some countries and sectors. Nev- goals.
ertheless, making the public sector more effective is * A pricing strategy designed to ensure cost reimportant
for (at least) four reasons. First, given covery, which creates a desirable form of financial
current government dominance, the public sector independence for public utilities and even at times
will continue to have primary responsibility for in- for public works.
37

Lessons of success and failure
management yielded a productivity increase of only
-2.1 - percent - . -in- one . case and less than 4 percent in the
Although the public sector has invested heavily in other. Because these firms were already being run
expanding infrastructure stocks (Chapter 1), gov- on commercial principles, the gains from privatizaermments
have done less well in managing the flow tion were ten to twenty times less than would otherof
infrastructure services. Experience suggests that wise have been the case. There are many other
the key elements present in successful providers, examples of successful public provision of infraand
lacking in troubled ones, are those character- structure services-Mexico in power, Korea and
-ized above as commercial principles.
Singapore in most or all sectors, and Togo in water
supply to name a few. Until recently, Botswana's
What success shovws
water utility was also run on commercial prnciples,
and it has had an enviable performance record
That many public entities have performed poorly (Box 2.1).
does not mean the public sector is incapable of get- What is the secret of such success? A.common
ting it right. A recent study-of the privatization of feature is a high degree of autonomy for the entities
two previously well-run public power frins in concerned. Managerial and organizational auton-
Chile shows that the improvements from private omy does not mean complete freedom: all public
Box 2.1 The rigt way to run a public utility a look at Botswana's
Water Utility Corporation
Created in 1970, Botswana's Water Utility Corporation others in order to retain supply. BWUC does not hesitate
(BWVUC) has two primary responsibilities: to provide to adjust prices as needed in order to manage demand.
potable water to the coumtrys principal urban areas and In 1985-86 charges were raised to counter the effects of a
to operate a financially self-supporting service.
severe droughL This action effectively reduced demand
WUC is under the admi nistrative jurisdiction of the to the point where everyone could obtain a minimtun
Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairsm The quantity of water during the drought and avoided the
ministry's deputy secretary is chairman of the board, need to cut supplies. Accounts receivable are usually less
and until recently he has been successful in keeping po- than 2 penrct of all the amounts collectible, attesting to
litical influence out of the conduct of BWUCs opera- the success Jstrict billing and colection procedures.
tions. This effort has been helped to some edentt by con- A family of six people consumning about 100 liters a
tracting out management (until 1990 mostly to day per capita pays about $8.85 a month-approxiexpatriates,
but increasingly to nationals). The only pus mately 8 pecent of its inome. Reducing consumption to
sible defect in this arrangement is that contracts are for 80 liters lowers the water bill to about 5 percent of intwo
years, which fouses problem solving on short-term come. A wealthier family consuming twice that much
solutions because managers want to be able to show the would pay about$32.25 a month. These charges are high
effect of their decisions while stil under contract
in comparison with those levied by sinilar utilities in
BWUC maintainis a twenty-four-hour supply of Africa, but they have the effect of constrainrig consumpwater
to all its service areas, with high-quality treatment tion and ensuring that the utility does not have to rely on
Botswana is thefefore one of the few countries in Africa subsidies from the government or from other sectors in
with a safe urban water supply. Water losses are accept- the economy.
able, at about 15 percent in the distnbution system and A noteworthy achievement is the "one-check" sys-
10 percent in the raw-water transmission and treatment tem for govemment users. The Ministry of Finance
processe The overall loss of about 25 percent would be meets all monthly charges for the govemment and
considered good by utilities in many industrial coun- deducts them from the cash allocatrons of each ministry
tries. These low losses reflect the good quality of or department This procedure avoids the accumulation
BWUC's engineers, who are attracted bv competitive of arrears by govemment users of infrastructure services
salaries. - that is common elsewhere.
BWUC charges commercially oriented tariffs appro- Recently, however the utility has begun experiencing
priate for the urban conditions in Botswana, and tarifs -problems. After more than twenty years of successful
are increased when necessary. Meters are read and con- operation, BWUC is finding it increasingly difficult to
sumers are billed monthly, with thirty days to pay. Sup- adjust its rates as required. Lags, in tariff adjustments
ply is cut off immediately if payment is not made, and may yield short-term political gains, but they will also
there are charges for reonnection. Little evidence exists allow water consumption to grow and increase the risks
that consumers who have been cut off are sharing with of water shortages in this severely water-scarce country.
38

Table 2.1 Common management problems in public sector infrastructure entities, 1980-92
(pardentg of World Batk loais in witidr comnditiors wer imposed to address trie pmblen artrt)
Secfor Nzrnnberof lorns U[ndear grls
Sounreofprobkm.
Lackofrnmwagaunmt
artonotmy rand accmutiatbiliy
Financial
pbtentks
W agea:nd
labor prbens
Electricty 48 27.1 333 72.9 31.3
.Water 40 25.0 40.0 70.0 35.0
Telecom 34 14.7 353 5_29 32.4
Rail 39 15.i 20.5 53.S 333
Road 35 8.6 22.9 40.0 -40.0
Parts 28 21A 35.7 32.1 42.9
Source World Bank database (ALCID).
providers are subject to regulatory oversight by America, or South Asia, water and power entities
their parent ministries. Government sets clear poli- receive miixed signals from governments about
des and goals while leaving detailed planning and where to expand their networks. The main victims
implementation of services to the providers. This of inconsistent official prionrties have often been
delegation of responsibility and conscious absence rural areas, where government failure to improve
of political intervention are one reason wvhy these coverage is pushing users to search for alternative
public agencies have retained high-quality man- forms of service provision (Chapter 4).
agers and why they enjoy stability in mid-manage- A lack of autonomy and accountability underlies
ment and professional structures. Successful public many other problems. Fmancial problems, overemsector
organizations also enjoy financial strength. ployment, and unfocused goals occur because man-
Tariffs cover (at a miniimum) the requirements for agers do not have control over day-to-day operaoperations
and maintenance, while effective cost ac- tions-or over decisions on prices, wages,
counting controls expenses. This reliance on cost re- employment, and budgets. Managers in such crcovery
from users accounts in part for the emphasis cumstances seldom. have much mcentive to try
on good customer relations. Also common (although harder. In Ghana, for example, a 1985 reform made
not universal) among well-run public organizations the chief executive of a utilitv responsible to its
is the use of private contractors and private capital board of directors, but amendments gradually
in infrastructure operation and maintenance,
shifted accountability back to the relevant ministry,
thereby restoring direct political intervention. The
Wht fiizre shows
problem became even worse when perfornancebased
bonuses, introduced to motivate managers
A survey of forty-four countries with World and employers, became an integral part of the salarv
Bank-financed projects designed to improve infra- structure and thus lost their incentive valuestructure
performance revealed the most common The third problem, financial difficulties, is comproblems
in six infrastructure sectors (Table 21). mon in power and water utilities when politically
Unclear goals, lack of managerial autonomy and ac- motivated tariff adjustments lag behind cost incountability,
financial difficulties, and wage and creases. These difficulties reflect a lack of managelabor
problems are recurrent problems for the pub- ment autonomy and the use of public infrastructure
lic sector entities involved.
entities to achieve diverse uncompensated goals-
The goals of public sector infrastructure pro- such as keeping tariffs low in order to counter inflaviders
are often hazy and inconsistent More than tion- In Brazil, between March 1985 and the end of
simply financial objectives are necessary in setting 1989, three freezes on public sector pnrces caused the
goals for infrastructure providers, especially when a real tariff tD drop by 59 percent for port services, 32
large share of the population is without access to the percent for railways, and 26 percent for telecormmuservice
involved. The goals may indude quantita- nications. The results were higher public enterprise
tive targets like user coverage or capacity expan- losses that defeated the anti-inflation strategy by
sion. In the absence of such goals, public providers fueling the overall public sector deficit.
have often failed to recognize that some consumer Problems with wages and employment often
groups-such as the poor and rural consumers- have their origins in the first three problems. Many
are willing to pay for services and thus should be infrastructure utilities are overstaffed because govtargeted
to receive them. Whether in Africa, Latin emments use them to create public sector jobs and
39

-~~~~o 22, -Svrac pa eae layoffs
tte use of local resources and can be more consistent
Box 22 Sevrancepay eses lyoffswith
environmental and poverty objectives. In
inu Argentinma Ralwy
Rwanda, for example, switching to labor-based con-
R~~i~ had struction of secondary and gravel roads increased
By o te th ed 190s,Ai~ntiailashd.le
employment by 240 percent (mostly for low-wage
about 95,000 employees and an annualdeit
equvalnt o 1perentof DP.Sine te md-unskiledl laborers highly represented among the
1970s, the wage bill ad consistetly exceeded revpotal co ni
enue. Estimates indicated that cutting personnel by by about one-third.
half would not affecthe level of service. Governents can avoid these four common
Major refomd s have been introduced over the problems and increase the chances of success by a-
past few years. Prvate sector
fwouldnotaffertthelevelofmany
concessions were ating goverrunents organizations contdnt driven by avod con,unera pressfures prindgranted
to run al freight lines and the Buen Aires pies. Corporatization misulates organizations from
Butmon
region passenger service. To curb losses and reduce conts and peusBti
employment intercity passenger service was cut
back by t The World Bank supported the
many governent
does not mean that infrastructure providers are able
initial reforn efforts by financing (trugh an ad- to set their own agenda and goals. Governument, as
justment loan) severance costs of the voluntay re- the owner of public infrastructure enterprises or cor-
-tiement of 30,0W rail employees. The serance porations, continues to set their basic goalspay
was roughly equivalent to tWo yers of salry . -through explcit contracts if necessary-and to regufor
each retired employee. Auditors certified that late their behavior so as to ensure an adequate
severance payments were made orny to staff whose
labor contracts were te rmnated and that payments
manconformed
to labor laws and were consistentwith agerial autonomy and well-fcused goals, prices
severance pay in other sectors. Measures to prevent must be set-either by the provider or through regreemployment
were also put in place. ulation-at levels that ensure financial strength and
dExeal finaning of the initial adjustment incentives.
added aedibility to the reform prcess and reduced
the resistance of unions. It also paved the way for Corotiztion
subsequent employment-eduction cycles financed
from covement esources. Eventually, 60,000 -
workerswernmretired overa Evntyearpeliod. The explicit separation of infrastructure service proworkers
were retired over a two-year period.
viders from government starts by changing a government
department into a public enterprise in
order to increase management autonomy. Many
countries have adieved this changeover in water,
pass the additional cost on to taxpayers or con- power, and railways, although it is a more recent
sumers. This practice often results in the underfand- phenomenon in port services. Enterprises are
ing of maintenance. Overstaffing erodes managerial obliged to provide services that match demand, but
autonomy, diffuses organizational goals. and creates manv do not have the legal corporate independence
financial problems, especialy in transport, although needed to ensure efficient operatiorn.
also in other sectors. During the 1980s, one of the Corporatization is the next step, giving the enterlargest
water systems in East Asia increased its prise an independent status and subjecting it to the
billed services by 132 percent, an increase that nor- same legal requirements as private firms. Corporamnally
would yield a dedine in per-unit personnel tization means that the entity is subject to standard
costs. But staff increased by 166 percent over the commercial and tax law, accounting criteria, compesame
period, thereby negating the benefit of higher tition rules, and labor law and is less susceptible to
revenues. governent interference. In practice, this transfor-
Another employment problem is that, although mation is not always complete because public orgapublic
entities are often overstaffed, they seldom nizations do not face adequate competition or do
use sufficiently labor-based methods, which can be not have solely coDnmercial objectives. For examnple,
both cost-effective and result in high-quality infra- corporatization implies the transfer of employees
structure in roads, water and sanitation, irrigation, from civil service status to contracts governed by
and urban infrastructure. In Sub-Saharan Africa ordinary labor law Yet even under corporate strucpublic
agencies have often preferred equipment- tures, public entities are often reluctant to reduce
and capital-intensive road construction for overde- employment The experience of developing counsigned
roads that usually require capital-intensive tries suggests that the enforcement of ordinary
maintenance. Removing such biases often improves labor law and the work force cuts needed for suc-
4D

Box 2.3
It took ten years to corporatize Indonesia's main ports
In Indonesia, there are three formal stages in the adop- Two years elapsed before the government addressed
tion of commercial princples. First, the government de- the overregulation that remained a major inpediment to
partment is transformed into a government enterprise, the success of the new corporations. Moreover, man-
Then the enterpise becomes a corporation that still has a agers did not yet have a lear understanding of their rocombination
of commercial and noncommerial goals. sponsibilities and accountability and ladced the auton-
Finanly, the corporation is turned into a profit-oriented omy to implement refonns they thought were needed.
entity whose ownership can be shared with the private These problems had been addressed by 1988, when an
sector. Ports have just reached this third stage. effective cost contrml program lowered expenses by 5
The reform of Indonesia's port management began in percent and increased revenue by 20 pent for the
1983. Before that, the management of all 300 ports was largest port corporation. Between 1987 and 1992, revcentralized
in the Directorte General of Sea Communi- enue grew almost twice as fast as expenses.
cations, a govemnment departmient Most of these ports Ten years after the reform process started, the port
had obsolete equipment and ailed to meet regional corporations face the market tesL Competition promnises
-needs. In mid-1983 the government decided to decen- to be tough: a recent survey of foreign investors ronked
tralize management for ninety of its ports by creating Indonesia's port infr_astructur at about the same level as
fior new public port corporations, headquartered at the Australia's but below others in the region, such as Hong
four largest ports.
Kon& Malaysia, and Sn'gapore
cessful restructuring are more politically accept- down by 67 percent, allowing its revenue to inaease
able-and hence more sustainable-when sever- from 92 to 111 percent of its full operating costs.
ance pay accompanies dismissals. This has been the Organizational changes are.always simpler on
experience with Argentina's railway reform pro- paper than in practice. It takes time and much effort
gram (Box 2X2).
to convert a government department into a public
The transformation of a government department corporation. The introduction and full implementaor
rministry into a public enterprise is more difficult tion of standard accounting practices alone can talce
for public works than for utilities-and roads pre- up to five years, as many Eastern European policysent'a
special challenge. However, converting high- makers are finding ouL Getting everything else
way departments to public utility corporations (as right is equally difficult Ghana's utilities have been
in New Zealand) is attracting hiterest as a way to undergoing transformation for seven years and still
improve performance, especially im the area of have a long way to go. And it took ten years to cormaintenance.
Highway expenditures are budgeted poratize fully Indonesia's major ports (Box 23).
according to assessments of traffic-related costs, and
user charges are then calculated to reflect the wear Focused goals and accountable management
and tear caused by different types of vehicles. This
experience is very recent, however, and, although it Corporatization provides an .organizational struchas
inspired similar approaches (in Tanzania, for in- ture, but by itself it merely transforms the problem
stance), it is too early to assess its sustainability. of official governance into the more tractable, al-
Commnercial accounting procedures are an imme- though still difficult, task of corporate governance.
diate benefit of corporatization. Explict cost ac- Organizational changes alone neither provide dear
counting identifies nonremunerative activities and goals nor create incentives for managers to meet
reveals sources of inefficiencies, making costs and these goals. Many gouernments argue that their debenefits
more transparent in public enterprises partments and enterprises are already run on comand
govermnent departments. In Ghana, for exam- mercial principles, but this has not helped managers
ple, an attempt to reform the main utilities began to be more effective. Many manngers argue that the
with the development of a good set of accounts for autonomy they do get is too limited to be effective
costs. The government's move to suppress transfes and that it is too easily revoked Many workers argue
to enterprises that could achieve financial autonomy that they have little incentive to be effective because
created a need for the enterprises to use proper cost- good and poor performers are treated equally. And
accounting techniques. Within two years, real oper- many users would argue that corporatization has
ating costs in the state transport corporation were not given them access to unproved or expanded ser-
41

vices. These concerns are particularly prevalent in Performance agreemcn2ts
Africa and South Asia, where reorganizations of
public utilities and goverunment departments have Performance agreements negotiated between govbeen
common but where performance has often re- emment (the enterprise owner) and managers have
mained disappointing. Latin American countries been tried in most infrastructure sectors. This type
have prefenred a more fundamental shift to pnvate of agreement onginated in France, where the main
ownership (Chapter 3).
purpose was to spell out reciprocal commitnents of
The introduction of market principles can help govenment and managers. Korea, which was
solve the problem of corporate govemance. For its among the early Asian users of performance agreepart,
government must allow adequate competition, =ments, added explicit performance-based incentives
level the regulatory playing field, and instruct man- for both managers and employees. The focus on inagers
to maximize profits or to achieve set. rates of centives.is what most recent contracts are trying to
return. Although effective in the long. run for some duplicate...
sectors and some services, this solution raises at
least two problems.. First, and more obvious, pro- REVEALING INFORMATION TO IMPROVE THE FOCUS. In
viders in many cases are in the public sector pre- order to identifv the sources of incentive failures,
cisely because of the limits on profit maxiiiza- govermnents.must develop information and evalution-either
because the services are public goods ation systems for performance monitoring. The in-
(as with roads) or because governments have objec- formation component focuses on the development
tives other than profit. Second,.because service of standard financial and cost-accounting proce-.
providers have monopoly powers, prices have to dures, as well as detailed quantitative and qualitabe
regulatedc outside the supplying entity (see tive. indicators. In roads, for example, these indica-
Chapter 3).-
tors include measures of the condition of the
When the market solution cannot be used to ad- network and its use and management, admhnistradress
corporate governance problems in the public. tion and productivity, and finance. The negotiation
sector, three.other approaches miight be considered of a performance agreement covering most of these
for structuring the relationship between govern- indicators has allowed the HIghway Department of
ments and infrastructure providers..
the State of Santa Catarina in southern Brazil to
P r aee retain al dcso in . ..................... sharpen its objectives. The result is that priorities
Perfornmace agreemnents retain all decisions m hv hne n ou oeo aneac n
the public sector. They try to increase the account- have changed and focus more on maintenance and
ability of employees and managers and to*
rehabilitation of roads than they have in the pasL
abilty or emnployees and managers and to improve
the
the
focus
focus
of
of
operations
operations by
b. clarifying
clarifying
pe.
performance.--
,Specific orinance
targets have
--
been set for all categories of ex-
expectations and the roles, responsibilities, and re penditure. The share of paved roads i poor condiwards
of all those involved. ~ - tion is expected to decline from 18 percent in 1991 to
4 percent by the end of 1994. Staff needs and skills
Manage7ne12t con2tractstrnEropvaer-
i
-de respo the t fr managin g private - have been assessed, supporting a reduction in
viders the responsibfllty for managmgz an operation--- -
an opera,ti workers from 3,149 in 1990 to 1,885 in 1993. Ahready
such as a port or a power or water utly Thyisucrasethe
auportonapomy m of agenty andreducether m- 10 percent of all maintenance work is contracted out
crease the autonomy of management and reduce the - -
risks of political interference in the day-to-day oper- to the private sector-and the performance abgree
ations of the public entity- ment requires an increase to 25 percent by 1995.
- Service contracts transfer to private providers Simflar reforms are being introduced in the states of
*Service aoufmcts transfer to private providers ._ ...- -
s
the responsiblfity for
,.
delivering
, . .,-
a spedfc
.
service
. hS~~~~aranh5o,
at
Piaui, and TocanEns.
lower costs or obtaning specific skills or expertise B - Nc
.. - . . . . , . . ~~~~BUILDING IN INCENTTVEs. This component has sevlacking
in the public sector-such as design engi& e
neering. (Turning all operations over to the private m gal autonomy forst enterprise as welleas
sector under a lease or concession is discussed in renaris wk for a mnaersnsexange fo
Chapter - 3.) . ~~~~~rewards for worlcers and managers in exchange for
Chapter 3..
fulflling agreed performance targets Some agree-
-Properly designed, these contracts can address ments in India, Korea, and Mexico iiclude bonuses
organizational failures. And they can be just as ef- of up to 35 percent of total wages. The Koreans confective
in a public works departnent as in a public sider nonpecuniary benefits-such as award cereutility.
Many governments are attracted to such con- monies or press coverage-to be a key factor in
tracts because they do not involve relinquishing their success witlh contracts. Firing nonperforming
public ownership.
staff is one of the sanctions available in Korea (Box
-42

2.4). The second incn!five element that can be built WHAT . IAVE PERFORMANCE AGREEMENTS ACCOMinto
these agreemenits relates to the duration of the PLUSHED? Performance agreements have often been
agreement Shorter agreements (one year, as in successful in East Asia, thanks to explicit efforts to
Korea or Mexico) are more effective because they build incentives for.managers and workers into the
allow for more frequent a-essments, although they contracts and to monitor these incentives. When
also involve time-consuming renegotiations.
performance agreements were used, the rate of re-
The third common -incentive is the weight at- turn on the assets of the Korean Electric Corporation
tached to various performance indicators after care-. tripled over a period of seven years (Box 2.4). These
ful negotiation between the managers involved and agrments are also. proving useful in the reform of
the government In Mexico the agreement signed in Ilighway departments, as seen from the supplier's
1989 by the Federal Electriity Commidssion and the experience. .Performance agreemnents have not
government distributed weights according to its achieved such impressive results in Africa. Alpriorities
as follows: 44 percent for improvements in. though they have often improved noncommercial
productivity, 23 percent for better operational effi- goals, such as increases in rural coverage, they have
ciency, 18 percent for reaching administrative and fi- often failed to achieve financial targets. In Senegal
nancial targets, and 15 percent for improvements in cost recovery efforts improved initially, but within
service quality. Thtese weights were only partly suc- three years costs were back to the level they had
cessful in giving managers and employees a better been before the introduction of performance agreesense
of priorities and an incentive to focus on what ments. In this case, the agreements failed to address
matters rather than on what might be easier to the lack of performance incentives for managers and
achieve. By 1991 the ranldng of performance from workers. The difficulties that many agreements have.
best to worst was as follows: efficiency, service qual- had in differentiating the rewards for performance
ity, productivity, and administrative and financial in the civil service explains why most experts hold
performances-not quite a match with the priorities little hope for such agreements in Africa and suggest
and weights.
relying more on other alternatives discussed below.
Box 2.4 What's special about Korean perormane agreements?
The Korean performance agreements are an outcome of opment, improvement in management information, and
the 1983 reform of public enterprises The agreemenils internal control systems Indicators are combined into a
are intended to pmdt comparative evaluation of the single public profitabilityindicator using a weighted avshort-
and long-term performance of all managers erage of performance Witfirespect to each indicator.
(rather than focusing on the company), to ensure that in- Whrit is tire infonnation base for the assessment? Korea
formation is available for the evaluation, that rewards to now benefits from a sound financial and accounting
managers and emplyees are linked to their perfor- basis that provIdes management with a. clear statement
mance,-and that the evaluation is done by independent of objectives for performance. To some extent, this
auditors. Korea has been imore successful with perfor- - spread of standard accounting techniques stems from
Iiance evaluations than most countries Despite finan- their introduction as one of the performance indicators
cial difficulties at some enterprises in recent years, they HOW is permance relatcd to nrward? To increase achave
generally reached their noncommercial goals. countability to users of infrastructure services, the per-
What ind of perfonmnce indicators arm tsed? Perfor- formance-based ranking of publlc companies is pubmance
indicators are selected to measure results against lished in the press. The best managers get not only
the trend and according to agieed targets. The bench- prestige but also monetary compensation. The annual
marks are generAly based on international experience bonus to staff members and the career prospects of their
and are derived in consultation with independent out- -managers are related to the ranking of their company.
siders to miniiize potential conflicts of interesL The tar- 7The outcne? Within three years, the management
gets are set and assessed annually to increase account- performance of executive directors, directors, and deability.
Quantitative indicators- generally aCCOuntlfor 70 partmnentchiefs improved substantiallyinatleastd60 perpercent
of the final sore. The key quantitative indicators cent of the enterprises. More dramatically, the mte of reare
profitability and productivity. Other quantitative turn on the assets of the public enterprises (in the case of
indicators are sector-specific, representing such charac- the power and telecommunications companies) rose
teristics as coverage or physical outputs. Qiialitative in- from less than 3 pecent before 1984 to more than 10 perdicators
focus on corporate strategy, research and devel- cent by the end of the decade. -
43

Management conitracting
wHEN is Ir Em!Fcnvf? management contr-acting
works better when a contrctor is granted significant
Management contracting gives responsibility for a autonomy in decisionmaking and compensation is
broad scope of opera tions and maintenance to the based, at least. in part, on. performance.. In France,
private sector-usually for thiree to five years. This where management contracts are common in water
approach can be more effective than relying on a supply and sanita tion, the incentive for productivity
performance agreement to achieve similar objec- improvement links the contractor's payment to such
tives. A management contract signed for th-e power indicators as 'reduced leakages and increased concompany
in Guinea-Bissau is demonstrating that nections. The- contract for the Electricity and Water
management contracts may work where many per- Company of Guinea-Bissau specified that 75 percent
formance agreements have failed. Thiere, a new of the remuneration was guaranteed but that the remanagement
team succeeded in doubling electricity maining 25 percent was based on performance.
sales in just three years (Box 2.5).
Management contracts with fees based on perfor-
However, when public agencies prevent a pri- mance tend to be more succesful than those with
vate contractor frorn controlling key functions af- fixed fees-such as traditional management confecting
productivity and service quality-such- as suiting assignments. Fixed-fee arra ngements differ
staffing, procurement, or* publicly provided work- little from technical assistance and are seldom suc-.
ing capital-the contractor cannot be held acoDunt- cessfuL. Relating incentives to performance may not*
able for overall performance, and generally the con- work, however, where a government can interfere
tract does not succeed. That is why a recent withi tariffs. In general, such contrxacts tend to be
management.contract signed for a power plant in~ more useful as interimn arrangements allowing prithe
't
Philippines
t'
failed within nine months. When the vate firms and public agencies to gain
unai
experience
new. managers and the governmuent disagreed on withi partnerships before engaging in mare compre-
*staffing levels and composition, the contract was hensive contracts or while the regulatory framework
broken despite the rapid improvemnents observed in is being develope-d (both discussed in Chapte-r 3).
maintenance following the arrival of the new man- A recent innovative application of management
*agement team. contracts is the experience with Agences d'Execu-
::'~~~~Fe
Box 2.5 Management contracting in Giiinea-Bissau-a success story?
Introducing a five-person mnanagement team under a The foreign management cpntract was implemented
foreign mnanagement contract improved the perfofnance under a joint Initiative of the French Mfinistry of Cooperof
Guinea-Bissau's national electric utility. Previously, ation, the United Nations.Development Progrmmue, the
service interruptions had been chronirj and most' areas Afri'can Developmenit Bank, and the World Banik. Itr-mhad~
elctricity only a few hours a day. Comnpara tive sta- duced wastage of foDreign aid.. (n the previous ten years.
-tistics for 1957 and 1990 shovw the turnaround.. But more foreign aid for power was more than three times the estirecent
experience illustrates the difficulties of manage- mted value of the utility at the.end of the.period.)
ment-government relations.
At the begitnniing of 1994. however, seriousi problemns
became evident. Despite economic tariff~ the utility was
Box table 2.5 Performancoe of Cufinea-Bissau's
unable to generate revenue to finance expansion~-or
national utility electric
. ~~~~even, at times, current operations-leadin agin to
Indictor 1987 1990 1993 ~~~~shortages and reductions in service quality. This precari-
Installed (megawatts) capacity 72 ~ous finandal.condition was due to a large rise in receiv-
Operable capacity(megawatts)
fl 73ables stemming fromi the utility's difficulty in collecting
Capacityfacor (percent. 32 51 42 payments. The goveffnirent demnanded continued sercuo
xnsumnptin (kilograms
vice for 'critical' functions even when.isupi bills
per l ott-hour) 0300 0.254 0275 wr causg financial disr-es And ira the perivate sec -
Syst losses (percent 30 26wr 24 tor fiiudulent connectons were rampant despite the
Electrucity-sales (millions of -
utinty's efforts to prevent them.
keIlowatt-hours)
Average, revenuwe (dollai
14 28 27.
- per ki]owatt-hour) 0.12 0.25 .0.22
44

Box 2.6' AGETIPs: inrvolving the private sector in Africa's urban infrastructure
If govrnments do poorly in executing infratructure Contracting out promotes the development of local
projects, why niot leave it to the private sector? That is contrcting and consulting firms byaceating demand for
preciseiy what is happening in ten West African cairn- their services. The ACETIP in. Senegal now has 950 local
tries. The Agences dl'Exikutionf des Travaux.d'int6rf1: contractors and 260 local consultants on its books. It has
.Public (AGETIPs)-nonproflt nongovernmental agen- reduced barriErs to entry and made life easier for new,
cies fir executingpublic works-enter into contractual weaker firms by paying contractors every ten days; pubarrangementts
with governments to carry out infrantruc- lie entities typically take several months.
tum projects. The AGErIP i-n Senegal, wthich has twenty The autonomiy given to AGETIP managers enables
professional staff memnbers, has handled 330 projec:ts in them to run efficienL impartial, and transparent operaseventy-eight
municipalities. It hires consultants to pre- lions, and the agences' protected legal status shelters
pare designs and bidding documents and to suipervise them from political pressures. A strong management inworks,
issues calls for bids, evaluates bids and signs con- formation systemt and institutionalized personal actracts,
assesses progress, pays contractors, and repre- coDuntabilityf 'enable AGETIP managers to account for
sents the owvner at the final handover of the works, every project, supplier. payment voucher, and outstand-
ACErIPs use an integrated approach to design ing bill All consolidated project accounts are indepenworks
that promotes competition while facilitating ac- dently audited every six months. Theme are also bicess
foDr small contractors. Project designs take into monthily managem-ent audits and ant annual technical
aiccountlocal constraints, labor markets, the limlited out- auditL
put ipoten of small contractors the weak projec- An evaluation of AGETiP
identification capability of local governments, the avail- "corruption-free procedures!" have allowved them to
ability of consultant architects and eniees and the* complete projects largely on schedule with a cost overeconomic
and social rationale of subprojects under.con- run of only 1.2 pearet of the portfolio (cost overruns in
-sideration. Project eligiblt and selection criteria are public procurement average 15 percent of original estispelled
out, with.particular emphasis on labor-intensive mates). ACETIPs routinely obtain unit prices 5 to 40 permnethods.
Open competitive -bidding weeds out ineffi- cent lowe'r than- those obtained by the admiinistration
dent opeatom
thogh official bidding.
-~~~~~~~ta aciite shu ht hi
tio des x Travaux dInt&t Public (AGETIPs) in West for example, are routinely contracted out to plant
Africa. Management responsibilities for urban infra- suppliers. or specialists in most developing counstructure.
projects have been contracted out to non- tries. Service on contract is also a standard
profit, nongovernmental agencies that in tur con- arrangement for the design and construction of
tract out the public works involved. Increased maajor capital works- because of the obvious bemianagement
involvement and accountability have fits from speciaic zed engineering knowledge and
improved project performance- The management of construction skills The infrastructure supplier sets
contracts has improved and so has iplementation the performance criteria for the contracted serthrough
allowing smaller firthis, with more lbopr- vices, evaluates bids from competitive tendering
intensive techniques, to participate in goverment supervises performance, and pays agreed feesfor
contracrs. In Senegal the use of AGETIPs has led to the services involved. Contracting out is a versatile
10 to 15 percent reductions in unit costs in local in- means for carrying out many otuher tasks, and the
fra-structure projects (Box 2.6).
base of developingu countr experience is grwng.
Standard professional seivices-such as auditing,
Contracting out services data processing, and recruitment-are also often
contracted OUL Railways in Pakistan have con-
Contracting out services is becoming poput ar withi tracted out such activities as ticketihig cleaning,
public infrastructure providers. It provides a fled- and catering.. Private contractors in Kenya do limble
and cost-effective tool for increasing responsive- ited locomotive repair and maintenance for the
ness to users and taps expertise too eoensive to state railroad. Meter reading and fee colrections in
maintain permanenUty on public payrolls. It also the water supply and sewerage sectors have been
permnits competition among multiple providers, handled througlh service contracts in Chile since
each with short and specific contracts.
the 1970s. Santiago's public water company even
tContracting out is most commnon for mainte- encouraged employees to leave and compete for
nance services. Major overhauls of power stations, service contracts.
45

- :. : : . - I-
~~*r~
4.~ accounts and ach-ieve a better overall quality of ser-
.>gre-A1_;The4iagoftio, ofcowm~iM
vice. An additional gain fr-om these contracts is that
gp 4 r. & go s governument force account work groups have ber*wterecoveragn
come more en compelled to compete
: ~: with private contractors. A survey of contractors
sugest, lowve, tatmaintenance contracts o
- ... longer duration and wider scope are needed to jus-
F-di;ii9i>'e.>a-r.&-',;4.rr ti- capitalization -9=fy and acquisitiono of specialized
* FiguiE l (1984.>
. of a public entity depends on the actions of governr-
~ g - >- w ; ment, managers, and workers, the best contract is
.;-,. 7 Uu8~ tt.................... the one that most effectively alters incentives to
but a:perf.mancagreement in989 was-. whidnever of these three performs least well
-=needed to imp . eBnanczl outcomes If the problem is with the government, the perr>
ee - *--- L::->----: formance agreement may be the preferred instru-
190
* :
-; ! ment -; -because 0 | performance agreements are reapro-
. . For -: example, ..... = a 1989 :-;.caL performance agreement by
Togo's water utility illustrates how managers can
* . use m such ; - .: a -. ent toget the goverment to endorse
needed tariff inaeases. The performance
agreement was a complement to conmmercialization
Average @ ,. : X . in 1984. The utility's managers wanted an explicit
.perfonance agreement to commit the govenment
to tariff increases. Although commercialization unproved
performance with respect to noncommercial
*St< ; > s- I- ; 5 , goals-a 73.5 percent increase in the number of con-
* ,iSg~? B8687' 88< 89 o "-91 nections in just five years-it did not help financial
-Sr, ., ~performance because the govenmnent did not aurfl[
fjjjnjal c~ifl~fl.ntflbofl (198449)thorize - .
needed tariff increases. By 1989 the cost re-
: . - -covery ratio was 7 percent lower. than in 1984 (Fig-
* { lPerio& wth6e agreement (1989u91)
Lttrt '"
re 2Z1). The performance agreement was needed so
~~~~~~~~~that the government and the utility could agree on
~ AiilA~$J 4 k&Jt% > the steps to achieve finncial autonomy. Within a
year, the cost recovery ratio was 16 percent higher
than its 1984 value. However, if the problem is one
of weak commitment by the government, no reme-
How EFFECnvE s coNTRAcnmc our? Contracting dial instrument short of privatization is likely to be
out tends to be more cost-effective than using public very effective.
employees to handle maintenance (known as force If the problem is with management, the choice of
account). Brazil's switch to road maintenance by contract depends on whether abilities or incentives
contract reduced costs by some 25 percent for equiv- are in question. Performance agreements with in-
* alent service quality In Colombia rural microenter- cumbent public managers assume that their capabilprises
charge about half the rates implicit in force ities are adequate. Thus, in the case of an organiza-
46

tion with weak management skills, management is in the interest of both managers and users to encontracts
based on performance are more effective sure the predictability and stability of these rein
the short run, as in Guinea-Bissau. For the longer. sources. More transparency in the process will inrun,
training objectives an be incorporated in both crease the financial autonomy of managers.
performance agreements and management contracts.
Pricingfor public utilities
If the problem with management is one of incentives,
performance agreements need to make a dear Among public. utilities in developing countries,
link between performance and pecuniary and non- gross revenues typically cover costs only in telecor
pecuniary rewards to managers- This approach has munications (Figure) 2). Even so, local services are
been effective in Korea, where the president of a typically underpriced, with the losses made up ftom
public corporation that moved from last place significantly above-cost charges for long distance
(twenty-fourth) in the ranking of public enterprise and international service. This difference between
performance to first place in just one year was pro- tariffs and costs is a type of tax on users. In all other
moted to deputy minister. Management and service sectors the gap between revenues and costs implies a
contracts have the added advantage of signaling to government subsidy to users. These subsidies vany
civil servants and public managers that, if they fail from 20 percent for gas to 70 percent for water. The
to deliver, alternatives are available in the private low ratios of revenues to costs illustrate how little of
sector. The threat to switch to a private provider has their costs public utilities recover the financial losses
to be credible to be effective. In Botswana, after long thus generated are made good by transfers from
use of expatriate managers, the water utiliy govermenL For public water utilities in Latin
switched to a domestic manager, but the govern- America, annual financial losses represent 15 percent
ment has shown itself willing to rehire expatriates if or more of the invesbnents needed to supply the enperformance
deteriorates.
tire population with adequate services by the tum of
If the problem is :ne of poorly periforming civil the century
servants, incentives must go beyond managers.
Governments and managers can agree to build into
a perfornance agreement a clear link from em- -
ployee performance to salaries and nonpectiniary ftgure 22 doli;ae sddoni fuill ei
rewards. Yet at the same time, if employees arepro- iiaucture -
tected by civil service labor practices, neither performance
agreements nor management contracts mayf i&-to cot
suffice. A more effective method is to rely systemat- -; - ---
ically on service contracts, the way Chile has done -
to improve its road maintenance. This approach
guarantees that the job gets done and is an alternative
to the use of force account.
Pricing for financial independence
The third eleient in the successful provision of infrastructure
services on a commercial basis is the establishment
of reliable revenue sources that give -. -
providers more financial autonomy. Reliance on
revenues directly related to services delivered will -
increase the productivity of infrastructure suppliers.
and also often benefit users. Wit fwer budgetary -
transfers, the government has less occasion to inter- 0.0
fere, a fact key to managerial autonomy. For public IMF :
utilities, smaller subsidies give managers a greater Tio a Gas -
Wate
incentive to focus on cost reductions and to satsfy ------
users because payments from users have to cover :- ircTele rilU 1994 gas; WorldBnkdata poweh&
the cost of the service In the case of public works, fi- - onesiit-Joit sI993,Watet Bha .tiaa993.-
nancing must rely mainly on budgetary transfers. It -' -. --
47

The best way of reducing the gap between costs ities. This pricing strategy focuses on recovenng the
and revenues is to c-lt costs and achieve productive three main cost components of most infrastructure
efficiency-perhaps the most important lesson of utilities: connection, usage,-and peak-capacity costs.
the Bank's experience in infrastructure. Costs due to The cost of connecting a customer and maintainpoor
debt management are excessive in about one- ing that connection to distribution or collection netthird
of World Bank-supported infrastructure proj- works is typically levied as a periodic flat fee, often
ects. Maintenance problems that cause water or linked to charges based on usage in a two-part tariff.
power losses are even more common and costly. In The usage cost is easiest to recover when metering is
Costa Rica the national water company estimates an available to measure use and charges are based on
annual loss of income from such losses equivalent to actual consumption. Such charges reduce waste and
24 percent of investment planned for the next five encourage more efficient use. In Bogor, Indonesia,
years. In Mexico City at the end of the 1980s, neglect raising tariffs to meet crosts reduced water consumpof
maintenance and the lags between tariff increases tion by 30 percent -i less than a year without any
and cost increases in the water sector required a fed- obvious impact on health or economnic production.
eral subsidy amounting to about 0.6 percent of GDP Where metering has not been introduced, estimates
a year.
of usage are the mle. In Colombia and Thailand,
Once costs are controlled, well-established pric- fees rise with the diameter of the pipe- En India, the
ing principles can help achieve financial autonomy. fee increases with the value of the connected propand
reduce distortions in the allocation of re- erty. These soLutions axe not perfect and require fresources-reflected
in the success of countries as dif- quent monitoring, but they often are the best option
ferent as Botswana, Chile, Korea, and Singapore available. The move to metering depends on the pri-
(Box 2.7). The infrastructure pricing strategy in ority given to recoverng costs. One outcome of the
these countries aims at cost recovery suffcient to end of subsidies to Ghana's water utility in 1988
giuarantee the financial independence of public util- was an increase in meter coverage from less than 30
Box 2.7 Designing tariffs to achieve financial autonomy while addressing multiple goals
The geeral princple for pricing public services to re- vices (usually water or power) is priced at a low initial
cover costs without distorting the allocation of
rate reources up to a specified volume of use (block) and at a
is to set the price equal to all short-run costs incaured in higher rate per blodc thereafter The number of blocks
efficienty producing an additionlal unit of output (for ex- varies from tHree to as many as terL The most effective
ample, an extra gallon of water or a cubic meter of gas) structure is the simplest in particular when monitoring
while keeping productive capacity constant-that is, and administrative capacity are constraining.
price equals the sbort-run marginal cost. However, Under the time-of-use rate structure, users pay a pretelecommunications,
power, and water systems periodi- mium during periods of high demand. This structure encally
require large investmnents. In such cases, average courages users to shift demand to the off-peak period
costs fal as production is increased, and the efficient and has the added advantage of increasing the overall
price is below the average cost Charging that price utblization of capacity-and it often imcreases profits.
would result in a deficit and hence a loss of financial au- rune-of-use rates have been applied to railways, urban
tonomy- But even when there are no such economies of buses, and subways, but they are more common in utiliscale,
financial autonomy is at risk when public pro- ties such- as power, water, and telecommunications.
viders have ais obEgation to address social concems lime-of-use rates are practical for inrastructure supply
(Chapter 4).
networks in which the product cannot be stored cheaply
Adjustnents in the general pricing formula can be and its use can be partitioned by time slices into multiple
used to avoid an operational deficit and minimize the products. rune-of-use rates often vary by time of day for
tradeoffs imposed by the need to jointly address equity, power and telecormnunications, and by season for natefficiency,
and financial goalsh Ingeneral, if financial au- ural gas (to reflect seasonal demand for heating) and
tonomy is a requirement, the public price has to be re- water (to reflect seasonal supply, especially in dry
vised to cover the cost of providing the service plus a -seasons)-
markup, often resulting in multipart tariffs and possible Tariffs can also be differentiated in other ways. For
cross-subsidies Two common options to minimize the nstance, when servce costs differ by region, prices
distortions (to effidency and equity) of achieving finan- should reflect these differences. In Nairobi, Kenya, the
cial autonomy are increasing-block tariffs and time-of- 1975 cost of providing water at higher elevations was 32
use rate structures.
percent higher than the cost in lower parts of the acty
Under an increasing-block tariff, consumption of ser- Prices should vary vith such differences
48

percent to 53 percent in 1993, and in revenue coliec- Thiis effect has been demonstrated most convinction
from less than 50 percent to 91 percent of ingly for water, where the concerns for the poor are
billings.
properly strong. In the Brazilian city of Grande Vito-
One aspect of cost recovery that separates good ria, Espirito Santo state, the wilLingness to pay for
perfonners from poorer ones is that good perform- new water connections in 1993 was four times the
ers recover the costs of maintaining suffcient capac- cost of providing the service, while the willingness
ity to meet peak demand by levying a charge based to pay for. sewage collection and treatment was 2.3
on potential demand or actual consumption at peak. times its cost. Without treatment before disposal, the
This method helps avoid power outages and water willingness to pay falls to only 1A times the cost beshortages.
In other words, good performers are cause untreated sewage creates health problems and
much more careful than others in assessing de- reduces the recreational value (mostly the fishing
mand. In Colombia, India, and Korea, this capacity yield) of the waters into which it is discharged.
cost is charged only to the largest commercial and The willingness to pay for water is high for good
industrial users because they tend to be the main reason; For the poor, easier access to water can free
source of peak demand.
up time that can be used to pursue income-earning
Just as important as the incentive to meet objec- activities. In rural Pakistan, women with access to
tives negotiated with the government is the finan- improved water supply spend nearly 1.5 fewer
cial independence that allows public managers to hours a day fetching water than do women without
rely on the price system to assess users' willingness this access- Such savings are reflected in the value
to pay. Reliance on the price mechanism is in the in- users attach to the services. In Haiti a household's
terest of users because it directs provision toward willingness to pay for a new private connection inpreferences
determined by users rather than bu- creases by as much as 40 percent if the current water
reaucrats. Users are wiling or able to pay more source is at least a kilometer away
often than they are given credit for (Chapter 4).
The poor are not simply willing to pay in theory-
What keeps so many public utilities from recov- they are paying in practice During the rnid-1970s to
ering costs is political constraints Low prices are the early 1980s, people in seventeen cities surveyed
popular among those who receive a service even if were paying private water vendors an average of
they are willing to pay more. In Bangladesh, In- twenty-five times the prices charged by the utility.
donesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, receipts from In Nouakchott, Mauritania, and Port-au-Prince,
irrigation user fees are 20 to 90 percent less than the Haiti, vendors were charging up to a hundred times
cost of operation and maintenance. This shortfall re- the public utllity price. Expanding the public utility
flects the strength of the farmers' lobbies and their network to give the poor access would mean that
ability to get political endorsement for high subsi- fthey would pay less than they are now willig and
dies. Moreover, with subsidies guaranteed, public able to pay private providers.
managers have little incentive to perform well or to
improve their responsiveness to users. Without po- Public wuorks and financial autononmy
litical support, the needed organizational changessuch
as linking managers' rewards to the financial Making public works agencies financially indepenperformance
of the department or utlity-will not dent does not mean that the public organization
suffice.
collects revenue directly from users to cover its operational
costs. For public works, it is difficult or im-
COST RECOVERY AND THE PooRi Many govern- possible to measure-and hence to price-individinents
fear that fully recovering costs will hurt the ual use. Nevertheless, a predictable and transparent
poor, yet increasing prices to enable cost recovery in flow of revenue is necessary, based on user fees and
the delivery of services may actually help the poor. standard budgetary allocations from govemnment.
They often pay much higher prices per unit for pri- To some extent, the goal is one of financial accountvately
provided water and lighting because they are ability rather than financial autonomy because the
not connected to public service networks that have main objective is to achieve predictable and adelower
unit costs, and because they do not benefit quate financing. The key to the success of Korea's
from subsidies to users of the public system-usu- highway corporation has been making the perforally
the better-off. Expansion of access benefits the mance of the organization more transparent (a
poor by allowing them to rely on less costly sources process described in Box 2.4) and lining budgetary
of water and power. (Cases in which subsidies are transfers to performance. But in many developing
needed are discussed in Chapter 4.)
countries the budgetary process does not allow for
49

the high rates of return for maintenance, among the
highest in the public sector. As long as poor budgetary
practices and policies lead to preferences for invest-
ment over maintenance, and as long as the rates of re-
turn on maintenance remain high, earmarking will
avoid the underfunding of maintenance and improve
theallocation of resources in theshortrun. But thismay
be a short-term solution to a long-termn problem and
needs to be reviewsed periodically-
The establishment of new road funds involves more
-than just eannarikng revenues to road maintenance It
also indudes reforms to improve the efficiencY of road
agencies and the establishnnt of road boardswith tech-
nical experts and representatives of the user commutity
who oversee the allocation of revenues and the setting of
priorities Countries in Africa are starting to adopt a
promising -commercialization" approach to making
road fund operations more economically based and
more user-responsive; Tanzania provides a noteorthy
example of best practice. Moreover, the automatic rev-
enue flows have been designed to avoid building up a
fund surplus and hence to discourage wasteful spend-
ing. These additional reforms are necessary because ex-
perience shows, that the mere existence of earmarked
road funds does not mean tiat a government is commit-
ted tomnaintenancea Nordoes it ensure that naintenance
wvill beefficienL Colombia hada rDad fund for more than
twentv years, but abandoned it in 1991 because the re-
sources were going to sectors other than roads in many
cases.
Box 2.8 Can earmarking improve highways?
When budgetary processes work vell ,they assign funds
to activities with high economic rehtrns or high prioritvy
In such cases, earmarking-the assignment Df revenue
from a specific fee or tax tD a specific activity or expenditun
such as road maintenance-should be avoided because
it impedes the ability of the budget process to
move funds from one activity to another In times of
budgetary stringency, earmarking shields expenditures
in protected sectors and focuses budget reductions on
unprotected activities. In countries with narrow tax
bases, earmarking can encumber a large share of tax
revenues.
In many countries, however, budgetary processes do
not systematically assign funds to activities with high returis.
In the road sectok, high-return maintenance activities
are often underfunded because budgetary resources
are assigned one year at a time. Underfunding happens
in spite of the commitment to fund maintenance for multiple
consecutive years tiat is implicit in the assessment
of the investment decision. Rate-of-return calculations
assume a pattern of maintenance that requies nunhnurn
funding year after year. The failure to assign appropriate
prority to road maintenance explains, to a great extent,
the deterioration of many national road systems. Earmarking
can ensure that needed road maintenance will
be reliably funded.
Far the past few years, road fumds have been enoouraged
by the Bank in many African countries where
underfunding and inconsistent flows of funds disrupt
maintenance The case for earmarking there is based on
such a dear link between resources and perfor- pose on roads- In Ghana heaivy trucks use four to
mance, and many public works departnents have five times more fuel than cars, but their axde loadbeen
tying to increase their own sources of rev- ings, often ten times higher than those of cars, cause
enue. Doing so is easier for local public works agen- road damage many times higher than cars. The way
des than for highway authorities because the bene- to handle this difference is through such suppleficiaries
of local services are more easily identified. mentary taxes as annual licensing fees that vary bv
vehide weight. In the case of articulated trucks, ap-
FINANcAL INDEPENDENCE OF ECHWAY DEPART- propriate licensing fees based on weight have been
mENfs In principle, departnents can increase their calculated at $2,550 in Tanzania and $3,000 in
share of own-revenue sources by making beneficia- Tunisia. But road users resist paying such high road
ries pay, directly or indirectly, for road use. Users taxes where roads are in poor conditionpay
many road-related fees on vehide ownership, Some counties have taken to financing road
such as license charges and taxes on vehicle acquisi- funds through the allocation of specfic user fees
tion, registration, and inspection. They also pay (such as tolls or fuel tax revenue) for specific activicharges
for use, such as fuel taxes, tolls, or parking ties such as maintenance- This narrow earmarking
taxes. Such road-user charges usually fall far short of specific taxes and fees that are closely related to
of costs, however. In Zambia in 1991, road-user use of facilities helps overcome resistance to taxes
charges (mainly license fees and road tolls) financed The practice is common in Latin America, the
only 10 percent of the total spending on roads, with United States (for woads), and some Asian countries
general budgetary revenue making up the shortfalL (special accounts in Japan, Korea, and the Philip-
The gap between user payments and expendi- pines). The desirability of such earmarling hinges
tures arises because road-user charges often do not on practical rather than theoretical issues in mrost
cover the costs that different types of vehicles im- developing countries. In general, if the budgetary
so

process works well, earmaricing should be avoided vices: the adoption of commercial principles. Abid-
(Box 28 gives guidelines).
ing by these principles will be unsustainable, however,
if they do not reflect a political commitment to
COSr RECOVERY FOR LOCAL INFRASIXUCrUR EXPEN- improve public sector. delivery. Political commit-
DITURES. Local governments have been more suc- ment underlies good public sector performance in
cessful in recovering costs indirectly-as in Colom- Singapore and the sustainability of reforms in
bia,.for example, where "valorization" taxes pay for Korea's public enterprises. It also explains why
street improvements, water supply, and other local Botswana has been willing to search internationally,
public services. With valorization, the cost of public not just locally, for the best managers of its public
works is allocated to affected properties in propor- entities.
tion to the benefit the work is expected to bring. Im- . Explicit or implicit contracts between policymakportant
for success are the participation of prospec- ers and managers or operators have been used effective
beneficiaries in planning and nianaging tively to generate political conunitment. The out-
.projects, care in planning and irnpleme.atation, an standing common element in contracts used by the
effective coUection system, and-in many cases- most successful countries is that they are governed
significant advance financing from general govern- by. clear rules. Among contracts that maintain ownment
revenues so that works may be started on ership in th-e public sector, service contracts seem
dinme In Korea and North America, local infrastruc- the most promising in this respect. Moreover, thev
hnre development has recently been financed using test the capacity of the private sector to contribute to
exactions, lot levies, development charges, and sim- the provision of infrastructure. Thus,. service conilar
mechanisms to levy charges on would-be prop- tracts may be the most useful complement to corpoerty
developers to cover the added demands their ratization and may provide a ready means of alterdevelopment
will impose on the urban infrastruc- lng the partnership between the public and the
ture The success of local taxes in contributing to the private sectors. Performance agreements have been
financing of infrastructure also depends on the the least successful because they often endorse disquality
of a city's institutional infrastructure-such cretionary decisions driven by the many conflicting
as its records, valuations, and collections. Each local or evolving government interests.
51.
tax requires technical expertise and political will in Simply establishing cormmercial principles and
its implementation.
maintaining them through political commitment are
The need for political commitmnento
not
reform
sufficient for the success of commercial enter-
The a political need for commitment toreformprises, however. The missing element for success is
Thischapterhasfocused ononeessentialelementin the introduction of competition with appropriate
the effective public provision of infrastructure ser- regulation. That is the focus of the next chapter.

l:: :: . - : 0~ ,aSn-
::~~~i
/W-#H
-t
Using arkets -in infrastructure
provision
Market forces and competition can improve the ever, where extreme underprovision of services is
production and delivery of infrastructure services, common, as in many developing countries, con-
That is the consensus emerging from a reevaluation cerns about a private monopolst restricting output
of the sector based ont experence, technological -to boost.prices and profits may have less force than
change, and new insigh-ts into regulatory design. where networks are better developed. Thus, thie reg-
This new consensus is displacing the long-held ulatory apparatus needs to foDst-er efficiency and inview
that infrastructure services are best produced vestment both. by elimiinating outdated restrictions
and delivered by monopolies. Because the unit costs on the right to provide service and by assuring fair
of delivering an -ifrastructure serce-a galon of terns of network access to new entrants.
water, a kilowatt-hour of electricity, a local tele-. In the move from a goverrunment montopoly to a
phone call-typically decline as service output in- more competitive system. enforceable contracts are
creases, provision by a single entity seemed to make required to.balance the inter~ests of various per!Iies in
economic sense To limit the undesirable exercise of specfic projects and to provide the stability needed
market power, government was. expected to be the for long-term investment Also required are cornsole'supplier
or to closely regulate the private prehensive, transparent, and nondiscriminatory
monopoly.
rules of the game. Although these are desimble in
Technological change and, even more important, thie long ran, the evidence shows that the move to
regulatory innovationd are makig competition private supply and competition does not have to
possible in many forms. The economies from large-. wait for the rules. to be embedded in a fully devel-.
scale production and delivery although stiU ispor- oped statutory regulatory systemv
tant in some infrastructure activities, have dimin- Regulation itself is imperfect because the
ished, especrially in telecommunications and power "right regula r mechanisms ayr not always evigeneration.
Regulatory innovation has made possi- dent It is also imperfect because effective impleble
the unbundling of activities-the separating of mentation of economic regulation requires an inactivities
in which economies. of scale are niot incpor- formation base atd sophistication tat axe rarely (if
tant from those in which they are Unbundling pro- ever) attainable. Regulators are therefore vulneramates
competition by detaching activities that were ble to manipulation. Regulation can also have perearlier
performed in monolithic organizations and verse, unintended consequences when competition
opening them to various forms of competitive pro- from substitute goods and services is possible. A
vision. Even when infrastructure service is provided greater appreciation of reguatory failure has led to
most economicall by a single supplier-making progress in the design of simple rules to which regcompetition
in the market asaexor even hifea- ulators can precommnmt and that produce presibe-competition
from alternative suppliers for dictable and consistent outcomes. Moreover, inthe
right to supply the market can spur efficiency volvement of other interested parties, esperially
Market forces do not eliminate the need to regu- consumers, can make the regulatory process more
late prices and profits to protect consumers. How- effective.
52

Unbundling services for competition
proves management accountability. The trend is unniistakable:
unbundling of infrastructure services is
Should one company provide all telephone ser- proceeding at a brisk pace.
vices-local, long distance, celiular, data transmission-or
should the elements of the telecomnmu- Vertical unbunding
nications business be unbundled into separate
enterprises? Is electric power provided most effi- The electric power industrv illustrates how regulaciently
when generation, transmission, and distribu- tory and technological innovation interact In 1978,
tion are coordinated within a single entity, or should the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA)
the stages involved in delivering power be sepa-- required electric utilities in the United States to
rated? Should a railway be a monolithic organiza- purchase power from independent power production
owning all facilities and offering a variety of ers. This requirement opened up the industry to
passenger and business services, or should services more efficient generators, including those that prbe
operated as separate lines of business, possibly duce power from waste heat in manufacturing opunder
independent ownership?
era tions (cogeneration). Combined-cyde gas tur-
Central to this discussion is the concept of a nat- bines, using clean natural gas and requiring small
ural monopoly, which is said to exist when one investments, also became popular, although many
provider can serve the market at a lower cost than independent power projects continue to use contwo
or more providers could. Such is the case when ventional technologies.
the costs of producing ant delivering a service de- Such vertical unbundling-separating electricty
cline with increasing output (a condition often re- generation from transmission and distribution-has
ferred to as economies of scale). In infrastructure since been effectively adopted in many developing
sectors, it is also common for providers to supply a countries, allowing new, substantial entry in generanumber
of services, some of which are natural mo- tion Countries that have operationally independent
nopolies and others of which are not- However, a power producers indude Argentina, Chile, Colomnatural
rrnnopoly in one service may allow the bia, Guatemala, and the Philippines. Independent
provider to gain an advantage in another service power projects are being constructed or considered
that can be competitively provided. This occurs in Cote d'Ivoire, India, the Lao People's Democratic
when it is cheaper for a single provider to produce Republic, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania. (See
and deliver two or more services jointly than for Chapter 5 on the financing of independent power
separate entities to provide the services individually producers.) In addition, to facilitate competition in
(and, when that happens, economies of scope are the distribution of electric power, transmission and
said to exist).
distribution have been separated in several coun-
By isolating the natural monopoly segments of tries. The transmission agency handles the transport
an industry, unbundling promotes new entry and function, and generators ard distributors contract
competition in segments that are potentially com- directly for power supply. Transmission is likely to
petitive. Failure to unbundle can constrain an entire remain a natural monopoly. While the physical dissector
to monopoly provision even when numerous tribution network will also retain monopoly characactivities
can be undertaken competitively. In the teristics-it would not be economical to run more
past, maintaining sectors in a bundled form has than one distribution line to a home or a business-
-been justified ontwocounts. First,whereeconomies alternative suppliers can and do compete for the
of scope are significant, unbundling raises the costs right to supply over the single distnbution line.
of provision. However, the gains from economies of Similarly, in the natural gas industry, the wellscope,
where they do exist, need to be weighed head and the pipeline and local distribution sysagainst
the benefits of cost-minimizing behavior tens can be owned and operated by different entiunder
competitive pressures. Second, subsidy of ties. In Argentina, Gas del Estado was until recently
one service by another has been extensively under- an integrated monopoly in both the transportation
taken within enterprises offering multiple services and distribution of natural gas, acting as the sole
and has been the main mechanism for subsidizing gas trader. Today, ten distinct entities-two transservices
to poor customers or those in remote areas. port businesses and eight distribution corpora-
Unbundling, however, is desirable because it makes tions-provide these services, as well as gas treatcross-subsidies
between different lines of business ment and storage. To demonopolize the natural gas
more transparent, identfies more precisely the sub- industry in Hungary, the OKGT-a trust that opersidies
needed to deliver services to the poor, and im- ated the entire oil and gas sector-was split into six
53

egional gas distributors, and an enterprise owning But in other segments of telecommunications the
the refineries, storage facilities, and transport distinction between vertical and horizontal unpipelines.
The liquid-propane gas operations that bundling is not always sharp. Specialized providers
had been part of OKGT's operations were pnva- sell information services using communication links
tized separately.
owned by traditional network operators. In such
A key part of many rail transport reforms is to cases vertical unbundling between the provision of
separate track management from railway opera- networks and the supply of information services is
tions. For example, in 1988 two rail organizations needed to allow fair competition between horizonwere
created in Sweden: Baverket is in charge of tally separated service operators.
track investment and maintenance, while Statens
Jirnviigar operates the freight concession and pas- Pmctinal approadzes to unbundling
senger transport on trunklines. For its track services,
Baverket receives a fixed charge per tunit of rolling Constraints on unbundling are both technical and
stock plus a variable charge reflecting the social economic Attempting to force activities that are
marginal costs of operation (induding those for pol- closely interdependent into distinct boxes can imlution
and accidents). Separation between track and pose higlh transaction costs as the coordination once
operation is iplicit in many reforms of the rail sec- achieved smoothly within a single firm becomes
tor in developing countries, where specific services, more difficult and less effective when handled besuch
as passenger and freight, are being separated tween firms. And having separate, vertically linked
(see the following discussion on horizontal un- monopolies, each charging a markup over costs,
bundling). To be successful, such reform requires may result in higher charges than with a single, verthat
operators be allowed access on a fair basis to tically integrated firm.
track outside their jurisdiction.
However, that does not mean that the incumbent
monopolists-who will alwavs argue that un-
Horizontal unbitidling bundling will increase costs-should go unchallenged.
There may well be options for allowing a
The second type of unbundling separates activities vertically urnintegrated firm (for example, a power
by markets-either geographically or by service generator) to compete with a firm whose operations
categories. In Japan, the national railway was reor- span the entire range of activities, although that
ganized and split into six regional passenger opera- would require a regulatory framework for ensuring
tors and one freight operator that rents track time interconnection. As long as competition occurs on a
from the regional railways. Gains from restructur- fair basis, the market outcome will indicate whether
ing have been enormous-freight volumes, which or not genuinely important economies of scope
had been falling before the restructuring, have risen, exisL
while unit costs, which lhad been rising, have de- But even where the technology permits unclined;
the need for government subsidies has con- bundling, the legacy of history and institutions
sequentlv fallen Other countries are now emulating often limits the possibilities. In Hungary a telecomthe
Japanese modeL Argentina split the monopoly munications law enacted in 1992 separated long dis-
Argentina Railways into five freight concessions tance (including international) services from local
and seven suburban concessions, with the efficiency telephone services, which are under the jurisdiction
gains reflected in a substantial reduction of the gov- of municipal authorities. Under the law, private
ermient operatig subsidy. The Polish national rail- concessions for local services were to be granted on
way is to be divided according to region served and a competitive basis. But practical problems intertype
of service (Box 3.1).
vened. As in other countries, local calling rates are
Teleconmnunications lends itself to this dind of very low, attracting few investors to that part of the
unbundling as welL The operation of rapidly grow- network And investors in the long distance service
ing radio-based cellular services is typically sepa- faced the prospect of bargaining with group after
rated from the provision of traditional telephone group of local government officials on terms of inservices.
In some cases, horizontal unbundling, or terconnection to local networks. A compromise
divestiture, into a number of producers allows di- awarded, a single franchise for long distance serrect
competition; in other cases, as when divestiture vices and 60 percent of the local network. Competileads
to regional monopolies, it allows for better tion for the rest of the local network was open to
performance comparisons and therefore more effi- companies with demonstrable financial strengtih
cient regulatory monitoring.
and sound business plans.
54

Box 3.1 Divided they stand: unbundling railway services
As infrastructure markets, technology, and operating services evolves, and not al the commitments made in
practices have evolved, the need for single ownership the franchise agreements will be honored because some
has diminished-even in such traditionally monolithic requirements imposed as part of the franchise award are
operations as railways,
likely to be unsustainable.
Arg...fix. In 1989, folowing years of bad serce-. Pol1is Polish Railways(P)is restrucuing its
heavy losss, and government subsidies as high as I per- monolithic railroad system along its principal lines of
cent of GDP (9 percent of the public sector budget), the business: conumercal freight (primarily coal), intercity
Argentine.railway began to transfer operational respon- passenger, international passenger, and local and subursibility
for many services to the private sector.
ban passenger services. Eventually, PKP is expected to
All services were transferred on a concession basis have an infrastructure department servicing institution-.
most loss-nmakng lines and services were dropped, and ally separated lines of business, with suitable nondisthe
railways surplus assets were sold. There were five criminatuy compensation for track use paid by each line
freight concessions, seven suburban concessions (indud- of business (in line with European Union directives).
ing the Buenos Aires subway), and a remnant of intercity Suburban passenger activities will be spun off to local
passenger service that was transferred to provincial gay- agencies or covered under "contracts" with national or
ernments. In Buenos Aires the new company established local govenments to provide unremunerative public
to take over Argentina Railways' suburban operations services in return for adequate compensation. PlCP wvill
transferred the relevant lines to the new concessionaires transfer its liabilities (mainly surplus labor) and noruail
and then regulated and coordinated all transport issues in assets (mainly urban real estate) to a new authority. It
the area. A metropolitan authority was also established, wfll also seek to transfer its nonmailway activities to the
in their first two years of operation, the new railways pnvate sector
carried about the same traffic as before (a downward This reorganization wi separate coumercial sertraffic
trend has been reversed), with only 30 percent of vices (unregulated and unsupported) and public serthe
labor force Freight rates are fallng, service is im- vices, such as urban and suburban passenger servces,
proving. and the level of annual govenmment subsidies rural lines, and certain lines of strategic importance. The
has fallen fumS800 million to $150 million. Some of the publicservices are to be planned and paid for bv public
franchises will have to be reconstituted as demand for authorities at appropriate levels.
The range of market alternatives.
* Priuatization of monopolies. Where monopolies
persist transfer to pnvate ownership g,nerally
Once sectors have been unbundled, competition can yields efficiency gains. Regulatory innovations that
be used to increase efficiency and new investmenL reward performance (such as price caps and other
Ln infrastructure services, the choice is not simply incentive mechanisms, discussed below) create the
between unfettered supply in the marketplace and basis for continued productivity growth.
monopoly government supply. Four intermediate Moving an existing enterprise to more marketarrangements
for market-based provision are possi- based provision can lead to one or more of these
ble, and often advisable. Three of them promote arrangements (Figure 3.1). Competition for thecompetition.
The fourth, private monopoly, creates market is Option B, public ownership and private
the basis for greater accountability through a harder operation (see Chapter 1); the remaining three
budget constraint and more explicit regulation than arrangements are variations on Option C, private
govermnent monopoly.
ownership and operation.
* Competition from substitutes. The threat of losing
customers to suppliers of substitute products Competition jiDn substitutes
provides motivation and discpline.
* Comtpetition hi inzfrastructure markets. Multi- Competition from substitutes is frequently disrepie
providers compete directly with each other, garded in discussions of natural monopolies in inwhile
government regulatory control ensures fair frastructure. Failure to take it into account can result
competition.
in perverse consequences. Energy and surface trans-
* Competition for the market. Governments create port are the two most important areas where comcompetitive
conditions through leases or conces- petition from substitutes brings pressure to bear on
sions, and firms compete not for individual con- the monopoly supplir±ez
sumers in the market but for the right to supply tlhe A natural gas provider may be a monopolist, but
entire market.
natural gas is only one possible fuel for the genera-
. . . .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

5 :
zFigre3C4mnbndbgl atvitie ices es,th bdoiivWrcmeior
-ad p e e oinvo ve
:rvas P quali
: 0:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:
:~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~pin - r omeito reuato
,~Ir. No ,mundligP , q ,.
Monopoly ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~t onpl
tion of electricity Oil:and coal can be used as well
state Commerce Act regulated railroads, butdtoerus-
economie s of scale.
to.-- rai
growth in productivity
shippers often have a'. * choice.between'ra, em an ga dscipine suppiers aturl road, Gerany and further tabiitv illustrates f rairoad what soo can reqiredbeguation,o hapn services h
-">-,"f:4. -;.,, -. 5 - - ': -- , -= < z~~~~~egullation. ..
thug som aset of ga supl hav strn roads an trckn wer bot deeglae, leading- -3 ..
.~~~~~~~~~~7 L
Whr ralwy ar oprae as a _. monopoly ., Hon Kog' exeiec wit ura trnpr
tion of electriaty. Oil ant U d State theas wellr state Co regulated railable We a
acompetitive pessures from oil and coal produc- tain such rmo-
-ers can discpline riatural gas suppliers. Germany itblt freuatirassonwihu reunrd ermainin tepofth
view thse omptitve ressures as strong enough -otherwise competitive trucking services, .limiting
: - ~to justifyr derVeglating the natural gas indwstry, even -grrowth in thlat industry- In the 1970s and 1980s rail-
* - ~though some aspects of gs supply have strong roads and trucking were both deregulated, leading
-- economies of scale. -to rapid growth in prouctivity
Wher raiwaysareoperated as a monopoly, Hongt Kong's experience with urban. transport
- ~~shippexrs often lave a choice between raii, road, and further illustrates what can happen when services
- - ~water transport. In the United States the 1887 Inter- are regulated and substitutes are available. When a
56- '

government-owned subway system began opera- that can contest the market limits the risks of mntion,
large buses became less profitable, and the rate nopoly abuse. The implication is that, absent comof
return that had formerly been guaranteed to bus pelling arguments to the contrary, all new entrants
companies by regulation became univiable. Efforts should be allowed to provide services, with the
to maintain the rate of return by raising fares on market deciding how many providers can operate
large buses caused passengers to abandon bus profitably. Potential competition is most effective
transport, leading to taxi shortages, overuse of cars, where new entrants tave limited sunk costs of marand
continuing congestion. ket entry-that is, when entrants.can recover their
Thus, when substitutes are available, regulation investments by selling their assets if they decide to
can have especially perverse effects. To shore up re-. pull out of the business. Technological change and
turns in tlte regulated sector, regulators often ex- easing of regulatory constraints are permitting
tend their reach to sectors in which natural monop greater contestability
oly elements are weak. It -is far better in these ' Much of the experience with direct competition
crcumstances to allow the competition from sub- in infrastructure is relatively new, but the results
stitutes to discipline the conduct of the alleged validate the benefits of competition. Systematic evimonopolisL
dence of efficiency gains from greater competition
Co*petitin i. i.frastructe .narket- '.
-comes mainly from the United States, which, after
CoipeStitioi in inJimtruicture tiMarkets
years of regulation, has introduced a number of
Although infrastructure markets with nurnerous major deregulatory initiatives over the past two
suppliers are rare, competition among a few rival decades. In virtually all sectors, greater competition
providers can lower costs and prices. The thieory has led to. lower prices or better services for conof
contestable markets says thtat even where suiners-while efficiency gains and new technoloeconomnies
of scale and scope favor a single gies or business practices have led to sustained profprovider,
the existence of potential rival suppliers itability (Box 3.2).
Box 32
Regulatory cycles in the United States
With its long history of private infrastrcture provision, timate, 17 percent of the U.S. gross national product
the United States exemplifies the changes in regulatory (GNP) in 1977 was produced by fully regulated indugoals
and implementalion and the ensuing cycles in reg- tries; by 1988, this proportion had declined to 6.6 perulatory
poliy. In the late nineteenth century and well cent as large parts of the transportation, communicainto
the early part of the twentieth centur, much compe- tions, energy, and financal sectors were freed of
tition prevailed, especially in electric power and economic regulationL Greater operational freedom and
teleconnmunications. - competitive threats stimulated service providers to
An early instance of economic regulation-the Inter- adopt new marketing, technological, and organizational
state Commnerce Act of 1887-was concerned with mo- practices. The evidence from the United States points to
nopoly power in railway operations. The bounds of substantial economicgains from deregulation, as shown
economic regulation were extended gradually, btut espe- in Box table 32-
cialy during the 1930s and the Great Depression, to virtually
all infrastructure sectors and to other areas of pub- Box table 32 Estited gains from competition
lic interest (for example, creating service obligations and through deregulation of infrastructur sectors
information disdosure requirements). - - the United Sttes
Delivery of infrastructure thus came to be based on a
Fslimotdal niame
particular social compact The service provider was typi- ExStof ga fiun dutio
cally provided with exdlusive rights to specific markets, -Seo dgnuFalion (billions of 1990 U.S. dollars)
and, in return, the government took on the public re- Airlines Complete 13.7-19.7
sponsibility of ensunng that service obligations were ful- Tmrcing, Substantial 10.6
filled at easonable and just" prices. Inflationary pres- Railroads Partial 10.4-12.9
sures of the early 1970s caused regulators to intervene Telecom- Substantial 0i7-1.6
even more heavily in the operations of service providers. munications
Health, safety, and enviromnental regulation also gained Natural gas Partial Substantial gains
momentum around this time
to consumers
Public dissatisfaction with regulatory outcomes re- NetlcGains troi compefition cover netguinstoproducess(in teris of
profits), consumers (pdiCCS and service quality), and industbv emnploysuited
a move to reduce economic regulation in many ees(wagesandemployment).
sectors in the late 1970s and 1980s. According to one es- Suture Viscsi, VerneRand Harrington 1992; Winston 1993.
57

Helped in part by sectoral unbundliing, competi- domnestic long distance services (Chiile and Mexico
tion iifrstricture sectors ha-s increased in the by 1996 and Honig Kong by 1997).
past decade. The possibilities and conditions for ei- Although transitional issues arise when competifective
competition are illustrated below for urbani tion is being introduced, pragmaticsolutions canbe
transport, teleicommunications, and power.
found. In the past, long distance telephone calls
were priced high enioughi to allow mionopoly suppli-
URAN4 BUS TRANspocr. C'ompetitioni has stimu- ers of telecommunications services- to earn reasonkited
bothi innovation and cost reduction in urban able profits whiile keeping down the price of access
public tranisport. In Sri Lanka, for example. deregu- to the network and of local calls. With unbundling
lation permitted the profitable operation of smaller and increased competition, this structure of prices
vehiicles-by small-scale entrepreneurs, substantially becomes uinviable, and rate rebalaning is required.
improvinig service availabilily. Competitively ten- But during thle transition the incumbent operator is
dered franchises or the granting.of overlappinig saddled with the old rate structure and service.
franchises to competing.associations of operators is obligations. If new entrants are unencumbered by
being practiced successfully in several nmajor cities these obligations, they will flock to sectors with artiin
Latin- America anid Africa.
ficially bigh pro'fitbLiy a "cram skimming" that
Th-e challenge is to combine competition, for its canr be econromically inefficienL
cost-reducing impulse, withi residual controls to en- Mexico and the Philippines have taken two difsure
the quality of service and maintain operating ferenit approaches to resolving suchi conflicts. In
discipline. Fragmentation of ownershiip has in some Mexico, Telqifonos de M&xico (Thimex) was awarded
instances led to difficulties with route coordination a six-year monopoly under a concession agreement
and, at times, to excessive congestion and unisafe in 1990. To begin to bring prices in line withi costs,
practices. In some countries, at least part of the orga- rates for local services were waised three or four
nizing or regulatory function has been taker ovrrby. times over original levels. Telmex was required to
an operators' association. Experience with suchi as- furth-er rebalance rates during the period of the consociations
.8 shows thiat, while some aspects of regula- cession; long distance rates have fallen, while rates
M
tion can be successfully delegated to the private se- for local services hiave risen steadily. Thle Philiptor,
provisions are needed to ensure that regulatory pines chose instead to encourage-new entry immepowers
are not used to prevent new entry. More- diately. New operators are prevented from serving
over, public scrutiny and r-egulation on such matters
as passenger safety, service obligations - and polluonly
th-e lucra tive international services market and
arereuedtpmde30lclxhaglisfo
tion are essential in this competitive industryeahlnontirnentoalgewy
The opposite problem arises when thie incumbent
TELECOMMIUNCAlloNs. A major competitive ele- operator acts to limit competition, placing the aspirmerit
of special relevance to developing countries is ing enitrant at a disadvantage. This is especially th-e
thie advent of radio-based cellular telephone nlet- case whien the entrant's use of thie inicumbent's
works. These networks hiave'relatively low.capital established network is restricted, reducing.tile encosts,
making their market rzadily contestable. tra nt's reach until it has invested in possibly dui-
Radio-based telephones compete withi existing loaml plicative network facilities. Such a bottleneck effect
networks-and in many coun tries, with one an- in facilities owned by thie incumbent is also an issue
other. By 1993 Sri Lanka had licensed four cellular- in other sectors when they are vertically unbunoperators,
leading to tariffs that are among the low- died-access to the railtrack is required by all serest
in the world: connection costs of $100 anid oper- vice operators, and competitive generators need the
ating costs of 16 cents a midnute. Comnpare those right to transm-it and distribute electricity over mocosts
with thle more typical costs in El Salvador- nopoly facilities. Two distinct issues need to be re-
$1 .0(X and 35 cents a minute~-which has a sinigle solved for efficient interconnection of entrants: the
operator. However, regulation is important to sus- physical right of access and, at least as important,
tain competition. For example, in Mexico regulatory the price of access. No established norms exist for
action was necessary to ensure fair interconnection interconnection pricing, although a variety of apby
cellular operators into fixed netwvorks.
proaches are being tried. Most favorable to Hie in-
Lo-ng distance services will be the next arena of cumbent i- -in arrangement whereby the price of incompetition
in developing countries. Korea already terconnection between a point on the network and a
allows competition in in ternational siervices. Other customer is the retail price charged by thec incumcountries
are conmmitted to permitting new entry in bent less direct costs of operating that link 7this

maintains the full profits of the incumbent and is electricity is supplied in this form Because pool
also socially optimal if the network is efficiently prices tend to be volatile and unpredictable, both
priced and operated. In New Zealand such a rule suppliers and buyers (mainly regional distributors)
has led to new entry, although the rule has been tend to enter into long-term contracts as well, relychallenged
by the new entrant as anticompetitive. ing on the spot market for a relativelv small share of
Other approaches seek to encourage entry by limit- transactions. Having a choice of suppliers when'
ing interconnection charges to full costs incurred by contracts are renegotiated maintains competitive
the incumbent (exduding profits accruing on the discipline.
link). Such charges (e.g., those in Australia) include If generating capacity is concentrated in one or
an element for fixed costs of the network as well as two firns, they can try to influence the price at
costs incurred due to universal service obligations. which electricity is purchased from them. Anti-
The interconnection issue is acquirng increasing trust laws can be used to prevent monopolistic or
importance in developing countries, and especiallry collusive behavior. Effective competition, howin
Eastemr Eirope where multiple operators have ever, may require splitting large generators into
been licensed. In Poland, for example, a 1990 new companies.
telecommunications law allowed independent oper- Competition in electric power is being extended
ators the right to develop networks in regions not to retail distribution in the United Kingdom, startserved
by the government-owned telecommunica- ing with large consumers. Users wlhose peak detions
provider Telekomunikacja (TIP SA). Three mand is 100 kilowatts of power or more are not relarge
independent operators have been licensed to stricted to their local distributor, but may contract
provide local services, in addition to almost sixty with other distributors or directly with generators.
other small providers. Interconnection between TP About 45,000 businesses are eligible to shop for elec-
SA and the independent operators involves provid- tricity in this way. All customers will be able to do
ing access to each company's network and sharing so by 1998.
revenues from this access. To date there is no one In many developing countries, one legacy of
standard interconnection agreement between TP SA poor public sector performance is the large underand
the independents. The telecommunication law used generation capacity of many large manufacturstates
that each independent company must negoti- ing fims. The market for electricity can be made
ate its own separate agreement with TP SA. This more contestable by allowing large manufacturers
lack of standard agreement has prevented the ma- with their own generating capacity to sell electricity
ority of the independents from further pusuingthe to the public grid, creating competitive discipline
development of their local network Without inter- and fostering cost reduction. A systematic study
connection, outside investors are hesitant to commit shows that, if firms in Nigeria were allowed to sell
any resources until a strong and fair contract is es- power from their underused generating capacity,
tablishedL Alternative models are being examined to the unit .osts of electricity produced by these firnsprovide
interconnection on fair terms. Developing would fall considerably. Informal evidence suggests
countries seeking to expand networks and new ser- that the samne is likely to be the case in many develvices
may wish to consider a pricing system favor- oping countries.
able to entry, effective antimonopoly legislation, and
procedures for implementing both.
Where direct competition is not possible, efficiency
POWER. Electricity generation is another area in can be increased by means of competition managed
which unbundling can introduce competitioiL through contractual arrangements, ranging from
Using similar approaches in electric power genera- simple contracts for 5pecific services -to long-term
tion, Argentina, Chile, Norway, and the United concessions that require operation, maintenance,
Kingdom have created electricity pools that simu- and facility expansiorL Although there is only a sinlate
competitive market conditions. Generators bid gle supplier of the service at any point in time, comfor
the right to supply bulk electricity in time slots petition occurs before the contract is signed and, in
(as short as half an hour in the United Kingdom) by principle, when the contract (or concession) expires
specifying a supply schedule of price and quantity. and is due fur renewaL Thus, there is competition
The power pool manager aggregates these offers for the market even though there is no direct compeand
arrives at a systemwide price based on esti- tition in the market during the term of the concesmates
of demand for the particular slot All offers sion. The commitments entered into through :the
below this "pool price" are then accepted. Not all contract can then, within limits, provide an alterna-
59

;t~~1F D ¢- l- e
as is demnonstrated by the successful award of a .con-
Wi an&concesslonsrn ~~~~ cession in Buenos Aires for water and sewerage, in
%ii~fr"i& 6d6i iiarE ,ommoi;.event- contrast to a proposed concession in Caracas that
J~~~~~~~ ::
M$~iSi~4fL~iii~
~iiiiA& t aj r-~ -. failed to attract responsive bids. Buenos Aires bene-
- r. tw~~~~, fited from a numnber of advantages that Caracas did
.. not share, incuding stronger support from govern-
. 3~ -ment authorities, better technical and. financial
econormc risks to investors.
aicnesiAgTi 5.. preparation, more attractive initial tariffs, and lower
In practice, the original frandcisee is rarely dlis-
~. lodged. In Hong Kong, which uses fr-anchising
metlhods extensively for infrastructure provision,
only one bus company has lost its franc-hise in recent
decades. In France, franchises tend to extend
into perpetuity. The incumbent enjoys significant
advantages in rebidding, which must be factored
|:)0 | | , into efforts to make the market contestable.
g E j| B
-< LEASES. Under a lease, the govermnent supplies
the major investments for production facilities, and
-5- j j ~ R a private contractor then pays for the right to use
the public facilities in providing service. A lease
* r 0 wamne- -M M M
_a generally awards the contractor exclusive rights to
r
___f__________t_ ye ____r____ ____ r
- .. the stream of revenues for a period of six to ten
years. The contractor beas most or all of the com-
-Watean - mercial risks, but not the financial risks associated
*jS .-- #.rt- . with large investments. Such arrangements are most
* ;-..~x ~ ~.*** practicable in activities where investments come in
-=& . &.:t.-W.- --T.nfiequent bursts, so that responsibility for operations
can be separated from responsibility for investmenL
In France leasing has been used for
tive to relying on a full-blown independent regula- decades i urban water supply and sewerage, and
tory apparatu. -the model was recently adopted in Guinea (Box 3.4).
tory apparatus. . Leases allow a mix of ownership. l "landlord
L eases and concessions are increasingly common orts, the inin
inffrastructure. Such arrangements arei o p t public authority owns the land and iner.tion
or under implementation i- t.irty-seven frastrurture facilities, while a private finn owns and
erahonor lmlemenatwn uner - thtseven operates the superstructure. In 1986 Malaysia. transcountries,
including eighteen low-income countries operates s the t re In1 Manayiatrans-
(Fgure 3.2). In (Figre transport, ransort .2).In cocessonsare concessions are primarily rhnri~ ferred operation of thie Port Kelang container tenni-
- - . . . , -,. . ~nals and bxerths to two consortia under lease5. The
for large, fixed facilities such as ports and toRl roads. n and berths to o conshe
Concessions are Concessions common conunonmthewatersector.Be
are in sector. Be- facing private the
operators,
public operator,
freed of many
improved
of the
productivity
constraints
cause economies of scale remain important in water
supply, most countries have used mechanisms that sapananalays began such a operacrete
or °mptiton hemaret Iabe 31).Eve -Japan, and Malaysia began a wave of-surch operacreate
competition for the market (Table 3.1). Even tions in Asia-leasing Is now under way in Chima,
among these agreements, there is a wide variety of the Philippines, and ailand and is under considarrangements.ȧrrangements
........ . . ~eration in Korea, Pakistani, and Viet NaL At timnes,
The eff-ectiveness of a franchise arrangement de- eaini oe,Pksa,adVe an ttms
ahe enumer effe of afranctrs.ie incentives fr only parts of the port-such as individual berths or
pends upon a -number of factors.ThEe
pends
incentives
upon
for
. container terminals-are leased, leaving arrangefranchise
holders to operate efficently depend on
. . - . - . . . ~~~~~ments for other parts of. the port unaffected.
the criteria for awardig the franchise, which in
turn vary with sectoral characteristics and govern- CONCEssoNS. Concessions incorporate all the
ment objectives (Box 3.3). The contractual provision features of a lease but give the contractor the added
of services is most likely to succeed when the con- responsibility of investments-such as for specified
tract increases transparency and accountability by extensions and expansions of capacity or for the respecifying
in detail the terms of operation. How the placement of fixed assets. Concession arrangements
contract is awarded is also important to its success, exist for railways, telecommunications, urban trans-
60

-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7 --
port systems, anda water adtetnit supply to fteBeo ie uwysse a fee
SODECI, the .private water company in C6te under a concession and awarded on the basis of the
d'Ivoire, has a well-established and successful con- lowest subsidy demanded to operate and invest in
cession contract (Box 3.5). . the system. Highway maintenance has also been
-Argentina has recently-had a flurry of concession opened to concessions, and it is funded by reveniues
arrangements, some of which were made possible from tolls initiated on many highways in 1992.
by prior sectoral unbunidling. In addition to the rail A possible problem with leasing and concession
and water concessions described above, the opera- arrangements is that they may not provide suff_-
61

short-mn gain and skimp on routine maintenance.
Most of these problems can be avoided. Expli4t
maintenance requirements can be written into con-
tracts, and compliance can be monitored. Private
dent incentives to maintain and expand the facilities
in their charge. A private supplier that does not
own the production facilities or is uncertain of contract
renewal may depreciate assets rapidly for
Box 3.3 Tailoring concessions to sectoms and government objectives
The method of awarding concessions or the right to op- depreciate considerably. But because trucks can be sold
erate is extremely important in determining the incen- more easily than assets underlying roads and power
tives to private sponsors. When the returns to the spon- plants, the contract period may be as short as several
sor. are unrelated, or only wealdy related, to the months.
performance of the operation, the benefits of private= Ar. interesting variation is used in telecomnmunica-.
sponsorship are forgone.
tions, although it could be applicable also for indepen-
The goal is to ensure an attractive financial return dent power projects. The focus is not on the length of the
for investors while safeguarding public interests. One concession period, which can be indefinite, but on the
key element of negotiation is the price the investor period of the exclusive concession. In Mexico and Arpays
for the right to operate the service-or the extent gentina, the newty privatized companies have been
of capital or operating subsidy that the govenmuent granted exclusive licenses for six to ten years, during
may provide. Other negotiating points are the price which they have certain investment obligations. After
that will be charged for services, the concession period, the exclusive period, the government is free to allow
and the rights and obligations at the end of the contract new entrants.
period;
The method of chlarging for the right to provide ser-
This is a complex brew, with each element depend- vice can take different fonns. In theory, it is most efficient
ing on another. There is always a danger that the terms to award a concession to the bidder who offers the
of a concession will allow investors to secure too high a largest lump sum up fronL Having paid a large initial
rate of retur, or will fail to provide sufficient incentives fee, the operator will be motivated to operate the fadlity
for proper.maintenance of the assets and provision.of in themostefficientmanner. For large projects, however,
services.
where project costs and revenues are uncertain, revenue-
To simplify matters, certain nonns and conventions sharing or profit-siaring arrangements can spread the
have been adopted. The length of concession periods is risk (as in the Guangzhou-Shenzen highway in China).
typically related to the life of the underlying asset For Where the govermment sees itself mainly as a guardian
example, thirty-year concessions are common for toll of consumer interest it may choose to receive no fee but
roads, and fifteen years is common for power generation to awsard the contract on the basis of the lowest price
pxrects (although for hydroeectricprojects, tiirty years charged to the consumer (which can later create probis
more likely). Contracts for solid-waste disposal are in lems with quality of service and requires spedfication of
the range of four years, a period in which garbage trucks mnirmum service standards).
Box 3.4 Success of a lease contrat-Guiinea'swater supply
When the Republic of Guinea's water supply sector was To make sure the necessary tariff increases wvould be
restructured in 1989, it was one of the least developed in affordable, the Guinean lease contract included an inno-
West Africa At that time a new autonomous water au- vative cost-sharing arrangemenL Under the agreement
thority,SONEG, took over ownership of the urban water nroega.ed by the government, the two sector entities,
supply infrastructure and assumed responsibility for and the external financier (the World B3ank, the consector
planning and investmenL SEEG, 49 perent gov- sumner tariff was to be adjusted gradually from the first
ermnent-owned and 51 percent owned by a foreign con- to the tenth year of the contract During this period the
sortium, was created to operate and maintain the sys- World Bank agreed to assume a declining share of the
ter's facilities.
foreign exchange expenditures of operation, and the cen-
Under* the ten-year lease contract signed with tral government covered a declining share of the debt
SONEG, SEEG operates and maintains the system at its sennce. By the tenth year tariffs were expected to cover
own commerdal risk. Its remuneration is based on user the full cost of water. Tariff imcreases have to date excharges
actually collected and fees for new connections. ceeded the planned schedule, rising from 50.12 per cubic
SEEG also benefits from improvements it achieves in the meter in 1989 to about 0.75 in 1993. Despite higher tarcollechon
ratio, from reduced operating costs, and from iffs, the collection ratio for private customers has inreductions
in unaccounted-for water. Since SONEG has creased dramatically-frrn less than 20 percent to more
ulftimate responsibility. for capital financing, it has strong than 75 percent in 1993-and technical efficiency and
incentives to seek adequate tariffs and to make prudent service coverage have improved.
investments based on realistic demand forecasts.
62

suppliers can be held responsible for documented public utilities typically undergo major corporate redeterioration
of- the capital stock (alth-ough this can structuring,;and the immediate gains from privatizabe
problematic because some deterioration may be tion have been impressive. A study of total welfare
due to poor construction). Eligibility for renewal can gains (net monetary gains to producers, consumers,
be made contingent.on the observed state of the and employees) found that in three cases involving
capital stock.
telecommunications, the gains (as a proportion of
sales) ranged from 12 percent in the United King-
Privatizantionl of monlopolies
dom to 155 percent in Chile (Figure 3.3). Two years
after the privatization in Venezuela, the total net-
Another way to introduce market principles into in- work had expanded by 50 percent and virtually all
frastructure is through privatization, which trans- targets for service improvements had been met (Box
fers assets out of the public sector. Privatizations are 3.6). Disentangling the effects of prvatization and of
spreading rapidly in developing countries-the increased competition is not yet possible in many
value of transactions reached more than $6 bilion in sectors, however, nor have sustained long-term
both 1991 and 1992 (Table 3.2). Privatization has gains in productivity growth yet been demonstrated.
gone the furthest in telecommunications. Argentina, Utility privatizations are often accompanied by a
Chile, Hungary, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, and' requirement to undertake certain nminimum invest-
Venezuela have all undertaken substantial privati- ments. These so-called roll-out obligations are exzations
of teleconmunications services. The power emplified by the service conditions inposed on
sector, too, has recently seen several large privatiza- Telmex, the privatized Mexican telecommunications
tions.
provider. Network development targets built into
Although privatization of industrial enterprises the concession require Telmex to achieve a line
has a relatively long history-providing evidence of growth rate of at least 12 percent a year-twice the
its positive effect on performance-privatizations in growth rate achieved during the late 1980s. Tax ininfrastructure
are comparatively new. Pxivatized centives reinforce Telmex's contractual investment
Box 3.5 Cote d'Ivoire's experience with a concession for water supply
Ant excellent example of a private company providing Since the early 1970s, full cost recoverv has been the
public services in West Africa is Cote d'lvoire's SODECL rule, and revenues from water sales have fully covered
SODECI is an Ivorian company whose capital (about 515 capital and operation and maintenance costs. During the
million) is ouned 52 perent by local interests; 46 percent past ten years, unaccounted-for -water has never exby
Saur, the French water distnbutor and 2 percent bv a ceeded 15 percent, and collection from private congovernment
investment fund. It started operations with sumers has never fallen beWow 98 percent (collection
the Abidjan water supply system thirty years ago and from goverment agencies is more problematic). Morenow
manages more than 300 piped waler supplv sys- over, despite the dispersion of operations, theme are only
tems across the national teritory. Until recently, SODEC four staff per thousand connectons, reRecting bestoperatedunderconcessioncontractforwaterpzoduction
practice standards. The company. has also succeeded in
in Abidjan, the capital city. It was under lease contract reducing expatriate staff while expanding operations.
for water production and distribution in all other urban SODECI retains part of the rates colected to cover its
centers; for water distribution in Abidjan; and for man- operating costs, depreciate its assets, extend and rehabilagement
of the Abidjan sewerage system.
itate distnbution networks, and pay dividends to share-
To dml uwith financial troubles caused bv govern- holders. It also pays the government a rental fee to serment
polcies in the 1980s regardi.g sectoral investment vice the debt attached to earlier projects financed by the
and tariffs, the urban water sector was reorganized. governmenL
SODECrs contract fur urban water supply services was SODECI provides service dose to thestandaids of intransformed
into a concession contract for the entire dustrial countries. Yet the cost to consumers is no higher
country. with SODECI taking responsibility for both op- than in neighboring cuntries in similar economic condierations
and investments. Today the company has tions or in members of the CFA franc zone, where tariffs
300,000 individual connections that serve some 70 per- rarely cover capital and operation and maintenfance
cent of Cote d'lvoire's 4.5 million urban residents-2 costs, and service lags behind. Private Ivorian interests
million in Abidjan and the rest in settlements of 5,000 to now own a majority of SODECrs shares. Its bonds are
.400,000 people. Under a policy to provide low-income one of the main itens traded on Abidjan's financial marhouseholds
with direct access to water, 75 percent of ket, and it has distrbuted dividends to its shareholders.
SODECI's domestic connections have been provided The company has also paid taxes since its inception.
with no direct connection charge. The number of connections
is growing between 5 and 6 percent a year.
63

Table 3.2 Value of infrastructure privatizations in developing countries, 1988-92
(iil&ns of U.S. d.:rs)
Total, Nzmurberof
Subserlor 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1988-92 countries
Telecommtunications 325 212 4,113 5,743 1,504 11,821 14.
Power generation 106 2,100 20 248 1,69 4,164 9
Power distribution 0 0 0 98 1,037 1,135 2
Gas distribution 0 0 0 0 1X96 1,906 2
Railwads 0 0 0 110 217 327 1
Road infrastructure a 0 250 0 0 250 1
Ports U 0
.0 0 7 7 2
Wa ter 0 0 0 0 175 175 2
Total 431 2,312 4,037 6,200 6,535 19,785 15
Closely nrlaled priuatization±
Airlines 367 42 775 168 1,461 2,13 14
SPipping 0 0 0 135 1 136 2
Road transport 0 0 0 11012 13 3
Total developingacounty privatizations 2,587 5188 5,618 220-49 23.187 61,629 25
Rt Countriesd undertakng infrastructure priv- zatioaO.-
198&- power-Mcdcw, telecomn-Belize,Chile,jamaica,Turkcey airlines-Argentina, Mac.lea
1989: power-Korea; tOeom-Chile,Jamaica airlines-ChileO
199Th power-Malaysia, Turkeyr telecom-Argentina, Belize, Chile, Jamaica, Malaysia. Meico, Poland; roads--Argentina; airlines-
Arentin, Brazi Mexico, Pa.istan
1991: powver gerieration--Chile, Hungairy ponwe distribution-Philippines; railroads-Argentina; telecom-Pagentina, Barbados, Beli2e,
Hungary, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Ventezuea; airtines-4-londuras, Hungar', Panama, Turkey, Venezuela; shipping-Nlalkysia; road
transport-Toga.
1992 power generation-Argentina, Beliz Malasia, Poland: power di2Sbution-A8tina. Phippines; gas distribution-Aag0tia2
Turkey: telecom-Argentinad eFstonia, M2lysia, Turkey, railroads-Argentina; parts-Colombia, Pakistan water-Argentina, Malvsia: airlinE9-Cwechaslovalda,
Hungan Malaysia, Mexic, Panama, Philppines, Thailand; shipping-S Mc, Lanaad transport-China, Pair.
Source Sader 1993.
obligations. in addition to line growth require- whatever the path, success requires a sustained
ments, the concession requires improvements mi ser- commitment to private entry The transitional
vice quality Telmex has more than met the targets phase can be effectively managed through enforceand
has announced plans to invest $13 billion over able contracts that create incentives foir the entrefive
years to upgrade equipment, add access lines, preneur to be efficient while also embodying the
and improve service-
public interest-
Underpinning these requirements is the concemr A statutory regulatory system that provides for
that a monopoly service provider-such as dear and open enforcement of the terms of the con-
Telmex-may restrict output below socially desir- tracts is 4ilso required, although its absence has not
able levels. While this may be a legitimate concern held up private entry- The design of such regulation
in the longer term, it sits uneasily with the current may weUl benefit from contractual experience with
situation in many, if not most, developing countries. early entrants. Effective statutory regulation re-
Levels of service provision are now so low that even quires predictable and nondiscrmin-natory rules and
an unfetteed monopolist would face strong incen- the creation of consumer constituencies.
tives to expand-and to do so at lower cost t9an the
public sector providers of the past. Roll-out require- Twansitions in market structures
ments may consequently be unnecessary and, when
used to secure the provision of services on uneco- Should the move to a market-based system occur
nomic terms to particular areas or consumers, can in a single step, or can it be achieved more graduperpetuate
psrcing distortions.
ally? There are no simple answers. What is important
is that tohe shift to market provision be credi-
Paths to market provisio mn ble. Without that, private entrepreneurs are not
likely to take on new investmnents. Commitments
The move from government monopoly to competi- from govermnents are most credible when ar the
tive market provision has taken many routes, but, enablng measures needed for pvriate entry and
64

market provision are adopted witiin a short span
of time as part of a consistently designed program. Fig- as,ji ta ''
Where institutional legacies-concerns about - eommaiocleadto large g
labor redundancy, F r example-prevent immediate
privatization,' opening the sector up to substan- C
tial new entry may be a strong sign of goverrunent ; T_otal welf ,gans as,a percen tag
commitment to sector reform.
o,fannual sales
One recommended sequencing strategy is to start 180
with the design of statutory regulation that sets the
rules of the game. This is to be followed by the de- 160
termination of the appropriate industry structure
(the degree of unbundling, extent of new entry, and
split of existing providers to prevent economic
dominance) and privatization. Chile comes closest
to having implemented this sequence over the pe- 120
riod of a decade, although industry structure has
continued to evolve after privatization. Other countries
have folowed pragmatic strategies, dictated by
their crumstances, with impressive results.. Three
examples illustrate transional options and issues. 80
ARGENTINA. Argentina has adopted the most farreaching
privatization program, designed to create
competitive conditions in the economy. -A major
infrastructure providers were privatized between
1989 and 1993, and activities were unbundled to foster
competition. In the electric power sector, genera- 20
dion, transmission, and distribution were separated;
two telecommunications franchises were awarded
to serve the north and the souti; and railways were
separated along different lines of business. Tdecom T Br:T3sh
Although privaization has occurred rapidly, the (Onle) -xi) Telecom
capacity for regulatory oversight has lagged (as it
has in most developing countries other than Chile, oe Wfre gans are the smof gasaing to
where sophisticated regulatory capabilities were p p nsiLir, and-consumers:
put in place prior to privatization). The absence of S GJ 4Oad lnfo
regulatory oversight has not been an impediment so 4-
far;, lowever, where market forces do not provide
adequate discipline, efficient functioning will require
regulation. Antitrust regulations will need new generators. Opening generation to new proparticular
attention in view of the heavy concentra- viders required the elimination of the monopoly ention
of ownership. The Chilean experience, with one joyed by the National Power Corporation, a governprivate
firn owning 65 percent of generating capac- ment-owned utility that has not been privatized
ity, shows that a dominant provider can influence These reforms came in response to an almost
market outcomes. Also in Chile, concerns have been crippling power shortage. The urgency was so great
expressed that the large installed base of the local that new entry had to be based on contractual agreetelephone
company may prevent fair competition ments between the govermnent and private generawhlen
the company begins to provide long-distance tors, since reform of the Electricity Regulation Board
services. And everywhere, market provision will re- would have taken too long. By August 1993, seven
quire greater information disclosure and public new projects with a combined capacity of 800
feedback-
megawatts had been completed, and five additional
generators were placed under private contracts for
PHIUPPINES. In the Philippine power sector, pri- rehabilitation and operation. Fifteen more projects
vate provision was based entirely on the entry of (2,000 megawatts of capacity) are under negotiation.
.65

Box 3.6 Telecom piivatizati6ci the case of Venezuela
When Venezuela privati2ed its stte-owned telephone were granted a limited monopoly on basic service (six
company (CANTV) in DEcember 1991; it had 1.6 nMlion years in Mexico; seven veers extendable to ten in Arlilies
in service (82 lines per 100 people as compared gentina).
with 35 lines per 100 people inKorea. An eight-year wait In Venezuela the process culminated with the sucfora
new telephone was common, and completion rates cessful public tender sale of a 40 percent share (but with
for international calls were less than 20 perent
majority voting control) to an internatioral operating
The government sought to expand and improve basic consortium for $1.9 billionL Pending passage of a new
service rapidly by tuni-ng the company over to i private telecom law, the government enacted a series of decrees
operator- with first-class international experience. Al- that established the mrgulatory agency, CONATEL, and
though it recognized the need to increase local rates sub- defined the regulations for the various types of service.
stantially, the goverinment was concerned with the po- Until the new law is passed, rate increases must be ratitential
political fallout from 4 rate shock:" Consequently, fled by the govemment
it decided to phase the rate rebalandng over nine years. In the two years following privatization, CANTV in-
During this period the newv operator was granted an ex- vested more than $1.1 billion and installed 850,000 new
dusive franichise for local, long distance, and interna- and. replacement lines, far exceeding its obligations
tional service The profits from international service under the concession contract. Virtually all service imwould
be used to cross-subsidize lcal service and fi- provement targets were meL
nance the desired network expansion. The concession Several Iessons have emnerged from the Venezuelan
contract included annual obligations to expand and im- experienmc Even without a fully defined legislative
prove basic service (induding the insallation of 3.6 mil- framework, telecom privatization can provide immedilion
additional lines over nine years) and a cap on the in- ate benefits f orn increased investment Although some
crease in prices for basic telephone services. All other rebalancing of tariff lias occmrd, sustained tariff inservices
were open to competition-including celular creases will be needed. With rapidly changing techuolservice,
private lines, information services, and equip- ogy, monopoly rights granted to maintain cross-subsimernt
This model resembled telecom privatizations in dies and to promote service expansion will prove
Mexico and Argentina, where the privatized operators increasingly difficult to define and enforce.|
During this process, new laws and administrative utilities through continued shareholding or ftirough
procedures have also been put in place (Box 3.7). "golden shares" that give the government veto
Although regulation through individual con- rights, especially on matters reladng to the social
tracts has attracted new investment to the power obligation of the utilities (Box 3.8).
sector, further development will require sectoral
rules to ensure fair competition. As in most devel- Dealing with regulalory hiperfections
oping countries, new generating capacity has been Regulation must negotiate many potential pitfalls:
developed without well-agreed principles on inter- as it controls the exercise of monopoly power, it
connection and-dispatch among providers. This ab- must also ensure service quality, safety, environsence
has not been a problem so far, partly because mental protection, service obligations, and the
private supply was filling large demand gaps. As rnghts to network access (Figure 3.1). The weight of
the gaps close, however, the various suppliers will each of these objectives varies with industry struccome
doser to being competing sources of power, ture, which evolves over time. Flexibility must
and the regulatory authority wfll have to define therefore be balanced with commitment to fixed
clear rules for determining whose power is bought rules. Too much flexibility lets well-organized interand
on what terms-
est groups gain control of the regulatory process, to
their own benefit Too rigid a regulatory structure
MALAYSIA. Malaysia's approach puts it some- limits the ability to correct mistakes and adapt to
where between that of Argentina and the Philip- change. It can also stifle initiative. Regulation sonepines.
Utilities have been gradually privatized, and times leads to outcomes worse than those that imnew
entry has been allowed in electric power and perfect markets could achieve.
waten Statutory regulatory efforts have lagged, and Experience argues for keeping regulation to a
discipline on operations is imposed through con- miriimum. Three considerations influence the regutractual
agreements. The government also has latory. task that accompanies the introduction ofprimaintained
direct regulatory supervision of large vate sector involvement
66

Providing suffident resources, autonomy, and though often monopoly) provision of infrastrcture
credibility for the. regulator
services has been the nonn. The United States,. rely-
* Where price regulation is necessary, choosing ing on federal and state commissions, has develinstruments
that encourage cost efficency in the oped a significant capacity for autonomous regularegulated
entity
tion. Although the process is remarkably open, it is
* Creating constituencies in the regulatory also characterized by adversarial relationships and
process.
litigation. Europe and Japan have had less experience
with explict regulation, since they rely on
RECULAmRY RESOURCES, AUTONOMY, AND CREDI- public monopolies, combined with regulatory and
BILITY. Regulation requires detailed knowledge and operatiortal responsibilities. Even when regulatory
continual monitoring of the activity concerned. The instruments such as price controls, technical stanregulatory
menu includes problem identification, dards, and entry licensing have been used, they
fact finding, rulemaking, and enforcemenL Regula- have been implemented by related ministries or intors
need to be able to shift course in order to antici- terministerial committees rather than by specific
pate or respond to changing conitions in the indus- regulatory agencies. The U nited Kingdom has retry.
They also need.operational autonomy within a cently moved .toward privatization and indepenbroad
policy mandate to ensure their effectiveness. dent regulation, and similar reforms are tking
Because doing all of this well requires a detailed place elsewhere in Europe. Developing countries
worldng knowledge of the industry, there is a strong have virtually no experience with regulation of pricase
for regulatory bodies to be specialized and au- ivate providers because their infrastructure entertonomous
public agencies, rather than general bu- prises have, in the main, been publicly owned and
reaucracies. But because sectoraly specialized agen- operated- An exception is Hong Kong, which is well
ces are more susceptible to capture by the known for its encouragement of private initiative
industry-and so are more likely to perpetuate reg- but which has a regulatory system that protects
ulation that favors incumbents-the regulatory consumer interests.
agency must be monitored as welL. A problem for developing countries is assem-
Much of the experience with statutory regulation bling experienced professionals to staff a regulatory
derives from North America, where the private (al- agency Regulators have limited resources and are
Box 3.7. The evolution of private power in the Thilppines
The Philippes evolutionary approach to attracting pri- menting rules and regulations-the law created a dearer
vate entrepreneurs in power generation is instructive. In legal basis for allowing entrv by private capital, though
July 1987 private power generation becane a deliberate still requiring tmnsfer of owrnership back to the governelement
of government policy and effectively signaled ment at the end of the concession period.
the end of the generating monopoly of the state-owsned The Philippines is also seeldng to streamline the pri-
National Power Corporation. Although the first project, vate powser solicitation process. Under preset arrange-
Hopewell Navotas I, was successfilly negotiated and ments, the effectiveness of project contracts depends on
conumenced operation in 1991, early dealings with other several conditions that must be met after the contracts
private proposalswere generally not fruitful. A proposal are signed. Delays or failures to meet certain conditions
for a 220-megawatt cogeneration plant did not proceed can jeopardize a project The National Power Corporabeyond
the negotiation stage in 1989, in part because of tion is seeking to establish model contracts. preapproved
inadequacies and inconsistencies in adminiistering regu- by concemed government agencies, to facilitate private
lations. The lessons from the failed effort helped ongoing participationL This arrangement is expected to enable inefforts
to improve regulatory and clearance procedures. vestbrs to proceed immediately from signing the con-
-After 1989, Philippine agencies associated with pri- tract to finalizing the financing plan.
vate power began to work in a more coordinated man- The urgency in creating new capacity in the Philipner
There was greater participation from the National pines led to expensive power generation. Early projects
Economnic Development Authority (which had played a used "peak-load" plants that can be installed rapidly but
key role in initiating the private power program) and operate at very high cost and are designed to serve only
more ranlIdng of priorities through the Investment Coor- for the few hours in the day when demand is very high
dinating Commnittee. A major improvement in the frame- Subsequent projects, p:epared under less time pressure,
work for reviewing and cdearing proposals was the 1990 have addressed this concern. At the same time, expenbuild-operate-transfer
law and its accomparying imple- ence has allowed project size to grow.
67

Box 3.8 Regulation and privatization: which comes first? The case of Malaysia
Ptivatization of the infrastructure sector has progressed sion of tariffs and the maintenance of service standards.
rapidly in Malaysia since the mid-198s. In all cases, the. The scope of regulatory action in Malavsia, however, is
government department or statutory body that was pre- fairly rudimentary. For instance, no clear link exists beviously
supplying the services has assumed the statu- tween the functions of the regulatory agencies and the
tory role of regulating the privatized suppier. Forexam- reation of incentives for the privatized supplierof infraple,
the Kelang Port Authority is now the regulatory structure services to achieve efficiency
agency supervising the two private operating conpanies Although regulatory agencies exist, the respective
at the port, and the Telecommunications Department is ministers stil appear to have considerable influence
the regulator of the telecommunications sector. (The over the policies of the privatized suppliers of infrachange
irn the function of the government department or structure .services. Rate revisions, for example, are not
statutory body has, in each case, necessitated new em- completely a.matter for the regulatory agency to decide
powering legislation.)
and almost alwhays appear to require ministerial sanc-
Significant government. equity ownership in for- tion. There is also a distinct possibility that industry
mnery privatized enterprises and the mechanism of the might "captuWre the regulatory agency in some cases. At
-golden share also play a role akin to regulation. (he. present, considerable ambiguity exists about the indegolden
share, which gives the government veto powers pendence of the regulatory agencies from ministerial or
on major policy matters of the privatized firm, was first political interference.
introduced in the privatization of Malaysian Airline Sys- Although still evolving, the regulatory mechanism
temsano the Malaysian InternationalShippng Corpora- does not appear to have limited new entry and.investtion.)
Equity ownership by the government and the ment The lesson from the Malaysian experience is that
golden share are intended to ensure that the polides of moves toward privatization and private sector provision
the pnivatized firm are in conformity with government of infrastuctureu services need not wait for the fomnal
policies and national objectives,
creation of a comprehensive regulatory framework-
Regalation in Malaysia has really meant the supervioften
unable to attract qualified people. Even in Ar- the process and policies are known and published
gentina, which has a pool of well-qualified people, can assessment of regulation be effective.
civil service salary restrictions and tight budgets The Philippines, responding to the generally inhave
led to weak regulatory agences (Box 3.9). effective regulation of the past, has recently acted to
Allowing a regulatory agency autonomy while make the process more autonomous and accountmaintaining,
its accountability requires a delicate able. A draft bill in the lower house of Congress debalance.
If regulators are easily replaced, directly fines the role of the National Telecommunications
elected at frequent intervals, or easily influenced by Commission more dearly, increases the number of
special interest groups, they may be unwilling to commissioners, assigns a fixed tenure, and increases
implement policies that are socially desirable but -the commission's access to operational funds.
poLitically inexpedient Conversely, a regulator with As regulators become stronger,. "regulating the
too much discretion can, for example, arbitrarily re- regulators" may be desirable, if experience in indusstrict
new investment Experience in Jamaica reflects trial countries is a guide. In the United Kingdom,
some of these problems (Box 3.10).
for example, the National Audit Office audits regu-
A few principles seem to have general accep- lators as. part of a mandate to determnine "value for
tance. It is important for a regulatory agency to re- money" in public service, and the Monopolies and
port directly to the legislature rather than solely to Mergers Commission hears appeals of decisions by
(or througlh) a minister. Legislative scrutiny of regu- sectoral regulatorslators
is typically more open, although informal
pressures can creep in. The head of the regulatory INsrRUMENTs OF REGuLAHON. While regulators
agency should be appointed for a fixed term, prefer- seek to maintain "reasonable' and just" prices in
ably out of cyde with political elections. Scrutiny order to protect consumers, profits must be adeshould
be regular and should systematically assess quate and not subject to political risk or uncertainty.
an agentc's performance in achieving its goals and The ubiquitous instrument of regulation used to
whetlher regulation is well focused. Transparency is balance these goals-for sectors ranging from urban
critical tG regulatory accountability because only if transport to electridty systems-has been "cost-
.68

plus," or rate-of-return regulation, which ensures between alternative services is a formidable task.
that the financial return received by the provider Determiining an appropriate rate of return is also a
covers all costs (operations and maintenance, depre- source of much contention between the regulators
ciation, and taxes) and, in addition, guarantees a ne- and the regulated. Thiese problems encourage misgotiated
return on investment
representation of information and the adoption of
In recent years this instrument has come in for inefficient technologies that inflate the base on
much criticism. Rate-of-return regulation is difficult which rates of return are calculated; they also foster
to implement-obtaining accurate information on unproductive lobbying. Most important, because all
costs of production and the allocation of such costs costs are covered and a rate of return is guaranteed,
Box 3.9 Development of reglatory capacity in Argentina
Although a well-defined regulatory framework was ExIm CNT's inability to effectively address service
legally in place after the privatization of telecommunica- complaints.
tions, regulatorv practice did not conforn to the frame- Since mid-1993-ahnost three years after the beginwork.
Charged with regulatory responsibilities in ning of the rform process-4CT has inproved its per-
November 1990, the.Comisidn Nabonal de Telecmuni- formance, in particular with respect to the concerns of
caciones (CNI) did little until the end of 1991. ND dear consumer A team of outside consultants working with
reguiatory processes were developed, and a bacldog of CNT made progress in developing strategies and procedecisions
began to pile 'tp. Experienced staff were lack- dures. Moreover, aftersome early difficulties in the selecmg,
as wereresourcestohueaddiflonalstafforevenpay
tion process, CNTs top staff (6 directors) are now in
existing staff on a regular basis.
place. The selection was made bv an independent pri-
The outcome of these regulatory and staffing gaps vate recauitment company after a rigorous screening of
was that the development of new telecommunications 125 professionals, and its five nomninees were retained as
services proceeded slowly. This was due in part to CNTs directors, including the president The last director was
failure to formulate standards and processes for issuing proposed by the provinces.
licenses, maIking most of these services uneconomic Progress in Argentina's telecommunications sector
Meanwhile, a number of radio operators and telephone has been significant, and privatization has been able to
cooperatives, faced with little or no regulation, started move ahead in spite of the delays in implementing reguoperations
without licenses. Consumers also suffered latory changes.
.
Box 3.10 Jamaica's regulatory roller coaster for telecommunications
Jamaican telecommunications were initiaUy privately lished the Jamaica Public Utlity Commission in 1966.
run, then nationalized in 1975, and then reprivatized in Not onlv was the commission open to representations
1987. Investment under private ownership wkas strong from allinterested parties; the new system did not set a
until the 1960s and has been strong again since 1987. But floor on the returns that the utility could ean. In the
between 1962 and 1975 utility-government relations United States constitutional protections plus well-develwere
turbulent, and invesmnent levels were low.
oped rules of administrative process afford private utili-
Repeated shifts of power between tvo opposing po- ties substantial protection, even though the privatelitical
parties with divergent views have made it difficult utility commission system nominally gives regulators
to establish a credible regulatory regime that investors substantial discretion But Jamaica lacked these foundacould
rej on with confidence beyond another election. tions. It also lacked a cadre of well-trained regulators
Until 1962 the regulatory regime-including precise, en- and experience in delegating authority to a quasi-indeforceable
provisions on the rate of return the utility. pendent commission. Clashes between the utility and
could earn-was built into the utility's operating lcense. the commission ensued, culminating in the 1975 nation-
Because of Jamaica's strong, independent judidary, pri- alization of telecommunications.
vate participants were willing to invest, confident that After the 1987 privatization, Jamaica returned to its
parliament would not unilaterally change the terms of a pre 1962 regulatory system. It wrote into the operating lilicense
cense of the newly pnvatized utility a guarantee of a 17.5
The newly independent Jamaican government de- to 20 percent annual rate of return on equity, shielded
cided in 1962 that a precisely specified operating license from change except with the consent of the utiity, and
unacceptably constrained the democratic process. Using enforceable by the judidarv. The result was a surge in inthe
United States as a model, the govemment estab- vestment and substantial welfare gains for Jamaica.
69

private management can become complacent about tance phone services, price caps on the dominant
making the right investments and keeping costs provider, AT&T, are thought to be the only instrudown.
ment needed because profits are limited by compet-
The response-has been to design new "incentive" ing suppliers. But where local monopolies exist (as
regulations in which the prices a provider is al- in local telephone services), rate-of-return considerlowed
to charge do not hinge on costs incurred. ations can reassert themselves so that, over time,
Thus, if costs increase, profits are lowered; if costs price-cap regimes may converge toward their ratedecline,
the provider and investors enjoy greater of-retum predecessors. Nonetheless, price caps do
profits. Incentive regulation therefore seeks to moti- have the advantage of shifting a greater part of the
vate providers to use their superior knowledge of financial risk onto providers of infrastructure seroperating
conditions to lower costs and introduce vices, who cannot be sure that the regulator will
new services.
allow them to recoup excess costs. This threat en-
Price caps. An example of incentive regulation is courages tighter self-monitoring of performance.
the increasingly popular price-cap, or "RPI-X," Yadstick conmpetition. When direct competition or
method for determining permitted increases in ser- competition from producers of substitute products
vice price. RPI is the percentage increase in the retail will not work, competitive forces can be replicated
price index (other indexes of costs that the provider through comparisons with performance elsewhere.
does not control can also be used), and X is the (pre- A utility in one region can be motivated to perform
determined) expected percentage increase in the better by promises of greater rewards if its perforprovider's
productivity- The infrastructure provider mance exceeds that of a similar utility in another rehas
an incentive to lower costs, since gains in pro- gion. However, only if the utilities' input prices,
ductivity greater than the expected X percent con- market demand, and government regulations
tribute to increased profits. To maintain intcentives equate can better performance be attnbuted to the
for efficient production, the X-factor should remain efforts of the utility.
unchanged for a period of several years.
A number of countries use yardstick competi-
Price caps are diffusing widely to different tion, fornally or infonrnally. In France the contracts
countries and, gradually, to sectors other than of the local water company often depend on the
telecommunications, where they originated. The quality of services and their production costs rela-
United Kingdom has led the way, using pnce caps tive to those of other French water companies. The
in airports, telecommumications, electricity distri- water sector regulator in the United Kingdom relies
bution, gas, and water supplv. Elsewhere, how- explicitly on cost comparisons. The Chilean teleever,
their main application has been in telecom- communications industry uses an important vanant
munications, with electricity distribution a distant of yardstick competition. A hypothetical "efficient"
second. In Mexico, for example, the government firn, rather than other Chilean finns, is used in setintroduced
price-cap regulation for Telmex in Jan- ting the prices that telecommunications suppliers
uary 1992 which applies a price cap to the overall can charge. International cost and price trends are
weighted average priee of Telmex's services, rather used to estimate the performance an efficient firm
than a specific pnce cap for each service. In the should achieve, and prices are established based on
United States many state regulatory commissions this estimate. Within this framework, the more effihave
shifted from rate-of-return to price-ap regu- cient the Chilean firm, the larger its financial relation.
Where comparison is possible, as between wards. In electric power, reasonable distribution
different states in the United States, the evidence is costs are estimated for three "reference systems,"
that price caps lead to lower prices than does rate- which vary according to such key determinants as
of-return regulation.
distribution costs, population density, and peak de-
There are also some enirly indications that the dif-- mand. Individual electricity distributors are placed
ference between price-cap and rate-of-return regula- in one of these three systems, and delivery prices
tion may not be as great as originally tlhought Price are regulated accordingly. A distributor benefits if it
caps are rardy observed in their pure form. Most delivers electricity more cheaply than the average
rgulators see a continued need to assess the rate of provider in its reference system. However, manipureturn
and so set the caps on estimaftcs of profitabil- lation of "reference system' costs by the few suppliity,
once again increasing the information require- ers in the market has driven the government to exmeits
for effective regulation. An exception arises plore improvements in its use of benchmarks.
when profits are under the control of competitive Although yardstick competition is limited by the
forces. For example, in the U.S. market for long dis- need for sufficiently refined and comparable infor-
50:

mation, that constraint is being partly relieved by Some pointers on consumer involvement in regthe
increasing possibilities of international compari- ulation are available from industrial countries. The
son. Specialized industry organizations and interna- United Kingdom has ten consumer commissions,
tional development banks can serve a useful func- one for each of the ten water service jurisdictions.
tion by disseminating data on production costs. Each is headed by a commissioner who reports to
Periodic audits can also provide information feed- the Office of Water Services on the needs and the
ing into the regulatory process.
concerns of consumers, including the results of for-
Ne-a inistrtuments. The limitations of existing regu- mal surveys and public meetings. In France, where
latory instruments (such as rate-of-return, price-cap, water services are controlled through local municiand
yardstick regulation) have spurred the search pal councils with consumer representatives, private
for new instruments. New instruments have been providers consider good consumer relations essendesigned
to minimize the information required by tial for maintaining their standing with the municithe
regulator and to increase the responsiveness to pal authorities.
the customer, manling them, at least in principle, especially
suited to the needs of developing coun- Conclusion
tries-although many of them have not been fully
tested in practice. In the United States, an intermedi- The past decade marks a watershed. Boldly innovaate
form of regulation balances the risk of windfall tive measures have been taken to pry open monoprofits
(or losses) from the selection.of an inappro- lithic infrastructure sectors. Competition and
priate X in the price-cap formula. If the rate of return unbundling of diverse activities are spreading. Techexceeds
a prespecified limit, the firn. ias to refund nological change (as in teleconmunications and
the difference to customers. If return, fall below the
lower limit, price increases greater than those im- - -
plied by the cap are permitted in some cases.
Another regulatory approach offers a provider a Box 3-fl Participation as regulation:
choice of regulatory options (a stiff price cap but no an initial step in Bangalore
mtonitoring of profits, or larger price increases with s h f t i cosue
A seaous hanchcap facing the individual consumer
ldoser monitoring of profits). The expectation is that dealing with a public utility is the lack of knowlthe
regulated entity will, through its choice, reveal edge of the "rules of the game" and the right to serits
ability to undertake significant cost (and, hence, vice. Expectations are often low and incentives for
price) reductions, as well as its attitude toward risk. collectiveaction are often lmited.
A form of regulation that is even less restrictive
A random sample of 800 households in the inbut
that can .provide meaningful discipline is | dustrial city of Bangalore, India, highlightedissatknownhat
"prot ia reatin.gulatosp ,a
mor n isfaction with the quality of service supplied by the
-r theas performaneof suppliersand standready mom -- telephone, electricity, and water utilities. Only 9
tLor the perforrnance.of suppliers and stand rwedy to . preto pecn fthose hs sampled ape were'sat.isfied eestsidwt with their hi
intervene should problems arise. As long as cus-. telephone service. Even fewer people were satisfied
tomers are reasonably satisfied with the suppliers'
with electricity and water services. Problems cited
performance, the regulator places no formal restric- included supply shortages, excess billing, inability
tions on the suppliers' activities.
to get errors corected, and a geneal lack of communication
with the service agenrcy.
The conclusions of a broader study of quality of
- CREATINC A coNsumER cosnTuENcy. Consum-..
senCUice weolu dearn more competition and better iners,
both individuals and businesses, are not typi- formation are needed. The two groups of agencies
cally involved much in the regulatory process, even that performed relatively well in consumer assessthough
their input can be critical to efficient service ment-banks and hospitals-operate in a relawhere
the regulator has only limited means or ac- tively competitive environent. m
quiring information. Fmal consumers are often the
Another conclusion was that eosumer voice,'
best monitors of service quality. Consumer feedback mob rough groups such as residents' AssoCiations,
can be an important force in sectoral ieform
can be employed direcly to motivate suppliers to and reorgnization. These assocations can provide
provide high-quality
-provide~ ~ ~ service.
service.lo ~ For
examVation
example, returns
andiqalt
critical monitoring and feedback to
canetumse
minimize
for suppliers can be linked to consumer ratings of abuses and hold public officials accountable. Wellperformance.
Initial steps have been taken in Banga- publicized interity comparisons of service quality
lore. India, toward.creating an information base rel- would create an inforrnation base on which conevant
for consumer awareness and decisionmaldng sminer associatons could act..
(Box 3.11).
71.

this chapter shows, where regulatory barriers have
been lowered, even limited new entry or the credi-
ble threat of competition has led to lower prices and
substantial cost reductions.
Tailoring contracts to attract specific investments
has been the most common means used to balance
the public interest and private initiatve. Contracts
have been not only a regulatory instrument, but also
an essential mechanism for risksharing and hence
for financing private projects (Chapter 5). But expecting
individual contracts to bear the continuing
burden of policy formulation and regulatioi., al-
though attractive in the short term, iaises the possi-
bility of misuse because consistencv and transparency
in contract terms are not always easy to
ensure.
In the long run, what is needed is a stlitory reg-
ulatory system that dearly defines the rules of the
'game in each sector and openly enforces them. Al-
though the possibility of abuse cannot be eliminated,
it can be minimized through a system of
checks and balances that reinforces the incentives
for all parties to act in a manner consistent with the
social good. Using consumer feedback in innovative
ways in the regulatory process should be an impor-
tant priority for regulators.
electric power generation) has much to do with
these innovations. But more fundamental forces are
at work, making the new iniitiatives relevant to sec.
tors as diverse as surface transportation, waste treatment
and management, and drinking water supply.
The weight of evidence is that competition in or
for a market for services is generally more effective
in responding to consumer demands than are
mechanisms for making public enterprises more
accountable. We stand on the cusp of change.
Familiar practices are disappearing, but in their
place are unprecedented opportunities for productivity
growth and emergence of new products and
services.
The diffusion of novel ideas such as sector unbundling,
competitive entry, and incentive rcgulaions
from industral to developing countries has cccurred
at a remarlkable speed. Some developing
countries have in fact led the move toward more
market-based provision of infrastructure, as in pri-
Vatization of utilities. Continuation along this path
will bring further dividends In particular, developing
countries need to place greater reliance on new
entry and on competition to encourage investment
and efficiency and to mobilize the skills necessary to
achieve social goals. As the evidence presented in
~72.

t004 l__
Beyond markets in infrastructure
Commercial and competitive provision of infra- * Narrowly focused subsidies to make services afstructure
can effectively deliver the services needed fordable to the poor.
to meet social goals such as economic growth, * Changes in pricing, regulations, and project design
poverty reduction, and protection of the environ- to address externalities and to reduce the adverse en-
-ment. But a number of problems arise for which vironmental consequences of infrastructure.
markets cannot guarantee solutions. Many infra- * Project-plannling tedmiques to take account of
structure services, especially those that resemble economic, environmental, social, and sectoral con-.
public goods (as described in Chapter 1), will be cems not addressed in individual commercial or
undersupplied if markets alone are left to deter- local decisions.
mine their provision. Market outcomes may allocate
fewer infrastructure services to the poor than Decentralization and participation:
society desires. Environmental consequences of in- involving users
frastructure. provision are unlikely to be fully anticipated
and incorporated in market allocations. Co- In order for public goods, such as local feeder roads,
-ordination within and across sectors may not to be provided, three things must happen. First, the
receive .-dequate attention. Although these prob- amount and type of infrastructure to be supplied
lems have little in common, govermnent action ap- must be decided. Since the product will be available
pears to be the obvious solution in each case. Ad- to all, individual choices expressed in the market
mittedly, governments often have .failed to cannot be relied on for this decisiornmaing. Second,
distinguish themselves in providirng adequate pub- investments must be made and the infrastcture
lic goods, safeguarding the interests of the poor, must be provided. Since user charges that fully reprotecting
the envioroment, and coordinating sec- cover costs are not always feasible, private entities
tors But such failure has not been universal. Nor is cannot always be relied on to make the investment.
it inevitable.
Third, infrastruchtre facilities must be maintained
A variety of responses and policy initiatives can Because many infrastructure services benefit the
help overcome the limitations of both markets and public at large, individuals in a market setting cangovernmeits.
This chapter discusses five such ini- not be expected to perform this task
tiatives:
Although the market dearly would fail in these
* Decentralization and -local participation to in- functions, centralized publc inirastrucure bureaucrease
the benefits derved from local public goods, cracies have not proved particularly adept.at persuch
as feeder roads, and improve collective activi- forming them either. Investment decisions ofen reties,
such as maintenance.
sult in too little infrastructure in rural areas. When
* Sound budgetary allocations to nationwide spend-. riral infrastructure is provided, priorities are often
*Ig programs to improve the social value of major in- set centrally-resulting in inadequate responsivefristructure
networks, such as national trunk roads ness to local concerns and inappropriate provision
and large-scale irrigation.
for local conditions. For example, road design by
.73

transport ministries in Africa is often more sensitive such as roads, bridges, and water supply systems. A
to technical-as opposed to service-considera- review shows that projects are executed at one-half
tions. This leads to excessive rural road width and to two-thirds the cost incurred by centralized agencost
and hence to fewer roads. Moreover, without -ces. Since 1990, the municipal fund program has
sufficient local commitment to the infrastructure spread to- all but two Mexican states (Box 4.1). Bethat
is supplied, investments are not maintained cause local governments are better placed to deterand
thus deteriorate rapidly Soon after COte mineandrespondtolocalpreferences, decentralizad'Ivoire
spent $115 million constructing 13,000 tion can increase user satisfaction, too.
water supply points, a survey found that barely half The group of countries undertaking decentralizaof
the handpumps involved wvere functioning-an tion reforms is expanding and is not limited to inexperience
all too common in the rural water sector. dustrial countries or to large developing countries
In most situations, infrastructure provides public Csuch as Brazil and India). A study using comparagoods
of a localized nature. Decentralized responsi- ble data from twenty industrial and developing
bility, in which government authority is moved to countries found that decentralized expenditures acsubnational
levels of government, offers an oppor- counted for one-half of infrastructure spending in
tunity to improve the provision of such goods. Pro- industrial countries and one-quarter in developing
vision of local, and to some extent even national, countries. While local expenditure has always been
public goods can be more effective when participa- common in somne sectors, such as solid waste distion
provides -a voice for infrastructure users and posal by municipal authorities, the scope for decenstakeholders.
tralized control extends to other sectors, such as
roads and water, especially when responsibility for
Decentralization
various activities can be divided among nationaL regional
(provincial), and local authorities.
Mexican experience with a municipal fund program
reveals the potential for improving service delivery )DEcENTALZATIoN IN ROADS. Since roads in a city
by decentralizing govemment authority to indepen- or rural region chiefly benefit local residents, while
dent subnational govemments. Funds are made the benefits of primary highway networks are more
available to local governments for projects that are broadly spread, decentralization of responsibility for
-chosen, planned, and executed by local communi- local roads is quite naturaL Decentralization should
ties. Many of the- projects involve infrastructure,. indude implementation of maintenance and aLso fi-
Box 4.1- Mexico's'mwuicipios help themselves
Until 1990, Mexico's experience with rural infrastructure Execution is usually managed by community commitwas
typical of that in many other countries trying to pro- tees (Comftes de SalfMarkWf, which. hire and supervise
mote rural developmenL Projects managed by.state and local skdled workers and purchase materials. Communifedieral
agvenies were oft-en poorly, selected and de- ties must also contribute a minimumn of 20 percent of
signed and were implemented with hinadequate supervi- costs (usually in the form of unskilled labor and local
-Sion. Furthermore, there was no conunitinent Lo ongoing materials), which helps to- ensure that only projects Of
operations and mainteniance by the agencies, local juis xlcl priorityr are selected. Studies have found that mudictions
(mutnici pis), or conmuntuities. As a result, eqxpe- nicipal fund projecs often cost one-half to two-thirds as
tations often outstripped perfonnmncea
much as similar projects managed.by state or federal
Many -of Mexico's priority projects are relatively aecs.In Mexico this success mnay be explained in
simal and located in inaccessible places. Yet the munici- part by the presence of skilled workers in many comimu-
*pal fuind.program, introduced in 1990, demonstrated nities and a tmditionof volunteer community labor.
that a localfly managed grant fund can becoDme a success- Currently operating in all but two of Mexico's thiirtyful
alternative for managing rural investmnent in teduni- one states, the* programnhas financed approximately
* cally simple hinfrastructure scasmllwtrupy 7,00projects over the past four years at an avenige
systemns, rural roads and bridges, and school buildings. cost ofi511,000 each. Mexico's four poorest states have
The unicpalfund program requires commumity received 532.5 millon in municipalfnsa vrg
participation in project selection and execution. Every investment of 58prcapita,
year each mrunkcipio receives an allocation to finance prcj-. rntnzidpios
pedars 5 ua
ects selected with the participation of its communitiem
74

nancing to ensure that communities are willing to
pay for the quality of road service provided-if all Igare 4. oitries wvith decetaid
costs were borne by higher government levels, local wad mdaitenance -nave btter ro 6ads,
reidents would prefer paved roads. A review of
forty-two developing countries found that, where .
-road maintenance was decentralized, bacldogs were
P--,eicentage_oF rodslower
and the condition of roads was better (al- - -
thiough thie e-ffect of financing dcleontraliztion was L- ~ 5 012 533
not included) (Figure 4.1). The decentralied cases ,
also had higher proportions of paved roadway. But
decentralization was also associated with high-er unit Tnpvdros
costs of maintenance (partially reflecting the higher
share of paved woads) and with wider differences in
quality across regions (reflecting interregional differences
in institutional or human capacity).
DEca,rrRAuzxnoN IN wATER AND SANITAloN. An
analysis of World Bank-funded projects demonstrates
thiat a division of responsibfiiies, provided
that there~ is suitable coordination, leads to better
performance and miaintenance in the water~ and
sanitation sectors than would be the case in more
Paived road
Cntaize eU
flenraid
centralized frameworks. Data for a group of devel- --
oping countries reveal that per capita water produc- 5rWdd Idaa£42eelpgom2s
tion costs are four times higher in centralzed 'than -
in fully decentralized systems and are lowest when
decentraliztion is combined with centralied coordinationt
Mast water sector studies recommend a gional public utilities often take over local functions
three-tiered organ'ization, with a national agency re- on contract from those municipalities that lack the
sponsible for finance, long-term planning, standard -necessary scale of operation to be economic..
setting, and technical assistance. Under the national Decentralization is. not inherently good or badagency,
regional utilities function as operators, mon- As with all arrangemnents, its success depends on
itoring compliance with national standards and reg- the incenitives it creates, the capabilities it can draw
ulatiorns, supervising local systems, and training on, and the costs it imposes.-To improve incentives,
local managers and technical staff. The third tier public accountability is essential and can be enconsists
of local agencies that manage the local sy- hanced by local choice of leaders, local control of fi-.
tern, collect fees, monitor use and maintenance, and nances, and other forms of local responsibility. Elecplan
local budgets. An alternative decentralized tions are one mechanism for involving citizens in
arrang ement found* in France and Germany (and choices-electoral reformn in Colombia and Veneemerging
in Brazil and Poland) moves mnanagement zuela has produced a resurgence in 1hcal leadership.
of each activity to the lowest appropriate level. For Newly elected mayors have been able to mobilize
example, water resource mnanagement-including private sector financing for investment prograrns_ In
regulation, emission standard setting, and invest-. order to be held accountable, local leaders must
merit decisi'ons-is at the water basin (rather than have controL This includes control over revenues,
the national) level, while the provision of services is which in turn requires ade quate local finance laws
left to municipalities.
(covering budgeting financial reporting, taxation,
Of course, technical considerations may dictate contracting, and dispute settlement). In many countcollaboration
and planning across government 1ev- tries, key responsibilities of local governmentsels.
For example, water and santitation investment including the ability to tax or to charge user feesdecisions
made by regional utilities have to be coor- can be suspended by the central bureaucracy withdinated
with local land-use planning.. And linilta- out consultation. T-his lack of autonomy discourages.
tions are often imnposed by local capacity. In Brazil, local administrators and contributes to a popular
although municipalities are constitutionally as- image of local government inefficiency or even corsigned
respons-ibility for delivery of urban water, re- muption. Accounts and audits are important sources
75

Unlodking local effort through- decentralization
guze 4. Prpaomeeaerequires creating new technical and institutional calpmject
effecniveness byimprovmgsy~wt pacity. Many poor communities lack requisite skills
y -. ~ .. and cannot take up the opportunities offered by detS4V&
-~ 4 C >,-'-
2 1t t = m < -. centralization. This lack of capacity renains an im-
>cet;i.t. portant constraint. Adequate technical support is
Vt, ~ Projectneeded, including access to engneerng, project dest%,,

nizations is not a substitute for involving the ulti- 52,400 kilometers of village access roads have been
mate beneficiaries directly, for example, hirough built since 1971 as part of the saenmlal tndoprg movetown
meetings. For the water supply projects stud- ment of community self-help. These roads have a
ied, the effect of inceased reliance on intermediary modest standard-they are gravel-surfaced and
nongovernimental organizations or local govern- only 2 to 3 meters wide, with standard designs for
ment units that did not involve users directly was culverts and bridges. Brazil and Indonesia have
either insignificant or negative, while direct reliance both found that using participatory approaches to
on local organizations whose members included identify appropriate low-cost technologies requires
users had a positive impact on project performance. flexibility in planning and engineering, and in
It is particularly important to ensure that participa- donor attitudes as well (Box 4.2).
tory processes involve all groups of beneficiaries, in- Improved consensus on a project among induding
women (who are often the primary users of tended users not only increases their satisfaction
water and irrigation facilities) and others who may and willingness to contribute, but also helps mobibe
disenfranchised, such as the very poor and lize their.involvement in construction and maintelandless.
nance. In many rural areas, collective contributions
Reaching consensus on user needs often leads to are often in forms other than cash- In the Banglung
infrastructure that is .lower in cost, less technologi- distict in Nepal, for example, local communities
cally complex, and more labor-intensive. In Korea constructed sixty-two suspension bridges using a
Box 4.2 Applying innovative approaches to water and sanitation planning
Two World Barnk-funded projects in Brazil and indone- committees to act as decentralized water utilities- The
sia demonstrate thatusing demand-oriented planning of village commnitees can choose hum alternative levels of
low-cost waterand sanitation requires considerable ad- service and an array of tested technical solutions, dejustnents
by the formal institutions of government, the pending on how much thevillage iswilling to contribute
engineering profession, and extemal donors (such as the to basic investment funds provided by' the WSSSLIC
World Bank). In Brazil the Water and Sanitation Program projec.
for Lonv-lncome Urban Populations (PROSANEAX) Enginees med to adapt. In PROSANEAR, the partidproject
is investing $100 million to provide water and patoly process directly affected the kind of engineering
sanitation inftructure to about 500,000 people in low- advice used. For example, water companies were reincome
areas in eleven cities in different regions. in In- quired to award project design consultancies to a condonesia
the Water Supply and Sanitation Services for sortium of engineering firms or firms working with
Low-lncome Communities (WSSSIC) project is invest- nongovernmental organizations that specialize in coming
about $120 million in similar infrastructure covering munity participation. The supervision team at the na-
1,440 low-income villages in six provinces and affectig tional level encouaged proect design cornutants and
about 13 million people in alL
water company engineers to discuss plans wit. oDeiefi-
Partinpaiion must be tailored to trie population. The ciaries before agreeing on final proposals. In Indonesia
PROSANEAR project-now under way for about two nongovernmental orgaizations with cxperience in the
years-has taken a variety of approaches to involve ben- relevant sector are helping the project management team
eficiaries in the design of subprnjects En one appmach, and engineering staff to be responsive to the demands of
leaders of community organizations are consulted on low-income communities.
basic choices, and the details are then worked out with Donors have to adjist ther prnldks. The Brazilian and
actual beneficiaries In another approach, agreement is Indonesian projects were approved by the World Bank
reached between design engineers and beneEiciaries di- without blueprints of targeted service levels or delivery
redly, in consultation with community leaders and orga- systems. Istead, their appraisal reports provided broad
nizations. In both of thse models, conflicts of intest principles for project execution and indicative targets for
between the water company and community-based or-. benefits and costs, leaving much of the design to be deganizations
are resolved through negotiation, with the veloped during implementation The extrnal donor
project design Consultant as facilitator. Preliminary data must provide intensive supervision to work out details
indicate that these two approaches have dramatically of the subprojects as chosen by the communities and to
lowered per capita investment costs and increased the monitor and evaluate implementation. Experience so far
sense of project owne.ship among communities.
shows that these learning-intensive, participatory proj
In yet another .pproach Indonesia, which already ectscan reducecapitalcosts,althoughtheyalsoentailinhas
a strong tradition of village orgamzations providing creased investment of staff time from the donor.
public services, encourages village water and sanitation
77

Box 4.3 Power in Purang and roads in Ethiopia
Them isa presing need for electricity in the village of Pu- financial resources for improving and maintaining roads
rang in Nepal's Mustang district-and not just beGause and other inrastructures overlooked bv governments. A
the winters are dark and cold and fuelwood is scarce, nongovernmental organization, GRCO was founded in
During the winter months, whern villagers arm house- -1962 to improve and maintain roads and bridges in the
bound by bad weathe, electric liglhting permits indoor Sebat Bet Gurage region southwest of Addis Ababa.
incomegenerating acLivities, such as carpetmaking, GRCO mobilized funds from local Gurage villages and
Without initial exteral, assistance:or even a bank towns and from Gurage migrants living in Addis
loan, Purang has establshed a 12-kilowatt installation Ababa. Since starting.operations, it has financed imthat
is owned and managed by the communitv. The provenents on more than 350 kilometers of roads and
plant inns twenty-four-hours a day and supplies about spent about 7.2 million birr ($35 miUlion). In addition,
100 houses with, on average, 120 watts each Consumers members have contributed an estimated 8 million birrin
are charged to cover operation and maintenance costs. professional servies and labor. In total, GRCO con-
Given the icy-cold weather conditions, the heated dis- tributed about 70 percent of the cost with government
charge water is an added benefit
contributing 30 percent through budget aDocations to
Why is the Purang project successful? Because of the national roads authority, which carried out the road
community participation, the management of the instal- improvements.
lation is well integrated into sodal, poltical, and eco- Private ctizers participation in zoad improvement
nomic structures, ensuring that all participants have ac- and maintenance wvorks succeeded in GRCO because
cess to the decisionmaldng process. The community not local people were provided not only with adequate inonly
owns the installation but also feels responsible for formation but also with the opportunity tD set their own
it. Operators are chosen from among the villagers and priorities for development and to contnbute both finantrained
by a local firm. . . aialy and ir ldnd-thus maintaining their comnitment
Ethiopia's Gurage Roads Construction Organization and ownership. Govemment also supported local initia-
(ORCO).is a community organization that has mobilized tives with funds and tecinical assistance.
combination of local materials, labor inputs, and nancial self-sufficiency in most districts and irgovernment
fEnds- Households unable to partidi- ptoved the efficiency of water use.
pate directly in the construction were asked to .on- Self-help in the construction and maintenance of
tribute food or money. Costs to the government to- ifrastructure is most feasible with relatively smalltaled
only about $50,000, while the amounts scale projects undertaken at the initiative of a wellmobilized
locally were substantially higher. Similar defined group or community for its direct and exself-help
initiatives supply power in rural Purang, cdusive benefit With works that benefit a wider
Nepal. and roads in Ethiopia (Box 4.3X)
public, such as feeder roads, self-help is much more
Cash or in-kdnd contributions from beneficiaries difficult to sustain over the long term, espedally if
also enhance project effectiveness by increasing heavy reliance is placed on -inpaid labor. There are
local commitment Statistical evidence from the risks of exploitation of the poor and of low labor
rural water supply projects study mentioned above productivity under the banner of self-help and volindicates
that the larger the share of investment untarism. Moreover, some types of infrastructure,
costs paid by water users, the more effective the such as dams and major canals, power and telecomoverall
project will be. Until 1990, Mexican irriga- munications systems, tmnk highways, and water
tion operations followed a vicious circle-a para- and sewer mains, are technoro;::icnly complex netstatal
organization operated and maintained the fa- works for which local participation cannot ensure
cilities poorly, so farmers rarely paid the (highly adequate design and impiemrnentticin.
subsidized) charges, leaving the operator even more Participation is not a panace.' even in the sectors
cash-strapped. Service then deed even further, where it is most relevant, nor is it costless and withand
farmers became even more reluctant to pay. out risk. Participatory processes take time and often
Since 1990, responsibility for more than 2 million require the skills of professional intermediaries who
hectares has shifted from the government to water- interact with formal sector agencies, explain techuser
associations. In order to improve maintenance, nology options, and help resolve disputes. Particithese
groups voluntarily raised water charges as pation works best together with, not in place of,
much as threefold. The higher charges have led to fi- good governance. Special interests, local elites, or
78

powerful minorities can capture thte process to the largely re-plicates historical allocations and does not
exclusion of others. Finally, local communities can- allow for increased emphasis on particuflar activities
not be expected automatically to take into account or the phasin out of others. In Cameroon, Nepal,
the environmental costs theyr impose on others, any and Zambia, transport sector allocations have emmore
than a private firmn would.
plhasized the construction of new roads over main-
Improving allocationstenance
budgetary
mpro
or rehabilitation- of existing networks, even
~~~~~~~~~~~~though
the latter is a dear priority.
*Decentralization and participation can be useful in- Comprehensive and centralied medium-term
*struments for overcom'ing market failure, particu- planning with strong backing from political authorlarly
when the public goods provided are local. ities was attempted in many developing countries
When the public goods are at the national level- dining the late 19550s; and 1960s, without conspicusay,
a highway network-the central government ous success. An excess of ambition spawned large
maintains direct involvemnent in allocating re- public projects, many of which remain a costly bursources
and in the planning and selection of proj- den for the economies concerned.
ects. The process and criteria underlying central In some.ewononuies, incuding many in East Asia,
governments' decisions on budgetary outlays for governiment dedisionmaldng of a more intermediate
national -public goods and for transfers to subna- nature has been practiced- In Japarn, Korea, Mablaytional
governments are described in this section. sia, Singapore, and Taiwan, China, authorities focus
Strategic and project planning are discussed in a on directing public expenditures and actively COOPlater
sectioni.
erate with a strong private sector. Flexibility and
In many developing countries, the baisic process adaptability to changing circumstances are characfor
allocating and controlling public funds for capi- teristic, with formial plans being indicative rather
tal investment and recurrent operations is often dif- than prescriptive. In Malaysia, governmentt decificult
to reconcile w.ithi professed development ob- sionmaking involves different levels of government,
jectives. An analysis of budgetary allocations in with each level focusing on those issues for which it
Uganda revealed that the budgetary process there is best qualified (Box 4.4).
Box 4A4 Centralized. and decentralized infrastructure planning in Malaysia
The Malaysian approach to inifrastructure planning jurisdiction over the selection of expenditure programs
blends centralized and decentralied forms. First, at the for the five-vear plans.
centralevel, national development objectives and tar- Trhe institutional framework for hinfrastructure develgets
are formulated by the National Economi c Council (a opmnent in Malaysia has been effective in ensuring tlhat
mfinisterial council chaired by the prime ministe) and public provision of infratructure has reflecte both
the National Development Planning Comumittee (coin- broad national priorities and local needs. infr-astructure
pose of top civil servants from federal ministries), rvso.a sufficient to sustain strong economic
Alongside -these two groups, the Economiic'Planning growth up to the 1980s.
Unit, located in the prime miinister's department, acts .as By that time, however, the emergence of strong pria
coordinating and hintgrting agency rather than an ini- irate sector capacity convinced the government thiat its
tiator of sectoral Plans_
direct involvement in some sectors and activties was no
Following. deflibertion by these two groups, the longer necessary Fresh approaches were also perceived
federal government's development policies and sec- to be desirable int dealing with gruwing hifrdstructure
total priorities are conveyed to mndilstries, statutory bottlenecks. The government responded flexibly to these
*bodies, and state governments, which are then invited changing circmstances, placing hinfiastructure sectors at
*to submi't their programs for the next five-year plan. the forefront of its privatizatian program". To date;
This second stage constitutes the' dE-centralized ap- eighty-five projects have been partly or completey prdproach
to planning. Agencies that are located, in the vatized, indluding the 900-kilometer North-South Hfighstates
are required to discuss their development pro- way, the container termtinal, in Port Kelang, Telekom;
grams with the appropriate State Econom-ic Pang. Malaysia, and the National Electricty Board. The goviUniit
before submitting themn to the relevant federal erminents "Guidelines on PrivatiztioeC issued in 1935
miinistrv, This ensures that the state governments are and "PrVa1ization Master Plan" firmulated in 1939
aware. of the development. proposals of the. federal clearly confirm its view of infirastructure.prvatization
agencies operating withi.i their boundaries. Th N- yet another mneans to achieve. its underlying developtional
Developmrent-Planning Comm-ittee has ultimte ment strategies..
79

->W>

to this purpose without sacrificing other socially - .-..*-..
beneficial public expenditures. 4 E m s e centrally
Price subsidies to infrastructure almost always plannedecnonomies,infrastructurebsubsidides
benefit the nonpoor disproportionately. In develop- ' wentmainlyto the better-o'. -
ing countries, the poor ue kerosene or candles
rather tain electricity for lighting, they rely on pri- -.
* vate vendors or public standpipes rather than inhouse
connections for ater supply, and they are in- . t
ge.(1:1)
frequently served by sewerage systems. In Ecuador . Rt of subsidy to better-off;
the electricitysubsidy was found.to be $36 a year for
tossidytoporthe
37 percent of residential consumers with lowest -- 0 . 1 - 3 '-
use but $500 a year for the better-off households >'.-1 -.
-with highest use. In Bangladesh subsidies on infra- Eleciity -
structure services are roughly six times larger for
the nonpoor than for the poor. Although poor peo- Hou old'gas
ple generally consume more water and sanitation .
services than they do power, a study of five Latn ' UrbaIrsp_ ..
American countries found that water and sewerage
subsidies are diected more to richer than to poorer
"u":-:::'
households (Figure 4.3) Even in fonnerly centraly -. -.
planned Algeria and Hungary, the rich have re- . ' xauo of subsidylto better-of
ceived more than the poor in the way of infrastruc- to ssidy i- to por
tireservicesubsidies (Figure4.4). :. 3' 4
There are, however, ways in which infrastructre, a. - V; - - ' '
subsidies can be structured to improve their effecdireness
in reaching the poor. For example, for
-'
water, increasing-block tariffs can be. used-charg- Wat aind
ing a particularly low "'leline" rate for the firt part '
of consumption (for example, 25 to 50 liters per per- _ ,t,
son per day) and higher rates for additional .
'blocks" of water. This block taiff links price to volume,
and it is more efficient at reaching the poor rtdildtand HimayandWorld-Bank
than a general subsidy because it limits subsidized 19e 9 '5' <
consumption. Increasing-block tariffs also encourage
water conservation and efficent use by increasing
charges at higher use. These tariffs are most effective
when access is universal. When the poor lack connection costs to public services, especially when
access, as is frequently the case, they do not receive payment is required in advance of connection. In
the lifeline rate and typically end up paying much such circumstances, access to credit may be more
higher puces for infrastructure services or their sub- important than subsidized prices. Utilities are often
stitutes-
useful conduits for extending loans to finance con-
Subsidizing access to public infrastructure ser-. nection costs because they can use their regular
vices is often more. useful for ibe poor than price billing procedures to secure repayment In Banglasubsidies-
In Colombia in the early 1980s, water u:il- desh the Grameen Bank provides credit to about 2
ities in Bogoti and Medelin used household survey million poor and landless persons-most of them
data to distinguish between rich and poor house- women. The Bank combines group lending, which
holds and specifically targeted the poor with sub- allows the poor to substitute social oollateral based
- . . sidized connection charges and increasing-block on peer pressure for financial colla -al, with financ-
*: ' tariffs. This cross-subsidy scheme resulted in the ing mechanisms to extend credit for tubewells and
poorest 20 percent receiving a subsidy equivalent to sanitary latrines. In 1993 the Grameen Bank lent $18
* 3.4 percent of their income, financed by the richest million for this purpose and sLice 1992 has proquintile,
who paid a- "tax" equivalent to 0.1 percent
of their income. Many low-income households carnot
mobilize the funds needed to pay heavy initial
- .. . . . . .~~~~~~~~~
vided loans for about 70,000 suction tubewells.
In certain crcumstances, programs providing
employment to the poor represent a highly effective

way of achieving distributional objectives. Such to governmenL Enviromental sustainability inschemes
work because they mobilize large trnsfers volves innovation in technology and organization,
rapidly, and, by offering relatively low wages in re- as well as improved efficiency in the use of infratum
for unskilled manual labor, they transfer in- structure services through pricing and regulation.
come only to those without more attractive options. Regulatory efforts are also necessary for infrastruc-
In India's Maharashtra state, the Employment Guar- Lure services to be delivered in compliance with
antee Scheme, initiated in response to the severe public safety standards.
drought in 1972-73, provides unskiled rural employment
on demand. The scheme has provided at- Innovation in design for affordability
most 1.7 billion person-days of employment and is
credited with playing a large part in averting Worldwide, roughly 1 billion people lack access to
calamity during numerous droughts. However, lit- dean water and more than 1.7 billion do not have
tle evidence exists that such schemes produce the adequate sanitation. Diarrheal disease, often caused
most economically useful infrastructure. Coordinat- by contaminated water, represents one-sixth of the
ing them with overall infrastructure priorities might world's burden of disease (World Development Report
strengthen their economic impact
1993). The most widespread contaminant of water is
disease-bearing human wastes. The envirorunmental
Addressing externalities
benefits of water supply depend not only on delivering
safe water for drinking but also on providing
InfrasLructure often has wvidespread in.direct im-- enough water to permit good human hygiene.
pacts-frequently, on the environment-which can Equally important is reducing contact with human
be beneficial or harmful. Irrigation infrastructure excreta by providing pit latrines, toilets, and sewers
can reduce pressure on land resources by pennitting (Box 45).
greater intensity of cultivation on existing plots, but Although even among the poor the willingness
it can also promote excessive water usage, resulting to pay for water is often sufficient to cover costs, this
-in groundwater salinization and land subsidence. is not always so in the case of sewerage, both behifrastructure
can also reduce or increase public cause conventional sewerage is often expensive and
safety. Road improvements that raise traffic speed because certain costs of inadequate sanitation are
may expose nonmotonzed road users to increased not borne within the household. For limited public
risk of accidents; traffic signals can improve pedes- funding to benefit large-numbers, adoption of techtrim
safety. Because markets often fail to reflect nical and organizational innovations in low-cost
these extemalities, their management usually fails sanitation is necessary. A study in Kumasi, Ghana,
Box 4.5 Assessing a project's reach: water in Kathmandu
Evaluating infratructure projects is difficult at bes* En- niques, benefits from the cty's new $150 million water
viromnental costs must be identified and valued, the distribution system induded a dirct financial savings of
amount that individuals will pay for service determined, $500S,00( annually from lower maintenance costs, plus
and he -effect that service wil have on other infrastruc- substantial annual benefits (based on willingness-to-pay
Wr sectors assessed. Water supply, sewage treatment,. estimates for different users ranging from a low of $10
sanitation,solid and hazardous waste handling and am- for standpipe users to a high of $250 for business users).
bient water quality are all interrelated. A weaknmess in Tot benefits were estimated to be $19.1 million per year
any one will affect infrastructure requirements else- At a 12 percent discount rate, the pxriect showed a mtarwhere.
ginally positive net benefit of $52 million.
In the Nepalese tapital of Iathmandu, officals as- Using the more detailed service-lever approach to
sessed the effects of improving the water service using project appraisal, however, it was deternined that in
an extension of traditional cost-benefit analysis-the some cases health benefits fxom a reduction in coliformn
-service-levelV apprach to valuation. This approach rec- contamination of the water approached $1,000 per unit
ognizesthat environmenal services are valued differ- serviced. An education program that improved water
-entlybydifferentusersandalsoattemptstoassess indi- use led to further reductions in health and transport
rect effects of water poDvision. =
costs. After these indirect benefits were factored in, the
FKathmandu has l.miiilioninhabitanta Based on esti- - project showed a positive net benefit of about $275
mates using nannwly defined pFoect apprai tech- million. -
82-

found that, although households were unwilling to scarcity levels (particularlv in agriculture) and linkpay
for the delivery of conventional sewerage ser- ing price to usage are.important first steps in dealvices,
only modest subsidies would be required to ing with water scarcity as well as with problems of
achieve relatively high levels of coverage with ven- salinization, mcreasing fluoride concentrations,
tilated improved pit (V1P) latrines-
and land subsidence. Influencing demand through
During the 1980s the Orangi Pilot Project in. pricing allows the user to decide how much water
Karachi, Pakistan, mobilized poor people to con- to use and how to achieve conservation.
struct, finance, and maintain their own water-borne
sewers. This action resulted in the provision of sew- Reguilatioir
erage to 600,000 people at a cost of less than $50 per
household. The low cost was due to innovative Regulation is an additional means of reducing adtechnical
solutions combined with a participatory verse environrmental consequences. It is also imporapproach
in which corruption was reduced and tant for securing infrastructure service delivery that
communities contributed thieir own resources. A meets public safety requirements- The two principal
similar story comes from northern Brazil, where the regulatory approaches are command-and-control
use of technically innovative condominial sewer- measures and regulation based on economic incen-.
age-a collective. connection system provided. by tives. Command-and-control measures-direct regcommunity-based
organizations-lowered capital ulation along with monitoring and enforcement syscosts
by up to 40 percent over conventional systems. tems-are by far the most widely used technique in
developing countries. An advantage is that they
Motivation of user efficiency
provide the regulator with a degree of certainty
about, for example, how much pollution levels will
Efforts to mitigate enviroxunental impacts dtrough be reduced. But they have the disadvantage of proconsumer
investments in energy saving are ham- viding little incentive for innovation in pollution
pered by the low consumer prices and subsidies de- control techmology once standards are achieved. In
scdbed in Chapter 2. On average, developing coun- recent years, many countries have also adopted ecotries
use 20.percent more electricty than they.would nomic instruments. Setting prices to reflect full costs
if users paid the incremental cost of supply. Once (the "polluter pays" principle). is the most powerful
econonic pricing is established, governments are and obvious of such instruments. In some countries,
able to promote. the use of more energy-efficient experiments are under way using.additional regulatechmologies,
tory instruments, such as pollution charges, mar-
Similar price increases are merited in transport ketable pemlits, subsidies, deposit-and-return sysbut
are more difficult to implement Cars using city tems, and enforcement incentives, to introduce
centers at rush hour impose congestion costs many more flexibility, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness
times higher than they do in off-peak periods, and into pollution control measures. Some of these efthe
environmental costs of vehicle use are greater in forts appear promising.
urban, than in rural areas. Urban car users can be Environmental regulation begins by specidfing
made aware of such costs through the introduction abatement standards based on the technical options
of parking fees, area licensing, and tolls. Growing available. For example, for power generation, techenvironmental
consciousness and technological nologies.are emerging that effectively reduce noxchange
are likely to increase the use of tolls and fees ious pollutants from coal-regulation can thus subin
the near future, which will encourage travelers to stantially reduce emissions. But dean technologies
use public transit or nonmotorized modes.
almost always add to the cost of coal-fired thermal
Important user efficiency problems in the water power (by 10 to 20 percent on capital costs and 5
sector stem from the underpricing of water Domesr- percent on operating costs). Consequently, such
tic consumption, sanitation, irrigation, hydroelec- technologies are still far from universally used in
tric generation, and transport aU create water de- developing countries- Where switching to gas is an
mands and raise problemis of overall supply and economnically. viable alternative, there are manv ensectoral
allocatiorL In India in 1985, 94 percent of all vironmental advantages. Poland provides an examwater
used went to agriculture. Conflicts between ple of market-based incentives to reduce noxious
industry and irrigation have emerged in some emissions. Its National Environment Fund, set up in
areas, and in cities such as Bombay, Delhi, and 1980, levies charges on all polluters and imposes
Madras problems of water scarcty have arisen In additional fines on owners of industries that violate
many countries, raising the.price of water to reflect region-specfic abatement standards. The proceeds
83

are bundled into low-cost loans to industries to pur- Elements of infrastructure planning
-chase pollution-reducing eqtuipment. In 1992 the
fund's income was $188-5 mnillion, double the Because most infrastructure uses geographidcally
amount in 1991- Although collection rates for pollu-. distributed networks, spatial, sectoral, and intersection
c-harge and fines increased during the 1980s toral coordination and planning are necessary for
and early 1990s, a recent decline int compliance rates goverunment activities. In addition, project selection,
is raising concern,
design, and evaluation are important steps in the
Serious problems are posed by vehicle transport overall decisiornmaking process. Incorporation, at.
in Central and Eastern. Europe, despite a per capita the earliest stages, of the social and environmental
vehicle population only one-third to one-half the implications of projects is vital.
level in Western Europe-'The legacy of fuel and yehicke
underpricing, the high average age of vehicles, Sectored and cross-sectoral stmtegies
obsolete designs, inadequate pollution controls,
dirty fuels, and poorly maintained vehiicles-all Because infr-astructure investmnents. often ha ve
are factors producing environmnental degradation. broad impacts- on many groups, planning strategies
This situation has prompted suggestions that the should focus on coordinating the decisions of inc
ountries take direct measures to restrict road trans- .vestors, including donors, while also gaining the
port in favor of railways or river transporL. A study broad acceptance of other stakeholders. Particular
*of Hungary undertaken for the World Bank sug- attention may be required to ensure'that the congests,
however, that alternative approaches- can re- cerns of women are not overlooked (Box 4.6). User
duce vehicular emissions. If all new vehicles wvere groups and other interested parties need to be conto
comply with available best-practice emission sulted by the public officials and technical specialstandards,
the traffic growth accompanying eco- ists who usually lead the process, and mnechanisms'
nomic growth (as far forward as the year 2020) for conflict resolution are necessary.
could be accommodated at absolute emisinleel
n the case of watershed protection in the Sio
below those presently experienced. However, limit- Paulo region of Brazil, for example, a working
ing traffic growth may be necessary to control con- group comprising municipalities, water suppliers,
gestion.
and'-environmental agencies was set up to solve
In the Netherlands a transport sector strategy water quality. problems in the Guarapiringa reseraimed
at mi'nimizin'g environmental stress and voir so that it could meet rapidly growing demands
avoiding unnecessary investment mixes regulatory for water. As part of the consultation process, a
and market-based measures-for example, intro- town forum was held with more than 120 city and
ducing pollution premiums on road users, encour- state government officials, members of nongovem-
*aging the use of bicycles and -public transport, creat- mental organizations and community groups, acaing
vehicle-free precincts for pedestrians, providing demics and researchiers, leader of professional orincentives
for higher vehicle occupancy rates, and ganizations, and the press. Local consultants
instituting parking controls. In Japan and in several prepared an environmental profile of the region and
developing countries, including China, Ghana, and interviewed city, community, andl business leaders.
hindonesia, similar schemes to enicourage nonnmiotor- The process resulted-.in a basin development strat-
-ized traffic and pedestrian facilities are being con- egy arnd an action plan that combined public and
sidered.
Regulation to preserve safety standards in infrapoltical
commitnent.
When an infrastructure system is owned by a sinstru.cture
service provision and delivery is an im- gle entity, planning is generaly interaized by the
portant priority. Studies have shown that road acci- owner. Once ownership of a system is unbundled
dents are the first or second most important cause of (as described in Chapter 3), however, strategic plandeath
in many developing countries. Addressing ning_ becomes decentralized. To maintain the beneroad
safety involves not only restricting speed and fits of unbundling, the development of the natural
traffic flows, but intrducing safety considerations monopoly segments-typically the promcry (htunk)
into the design and collection of information for faclities-and the setting of technp ical standards
monitoring and analyzing safety conditions. Facility should be coordinated at the sectorl level because
construction also requires spedal consideration. Be- of the market power that comes with the right. to
cause construction exposes workers to a high risk of carry out these functions. In an unbundled ntetwork
injury and death, effective safeaty standards must be this responsibility could be entrusted t a coordinatapplied
to the construction of faclities, not just to ing entity made up of representatives from governtheir
operation.
ment, suppalers, and users.
84

Box 4.6 Women can benefit from inforastructure,'but success lies in the details
The beneficia impacts of infratructure on women can various countries, including Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho,
be profoDund, often ex%tending beyond the commonly Madagascr, and Tanzania, reveals that fmany poor
cited ipcts of water and.sanitation infrastructure on women welcome such emnployment opportunities and
household health or women's time allocation. But ensur- are able to perform the same tasks as men for similar
ing such outcomes requires foresight and attention to de-: wages. To expand women's participation in these projtail
during project planning. -- ects, eligibflity conditions must be extended, and job op-'
Women,. as principal producers and miarketer of portunities must be advertised more widely. In addition
food -in many African countries, benefit from the im- theme should be scope for advancement by women to suproved
access to markets that rural roads bring; Yet uin-. pervisory positions. Where maintenance is contracted
less they can afford to ftrnsport thick prodiuce by truck, out women's groups should be encouraged to bid for
goods must be carried to markets by the farmers contracts.
themselves. This sharply diminishes benefits from road Predicting. the impact of infr-astructure on women can
infrstructure. -Intermediate(no-nmotorized)
-means of be difficult and requires a dlose understanding of the detransport
such as bicydes arndcarts, can be attractive al- tails of their activities, opportunities, and constraints. In
temnatives to bead portage but involveihigh initial invest- . central Gambia, agricultur traditionally involved both
ment costs. In Ghana a pilot component administered by women and men within a system of coexisting commu-
NGOs in tie Second Transport Rehabilitationt Projec nat and individual-cultivation. -Men were responsible for
channels pa-rt of the wage earnings from labor- organizing the communal subsistejce cultivation of upl-
*intenigve road works to finance hire-purchase programs land cereals, with both men wamd women contributin
for intermediate means of transport.
labor, while women alone were responsible for cultivathin
many countries, destitute women are eager to par- ing and miarketing rice from individual plots. A rice irriticipate
in road works programs that off-er them opportu- gation project. w-as introuced, distribuftin 1,500
nities to earn cash. In one of Bangladesh's main road hectres of irrigated land'to farming households. An exmaintenance
programns, women comprise tin bulk of the plicit intention of the project was to improve the ecoworkforce,
byut in Kenya's Rural'Access Roads Program, nomic sbtats of the femnale cultivators by raising their inone
of the oldest and most successful of such.programs comes fr-om higher.rice yields. However, mnale farmers
in Africa, less than 20 percent of the workforce are became interested in rice cultivation for commnercial purwomen.
Similarly lowv participation rates for women poses and laid -claim to the irrigated land for their comhave
been observed in other African countries. Although munally farmed plots. While women did benefit from
it is sometimes argued that low partcipation by African the project through the higher incomes accruing at the
women is due to their already oppressive burden of do- household level, their position as producers and marmestic
duties and subsistence agriculture, evidence from keters of rice was undermined.
. -. : prducrs lomcn .a ald pricipl markter of ortnitis mst b aderEsd mre wdel. lnaddfio
CooRDiNATIoN oF PLANNING. Coordination of prices that reflect costs provide valuable informaplans
for, competing or complementary sectors, is
also imortauL -here program and project finanction
for decisionmaking on sectoral allocations.
Wh-en the-local highwyaecdcidtoxpn
ing involves many donor agencies, coordination trucking cargo capacity to the port of Santos in
preserves overall coherence of activities. In Africa Brazil, shippers pited out that rail transport was
efforts to imnprove donor coordination hin trantsport dieaper, and the railway and the railhead river port
have beent embodied in recent initiatives (Box 4.7). capacity were expanded instead. In China, the
With transport, intermoclal coordination is often Henan Power Company', after evaluating-the costs
required. The stress on speed and reliability in of expanding power gene-ration capacity in the Yan-.
modern-day freight transport is makding it increas- shi Themal Power Project, changed its initial profingly
vital for shippers, to be able to offer door-to-
*door service, comnyinvolving many. modes. It.
posal from locating the coal-fired powver station
near load cnesand suapplying it with coal by rail
* ~~is necessary to establish a legal framework that al- to siting the station near coal mines and transmidtlows
'freight forwarders to accept liability for the ting electricity to the load centers.
entire transport chain. In addition, customs procedures
in many developing country podts must be ProErAPASLTcnqe o rjecta
simplified to avoid delays that can significantly praialt are well estabirshed and-docurented, but in
raise transport costs and undermbine the intemna- practice they are not widely applied- Although fortional
competitiveness of local producers. . mal cost-benefit analysis of projects inposes non-
Although governmeenLs are often tempted to in- neglgible analytical and data demands, these techter
lene rin price-setting across modes or sectors, niques bring rational, objective, and, to the extent

powerful minorities can capture the process to the largely rwplicates historical allocations and does not
exdusion of others. Finally, local communities can- allow for increased emphasis on particular activities
not be expected automatically to take into account or the phasing out of others. In Cameroon,-Nepal,
- environmental the costs they impose on others, any: and Zambia, transport sector allocations have emnmore
than a private finn would.
phasized the construction of new roads over maintenance
or rehabilitation of existing networks, even
-Improving budgetary allocations - - . though the latter is a clear priority.
Decentralization and participation can be useful in-- - Comprehensive and centralized medium-term
struments for overcoming market failure, particu- planning with strong bacldng from political authorladly
when the public goods provided are locaL ities was attempted in many, developing countries
When the public goods are at the national level- during the late 1950s and 1960s, without conspicusay,
a highway network-the-central government ous success. An excess of ambition spawned large
maintains direct involvement in allocating re- public projects, many of which remain a costly bursources
and in the planning and selection of proj- den for the economies concerned.
ects. The process and criteria underlying central In some econories, including many in East Asia,
governments'. decisions on budgetary outlays for government decisionmaking of a more intermediate
national public goods and for transfers to subna- nature has been practiced. In Japan, Korea, Malaytional
govemments are described in this section. sia, Singapore, and Taiwan, China, authorites focus
Strategic and project planning are discussed in. a on directing public expenditures and actively cooplater
section.
erate with a strong private sector Flexibility and
In many developing countries, the basic process adaptability to changing circumstances are characfor
allocating and controlling public funds for capi- teristic, with formal plans -being indicative rather
tal investment and recurrent operations is often dif- than prescriptive. In Malaysia, government decificult
to reconcile with professed development oh- sionmaking involves different levels of govenunentL
jectves. An analysis of budgetary allocations in with each level focusing on those issues for which it
Uganda revealed that the budgetary process there is best qualified (Box 44).
-Box t4
Centralized and&decenitralized infrastructure planing in Malysia
B6 4E =n plnnn -. Malaysia .-
- The Malaysian approach to infrastrcture planning jurisdiction over the selection of expenditure programs
-,blndscentralizedanddecentralizedforms.Frst, atthe' forthefive-yearplansr.-
'central level, national development objectives and tar- The institutional frameWrk for infrastructure develgets
are formulated.by chi National Econoic Council (a opment in Malaysia has been effective in ensuinng that
minister council chaired by the prime mnirster) and: public provision of inastructure has reflected both
the National-Development Planning Committee. (com- broad national priorities and local needs. Infrasucture
posed of top civil sevants fr.m, federl ministries). proviion was sufficent to sustain strong economic
Alongside these two groups, the Economic Planning growth up to the 1980s.
Uni, located in thie prime minister's department acts as - By that time, however, the emergence of strng pria
coordinating and integratig agency rather than an iu- vate sector capaLty convinced the government that its
: tiator of sedtoral plans. .: . : - direct involvement in some sectors and activities was no
Following deliberation by these two grups, the : longer necessarsy Fresh approacds were also perceived,
fedemal government's, development policies and sec- to be desirable in dealing with growing infrastructure
toral priorties are conveyed to ministries, sttutory bottlenedcs. The govenment responded flexibly to these
:bodies, and state governments, which are then invited changing cdrumsanc, placing infrastucture setors at
-to submit their pgrams for the next five-year plan.- the forefront. of its privatization progam- To date,
This second stage constitutes the decentralized ap- eighty-five projecs have been partly or completely priproach
to planiing. Agencies that are located in-the vatzed, induding the 900-kclometer North-South Highstates
arequired to discuss their development, pro- way, the containwr terminal in Port Kelang Telekom
grams with the appropriate State Economic Planning Malaysia, and the- National Electricity Board. The gov-
* Unit -- before submitting them to the relevant federal . enment's "Guidelines or Privatization issued-in 1985
.. ministry.This- ensures that the state govenments are and 'Privatization Master..Plar formulated in .1989
aware of the dvelopment proposals of the federal; dey confirm its view of inrstructure privatization as
*.- .agencies perating within- their boundaries. The Na- yet another means to achieve its underlying develop-
:--.tionalDevelopment-Planning Committee has utimate ment strategies. . -
79

vestment included drainage and completion of un-
- water 4 anctsewemge, the.tter finished projects. In Indonesia, rates of return on op-
.-. b
erations and maintenance for irrigation and roads
have been found to be as high as 100 percent, indicating
that maintenance has been neglected.
; 0 X 7 }Doayuu u o Y -In many countries, increasing spending on basic
rural infrastructure is an economic priority that may
contribute significantly to poverty reduction. China
has been successful in integrating agricultural development
with industria development by building
up rural industrial infrastructure. Consequently,
rural industries have prospered and rural populations
have become employed in industry without
major dislocation. Township and rural enterpises
in China now employ more than 100 million people
ii M Mand produce more than one-third of gross national
outpuL In Indonesia and Malaysia since the late
:
priority for the governent has
E __ _been balancing regional development and reducing
_oet.To this end, infrastructure expendituresparticularly
in transport and irrigation-have been
directed to rural areas. In Malaysia in 1965, earth
and gravel roads represented 18 percent of the total
- . length - of the road network (15,356 kilometers). By
1990 such roads constituted 32 percent of the 50,186-
dkilometer network in the country. During this period,
poverty in Malaysia fell dramatically. Rural
mpovert, which in 1973 affected 553 percent of the
; . i t _ population, had fallen to 19.3 percet-by 1989. A
World Bank study of poverty in Malaysia identified
* 2 the | government's _
programs to raise land productiv-
- _ ity _ g as _ a jg primary factor in this impressive improvement,
and noted the importance of rural road and
1960s, an 9important
irrigation infrastructure-
Subsidies and transfers to the poor
Although the relationship between infrastructure
and poverty is pivotal, infrastructure is nevertheless
- 0 -: Decisions on expenditure allocation within infra- a blunt instrument for intervening directly on behalf
structure sectors as well as across sectors should be of the poor. Adequate budgetary allocations to parguided
by consideration of the countrfy's underlying ticular sectors or to poor regions, removal of price
development goals. Governments must choose be- distortions which support biases against the poor,
tween new construction and maintenance, and be- and the selection of appropriate standards and detween
ruraland urban sectors among regions. Allo- sign are generally the most effective ways to ensure
cating expenditures to different activities on the that infrastructure realizes its potential for fostering
basis of soa rates of return is an important labor-intensive growth and helping the poor to parmethod
of establishing priorities- Analysis of such ticipate in the growth process. Subsidized provision
retur.Ls in most developing countries reveals the of infrastrcture is often proposed as a means of re-
; critical importance of maintenance over new con- distributing resources from higher-income housestruction.
A. study of irrigation expenditumes in holds to the poor. Yet its effectdveness depends on
India identified maintenance of irrigation canals as whether subsidies actually reach the poor, on the
a top. priority, with retums as high as 40 percent adniinistrative costs assocated with such targeting,
Other actvities that deserved priority over new in- and on the scope for allocatng budgetary resources
*so.

to this purpose without sacrificing other socially
beneficial public expenditures.
-WM snoe&fd
Price subsidies to infrastructure almost always'.:ir&Mzb.idies
benefit the nonpoor disproportionately. In developing:
countries, the poor -use kerosene or candles- -3 .
rather than electricity for lighting, they rely on pri- t
vate vendors or public standpipes rather than inlhouse
connections for water supply, and they are infrequently
served by.sewerage systems. In Ecuador
.Y tlo;of-subsidrto
the electricity subsidywas found to be$36 a year for j .. m
the 37 percentofresidentia consumers with lowest
use but $500 a year -for the better-off households -- "$~?-
with highest use. In Bangladesh subsidies on infrastructure
services are roughly six times larger for -
- . the -. nonpoor than for the poor. Although poor peo- . el
ple generally consume more water and sanitation 1- =
services than they do power, a study.of five Latin
2Ud'nanpor5
Amercan countries found that water and sewerage
-iN.
subsidies are directed more to richer than to poorer *-"
households (Figure 4.3). Evn in formerly centrally
planned Algeria and Hungary, the rich have received
more than the poor in the way of infrastruc- tr ,C
turn service subsidies (Figure 4.4). t.-4w- yci
cf
- There are, however, ways in which ifratructure
subsidies can be structured to improve their effec-- 1.
tiveness. in reaching the poor. For example, for
water, increasing-block tariffs can be used-cafrg a e
-ig a particularly low lifeline rate for the first part t - 7t
of oonsumption (for example, 25 to50 liters per per--
son per day) and higher rates for additional . 4% Q _g
-blocks" of water This block tariff links pnice to volume,
and it is more efficient at reaching the poor i;Sic
4
da iC T r orl&Ban
* . than a general subsidy because it limits subsidized
consumption. Increasing-block taiffs also encourage
water conservation and efficient use by increas-
* - ing charges at higher use. These tariffs are most effective
when access is universaL When the poor lack connection costs to public services, especialy when
access, as is frequently the case, they do not receive payment is required in advance of connection. In
the lifeline rate and typically end up paying much such circumstanc, access to credit may be more
higher prices for infrastructure services or their sub- important than subsidized prices. Utilities are often
stitutes.
useful conduits for extending. loans to finance con-
Subsidizing access .to public infrastructure ser- nection costs because they can use their regular
vices is often more useful for the poor than price billing procedures to secure repayment In Banglasubsidies.
In Colombia in the early 1980s, water util- desh the Grameen Bank provides credit to about 2
ities in Bogota and Medellinused household survey million poor and landless persons-most of them
data to distinguish between rich and poor house- women. The Bank combines group lending, which
- holds and specificaRy targeted the poor with sub- allows the poor to substitute social collateral based
sidized connection chrges and increasing-block on peer pressure for financial colateral with financtariffs.
This cross-subsidy scheme resulted in the ing mechanims to extend credit for tubeweDs and
poorest 20 percent receiving a subsidy equivalent to sanitary latrines. In 1993 the Grameen Bank lent $18
3.4 percent of their income, financed by the richest million for this purpose and since 1992 has prquintile,
who paid a "tax" equivalent to 0.1 percent vided loans for about 70,000 suction tubewells.
of their income Many low-incomehouseolds can- In certai circumstances, progams providing
not mobilize the fumds needed to pay heavy initial employment to the poor represent a highly effective
f- - - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~

way of achieving distributional objectives. Such to govermnent Environmental sustainability inschemes
work because they mobilize large transfers volves innovation in tecnology and organization,
rapidly, and,.by offering relatively low wages in re- as well as improved efficiency in the use of infratum
for unskilled manual labor, they transfer in- structure services through pricing and regulation.
come only to those.without more attractive options. Regulatory efforts are also necessary for infrastruc-
In India's Maharashtra state, the Employment Guar- ture services to be delivered in compliance with
antee Scheme, initiated in response to the severe public safety standards.
drought in 1972-73, provides unskilled rural employment
on demand. The scheme has provided al- Innovatioii in design for affordability
most 1.7 billion person-days of employment and. is
credited with playing a large part in averting Worldwide, roughly 1 billion people lack access to
calamity during numerous droughts. However, lit- clean water and more than 1.7 billion do not have
tie evidence exists that such schemes produce- the adequate sanitation. Diarrheal disease, often caused
most economially use infiastructure. Coordinat- by contaminated water, represets one-sicth of the
ing them with overall infrastructure priorities might world's burden of disease (World Development Report
strengthen their economic impact
1993). The most widespread contaminant of water is
disease-bearing human wastes. The environmental
Addressing extemalities
benefits of water supply depend not only on delivering
safe water for drirding but also on providing
Infrastructure often has widespread indirect im- enough water to permit good human hygiene.
pacts-frequently, on the environment-which can Equally important is reducing contact with human
be beneficial or hamfuL Irrigation nrastructure exaeta by providing pit latrines, toilets, and sewers
can reduce pressure on land resources by permitting (Box 4.5).
greater intensity of cultivation on existing plots, but Although even among the poor the willingness
it can also promote excessive water usage, resulting to pay for water is often sufficient to cover costs, this
m groundwater salinzation and land subsidence. is not always so in the case of sewerage, both be-
.- lfifrastructure can also reduce or increase public cause conventional sewerage is often expensive and
safety. Road improvements that raise traffic speed because costs of inadequate sanitation are
may expose nounotorized road users to increased not borne within the household. For limited public
risk of accdents; traffic signals can improve pedes- funding to benefit large numbers, adoption of techtnian
safet. Because markets often fail to refect nicl and organizational innovations in low-cost
these exteralities, their management usually falls sanitation is necessary; A study m Kumasi, Ghana,
-.Bo 4.5 Assessing a reach:water in Kath=mdu
Evaluating inrastructure projects is difficult at best En- niques, benefits from the cits new $50I mlion water
vironmen talcosts must be identified and valued, the - distribution system induded adiectfinancialsavingsof
amountthatindividualswillpayforservicedeermine, - 5500,11 annually from lower mainte costs, plus
- and tie effect thatservce will have on other ninrsuc- substantia annual benefits ased on willingness-to-pay
mtre sectors assessd Water supply, sewage treatment estimates for different userangg from a low of $10
- sanitation, solid and hazardous waste handling. and am- for standpipe users to abigh of $250 for business users).
:bient*water quality are all interelated. A weakness in- Total benefitswereestimatedtobeS19-1 millionperyear.
any one will afact iastructure requiremens else- At a 12 perent discount rate, the project showed a mar-
:whe - ginally positive netbenefitofSS2 million.
'In the Nepalese capital of Kathmandu, officials as- -Using the more detailed service4evel approach to
:esse- d tiheeffets of improving the watservice usmg project appraisl, however, it was determined that in
.,an exitnsion -of traditional costbenefit analysis-the - somecaseshealthbenefitsfromareductionincoliform
-sevic-level"appoach t- valuation This approadchc-- contamination of the water appoached S1,00 per unit
,ognizes that environmental- servies are valued diffe- serviced. An education program that improved water
-ently byl difflnt users and also attempts to asess indi- use led to further reductions in health and transport
- .rect effectsof waterprviso n. costs. After these indiect benefits wer factored in, the.
- CKathniandu has LI millionhihabitants. Based onesti- project showed a positive net benefit of about $275
-':mates usng narrowly:defined project appraisal tedh- million.
82

found that although households were unwilling to scarcity levels (particularly in agriculture) and linkpay
for the delivery of conventional sewerage ser- ing price to usage are important first steps in dealvices,
only modest subsidies would be required to big with water scarcity as wel as with problems of
achieve relatively high levels of coverage with ven- salinization, micreasing fluoride concentrations,
tilated improved pit (VIP) latrines.
and land subsidence. Influencing demand through
During the 1980s the Orangi PNlot Project in pncing allows the user to decide how much water
Karachi, Pakistan, mobilized poor people to con- to use and how to achieve conservation.
struct, finance, and maintain their own water-borne
sewers. This action resulted in the provision of sew- Regulation
erage to 600,000 people at a cost of less than $50 per
household. The low cost was due to innovative Regulation is an additional means of reducing adtechnical
solutions combined with a participatory verse environrmental consequences. It is also imporapproach-
in which corruption was reduced and tant for securing infrastructure service delivery that
communuties contributed their own resources. A meets public safety requirements. The two principal
similarstory comes from northern Brazil, where the regulatory approaches are command-and-cntrol
use of technically innovative condominial sewer- measures and regulation based on economic incenage-a
collective connection system provided by tives. Command-and-control measures-direct regcommunity-based.
organizations-lowered capital ulation along with monitoring and enforcementsys
costs by up to 40 percent over conventional systems. tems-are by far the most widely used technique in
developing countries. An advantage is that they
Motivation of user effiency
provide the regulator with a degree of certainty
about for example, how much pollution levels will
Efforts to mitigate environmenl impacts through be reduced. But they have the disadvantage of proconsumer
investments in energy savig are ham- viding little incentive for innovation in pollution
-. -pered by the low consumer pices and subsidies de- control technology once standards are achieved. In
sca-bed in Chapter 2. On average, developing coun- recent years, many countnes have also adopted ecotries
use 20 percent more electricLty than they would nonic instruments. Setting prices to reflect full costs
if users paid the incremental cost of supply. Once (the "polluter pays- principle) is the most powerful
economic pricing .is established, governments are and obvious of such instruments. In some countries,
able to promote the use of more energy-efficient. epeimentsareunderwayusingadditional.regulatechnologies,
tory instruments, such as pollution charges, nar-
Smilar price increases are merited in transport ketable permits, subsidies, deposit-and-return sysbut
are more difficult to implement. Cars using city tems, and enforcement incentives, to introduce
centers at rush hour impose congestion costs many more flexibility, effidency, and cost-effctiveness
times higher than they do. in off-peak periods, and into pollution control measures. Some of these efthe
environmental costs of vehide use are greater in lorts appear promising.
urban than in rural areas. Urban car users can be Environmental regulation begins by specifying
made aware of such costs through the introduction abatement standards based on the technical options
of parling fees, area licensin& and tolls Growng available For example, for power generation, techenvironmental
consciousness and technological nologies are emerging that effectively reduce noxchange
are likely to increase the use of tolls and fees ious pollutants from coal-regulation can thus subin
the near future, which will encourage travelers to stantially reduce emissions. But clean technologies
use public tansit or nonmotorized modes.
almost always add to the cost of coal-fired thermal
Important user efficiency prblems in the water power (by 10 to 20 percent on capital costs and 5
sector stem from the underpricing of water Domes-. percent on operating costs). Consequently, such
tic consumption, sanitation; irrigation, hydroelec- technologies are still far from universally used in
tric generation, and transport all create water de- developing countries. Where switching to gas is an
mnands and raise problems of overall .supply and economically viable altemative, there are many ensectoral
allocation. In India in 1985,94 percent of all vironmental advantages. Poland provides an examwater
used went to agriculture Conflicts betweenf ple of market-based incentives to reduce noxious
industry and irigation have emerged in some emissions. Its National Environment Fund, setup in
areas, and in cities such as Bombay, Delhi, and 1980, levies charges on all polluters and imposes
Madras problems of water scarcity have aisen. In additional fines on owners of indushies that violate
many countries, aising the price of water to reflect region-specific abatement standards The proceeds
83

are bundled into low-cost loans to industries to pur- Elements of infrastucture planning
chase pollution-redudng equipment. In 1992 the
tfund's. income was $188.5 million, double the Because most infastructure uses geographically
amount in 1991. Although collection rates for pollu- distributed networks, spatial, sectoral, and intersection
charges and fines increased during the 1980s toral coordination and planning are necessary for
and early 1990s, a recent decline in compliance rates government activities. In addition, project selection,
is raising concern.
design, and evaluation are important steps in. the
Serious problems are posed by vehicle transport overall decisionnaldng process.. Incorporation, at
in Central and Eastern Europe, despite a per capita the earliest stages, of the social and environmental
vehicle population only one-third to one-half the iimplications of.projects is vitaL
level in Western Europe. The legacy of fuel and vehicle
underpricin& the high average age of vehicles,. Sectoral and cross-sectorml strategis
obsolete designs, inadequate -pollution controls,
dirty fuels, and poorly maintained vehicles-all Because infrastructure investments often have
are factors producing envirommental degradation. broad impacts on many groups,planning strategies
This situation has prompted suggestions that the should focus on.coordinating the decisions of incountries
take direct measures to restrict road trans- vestors, including donors, while also gaining the
port in favor of railways or river transport A study broad acceptance of other stakeholders. Particular
of Hungary undertaken for the World Bank sug- attention may be required to ensure that the. congests,
however, that aIternative approaches can re- ce.ms of women are.not overlooked. (Box 4.6). User
duce vehicular emissions. If all new vehidles were groups-and other interested parties need to be conto
comply with available best-practice emission suIted by the public officials and technical specialstandards,
the traffic growth accompanying eco- ists who usually lead the process, and mecianismsn
nomic growth (as far forward as the year 2020) for conflict resolution are necessarycould
be accommodated at absolute emission levels In the case of watershed protection in the Sao
below those presendy expinced. However, limit- Paulo region of Brazil, for example, a worldng
-- ing traffic growth may be necessary to control con- group comprising municipalities, water suppliers,
gestion.
and environmental agencies was set up to solve
In the Netherlands a transport sector strategy water quality problems in the Guarapiringa reseraimed
at minimizng environmental stress and vow so that it could meet rapidly-growing demands
avoiding unnecessary investment mixes regulatory for water. As part of the consultation process, a
- - and market-based measures-for. example, intro- town fomm was held with more than 120 city and
ducing pollution premiums on road users, encour- state government officials, members of nongovernaging
the use of biycles. and public transport creat- mntaI organiztions and community groups, acaing
vehicle-free precincts for pedestrians, providing demics and researchers, leaders of professional orincentives
for higher vehicle occupancy rates, and ganizations, and the press. Local consultants
instituting parking controls. In Japan and in several prepared an environmental profile of the region and
developing countnes, including China, Ghana, and interviewed city, community, and business leaders.
Indonesia, similar schemes to encourage nonmotor- The process resulted in a basin development stratized
traffic and pedestrian facilities are being con- egy and an action plan that combined public and
sidered.
political commitment.
Regulation to preserve safety standards in irfra- When an infrastructure system is owned by a smistructure
service provision and delivery is an im- gle entity, planning is generally internalized by the
portant prionty Studies have shown that road acci- owner Once ownership of a system is unbundled
dents are the first or second most important cause of (as descnrbed in Chapter 3), however, strategic plandeath
in many developing countries. Addressing ning becomes decentralie. To maintain the beneroad
safety involves not only restricting speed and fits of unbundling, the development of the nahural
traffic flows, but introducing safety considerations monopoly segments-typically the primary (tunk)
into the design and collection of information for facilities-and the setting of technical standards
monitoring and analyzing safety conditions- Facility should. be coordinated at the sectoral level because
construction also requires special consideration. Be- of the market power that comes with the right to
-cause construction exposesworkers to a high nsk of carry out these functions. In an unbundled network,
injury and death, effective safety standards must be this responsibility could be entrusted to a coordinatapplied
to. the construction of facilities, not just to ng entity made up of representatives from governtheir
operation.
ment, suppliers, and users.
8S4

4 I~~~Z
Box46 W canbenefitftbm ibut success lies in the details
:- The : beneficial impacts of infrastructure :on women can various countries, including Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho,
be- profound, ofen extendin beyond the commonly Madagascai anl Tanzania, reveals that many poor
cited Impacts,of water and'sanitation infrastructure on women welcome such employment opportunities'and
*household health orwomens'time allocation. But ensur- are able to perform the same tasks as men for similar
*ing suchoutcomes requires for2sightand attention to de- wages. To expand women's .participation in these proj-
.- tail during prject planning;-
ects, eligibility conditions must be extended,-and job op-
::-* Women;,' as principal producers and marketers of portunities must be'advertised more widely. In addition
food in many African countries, benefit from the'im- therel should be scope for advancement by women to suprovedaccess
to markets-thatnrual.roadslbrng.-Yet im- pervisory positions. Where.maintenance is contracted
less they can afford-to tbansport thir produce by tuck,: out, womenrs gups should be encouraged to bid for
goods:must be carriea'to markets by-the farners contracts. .
ithemselves. This sharply dimini-shesb&efltsfrom-rmad;. Pngtheimpactofinfrastructure on women can
i- infstructure- IntermediateS (nonmotoried) -means of ' be difficult and requires a 'close understanding of the detiansport,
suchis bicycles and carts, canbe attractiveal- - tails of-their activities, opportiunties, and constrats. In
: :.temnativestoheadportiPgeoutinolvjecighiiivest-- centraln Gambia, agriculture traditionally involved both
- meat cists ~InGhaiia a pilot cDmponent adinsere by -':womern and mem within a system of coe nixmu-
.. . .NGOs in the Second Tlar Rehabiitation nal aind idualtclivation. Men werf responsible.for
channels part: of the waage eaninmgs from labar- ' organizing the communal subsistence cultivation of upintens.radworks
to finance. :ipurchase programs land cereals, with-both men and women contibutiHng
--- nteorinediate means of transport ar . e.
labor, while women alone were responsible fcr culivat-
* .-- ' - ''' . n:manymuntries,destitute wainenare eager o par- ' 'irng and miarke*ing rice from indiyidual plots A rice irri-
-. ticipate'inroad worksprogramsthatofferinopportu- - gation project was introduced, distrlbuting J1500
nities to ea cash..In one.of.Bangladesh s main road hecars of irrigated land to farming households. An ex-
.. intenance.programs, women comprise thebulk of the. - plicit intention of the pmject was to improve the ecoworkfolc,
but in Kenya's Rural Access Roads Program, nonhic 2atus of the female cultiv s by raising their inone
of the oldest and most sucaesful of such progams comes from higher nce yieds. Howeve, male farmers
in 'Africa, less-than 201 percent of the workfoxre are . beameinterested-intricecultivationforcommercialpur-
- -' :- * women. Smailarlylow-participation rates for woment poses and laid laini to the irrigated land for their con-
-havebeenobservedmotherAfricancount Alhough muriaUy farmed plots. While women did benefit ftom
i: it is sometimbes argued thatlption by African the project through the higher incomes accruing at the
women is due to their. already oppressiveburden of do- household , their position as producers and marmestieduties
and subsistence agriculture, evidence frm kebes of rice was undemiined : -
COORDINATION OF PANNNG. Coordination of - prices that reflect costs provide valiuable informaplans
for competing or complementary sectors is tion for decisionmaking on secLoral allocations.
- - also important Where program and project financ- When the local highway agency decided to expand
ing involves many donor agencies, coordination trucking cargo capacity to the port of Santos in
; :preserves overal coherence of activities- In Africa Brazil, shippers pointed out that rail transport was
efforts to improve donor coordination in transport cheaper, and the railway and the railhead river port
have been embodied in recent initiatives (Box 4.7). capacity were expanded instead. In China, the
With transport, intermodal coordination is often Henan Power Company, after evaluating the costs
required-. The stress- on speed and reiability i-n of expanding power generation capacity in the Yanmodern-day
fteight transport is makng it increas- shi Thermal Power Project, changed its -intial pro-
- ingly vital for shippers to be able to offer door-to- posal from locating the coal-fired power station
door service, commonly involving many modes. It near load centers and supplying it with coal by rail
is necessaxy to establish a legal framework that al- to siting the station near coal mines and transmitlows
freight forwarders to accept liability for the ting electricty to the load centers.
entire transport chair. In addition, customs procedures
in many developing country ports must be NPRoJEr APPRAISAL Techniques for project ap
simplified to avoid delays that can significantly praisal are well established and documented, but in
raise transport costs and undermine the interna- practice they are not widely applied. Although for-
- tional competitiveness of local producers. mal cost-benefit analysis of projects imposes non-
Although goverrnents are often tempted to in- nelighible analytical and data demands, these tech-
'tervene in pnce setting across modes or sectors, - niques bring rational, objective, and, to the extent
85.

Bx47'Donor co-ordination4win ifrasrcueteAfrican
experience.
TeWrDBanes Arca region is encouraging donor eahohrbfre committng to. major new -invest-
~coordination thrugh two mainrmutes. First,it has used mets.
regional -partnerships 'of: donors to develop policy Second, donor coordination in Africa is translating
frameworks and: build 'osnu,angthose in- thiis consnsson policy reforms and investmenttpriorivolved
in the different infrastructure subsectors. These'. ties-into concerted action through large umbrella pronitiatie
Include, the Su-aaa-fiafasot jectisi supored by a coarttion of donors. The Bank acts
PolicyProgram (SSATP), which-was launched asa" jit as lead donor for these projects; other donors participate
unidertaking by the.Bank and 'the UN Economicd Corn-' :as.cofinanciers and soametimes collaborate.in prepuraau_mssion_
for Africa- (UNECA).7 -The SSATP is supre -tion. -The two largest..umbrella projects are the kInte-
-* a b oaliionof donors-that prvd eoddstaff and -grated-Roads Project in Tanzania (with sixteen particisupprt;it
nvovesAfrcaninstitutions such' pating donors in the flrstphase and twelve expected to
the Uion. Afrian Ralway andthe Maritime suipport the-'second phase) 'nthe~ Roads. and Coastal
Cofrnefor West and CnrlAic.The SSATP has Shipping 'Project in Moamnbique (with fifteen'partidbeenpariculrlyeffetiv
indeveloping aiconmmon-ap- paigdons.Both projects have focuLsed o usan
proach amnong- donors regarding- road sector ~reform, able'rmad finanding, the -provision of better qualified
-railwaiyrestructuring, road safety, and imnprovement oif 'and bigher-paid staff,and the contractin out of madl
the 'perfomace of urban public transpo?rt; The roaid' work. This integrated project design has improved gy
components- Of -the program-the Road MawLintenance 'ernments' efflciency in-managing exteral aid by stan-'_
Initia tive: RMM and the Rural. Trae a. .1 flnso dardizing their reporting. procurement, accounting, and
Progrm-resltedin the preparation-of a>Donor Code 'budgeting systems. Such approaches are beinig applied
of Conduct for this subsector (currently bieing ratified) to-the xaa&sectors in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya,
~in wich participating- donors agre to consult -with MadagascanRwanda, Senegal,and Uganda-
Box L ThWolBank's eprncwthproject-evaluation
The Bnk~s Wrld wn exeriene reveals that. project rae frtr.I di the report showed that, rein-
* ppp~ aloneis not sufficient to ensure the successof
projects.
tive to implementation capacities, projects were often tDoo
complex.Fnally, the report argued that greter attention
During the 1970s and early 1980s, integrated rurial to uncertainty and risk -was wtarranted in project pa
* devlopmnt pojecs rereseted a ~compreh~ensive ef- radion.
to rase ivin rral stadard thrugh.among other Both reports draw attention'to copnents. of. the
- comonent, a et. o coorinatdinrastructure invest-; projiect planning process'that.cannot be addressed by re-.
mens irigaion i rods,ari soialservices A review fining standard appraisal technques. The objectivity and
ofthe Banks expeience bylthe:Operationis Evaluation itracosteythtuhtcnqesoffermutb
Deparment(its internal auditing arm) found thiat'results, complemented by carful judgments about implem~entawere
often disappointing. Anwong the faCtors contiut dion capacitYand thenrgorouisanalysis of project risks. In
ing to -the relatively low success rates, the report cited addition, as describe hin the WoDrld Bank's official re-
:overemphai in appraisals on the details O i .
tednyt select laLrge and complex projects, and overly 'parties are commiitted to projects increases the li'kelihod
optimiistic projections of project outcomes. The review
emphsizd- a contr's tat ipleentaioncapaity
of project success. Seeking participation by beneficiaries
ini project identification, design, and implementain
iwas a critical prerequisite for project success. -while enuigitaoenetlcoordination and
Arecet revewof the BanLk's overallprojectportfolio agreement, are useful in -establishing such commitmnent
(the WVapenhans-report) documented an increasing num-- by stakeholders.Preserving some flexibilit in project:
y..br of p,oorly_performing infirastructure projets. One of, content and design is also desirble; this require carful
thie; c-auses- -of this inc,rease cited by the~ report was a ten- monitorinig duigpoetimplementation
dencjyto concentrate in the appraisal proce'ss on loan ap- from experience as dtheproject evolves.
adlann
proDval, WhiiCh can lead to anupwiard bias in estimating
possbe quantitative analysis to the decdsionmak- ing of implementatoarreuedfrpjctsing
process. Project appraisal is important, yet the ces (Box 4.8).
evaluation of-completed projects indicates that both Experi-ence with capital-rntensive projects, mnhigh-quality
project appraisal and ongoing mnonitor- cluding many in infirastructure, shows that manage-
.86

I Box. 4.9 Icroaigenviironmental. concerns early in planning: some recent lessonts
'from SriLnk
Over the -past decade, developing. countries,.and the researthes and environmnental experts, the study deter.
-World Bank itseZ, have begun to require comprehenisive mined long-term development options for the 5ector,
envirnmental assessments (MAs) ~as. a routine compo-.. incorprating. envirnmental concerns. Alternative
nent of .prmject development. This reuirement has. strategies were compared, taking into account system
foncd a bteinertoofevomntal dcerns cost, biodJiversity, health-effects, .system-reliability, and,
into poetdesignk, with appropriate attention to mitiga- greenhouse. gas emissions. The technique of multition
options. But-a project4evel EA is best at dealing: attribute -decision atnalYsis, whichleritsaayi of
with proj1ect-level mitigationjissues Without considera-: tradeoffs between -objectives~, is-particularly. useful in
dion of environmental issues at- the long-term planning such assessments when economic valuationi of environstage,
itis doubtful that project-level. EAs can steer the; mnental externalities proves difficult
deveopmnt f a ectr aongenvioronmentally sustain- Fyom, the analysis, the study identified the set of
able paths,Freaml,beas
pactsof hdropantsare
the environmental im-
-quite diffeent from those of -
"nndominated" options that was better than the others
in at least oeattribute (such as cost, emissions reliabil-
* Themal gn&rnin. th quetioni of ho~w air pollution ity) but no wojrse int the other attributest This set repreimpacts
are tradedcf ih nnaio-eae impacts sents thi. options that decsionmakers need to consider
-fall well outside the domain of project EAs. Although and induded, for example, notonly alternative fuel corn-
-_the.incremental effect of a single plant-can be rational-.
fred uiteeasil, wht ma ter ste oerl impact of
binations in power plants but also supply-side efficiency
improvements int the transmission -and distribution systhe
sequence bfd plants ini a power sector investment' tern and demand-sde management options, such as the
program.
~~~~~~~~~~~iniroduction-of
compact fluorescent lighting.
A recent World Bank study of thie Sri Lankan po-wer. Following this,study, such new methods of evaluasector
examnehd ways of bringing consideration of envi- tion have begun-to be institutionalized in the Sri Lankan
wonmental issues into the early stages of poe etri- utilitys planning cycle. In 1993, for the first time, the*
vestmentplanning and of dealing with the basic issues of study for planning expansion of generating capacity incompaning
very different kinds of.environnmental ho- duded aVsstematic eamination ofdemand-side-manpacts
associated wihdfeet technlogies. Working agement and privatization options, as well as an envi-
7with the Sri Larnkan generationt utility and a group of .ronmental overview of conventional supply options.
ment of thte econom3ic and fmandial-risics is often pacts are identified antd assessed. Experience with
criticaL Because of the inherentt uncertainity in fore- evrn ntlassessments demonstrates that infracas-ts
of future conditions,: projects should be se- structure projects are least likely to impose stress on
lected on the basis of careful sensitivity analysis. the environument if such assessments occur early
Planning forecasts -in the World Bank's appraisal of; and influence the design of individual projects-not
infrstrutureprojects have sometimes overesti- just the selection of a particular project from a set of
mated dem-and (Chapter 1). High demand forecasts alternatives. In Sri Lanka a recent power planning
lead to larger facilities, resulting in the selection of study involved not only selecting from among vanmore
capital-intensive investment options. Tech-. ous fossil fuel and other generating options, but also
niques that facilitate risk analysis in complex infra- paying attention to the need for energy conservastructur
projects, such as applying multicriteria tion (Box 4.9).
methods or drawing on financial options theory, are As the scale of hinfastructur projects grows,
currnty. being developed,
environmental consequences become increasingly
E,wiromnental
~~~~~ ,~~.significant
A study of several large World Bankfunded
projects in Brazi (representin total ap-
ASSESSING ENVIONMENTA IMPACt. Envirorkment- proved Bank financing of $1.15 billion) examined
tal regulation and promotion of the efficient use of environmental consequences and emphasized that
ifatructure help reduce adverse consequences environmental assessments should take a. broad
from existing infrastructur, issues ththv en perspective capable of recognizing regional effects
explored in detail by World Development Report 1992. and induced economic impacts, as well as the po-
More options'are* available with new projects, al- tential consequences of broad economic conditi-ons
though investment decisions can be consistent with. for the project Moreover, even though large investenvironmental
objectives only if environmnental im- ment programs mybe broken down into subcom-.
87

of design modifications reduced the number of
- Box > 0- 410 . . Populatibonresettlement X
and - households flooded from 3,300 (20,000 persons) to
project design: Thailand's Pak Mun only 241 (1,500* persons) while maintaining an achydropower
project
ceptable project return (Box 4.10). By contrast, many
involunta.y displacement e - :=..-.projects are delayed or abandoned as a result of in-
Because of its disruptive and impoverishing
adequate resettlement planning. Construction
avoided or minimized-often by modifying the de-CombasutpeUH
rorjctokthe
sign of a projmect Consider the Pak Mun hy- years longer at twice the planned cost because of
dropower project in Thailand, a projecto construct failure to -address the resettlement issue early on.
a 300-meter-long, 17-meter-high dam, submerging Successful resettlement requires monitoring during
: about .- 60xsquare kilometers Theinitial plansforthe and after project completion with flexibility for con-
:- . . - darn-aimed at maaiigthe proje* s.powerdam-abeneimoded
atbmaximizingtheprouet3,30 powser -tingences. In Indonesia, the Saguling and Cirata
-velds.. To haduoe tis impac the a pr de op tt sign dams in western Java displaced more than 120,000
.and siting were modified. The maximum retention people in the late 1980s, and despite cash compensalevel
of water was reduced from 112 meters to ioo tion many households saw their longer-run incomes
meter,, and the dam was moved upstream from the
. Kaeng -- - Tana rapids to Ban:Hua Heo. These modifi- ; .fdee. An enterprise based on reservoir fisheries
cations reduced the generation capacity somewhat, was launched toprovde employment to 7,500 disbut
they also reducet the number of householdsare- placed persons. The contribution from this employ-
Xquiring resettlment to 241. Even under the new ment t household incomes, and then to the wider
-. design the Pak Mun proect remains in the least- -communty, has been substantial. A recent study in
fcost develpent plan of Thailand's lectricty Cirata found that 59 percent of those who were
.Generating Autority. Compared with a 10 percent
Genratwing opportunity c06th~ cost of capital, Comarhed the discount Wiscth rat10 perent rate required
before the project becomes unattractive is selves to be-better off than befoie.
moved because of the dam now consider them-
: 123 percent
Fostering the success of the Pak Mun prject Condlusion
are four institutional
. ..
features in the Thai
.
policy
~~~~~~~~~~~ImnprDVing
rpUtlr
environment First, the govenment and the Elec- . * . ,
erformance.is oftben diffi--
-.triiy Generating Authority of Thailand are com- cultpolitically, technically, o tionaly, and
mifted to sound environmental poliies and prc adminitrative. Without the fundamentals of good
tics. Second, some local institutions- are well governane--accountability, a predictable and sta-
.tained in dealing with involuntary resetflement ble legal framework openness, and transparency-
ThIrd, lOcal and: iternational nongovernental = even the best efforts can go astray. The institutional
organizations are active-and vocal-in repre-
-- senting fhe intrest a s f f partes.
approaches discussed above are not uniVerSaly ap
project planners are prepared for public scrt-iny plicable, but they do addres specific concerns for
before projectimnplementation. specific tpes of in cture. For example, envi-
____. __ -___-__.___ -__.___-__ .___ -ronmental concems differ greatly across sectors.
Water, sanitation, and power differ m their impacts,
ponents and implemented im sequence, it is usually and even within the power sector, the environmennecessay
to conduct the environental assessment tal implications of fossil fuel generation differ from
on the basis of the overall progra.
those of hydroelectric generation.
Finally, there is a need to achieve a balance be-
R--. ReEM nT. Physical infrastructure typically tween exert and user, between direct and mdirect
requires an extended and undivided. site, whether controls, and between broad goals and those narfor
road, rail, power, or water line rights of way or rowly defined The provision of infastructure often
for water reservoirs. The extreme difficulty of pri- involves comnplex, highly engineered systems -that
vatelybaigaining; parce by parcl, in these cases has require technical expertise but that also must be reled
governments to reserve the right to use eminent sponsive to user needs to be effective. Direct condomain
in order to force the sale of propertyr F- trols, such as plant-specfic, quantity-based emis-
-quently these measures result in the displacement of sion standards, ofteen prove cumbersome and costly,
people Of the 146 World Bank pro irvolving re- while indirect controls, such as price incentives,
settlement of people between 1986 and 1993, more may not offer sufficent control. Infrastructure
than three-quarters were infrastructureprojcts.
should contribute to broad social goals, yet it may
Resettlement is most likely to be successful if be effective only when efforts are narrowly focuse
needs are addressed early and plans are adopted to The choice of instruments and approaches must remininize
avoidable displacement In Thailand's flect sectoral needs and the capacities of implement-
PakMunhydropowerprojectearlyincorporation
ing agencLes.
SB

. ............
--S -
Financigneededmivesotments
Innovative and diverse ficigtchniqtues are the project involved. Because infrastructure investbeing
employed to- sutpport an accelerating transi-' ments command such a large part of total financial
tion from public to private sector risk bearing in infirastructure
poion. Mechanisms for financing
flows, imnproving the efficiency of infrastructure fi-
nandingwilspr the general development of, capispecific
stand-alone projects are contributing to the tal miarkets. And as governments focus, more on
learning procxess as goverments shift from being being facilitators rather than financiers, interainfrastructure.
providers to, becoming facilitators, tional development banks-long the partners of
and as priv-ate enrpeer and lenders take a governments in supporting traditional financing
more direct role. But if there is to be sustained prin- systems-will need to experiment with new ways
vate risk bearing and investment in infrastructur, of doing business.
parallel and far-reaching actions"are required to reform
legal and fintancial institutions and to develop Old ways of financing inrsrcueadnew
capital markets- that efficiently intermediate savings'
into investment attovernments
have beent beairing more of the burden
Governments atpresent provide obrkrte
of infrastructure expenditure than they can reasonbulk
of infrastrucftur financing: about 90 percent of ably be expected to manage. Under today's system,
financial flows for. infrastructure are channeled tax revenues and government. borrowings are the
through a government sponsor, which bears almost predominant source of infrastructure finance. Boralpoetriskcs.
Private financing is needed to ease rowing--whether from official or piaesucs
the burden on government finances, but, more ira- is backed by a governmuent's full faith and credit,
portant, it wfi encourage. better risk sharing, ac- and thus by its tax powers. Under this systemi govcountability,
monitoring, and management in infra- eruments bear virtually all risks associated with instructure
provision. In some sectors, such as power frastructure financing. Private sponsorship and fif
or telecommunications, the scope'for private financ- nancing offer the twin benefits of additional funds
ing is great In others, such as road networks, and in and more efficient provision-especially valuable
some low-income countries, the opporthnities are because substantial new investmnents are needed to.
more liied ltog even there increasing room meet pent-up demandfor
financial market discipline exists..
The challenge for the future is to r.oute private Todaysfiadgste
savings directly to private risk bearers who make
*long-term investmnents in infrastructur projects. Developing countries now spend around $200 bil-
Doing so wfi require institutions and financing in- linaya n nrsrcue investment, some 90
struments adapted to the varying needs of Min- percent or more of i;t derived from government tax
vestors in different types of projects and at different revenues or initermediated by governments. The
stages in a project's life. The benefits of thus flnanc- burden on public finances Is enormous. On average,
ing private initiatives in hinfrastructure go beyond half of government investment spending is.ac-
59

- -. *1t a-N -.
X m.-0 -
:9t
'4:-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'
*~~~~~~M n z ce-. it& P -- SffLfXf00: |f.
4- t - ~A .
liars~~~~~~~~~
~has4Jcreased2,butpiihI
uaate
,-h,_., W _ t d
-bf17 6lirs
*;i needed in0 ( q y
* 'StS
th
ff"'; f-S X "W C, f:~~~~~
Pi: - U Mi. - .
5 -I
n o
: . - - nt direcll generatethe forein exchangMearning
:5 frte -_ coiintd
fiang, re.
ios uedn geaf,eate pr mr,pon
4, .c- .~~~~~~~~cosrit, n 9asoue o iac oclepn
. -f
iuWlstructure andervices- edaotbe fpinaced land soxp
: - men inxretment s rard less han 30 t andt dir-ecd gfor t he ton for;eqigmnt ehande ernaings
sometimes as much as 70 pecent (Chapter 1). hi ad- .nnce when public sector sau ngs i are imited. The
dition, maitenance and operatng expenchtures Dominied nRepubliciis onesof severalycounihies with
:t. comrnand a high share of current exSpenditures..--avr heavy reifance on foreign funding, which fi-
- Governments have relied to va.ying degrees on nanced tee to 8m percent of inftastructure invest-
-foreign finaig for infastructure- Official devel- ments in 1991. In the late 1980s the c aunty had a
: - opmenlt finance (including concessional and non- -nlarge pubcsc sector deficgt (due in part to low pnces
councessionar funds fromboth multrateral andsbidat- of winastruchme services), and a freeze was iceial
sources) has increaset over the past decade and- posed on the pubic sectors use of domestic credit,xpn
currently amounts to nearly $24 bihion a3 yearc thus a order to crb infsationa,y eqpectations and per--
sprovmidine on averages about7 2 percent of totaI re- nianc wein puaseic credittothe pinvate sector. T
sources for investment in these rne sectors. over- D R i o o s
whelmig share of these flows has been direced to IAv NSe OFrTHE oRE SYSfuM gNT The mawi adenergy
and n sort (Fhgure 5.1) In contrast to the vantage of 8e present system is thatin most counfcrease
in offici ng for infras tructur e, devel- puO mtients inent islthe most creditworuntry hada
Iicly guaranteed commercial financing has delined and is able to bordw at the lowest rates, maliceg
c(oeiogure whelming :- shr fun) :: d
enrg an trnpr
:these r flw t has bee e -diece ad b - to
(Fgr 5 .1). In cotrs to th
. oble L--TTIN infrastructure OP :.E -REE: provects -wr that might Th not mai owaersuc
ad: :-
vanag of th prsn syte is tha in mos coun-
fo i t in ths s . The
over-

Box 5.1 Is there a free lunch?-limits to govemment finance
In infrastructure projects, the cheaper credit available to centage-point advantage tmnslates into a unit cost reducgover:unents
needs to be weighed against possible inef- don of 20 percent. In other words, it would take almost a
ficiencies in channeling funds through government. in- 6-percentage-point Interest rate advantage to negate the
efficiencies arise when financial dWipline is relaxed as a inefficiencies described.
result of government sponsorship.
Consumers would undoubtedly benefit if it were pos-
For n powergeneration plant, with construction costs sible to combine low interest rates and efficient provision.
acounting for 70 percent of ail costs and a 10 pent In- But the goal of a free lunch may be illusory. Even creditterest
rate, construction cost overnuns of 20 percent and worthy govenuments cannot borrow unlimited amounts
delays in construction of two years each lead to a 15 per- at low cost. The evidence Is that governments' costs of
cent increase in unit costs of power produced. The track raising funds rise with the level of bornwins& Also, high
record for publicly sponsored projectshows that such levels of bormroing at a particular time increase debt levcost
overruns and time delays are conunon, leading to a els and limit the amount that can be borrowed later,
cumulative cost increase of about 35 percent Compare thereby redudng goverunent liquidity. These are further
this with an interest-rate advantage for governnent, reasonswhygovenmmentsmaybeweBladvisedtoentrust
which can borrow at, for example, 10 percent rather than to private sponsorshlp those infrastructure investments
the 13 percent available to private investors. This 3-per- that can be undertaken by private entrepreneurs.
vise be financially viable Balanced against this ad- contrast, policy or institutional reforms and prcvantage
has been the difficulty of maintaining ac- tices that build long-term sustainability (such as
countability, leading often to high costs of provision maintenance and user participation) require greater
for the consumer (Box 5.1). Moreover, being credit- donor commitment to providing steady support,
worthy does not imply that governments have un- through longer-periods of preparation and implelimited
access to resources.
mentation.
Governments' ability to spend on infrastructure A World Bank review of urban water supply and
has been severely constrained, in part because poor sanitation projects identified typical proolems. Seriperformance
and pncing have strained govemment ous cost overuns (the group of projects as a whole
budgets, as described in Chapter 2. Where budgets cost 33 percent more than the appraisal estimates)
have been tightened for macroeconomic reasons, and time overruns (46 percent of the projects rethe
large share that infrastructure represents in gov- quired two to four extra years to complete) greatly
ernment investment has led to proportionately increased costs of service provision. Maintenance
sharp reductions in spending in this sector. In the was severely neglected because a lack of funds cre-
Philippines, for example, public mivestment in infra- ated shortages of skilled staff and spare parts. The
structure fell from 5 percent of GDP between 1979 review found that borrowers had often failed to
and 1983 to less than 2 percent during the remain- comply with loan covenants, especially those relatder
of the 1980s. Such sharp declines are appropni- ing to prcing and financial performance.
ate where unnecessary or inefficient spending on in- hn the case of bilateral assistance, a furither probfrastructure
is the cause of budgetary problems, or' lem that especially afflicts infrastructure arises from
where macroeconomic adjustment is needed. How- the full or partial tying of aid-the requirement that
ever, a continued low level of spending on infra- funds be spent on goods or services purchased only
structure is not sustainable in the long term; re- from specified countries. In recent years between
newal of economic growth requires accompanying two-thirds and three-quarters of official developinvestments
ir infrastructure.
ment assistance to infrastructure has been fully or
International donor policies and practices have parally tied. By contrast, less than 20 percent of ofsometimes
reinforced distortions in recipient coun- ficial development assistance going to areas other
tries. Many donors have focused on financing new than ifrastructure is tied. By definition, tying aid
physial construction rather than on maintaining or precludes international competition in procureimproving
existing infrastructure Like mmistries menL The Principles for Effective Aid agreed on in
of public works, donor agencies find it easier to 1992 by the Development Assistance Committee
measure their acidevements in new project ap- (DAC) of the OECD reaffirmed the superiority of
provals. Moreover, physical works draw on the untied aid and specfied that, except for the least de-.
well-practiced technical skills of donor agencies. By veloped countries, tied aid should not be extended
91

f
r,' . ,: '. : . .-
to projects that 'would be commercially viable if fl- ously seeking high-yielding investments in develinanced
on market terms.
oping countries. Construction conglomerates are active
in toll-road construction and in power projects,
IHE NEED FOR NEW APPRoAC1rES. In the coming where they sometimes take an equity Interest, Some
decade, demand for infrastructure investments will companies or groups of companies also specialize in
simultaneously increase in two different sets of stand-alone infrastructure projects, putting together
coulntries: those that have, undertaken macroeco- financing packages and overseeing project developnomic
adjustment with consequent low investment ment and operation.
levels and, at the other extreme, those whose rapid Most indicators of infrastructure investment
growth is now placing a heavy burden on infra- under private sponsorship reveal rapid growth. Pristructure.
Infrastructure investments in developing vatized telecommunications and electricity utilities
countries represent, on average, 4 percent of GDP, in Latin America and Asia are undertaking large
but they often need to be substantially higher. and growing new investments. The number of tlese
Where telecommunications or. power-supply net- so-called greenfield. projects-especially in the road
works are expanding rapidly, annual investments in and electric power sectors-has grown rapidly (as
either sector can be as high as 2 percent of GDP A discussed below). Infrastructure investments by thespecial
factor increasing investrnent demand in 'Intemational Finance Corporation (IFC), a World
many countries is the rapid pace of urbanization, re- Bank affiliate that invests only in private entities,
quirng investnents in water supply as well as have experienced a surge, from modest amounts in
waste treatment and disposal.
the lite 1980s to $330 million in fiscal 1993. Thie
In Asia, the share of infastructure investment in amount invested by the IFC was leveraged more
CDP is expected to rise from 4 percent today to more than ten times, so that, in 1993, IFC particpated in
than 7 percent by the turn of the century, with trans- private investments of $3.5 billion.
port and energy likely to demand the most re- The most important development during the
sources, followed by telecommunications and envi- past four years has been the explosion in interna-
-rounental infrastructure. Some of the planned tional flows of long-term private capital to developinvestments
are without precedenL China, for exam- ing ountries, especially in the formn of foreign direct
pIe, has set a target of installing at least 5 million investment and portfolio flows. Aggregate flows
telephone lines annually up to 1995 and at least 8 stood at more than $80 billion in 1992 and were pro-
* 0 million lines per year thereafter, to more than triple jected to reach $112 billion in 1993 (Table 5.1): Infraits
1992 base of 18 millon lines by the year 2000.
Private entrereneurshtip: trends and opportunities
Table 5.1 Portfolio and foreign direct investment
in developing countries, 1990-93
(net inflows in biUlions of dollars)
Current efforts to'secure increased private sponsorship
and risktaldng in infrastructure projects reflect yre 1990 199- 1992 199M
these various challenges. After decades of severe Forgnequitysecities 3.7s 755 13.07 131
Closed-end fundsb 2.78 1.20 1.34 2.7
regulatory restriction, private entreprneurship in ADRSandGDRsC 034 4.90 593 72
infrastructure bounced back in two ways during the Direct equity . 0.77 1.45 5J80 3.2
late 1980s: through the privatization of state-owned 556 12.72 23.73 42.6
utilities and through policy reform that made possi- Bonds 4.68 10.19 21.24 39.1
ble the construction of new facilities in competition - Conimerial paper 0.23 1.38 0.85 1.6
with, or as a complement to, existing enterprses. Certificates of deposit 0.65 1.15 1.64 1.8
'The principal new infrastructure entrepreneurs Total portfoliod 9.34 20.27 36.80 55.7
are international firms seeking business in develop- Foreign direct investment 26.30 36.90 47.30 56.3
ing countries and operating often in association Tota 35.64 57.17 84.10 1120
: : with local companies. These firms bring to bear not- Not This table records all portfolio and direct investnent flows. Seponly
their management expertise and technical aratefigures forinfrastuctuare notavailable.
skills, but also their credit standing and ability to fib.
1993
A closed-end
figuresawrestimated
fund has a
orproed.
predetermined amount of funding and
nance investments in developing countries. Major sometimes a fixed life.-
-- ': ' electric, telecomimunications, and water utilities in GCADR = Amneican depositary receipts; CDR = global depoitay
md-stna- countries face slowly growing demand receipts. An ADR is an instrument used by an offshore company to
-industrial - - - - = courttries face slowly growing demand raiseequity in the United States without formal listing on a US. stock
exhangeGCDRs aresimilarinsftrments used in Europe and elsewhere
and increased competition (following deregulation) d. Portfolio investment is the sum of equity and debt
mtheir home markets. As a result, they are vigor- - Sou World Bank 1993i, pp. 10,21.
92

Box 52 Tapping international capital markets
Several channels exist for tapping international capital eign compaiies to raise equity on US. markets without
markets The larger private utilities in developing coun- the need for a listing on a.US. stock exchange and with-
--tries have direct access to debt and equity markets.. In -out comnplex settlement and transfer mechanisms. They
October 1993 Telecom Argentina placed much of its 5500 al issued by-a:US. depository bank, and the underlying
million, seven-year bond issue with U.S.. and Asian in- shares of the company are held in trust by a custodian
vestors; Argentina's Telefonika has also used bond mar- bank in the home country. In 1990 Compafifa de TelS
ket placements to raise . n- fonos de Chile (CTO raised $92 million on the New York
.:.'Foreign direct investment opens another route into Stock Exchange through an issue of equity in the form of
.international equity markets. General Electric Corpo- ADRs-the first major equity issue from Latin America
ration, an international conglomerate, has an active in- in three decades.
terest in developing infrastructure projects in develop-. In April 1990 the US. Securities and Exchange Com-
.ming countries. Its subsidiary, the General Electric mission approved rule 144a, facilitating private place-
DCapital Corporation (GECCQ, issues seurities on U.S. ment of securities, including those placed as ADRs. Be--
and European markets and invests the funds in se- fore then, privately placed securities held by qualified
lected projects. GECC has participated as an equity in- . buyers (Istitutions that manage assets worth at leastvestor,.for
instance, in the Northern Mindanao power $100 million) could be traded only after a two- or threeprojvect-a
108-megawatt diesel-fired power project in year holding period- Rule 144a allows trading to occrthe
Philippines. Backed by the* group's total opera- immediately, provided that the new buyer is also quali-.
tions, the placenient of securities-issued .by GECC is fied. Moreover after three years the secunities can be
- easier than it would-be for developing country power sold to all buyer Rule 144a was used in 1992 to enable a.
- projects alone- : t r $2075 million international bond issue for the Mexico
An instrument widely used to tap resources inCthe ity-Toluca Toll Road. Since then, offier MExican toll
US. capital market is the American depositary eceipt roads and the Subic Bay power plant in the Phiippines
(ADR). ADRs are certificates of deposit that enable for- haveraisedfindsusingrule][44a.
structure has been a significant beneficary of such tractive. As an example, electronic methods of idenflows
(Box 5.2). tifyg velchiles and chargng tolls could make roads
Aggregate private investmentin inifrstructure in more like a public utility service, and boost the
developing countries is currently about $15 billion a share of private finance in the highway sector.
year, or roughly 7 percent of the $200 billion being Even with the rising share of privately financed
spent annully on infrastructure in these countries, infrastructure, governments will continue to be an
-Although small, the fraction of private investment importantsource of financing. Often, they will need
in infhrstructure investment is much larger than it to be partners with private -entrepreneurs. Publicwas
some years ago, and there is a strong likelihood private partnerships in some ways represent a rethat
private investmentwillconinue to grow, possi- turn to the nineteenth century, when infrastructure
: -- .bly doubling its share of the total by the year 2000. projects were privately financed in much of the
One indication is the IFC's current infrastructure world while government support acted as a stimupipeline,
which is almost as large as all the projects lanL But the nineteenth century experince also offinanced
to date. . fers important waning signs (Box 53).
The smaIl overall share of private finance in infrstructure
obscures large. regional and sectoral dis- The spread of project finandng: achievements
parities. Private finance is proportionately greater in and lessons
Latin America than in other regions, and larger in
telecommunications and electric power generation Many new infrastructure projects in the private secthan
in other sectors. The diffusion of current expe- tor are built by "special-purpose corporations"
rnence across regions and sectors will raise the which bring together private sponsors and other eq-
- -- - global share of private sponsorship and finance. For uity holders. Despite their lack of credit histojr, sevexample,
telecommunications privatization and in- . eral such ventures have successfully attracted eqdcpendent
power generation are under discussion uity and loan finance-and a huge pipeline of such
in all regions, including Sub-Saharan Africa. And projects bears the promise of decisively shifdng the
continuing technological and financial innovations channels and instrumets of inastructure financwill
undoubtedly make private financng more at- ing in the-futurc
- : . 0 ............. W~~~~

-.Bo'x5. Warning signs from the nineteentht century
Throughout the nineteenth century, when infrastructure foDr investors to monitor management performance while
was largely in , private hands, contemporaries corn- opening the way for promoter to negotiate so-called
plained.that many wo,rthwhile psojects.were. neglected 'sweetheart' deals-with construction and suppl_y corn-
* f~~~or lack of financing& Some of the complaints reflected panies. Because'many infrastructure projets were onte of
mthe, difficulties of financing pioneerng transportation a kin&- the practice could be readily disguised. It now
(especially railway) projets. Oter complaints were' appears that bond guarantees led to higher construction
* ~~~~self-serving efforts to shift alt risk on to government costs.
* ~~~~budgets, and in many cases the financial bankruptcy of Larnlggrants. During the nbineeeth cenhury, lands adenterprises
hiad. severe consequences for government joining railways and canals were often ceded to promot-.
financer.
ers, ailowing them to profit from the many side busi-
Governments all over the world provided aid to pri- nesses that grew up around their investments By
vrate infrastructure pro*ets hin various forms, includinkg providing collateral that could be used to back bonded
direct subsidies. Two isrmnsin use then and of cur- debt, land grants--like interest guarantees-corrected
rent interest- as went are financial guarantees and. land for capital miarket imperfections. In Canada during the
grants .. 1550s and 1860s, defaults on guaranteed bonds drained
Guaamnfras In In dia, if a railway company did niot at-. government revenues. In 1871. therefore, the Canadiant
tain a minimum rate of Meumn of, for example, 5 patcent, House of Commons adopted a policy, of land grants as a
the government made up the difference under the terms way to subsidize railway construction without having to
-of a guarantee badcked by its futI powers of taxation. Such raise the rate of taxtion. Land grants proved most effec-
-guarantees were also critical in the, constructon of the tive in such large speculative ventures as the Indian rail-
Canadian railways. But guarantees remnoved incentives moads and the transcontinentalines in the United States.
Project financing, which permits- sponsors to ment support does-n'ot disappear One-time grants,
raise hinds secured by the revenues and assets of a of either capital or land, are the preferred mediaparticular
project, is often used in new ventures that niLsm for ensuring efficient opertion.
* ~~have no track records. This technique requires a cnet n rnsh rjc iacn
dearer defineation of risk than is the case with traditional
public projets. Allocatin risk among partid- Established companies-such as privatized telepants
has often been a difficult and lime-consumiing commnunications and electric power utilities-have
* ~~process, but nwsafeguards and conventions are a credit history, a customer base, and tangibl asets
evolving to deal with project risks and complexities.- that can be offered as security to lentders. New corn-
Providing funds to a project is an important oh- panies-as in electric power generation, toll woads,
Jective in itself, but the financing process also serves or envirounmenta infrastructure-have ontly the
another important end. Monitoring -by financial poecofa future earnings stream to support bornmarkets
-and institutions complements regulation rowings. For themn, a key issue is what recourse
and competition in servce dehivery- As such;it pro- lenders have if investments fail to produce the exvides
anotlher mechanism foDr investors to impose pected returns.
discpline. Norms for devising incentive and pen-- The financing of a project is said to be non recourse
alty mechanisms to ensure performance by private- when Ienders are repaid only from the cash flow
sector interests axe becoming dlearer- Privately sport- generated by the project or, in the event of complete
sored and financed projects, measure their success failure, from the value of the project's assets.
against.contractually agreed targets. for new capac- Lenders myalso have limited recourse to the assets
ity, construction costs, and time overruns and of a parent company sponsoring a project An imagainst
indicators of servce qluality-
portant policy question is whether government tax
The continuing role of the government lies in in- revenues should be used to provide recourse, in te
suiring the private investor against policy-induced form of guarantees to lenders.
risks. M-oreover, certain types of infrastructure-. The use of nonrecourse or limited-recourse. firural
roads and, to a lesser extent, sewerage and nancing, also known as project financing, is a transisanitation-may
be unable to finance themselves tional response to new needs arising from'activities
through user charges. Thus the nteed for govern- recently brought withiin the orbit of -the private sec-
'94.

1~~~~D Clt ,-,.Re -b cope an tie 0 reous 0.
'tor. Financingin.this form.can be oplx and time- r e projiects. Relative to its size, Malaysia, too,
consuming, as the interests of various parties have. has been a significant user of project finance.
to, be secured through contractual agreements. The Trans,portation projects, maindy toll roads, doniequity
stake of private sponsors is typically about 30 nated the numbers and the value of projects in highpercent
of project costs and usually fonns the limit income and developing countries Crable 53). The
of their liability Private lenders (especially commer- more than two-thirds share of transport projects in
cial banks) influence project success by demanding middle-income countries reflected the extensive
performance guarantees from project sponsors. toll-road programs in Argentina, Malaysia, and
Where performance depends on govemment poiqc, Mexico. The survey estimated that twelve pow-er
such guarantees are sought from governments. The projects had been funded in middle-income counexpectation
is that projects financed on a imited- tries (a 16 percent share of all projects). This estimate
recourse basis will, over time, develop a track record is already outdated, however, with the number for
that will provide comfort for future investments. the Philippnes alone now beng eighL The sectoral
composition of -the project pipeline is constantly
ADVANCES mN rROJEcr RNNaNc.'A survey pub- changing For middle- and (especially) low-income
lished in October 1993 provided details of nearly countries, independent power projects are likely to
150 private infrastructre projects that l[ad been be an important focus for future prject financing.
funded worldwide since the early 1980s on limited- Water and environmental infrastructure is another
- -.-- recourse terms, at a total cost of more than $60 bil- growth area-projects are being undertaken in midlion
(fable 5.2). Both the number of projects and the dle-income countries (especially for wastewater
funding involved had doubled compared with an treatment), and their diffusion to low-income counearlier
sample (in September 1992). This illustrates tries is imminent A public-private partnership has
the stmng momentum in private projects, which made possible the construction of a chemical waste
firve years ago were largdy curosities.
treatment and disposal facility south of Jakarta in
About half the projects surveyed (by number and Indonesia.
value) were in developing countries, with a heavy The pipeline of projects under serious considera-.
concentration in middle-income countries. The only tion is substantiaL Public Works Financing estinates
low-income country with more than one funded that 250 projects are being considered in developing
projectcwas China (although many more projects are countries-seventy-two- of them in low-income
in the pipeline there). Argetina, Malaysia, Mexico, countries. The countries of East Asia and the Pacific
and the Philippines had the most projects. Along Rim are exected to be the biggest users of standwith
China, they represented 80 percent of the proj- alone, limited-recourse projects in the next decade.
ects for which funding had been comrmitted. Mexico This region has 150 projects in the pipeline, with an
stood out, with the largest number of limited- estimated total cost of $114 bilion China alone is es-
Table 52 Infrastructure project financing for projects fmded and in the pipeline, October1993
-: f - ~ (bitllwnsofdul&n5/- --
Number ofprocsts
Toal valucef prouts
A. veWviaeofpsec1s
Co-ntygaup Funded PWitecin Funddf Pipelne Funded Pr,liur
Woldd 148 358 63.1 235.4 0.44 0.71
High income 64 107 34.3 1121- 054 .1.05
ihddleincome -77 179. -25.7. 77.1 033 0.43
Lowincome 7 77- 3.1 46.3 0.44 - 0.64
So: P.Sblu P Wns ufic Fimd.ObeffI93.
. -.- Table 5.3 Project financing of funded infrastmcture projects, by sector, October1993
- ; - - . - - : - :Perentaedistrirut ion of pn#ects
-.Wleramd ewmnmmtalft
Co--. -;trySup Nhuberoqf pmfeElsfunded AWpmt Power Tqrnt mfrnsttur Tdecmmnotns Othr
:
World 148 - 100 13 60 16 2 10
-. lghiname 64 1.00 8 48 .25 2 17
-Middleiicome 77 100 16 69 - 10 .3 3
Lowincame 7: .00 29 57 0 0 14
SW= Pub-ic Fi:-dFtrbFc g,Odober1993. -
95

'W -:' "'-_ - .'' . ' f. '. ':v
timated to have as many as fifty projects under way. vertibility after tihe first ten years, and certain fJe
In the next few years India, Indonesia, and Palistan rnajeure risks.
could each have more than five projects, and several ProElectrica, a 100-megawatt, $70 million gas tur-
: projects are being considered in Sub-Saharan Africa bine plant near Cartagena, Colombia, financed en-
* : : : as welL tirely by the private sector, provides another good*.
Adapting project finance t-drniqz-es
example of carefully structured project finance for a
;..::Adopting projecEfnitoce tediniqutes
small project A group of large industial consumers
Differences in project, countiry, and sectoral charac- has contracted to buy electricty for fourteen years
te.; tics . influence the availability of finance, the in- from P.rElectrica. Foreign exchange payments have
struments of risk allocation, and the degree and na- been guaranteed through prepayments into an inture
of govemment involvement The main sectoral ternational esaow account In addition to short nedivide
is.betwe toll.rads (and urban transit sys- gotiations and early implementation, the benefits of
tems) and all other projects. Toll-road financing re- PoElectrica may extend to the regulatory reform it
quires greater government involvement than do has triggeredc The Colombian government has reother
infrastructure projects (see also Chapter 2 on sponded by creating arrangernents to ensure that
the unique problems of this sector).
the local transmission utility "wheels" the power
from the generator to users, a step that creates a
PRoJEcr szE As project size increase, the comr- precedent and a model for further new entry by priplexity
of risk allocation increases rapidly, requiring vate generators.
many complicated agreements between equity
holders, creditors, input suppliers, and buyers of CRMIBiE coNitAcrs. The credihility of the reguservice.
The dictum "start small, therefore, has its latory regime determines the bounds of available fi-
*:. . attractions. However, many contractual agreements nance (although success in financing a specfic projare
requiredirrectve of project sze, and the high ect creates a body of precedents that itself helps to
transaction costs entailed often mean that investors imnpxrve the. regulatory regime). Project financing is
are not interested in projects below a certain size. a key mechanism for initiating a process of change
The average size of projects in low-income countries. in countries or sectors with limited track records in
has-been $440 million, and that of projects in the private infratructureprovision.
pipelne has been even higher, at $640 mfllon (see The Phflippines, as noted in Chapter.3, has sig-
Table 5.2). In middle-incpme countries, average nificant experience with privately financed power
project sizes are more. than 25 perent smaller. The pecs. The achievements have bee considerable,
-infrence is that transaction costs in middle-income especally in attracting foreign investmentt, given - -
countries are lower, maldng smaller projects more the obstadles the countryfaced in mobilizing foreign
feasible-
investment in the late 1980s. Although the Philip-
Large projects can create serious problems in pines now has an extensive, and sophisticated, legal
low-income countries. An early and innovative ef- and administrative environment for. independent
fort using project finance for power generation is power projects, the country's earlier experience
the $1.8 billion Hub River Project m Paldstan, the shows that much can be achieved in less sophisticounts
first private power projec When con- cated crcumstances, provided that the ability to
pleted, the project wilI be one of the lagest private write credible contracts exists. This lesson is also
power facilities in the world.- It has suffered signifi- demonstrated by the expience of a power comcant
delays, howeverc because of complex negotia-. . pany in Guatemala (Box 5.4).
tions over.the division of responsibilities and risks An important additional element of contractual
* among the many parties involved. This expeience effectiveness is the mechanism for resolving disappears
to support the wisdom of learnmig dtough putes. International arbitration procedures are comsmaller
projects before moving on to larger ones. mon-for example, arbitration may be in a neutral
A Sri Lankan power project is a good example of jurisdiction using an interationally reognized set
what is needed when a country begins to seek pi- .'of rules, such as those laid down by the Intermavate
infrastructure investment The project is small tional Chamber of Commerce. Sponsors and lenders
(44 megawatts), and the foreign and local enhepre- may also seek to have key elements of the contract
neurs -involved are technically and finandally determined according to the legal framework of a_
strong. The goverment has guaranteed-payments- mutually acceptable third country- For example,
by the state-owned power puchaser, a dollar-based contracts for the Hopewell Shajiao C power station
.tariff for the first ten years, foreign exchange con- in China were drawn up using Hong Kong law.
:96

V
Box 5A A successfl-firtt
step in Guatemala
In January 199Z Empresa El4ctrica de Guatemala SA.. :maretrateWhpwavailabilityfallsbeow50 per-
-EFG.A) the major poerdistributotinGuatemala- cent, FQP wi pay EEGSA penalties The ageement re-
-sgned a fifteenyear power purchase agreement with a quires the proect to proide power at a competitive
-loca powegenerating pn Almnst immediately pnce.- Under current assumptions of capadly utliion,
-: -; :- the company sold its intert in the proiect to Enon which allow for deterioration of performance over time,
* Power Development: Corporaion, a subsidiay of a EEGSA will pay an average of $0.07 per kilowatt-hour
large US. natural gas company with intersts in several over the life of the projed-which is about the kag-run
--- zindependent power projects. The project consists of margn cost ofbulk power in Guatemala
-* - twenty 5-megawatt generats mounted on a barge at PQP has cut some of its risks by entering into con-
Puert QuetzaL which operate as a base-load planL The -tacts for tunkey mstallabon, operatins and mainbeprct
ineases Guatemahas generating capacity by 12 nance, and fuel supply The plant started operating in
percnt and its effective capacty by about l5 percent late Febuary 1993, on schedule and within budgeL A re-
The prces in the power phase gnentare d- viewofearlyoperationsindicates tatPQPhasachieved
nominated in US- dollas The ageemet rmeq high levels of available capadty, that revenues and net
EEGSA to provide the project company, Puerto Quen income agree with foeasts, and that convertg quetza-
: Power Corporation. (PQP), with wedey fixed capacity Ies into US. dollarshasnot beena pniblem.Afterwatchpayments,
provided thatPQPmeets minium avallabil- ing EESA sexperiene with PQP, the ntituto Nacional
ity standanl, weeky energy payments, with a mini- de Electriflcac6n-a goverment-owned enterprise remum
guaranteed purcbase of 5D percnt of output and spunsibIe power generatin transmission, anrd reta-Il
additional collateral and doumentary support to secure distribution outside Guatemala City-has began negt-
EEGSA%s obEgations to PQP. EEGSA has the option to ating other power purcase agreements with indepenpay
NP in U.S dolars or quetzales at the prevailing dent producers.
TOLL ROADS. Today's resurgee in toll-road con- basis of traffic flows), as proposed in Austraa and
struction reflects practical realitr: roads are needed the United Kingdom.
for economic development, but the financial and Governents and the pxivate sector have had
managerial capacity of the public sector is limited, limited expeience in dealing with each other as
In the past five years, Mexico has added an impres- equal partnexs on complex toll-road projects. Misive
4,000 kilometers of new toll roads at a cost of gations have had to be renegotated midstream
$10 billion. Malaysia has the most exnsve pub- when a project's ambitious original goals were not
lic-private project in the developing world, the $23 backed up by adequate p:eparation. Sometimes,
billion North-South Toil MoWrway. China is plan- specific road segments were not viewed as dependnang
many ambitious toll roads-the 123-kilome- ing on the quality of other roads, and competing
ter, $1 billion Guangzhou-Shezen superhighway ministries failed to cooperate.
will cut through the heart of fast-developing The Mexican toll-road program illustrates the
Guangdong Province. Many other smaller toil dangers of launching a major initiative with multiroads,
bridges, and tunnels axe also being con-. ple objectives and insufficent preparation. The constructed-
tract terms failed to pin the responsibility for con-
In most cases, tolls charged directly to users do struction time and costs on the private project
not cover the full cost of roads. Governments grant sponsors, an omission of conditions that have since
land rights o encourage development made viable become the normL De facto flexibility in the concesby
the road (for example, shopping centers on fre- sion period allowed sponsors to shift cost increases
way exits of the GuangzhDu-Shenzen highway; see onto the consumer or the govemment Creditors
Box 5.5). Govemments also allow private toll-road (niaulay state-owned banks) failed to perform their
operators to share in the reveues of edxsting pub- normal appraisal and monitoring functions. The reliclv
owned. toll roads (as is the case for Sydney Har- sulting high tolls have held down road use, albor
Tunnel and the Bangkok Second Stage Express- though measures are now being introduced to inway).
They can provide capital grants to make caease usage (Bo 5.6).
projects financially attractive to private. entipre- However careful the preparation, conflicts can
nears and can offer "shadow toils to private opera- arise. In the Second Stage Expressway. in Bangkok
tors (tolls paid from government revenues on the the Japan-led private consortium and the Tlansport
97

Box 5.5 'Land grnsand-eminent domain
Land gants have proved to be a valuable form of collat- delay infrastructue projects substantially-some of the
eml for innovative projects that might otherwise not difficuldes of the Second Stage Expesway in Bangkok
have been financed because lenders had little experence are related to these delays- Not only is an apprpriate
with similar pr-jects But in implementng a poicy of law of eminent:domain required to define the terms
land grants, there is a rsk ithatihe grants might be under which the governmet can acquire the land, but,
wasted if teyaregiven to projects that would be built in -as was demonstrated in the case of Narita Airport outany
case-
side Tokyo, lack of sensitivity in implementation can
Overall,' howeve,land grants have greater merit lead to contentious and expesive delays.
than interest guarantees because they represent a. one- In anticpation of land being acquired, landowners
-time inhfsion of resources-and do not reduce the incn- have an incentive to overdevelop their property or unfives
for efficient operation of the project. They may be dertakeothermeasures to overvalue their land. A prdCtiespeciallysuited
frmorespecative projects-suCh as cal solution is to use prevailing market prices and comldgh-speed
rail in industal couneries or high-risk trans- munity standards of land development as a norm. 'Me
-portisnent in developing cotnmties, more difficult issue is one of compensating those whose
Awarding land grants raises complex questions property values fai as the flow of business activity
-aboutacquisition proceduresand compensation of land- changes because of new infrastructur development In
holders Land acquisition can te. several years and: geeraL govenmnents have notcompensted such losses.
Authori hAve dls frs ove Le lee of to--s
Autorityhavedisag,Wfirsteoverelevelof tols vate parties. Four kinds of risks can be distinthey
had agreed on and then (more seriously) over guished-crency, commercial, policy-induced,
X -- who has the right to operate the road. Delays arising and country-although the distinctions namong
from these conflicts and frm sIow land acquisiton them are not always dear-cut
. have affected the viability of the Don Muang Tollway,
intended to link the Second Stage Expressway. CURRENCY RiSK Much ecent, privately financed
to the airport . ifrastructure has drawn an foreign capital and
The lesson for toll roads, as for electric power, therefore faces the risk of local currency devaluamay
be that contractual uncertainties arebestironed tion. Interational lenders rarly assume such risk,
out in smaller or simpler projects. Argetina has de- prefering instead to denominate their repayments
veloped an extensive system of private concessions in foreign currency terms. En the past, public enterin
which tolls are charged to finance maintenance. pnses or goverxunents have borne the currency risk,
There was an inial outcry against tolls on existing . but in the growing move to private finance, the risk
roads, and charges had to be lowered-but the of curency depreciation falls on the project sponsor,
greatly improved quality of the roads has made tolls and ultinately on the consumers of the service. In
more acceptabIe. En the state of Madhya Pradesh in many recent private projects, service prices have
India, an US-lkilometer tol road linkng an indus- been linked to an international currency
trial park to a national highway was built at a cost of Independent power generation presents a special
- $2 million and commissioned in November 1993. case Although most power projects do set their
The enabling legislation put in place and the finan- charges in US. dollars, these charges are paid by the
cial mechanisms used are being adopted and re- tran sion utility, and the final consumer is often
fined elsewhere in the country.
charged local cunrency prices untied to movements
in exchange rates. Transmission utilities cannot be
-* Riksharingr thelessowns lirned
expected to continue to bear currency risk in the
long run.i
At the heart of project financing is a contract that Countries may wish to promote schemes for inallocates
risks associated with a project and defines suring against cuny movements (forward
the daims on rewards- While often the cause of cover) so as to allow for short-term risk manage
delay and heavy legal costs, efficientrisk allocation menL In Pakistan, for example, the central bank ofhas
been central to- making projects financeable fers forward cover at an average premium of 8 per-.
and has been critical to maintamiing incentives to cent In time, private financial institutions may offer
- ; . . perfomL Risks are divided not only between pub- similar schemes- However, even with these anange
lic and private entities but also among various pri- ments, the consumer pays at least in part for ex-
98

change risk through the passing on of forward- example, to transfer construction risk to specialized
cover premiums.
construction companies through turnkey contracts
Also, sponsors may enter into longterm contracts
CoMMERaAL RISK. Two types of commercial risk with input suppliers.
may be distinguished, those relating to costs of pro- Where sector policy concens are unimportant,
duction and those arising from uncertainties in de- investors also accept market risk, but progress in
mand f-ur services. Substantial progress has been this regard has been slower. Tariffs in line with
made 'in shifting cost-related- risks onto private costs, sector unbundling to permit new entry (as desponsors
and other. private parties. Typically, con- scnbed in Chapter 3), and access to transmission
tracts include bonuses for early comnmissioning of networks are required in order to enable private
the project and penalties for late completion. In a sponsors to .assume all market risks. In telecommuproject
to construct a power plant in India, the pri- nications projects, the market risk is typically bome
vate sponsor will pay a penalty of $30,000 every day by the sponsor In the electric power and water sec-.
beyond the agreed commissioning date for the first tors, on the other hand, limitations on assumption
six months and a higher penalty thereafter A fixed of market nsk arise because payments to cover costs
payment for overall capacity also shifts the risks of. are not assured. Also, governments need to decicost
overruns to he pnvate sponsor. A contract may sively eniinate the prospect that investors will be
also specify operational obligations, such as mainte- bailed out if circunstances are unfavorable. In
nance or the availability of capadcty In the case of transportation projects, such as Mexican toll roads
utilities, a power or water supplier is sometimes pe- and certain Argentine rail concessions, governnalized
for capacity availability below prespedfied ments permiitted revisions in contract terms when
levels (see Box 5A on the Guatemala power plant). traffic levels were lower than expected.
Or the contract may require that a plant be available Assumption by private parties of even cost-rein
effective working order for a specified period of lated risks creates incentives for god perfortime.
mance. Not only do sponsors have equity holdigs
F-roect sponsors, are able to transfer some of in the project, but lenders are also central to the
these risks to other private parties. It is common, for monitoring process. As part of the contract, several
BaxL5.6 Mexico's toil roads: a big push that faltered
In:-as=uctre projects are often assocated with tine With tols that high taffic flaed to mtiali-the
construction outlays that result in limited productive old,feexoadswerepreferredevenwhetn travel timewas
use. This can ocu as much underprivate as under pub- typically twice as lon& Moreover, cost overnus aver-
.I entewprise if the right incentives are notin place. aged more than 50 paent of projected costs. Crhe High-
. in prexpartion for an ambitious 6,00-kilometer road wayof the Sun, from Cuemavaca to Acapulo, for examr
program, a-Meican government agency.did hasLy traffic ple, cost $251 billion, more than twice the orginal
and cost projections and prepared the road designs. The estimate.)
quality of these estiiates and designs fell fr short of re- To remedy the situation, the Mexcan govement
quirements for such an underaldng. At the same time, has taken several steps. in many cases, concession pen-t.
.- stat-owned banks lending to toil-wad prjcts did not ods have been extended fom ten or fifteen years to
perfrm the normal project screening and appraiua - thirtyyears VWherepintventuresoffr greater prospects
Although the concessions for road construction and of financial viablity, srethes of toll road amebeing coroperation
were awarded based on several criteria, in- bined under single management Heavier vehides nay
vestors who- promised to transfer the roads back to the be:bannedfrom the old road network as weight limits
- goverment intheshortst time werpeaallyfavored- are imposed and enforced.
Short concessions were partly motivated byia concern There are,signs that the most difficult period is past
that only short-term finandng would be available. The In the long run, consolidations of toll roads, longer con1-
attemptto achieve sucess.within a newadministratioirs cession periods, and more realistic trafficand costprojeterim
also creted a sense of ugency. In btrn, investors tions, along with economic grwth a n :
negotiated toa rates that would earn a retirn within the re spon bility on the partof thep
concession period. Tolls typicaly were therefore five to should bring significant retums on i-
ten timhes hger than those in the United States for cor- investment
parable distances.
S--- ~ .~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~9

financial covenants are made. In such situations, ance market is to provide- insurance for traffic risk
:--::.commnexial banks have a much greater incentive fora Mexican tol road.
for supervising projects than do lenders backed by
sovereign guarantees. SECrOR POucy-wIuc mIC. S Especially impor-
-The evidence, although limited, shows that the tant issues arise in the power sector because project
assumption of cost-related risks by private sponsors sponsors focus on the credibility and solvency of
and the monitoring of performance by banks are ef- their buyer,- typically a government utility that
fecive. Evidence, for exanple, on private construc- transmits and distributes power. The instrument
tion is very favorable and reflects the tight contrac- that protects the power supplier is the "take-or-pay"
tual conditions and severe penalties for cost and contract, or power purchase agreement Under such
time oveuns. A preliminary review of the FC's in- a contract, the buyer agrees to pay a specfied
frastucture projects shows that time overruns in amount regardless of whether the service is used.
construction have been only seven months on aver- The government thus provides a contract comphage,
and cost performance has been about on target ance guarantee-a useful transitional measunre
Such performance, however, is possible only when while the long-term goal of sectr reorm is being
commercial risks are truly transferred to private addressed (Box 5.8).
sponsors. The Mexican toil-road example shows Similar concerns arise with water and other envithat
when nsks can, inpractice, be transferred back ronmentat infrastructure projects (such as water
to the government, incentives for performance are supply, wastewater treatment, and solid waste disgreatly
weakened.
posal operations that are typically carried out at the
Private investors may wish to insure themselves municipal level by a local monopoly). Here governmagamist
commercial risks. The provision of such in- ment agencies (or municipal authorities) are not the
surance is best left to the private sector, although direct purchasers of the service. But they can and do
governments have a role in stimulating domestic influence the ability of the service provider to meter,
-guaranty facilities, possibly by taking an. initial bill, and collect Where the municpal authorities
stake in guaranty funds (Box 5.7). The private mar- cannot deliver, collection guarantees from the cenket
for risk insurance for international transactions tral governmentarerequired.
is small While short-term insunce for trade credit Thus, in such projects, the "market risk, or the
is available, pnivate insurance for infrastructure risk arising from fluctuations in demand, is effec-
.- - projecs is uncommon, although the London insur- tively transferred to the government through the
Box 5.. Leveragigthrough guarantees in Thailand
To encouTage private lndin the Thai government is zopolitan Region, and Bangkok ilseif are expected to be
--deveoping the Thai Guaranty Facility to gurantee the primary benefidaries of loanguarantees for investokans
made by prvate financial institutions to munid- ments in wastewater ttm ent, solid waste collection.
-palities and private operators of urban envital and disposal, and potable wate supply.
infrastuctu;m The facility is planned as a pubi-private During its-first two years of operation, the guaranty
corporation with prvate sector munagemL The tge facility is expected to recive $75 million. Lending will
date forinitial operation of thefacility is June l99t4 be five to eight times the level of these guarantyr funds.
-Because of limited experiencein lending to mwnii- Over a five-year. period, it is prjected tat the fility
polities, financal institutions consider them risky bor- will.be fiuded at a level of S150 million and will leverrvowers.
Pehrceivig igh project risks, lenders are reluc- age up to $12 billion in loans for urban environmental
tant- to malke loans for periods of-longer than eight infrastructure. projts It will obtain rpources princ-
. years-too short tD recoup investment from envirn- paily fhm the Thai governt om money borrwed
mental inhastrucht:..
in part from the USAID Housing Guaranty Potgram and
By pmrviding guarantees to private operators and in part from Thai finanal imstitutions. -
-nmunicipalities that help them to secure loans from Cont- A setof policy initiatives is also beingestablished to
- meial lenders, the g rens guaranty facility wMil ensure the effectiveness of this facility, including a move
create longer-term financg With increased lending to toward the "poluter-pays" priridpk change in adminlocal
govemnment it. will soon be posble to establish : istrative procedures, and greaterdecentralization, of
: credit ratings fbr dtiesand to allow them toissue bonds. decisionmadg.- .
Ten provincil dities, the five cities of the Banok Met-
I*.

Box 5.8 Look before you leap: limiting government exposure to contingent liabilities
.When a guarantee Is limited to contractual complianoe antees are sometimes desirable, they also create pervse
by goverunent agendes, the government has significant incentives that can lead to project mismanagenent.
control over events. Such guarantees can be made -_.Guarantees make sense when intemational investors'
calable, for instance, when governent agencies inhibit perceptions of country risk am poorer than economic
the supply of inputs to a project, fall to honor purchase conditions warrant, so that the guarantees are a stricdy
commitments, change pricing rles, or disaUow remit- transitional measure for attracting broad, and ultimately
tance of foreign exchange to service a p s private selfsustaining. investor interest.
loans. Unike blanket loan guarantees, this Idnd of agree- Government guarantees are not always necessary, as
ment does not commithe government toprect lenders demonstrated by. the financing of ProElectrica, the
and investors against such conmercial risks as cost and Colombian power plant A significant part of the foreign
time overruns, adverse movements in exchange rates. diect investment and portfolio flows to developing
and inefficient operatiorns Contractual compliance guar- countries has not been guaranteed-the underlying ecoantees
have-the added advantage of creating incentives nonic environment is what drives the flows.
-for government agencies to stidc by their commitments Thus, when offering guarantees to private. lenders,
and of limiting government liability to times when gov- governments need to determine whether such guaranermunent
agencies are outof compliance:
tees are truly required, what form the guaranty should
Governments may also issue guarantees.to ensure a take, and how they should be accounted for in governcertain
rate of rezurn- lype of guarantee that produces ment accounts. At the same time, governments need to
the worst incentives-or to lengthen maturities of loans. set policies to enable the development of private insur-
In both cases, the govemmentakes on a- commercial anceumarkets.
risk A centuy of experience shows that, although geartake-or-pay
formula. This becomes necessary be- sovereign risk, with exporters or bankers responsicause
market risk is intermingled with the danger ble for commercial isks. In mos' cases, these guarthat
financially troubled power purchasers (trans- antees are extended to both types of risk, in part bemission
utilities) or water users may not honor their cause it is difficult to distinguish sovereign from
commitments. Overall sector reform is required to commercial risks. As the prmary motives for setelminate
policy-induced risks and thus reveal the ting up such insurance schemes are supporting exnmarketnrisk
port industries (and thus domestic employment),
export credit agency prermums have been highly
COWINW Rsx Where govemments do provide subsidized, although they have been increased folguarantees
against sector policy or even commercial lowing losses incunred in the 1980s.
isks, these may not always be acceptable to private The Hopewell-Pagbilao independent power prointernational.
lenders, who may look instead for ject in the Philippines marked the first time that a
guarntees from creditor countries or from multiLat- loan from an export-import bank was not badced by
eral banks to imsure against "country" risks. The a govermment counterguarantee, placing the bank
role of the borrower goverment does not disappear on the same footing-as private lenders. Nonguaranin
such situations, since counterguarantees are typi- teed lending by export-import banks exposes them
cally required. . to the same nsks as other lenders, which-gives them
Export credit agencies in OECD countries off-er reason to improve their project appraisal, -assessguarantees
against risk of nonrepayment to their na- ment of borrower creditworthiness, and monitoring.
tional exporters or banks that extend credit to over- To attract international private capital to develseas
importers of goods and services. Typically, oping countries, several multilateral development
these agencies underwrite.overeign risk by provid- banks, induding the World Bank and the Asian
mg insurance on commercial credits and by extend- Development Bank, have developed guarantee
ing finance directly. Dunrng the period 1983-91, schemes. The World Bank's capital-market guaranexport
credit agencies did $53.1 billion worth of tees are used to facilitate the access of developing
business with a maturity of five years or more. Of countries to tlhe international capital markets by
this, 60 percent applied to infrastructure finance lengthening the maturity of related borrowing. The
linked prncipally to the import of capital goods. hi proceeds from such loans can be used for infriastructheir
most limited form, export credit agency guar- ture investments. The World Bank also issues guarantees
or insurance may be extended only against antees -for project financing-under the Extended
1..

Cofinancing Facility (ECO)-to cover soveregn mediation through capital markets. Infrastructure
risks associated with infrastuture projects. This fa-. developers and private (especially contractual)
cility, designed to improve developing country ac- savers share a long-term horizon. Bringing compaticess
to international capital markets, has been used ble savers and investors together is the task of capifor
the Hub River Project in Pakistan and a thermal tal markets. At the same time, the financing of infrapower
project in China.-The Multilateral Investment structure projects improves appraisal capabilities
Guarantee Agency (MIGA)-another World Bank and expands risk-diversification possibilities for
affiliate-has also provided guarantees for several local commercial banks, equity and bond markets,
infrastructure projects.
and institutional investors such as insurance comn-
:. . =; - -- - . - ~~~~~panies and pension fuinis. Exploitation.of these-
Institutions and instruments for resource p a p f E o t
mobilization................... links can be promoted - through prudent regulation,.
-.- mobllashon.------
improved disclosure and reporting standards, and
If the trend tDward private investment in infra- the development of credit-rating capabilities and
structure is to continue, financial markets will have credit risk insurance.
to respond by providing the necessary long-term
- = - , . . - . - . 17~~~~~~~~l,Xstrucfure
resource Paralleling the innovations described
deuelopnieat bat& ..-
above in the structuring of contractual agree- In many countries, spealized development banks
ments-which are critical to making a project fi- are a conduit for funds used in infrastructure projnanceable-lessons
have been learned about deliv- ects, especially for municipal infrastructure such as
ermg long-term finance through alternative water, solid waste collection and disposal, and local
institutions and instments.
roads. For municipalities, borrowing fiom such
Both foreign and domestic sources of capital will institutions supplements local taxes and central
need to be tapped. Reliance on foreign savings re- government transfers and is intended to cover flucmains
a necessity for many countries with inade- tuations in expenditure or to prevent large shifts in
quate domestic savings. But there are limits to the revenue requirements.
capaity- of any economy to access funds from In developing countries, such specialized infraabroad,
particularly for debt finance. External bor- structure development banks have suffered from all
rowing must be serviced laigely by domestic rev- the negative features associated with govemment
enues. Overall balance of payments constraints and ownership, such as inefficient targeting and subsithe
sheer size of infrastructure investments imply, dization of lendin& interference in operations, and
for most countries, that a sustained infrastructure corruptionL Inadequate diversification of risk has
program wiil have to be accompanied by a strategy also led to periods of heavy demand followed by
for mobilizing domestic funds. In turn, an increas- substantial slack Moreover, the banks' traditional
ing share of domestic savings will need to come function as conduits of government funds is inconfrom
private sources as governments reduce their sistent with the trend toward less reliance on-govinvolvement
in infrastructure. - errnent budgets and imcreased use of private sav-
As the dominant owner and supplier of infra- ings to finance infrastructure.
structure, however, govemments will continue to be In industrial countries, with stronger traditions
a major user of funds, as well as a conduit for re- of autonomy and solid appraisal capabilities, infrasources
from multilateral development banks. Mu- structure banks have performed better. In Japan,
nicipal governments (esponsible for large and postal savings have constituted the pnmary source
growing urban infrastructure) represent a major of long-term funds used bv such institutions as the
source of demand for financial resources. To meet Japan Development Bank (1DB) to finance infratheir
needs, new initiatives are being tried, indud- structure. The JDB has been crucial to past infraing
the revitalizing of existing ifrastructure Iending structure development, and even today, with the
institutions. Govemments are also creating special- move toward public-private partnersNhips, it continized
infrastructure funds (discussed later) as a tran- ues to play a major role in financing, often at highly
sitional measure to make long-term financing avail- subsidized rates. In Europe, municipal banks-ob-
-able where- private financing is -not likely to be tning their resources from contractual savings insufficient
Specialized infrastructure banks and stitutions -and other long-term sources-have genfuncds
are imperfect mechanism that need increas eraily performed well where local governments
ingly to acquire marketlike discipline, and their have had operational independence.
value needs to be assessed periodically. . Few municipal banks in developing countries,
Synergistic links can develop between private in- however, have shown a capacity-for sustained infrastructure
projects and domestic financial inter- vestment, largely because of undercapitalization,.
102.

poor financial discipline, and substantial arrears.
Although such banks have helped add to the stock Box 59 Successful micipal credi in
of urban infrastructure, they have done little to pro- Colombia
mote the capacity or commitment of municipalities
to expand and operate it effiienty. Except in- Colombiassexperienceiwith itsmicipal indude
a facility in Colombia that-rediscounts lending st n is a su sto with a history going
back more than twenty yens. The municipal credit
institution has evolved thugh succewssve incarnaprojects
(Box 5.9). - - - - btions into the Fmandera de Desarrollo Ternitorial
Certain pragmatic principles emerge from the ex- FNrDrER), an autonomos agency that opeate
perience thus far. A spealized institution is justi- under the firnance minisry..
fled orly if the value of business warrants it and if
FINDETE does not lend dircty to municipal
the concomitant. techical and manageral capabili- govemments but operates as a discount agency to
ties are available. A more practical alternative is tovate sectr and stat-wned bank
develop and improve existing commercial and de- that make the loans, appraise the projects, and
e momtor perfrnmance. The system' success has development
banldng channels. An effort in Argentina- pendet onthequalityofFlNDErEWsstaffand that
to create a new lending institution (COFAPyS) dedi- of the intennediaries through which itlends. Under
cated to the water sector filed. Besides defects in the control of the finance ministry, has it been reladesign
that led to limited funding capability, the tively insuated from political pressures.
bank was seen to offer no benefits beyond those of 9 a n d 1990, moe tha 1,300 pro.
existing chnnels for routing official development . with a value of more than S1 bilio were f-
nanceL assing 600 municipalities. The system's
funding does not rely on government budgetay
The long-term goal for existing infrastructure ao tions bat ratheronbonds,ngofits
bank-in keeping with the shift toward greater loans, and heign aedits frm bilateral and muliconmercial
orientation and accountability-must laenal sources.
be to diversify their portfolios and operate under
private ownership and control, possibly as wholesale
banks. In the interim, the discipline under
which they operate can be improved. For example, greater privatization of municipal fastrudcure
efforts are under way m MorocCo to reform the BANOBRAS is playing an important role in facilitat-
Fond d'Equippement Communal (FEC), an agency ing private watEr and sewerage projcts by guaranestablished
in 1959 to fund municipal investment teeing that municpalities will pay for services pro-
The FEC is being transformed into an autonomous vided (or will allow water billing and collection).
agency subject to supervision by the finance -miin- At the same time, BANOBRAS is worldng to
istry and by the central bank, with a board compris- strengthen municipal finances by demanding better
ing mainly central government officiaIs. The re operational and financial performance as a condiforms
provide the FEC with a new set of operational tion for its support
guidelines, eligibility citeria, and financial targets Domestic construction capability is crucial to the
This is not an ideal solution, but until capital mar- development and maintenance of basic infrastruckets
are better developed or alternative financing ture, but construction contractors are difficult to fimechanism
are available, revitalizing institutions nance because they have uncertain cash flows and
by maldng them more accountable is a pragmatic limited bankable collateraL Typically, banks disway
to proceed.
count no more than 60 percent of the value of pay-
Looking ahead, specialized infrastructure inter- ment certificates issued by government departmediaries
could play a catalytic role in capital-mar- mentsa Frequent delays in payments by public
ket development In India, the new and innovative authorities compound the inherently difficult finan-
Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services and cial position of contractors, who. are often forced to
the more traditional Housing and Urban Develop- resort to high-interest informal financing. The fiment
Corporation (which is seeking to redefine its nancing requirements of the construction industry
role) aim to sell their loans to other private financial can be partially met through local development fiinstitutions
once project credit histories have been nance compaxnes that on-lend funds to contractors
established. They also plan to padcage securities for highways and similar civil works.
from different projects and to offer shares in these Fnance is also provided through specialized inpackages
to investors. Another specalized in- frastructure banks. BANOBRAS, for example, profrastructure
bank, BANOBRAS in Mexico, is also vides short-term loans for public works against conlooking
for new responsibilities consistent with tractors' receivables from the government agency
103

sponsoring a project, a practice that is thought to vate sponsors to seek commercial financing or to
-.-- have contributed much to the development of the commit a laiger amount of equity funds and to enconstruction
industry in Mexico. As part of its trust sure that the fund manager or the operating interactivities,
BANOBRAS also operates a special fund mediary has a stake in the success. of projects fithat
can provide up to 25 percent of the full cost of a nanced. Although appropriately designed funds
project to finance the start-up costs of construction. could be useful instrments while capital markets
Such finance is no substitute for regular payment by are still developing, reform of the financial sector
government agences to contractors, however. and improved creditworffiiness of borrowers
should be the long-term goals.
A number of private funds have recently been es
Two types of infrastructure funds have emerged in tablished to channel international capital for develrecent
years. Government-sponsored infrastructure oping country infrastructure. They pool risks across
development funds are designed as transitional projects and hence increase the availability as well
mechanisms to provide long-ten finance until cap- as lower the costs of finance. These funds mobilize
ital markets are better developed Private funds, of resources through private placements from instituwhich
there are a grwing number, serve the corM- tional investors, indluding pension funds. For exammercially
useful function of diversifying investor pIe, a pension fund with little interest in investing
-isk. As transitional mechanisms, these fhnds serve directly in a toIl road in Mexico might be interested
two purposes. They allow the leveraging of govem- in participating in a fund that invests in a portfolio
ment resources or official development assistance of such toll roads. As has been the practice of govby
attracting cofinancing from private sources. They eriment-backed funds, private funds have concertcan
also create credit histores for borrowers per- trated heavily so far on power projects. Continued
ceived as risky In time, these borrowers can secure flow of resources into such funds will depend on in-
Tdhect aoces to capital markets.d
vestments being made in sound projects with credi-
The Private Sector Energy Development Fund m ble sponsors as well as on the pace at which regula-
Pakistan and the Private Sector Energy Fund in Ja- tory restrictions on institutional investors are
maica are designed to catalyze private financing for relaxed.
power projects. In response to perceived country
risk and a lack of long-term financing compatible.
Of domesbc capial mars
: wit - the requirements of the power sector, the Ja- The long-term goal must be to broaden and deepen
maican govenmnent -makes long-term financing domestic capital markets so that they can serve as
available through the Energy Fund (up to a maxi- efficient and reliable conduits for infiastructure fimium
of 70 percent of project costs) as a means of at- nance. Getting there will require broad investor partracting
private investments. Investors in the fund ticipation, a variety of market-making players (broindude
the World Bank and the Inter-American De- kers, dealers, underwxiters), and a wide range of
velopment Bank. Another example of fund leverag- financial instruments. hI addition, markets require
ing in a developing country is the proposed Thai adequate disclosure of information to ensure effi-
Guaan yFacilityforfinancing environmental infra- ciencr, and effective laws to safeguard investors.
structure (see Box 5X)_ This facility will not lend di- In most developing economnies, the informational
rectly to infrastructure projects but will guarantee and contractual preconditions are not in place forefprivate
loans to municipalities and private opera- ficient private and commnercial financing of infrators.
The Regional Development Account (RDA) in structure projects. Prvate institutions such as credit-
Indonesia is a transitional credit system designed to rating agencies and public ones such. as regulatory
shift.flnancing of fastructure projects from gov- agencies are needed to ensure an adequate flow of
enm. ent grants to debt instruments, thereby creat- information to investors, to facilitate monitoring,
ing a credit history for borrowers, principally local and to discipline managemeaL Fnancial liberalizaauthorities.
The RDA lends at .near-market rates. tion and polices to encourage the growth of the for-
The goal, is to give local authorties three to five mal financial sector wil in time help overcome such
years to establish measures for cost recovery and to . shortcomings.
demonstrateadequatefinancialmanagement-thus
Experience shows, however, that equity listings
enabling them to borrow diectly from financial in- and bond issues by inf-astructure comparies or
stitutiorns and capital markets. . projects can spur capital-market development by
Good design for such domestic funds requires increasing the range of investment options. The
that they pnrce their loans on market benchmarks. It discussion here higlights how inftastructure develis
also important to incorporate incentives for pri- opment, private provision strategies, and capital-
104

'sv,t-za6oapioceeds (billions of VS.EdEllArs)h
~~~~~~~~~~g Q-
market development are best considered within an dones (ENTel) in Argentna, Compalifa de Tel&
integrated faujiework.
fonos de Chle (CrC) in Chile, and Teifonos de
M:idco (Telmex) in Mexico-and one in eLectric
PRmVArIZAnON. The privatization of ifrastructure power generation, Chilgener in Chile, illustrate the
concerns has given a boost to local stock markets. Of implications of privatization for financial markets.
the $61.6 billion of revenue obtained by developing * All except Chilgener sought a strategic (or
countries from the privadzation of public enter- core) investor in order to introduce management expises
between 1988. and 1992, about one-third ($21 pertise and to 'create a commitment to further
billion) came from the privatization of infrastmuture growth.
entities. Aggregate proceeds from infrastructme pri- - * A significant proportion of shares was-sold to
vatization have been highest in Latin America, with the general public, and in all cases shares were allothe
most activity being in telecommunications (Fig- cated to employees.
ure 5.3). Some Asian countries, such as Malaysia and - Substantial proceeds from the initial stock of-
Korea, have opted for partial privafizatior. Ouside ferings and subsequent rises in share prices have
Latin America and- Asia, however, privatization has given these companies a dominant position in their
so far had a limited impact.
domestic capital markets.
Techniques for financing privatization have im- . The two Argentine telephone companies constiplications
for the broadening of share ownership on tute almost-40 percent of the market capitalization
stock markets and for the gneral development of in Buenos Aires, and Telmex dominates in Mexico
capital markets. Three privatizations in telecom- with a 20 percent share. These large capitalizations
munications-Empresa Nadonal de Telecomunica- have attracted financing from pension funds, creat-
: -. : - -- 105

ing the basis for long-term capital flows intD the long-term, stable retums. Generally, it has.been the
capital markets. Substantial returns (especially from role of the government to foster the development of
telecommunications and electric utilities), rising bond markets. Government bond issues establishi
market shares for infrastructure companies, and the benchmarks-in terms of pricing and maturity
growing investor confidence are mutually reinforc- structure-for bond markets overall.
ing (Figures 5.4.and 5-5).
Explicit and implicit commitments to growth
In developing countries, the use of bond financing
is in its early stages. Revenue bonds (used for
h ave led to. ambitious investment programs, fi- greenfield projects and paid back from the project's
nanced in part thirough new equity offerings, furthier revenues) are new in infrastructure finance in develsustaining
the growth of the domestic capital mar- oping countries. They have been used to help fiket.
As the aggregate numbers indicate, such priva- niance toll roads in Mexico and the Subic Bay Power
tizations hiave been a source of substantial foreign Station in the Philippines. Corporate or municipal:
exchange inflows in Latin America. The Argentine bonds, based on the credit of a company or governgovernment
used a debt-equity swap mechanism in ment authority, have been used by infrastructure
the privatization of ENTel, bringing in cash proceeds entities, but the bonds have often been placed on inof
around $2.2 billion and reducing its commercial ternational markets because domestic bond markets
bank debt (at. face value) by roughly 14 percent of are underdeveloped..
. the total debt to cominercial banks and 7.7 percent of The experience of industrial countries offers
the total external debt involved. These privatized some guidance. In industrial countries, bond financcompanies
have also attracted significant portfolio ing is widely used to raise funds for municipal ininvestnent,
directly in the form of equity held in the frastructure. It has also stimulated the development
companies and indirectly through sucl instruments of the local bond market. Municipal authorities
as'American depositary receipts (see Box 5.2). issue bonds directly. They sometimes -pool their
needs with those of other local governments, partic-
BOND MARKErS. Bonds can attract to infrastruc- ularly when their borrowing requiruements are small
tire financing a whole new class of investors, such or their creditworthiness is poor. For the investor,
as pension fumds and insurance companies seeking municipal bonds have been a source of high ref--
-- - :
- - .~~~~~~4. -c4 -.-- : -~ - t' - t t." -- - . .k :
-A El nfrwctnzcte4uiteiuia&ucodbuhntregro.oth:bt4SArgmtena U
s taal marktk
L~~~~~~~~~~~- - ,-
j-AnimxsoUStolr%
f:~~~~~~~~~~~ S:
i1. ' : -- 910 kr,
- . : . - , -, .:9:1: -* - 't. : ' :

-~ f4' * ;
ylkj
XtLSidolkits.(1.
-~~~~. long-termn liabilities, making them ideal suppliers of
term finance for infrastructure projects.
'-o edomedthes,taks bya hue margin. p Chile has used its pension fund system to pro-
.-.; - .- mote : the : . privatization of public utilities, including.
~10).r. -A- --. _ Santiago -the subway system, Soquimich (a chemical
.. . -. mining -- Xffi............................and
concem), CT. Holdings by pension
funds account for 1O to 35 percent of the equity
t'i -S: w"e. X -*t S _ -i F capital of these ompnis,a the pension
L.~~ #2~sI: iu;•~~ ~ ~ ~ funds hold less tHan 10 prcent of their portfolios in
4#W g gj*~ s.t4~ X g 2the m
form of stocks of priva te companies.
X {9s The Philippine soca securty syst tly
*Z; t; -&~.. - 'f, ¼
X
;0. -- W
created a 4-bil1ion-peso Ioan fund targeted to Philip-
SQ . S { -s¢ .m'%
pine power projects and administered, by local
;- .*; t8'sT) A ~- 1 f~ ,1 banks. This fund is able to provide fifteen-year
W g .. -
-O 4
1oans Of uP to 200 mfllon pesos to a bank, wlhic
-- 4 thent on-lends to the power project company. The so-
~~ 4 -r ~ I~TT cial securiiy system thus assumes only the bank
.iskI The banks handle appraisal and montorng,
r g Ji;e W ffiS I g X
and they can also leverage the funds by adding
-. wa :r.:Y' . ,, . . other resources. International insurance companies
-- 1 %ga Jz e I FX-' operating in the Philippines, where there is a dearth
-t~:; :~z-

J-t---00:- -3_
j
.. t~L,a,ozf0 ..
: . . . . . D . .. .. .
.
E '. A ' - . , . - . - &. ',, t t~t. - Xt r
*X' '''X' ""'
-';
z
- -t-.
- - ~assets that pension funds and other mstitutional m- thestructunng of starid alone prqcs usmngproject
- - .~estors can hold in thie capital markets in dweveop- finance tecuniques may reuie considerable eEFfort
: ~~mgcounties. -and techmiaa assistance from intemational agmesa.
- - -
- - ~~~~~~~~~~~Wer domestic capital markets are not wveU deve-.
; ~~Prospects oped and financial intermedianes- are -weak, the
- - . ~~~~~~~~~~~only
other option may be to strngthen spalized
- Moving from today's still heavy depenldence on hifrastructureffinnce institutions.Once firnancial in-
0~~~~~~~~~~- - .. '-.
- ~~public firiancing to tomorrow's sytem of more pn- -termediarfes are well developed,
-
thejy can
-1OS
take on
* --
gxW
-vate sponsorshp is Mcely to be a long and some.- the task of cataIyzing the development of domestic
;
-
tfimes
%'.r
painffil . process. In important respects, the tra- capital market through appraisa and underwriting
~~ditional style of miasrdr fiaancing has been functions. And once crecht rating-and public regu-
- -too easy. Money has flowed duwugh channels I ation of fiacl markt are, in place, other opwhere
scrutiny has often been limited because pub- tions open up, and the use of long-term savmigs
:- .-.- ,,= lHi ,...7. sponsorship :v? ... has pzovided high levelsof comfort of contractual -institutions -. -r and .Ig the deveopment =
- - - to lendesTemvtoamrapnndrna- of a variety of financial instruments should become
; -~ent syste imnplies greater scrutiny and the need possibIe.
:- ~~for more resource to coordinate many divers T.hegood news is that private enterprisehasbeen
- - ~interests. In returxi, it offers the pron-se of greater moving into a wide range of countries and pro*ts.
:-accountability. Lg.aL and regulatory reform is ahdy under way.
-; - ~~From the menu of new approaches, the options Infrastructure providers are being privatized, :lowr,
-available to a cofuntry depend on its administrative of foreign direct investinent bv new infrastracture
-. capabilityr and the state of its capital market (Figure -entrepreneurs are on the rise, as are international
0 . 5*56). Project finance repzesents the first rung of the flows of portfohio capitaL And the growth of domes--
-: . - ladder and should, in principle be reachable in all tic capital markets is a source of optiin hnance
- :countries. W.here capabffities lack adequate depth, . follows enterprise.-

.*,mmr
''',
'- ' f - .,__ -,
6..
-. ~ ~~~~ - -- A
7>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
.IMP
Setting priorities and
implementing reform
The potential for improving performance hi infra- Onoq Ak Punuc owNEtsHIP AND PUBUC OPERAstructre
ovisonand investnent is substantiaL as noN. In nearly all infrastructure sectors, the most
is the quantity of resources devoted to inrtruc- common vehidce for ownership and operation is a
lure Thus, both the need and the broad diection for public entity-a parastataL public enterprise, pub-
.eform are dear Additional inestment will obvi- lie authority, or government department-owned
ously be needed-but more invesment will not in and controlleed by the central, regional, or local govitself
avoid wasteful inefficenaes, improve mainte- emmunent As described in Chapter 2, the delivery of
nance, or micease user satisfacti Achieving these services is better caried out when public orpaizaimlprovements
will require thee broad actions; ap tions are run on commercial lines, freed from govplying
commercial principles to infristructure oper- emient budget and cvil service constrints and
ations, encouraging competition from appropnately subject to normal commercil codes and regulaeguilated
private sector providers, and incrng tidons C;ompetition from private firms pressures
the involvement of users and other staleholders in public providers to inprove their perfonnance and
planning, providin and monitoring infrastructure should not be preventedby regulatory or otherbarservices.
These adusitments caR not only for policy riers. Using private contractors for dearly defined
changes, but also for findamental institional services, such as mainenance of public utilities,
changes in the way that the "businss" of infrastruc- provides experience that can gradually be extended
ture is conducted. Four major options (introduced to full operation by the private sector through
hi Chapter 1) are, available for effecting such leases or concessions (Option B), as both public and
changes to improve infrastructue provision and private parties gain finiiatv and confidence with
performance and to expand the capacity to provide partnership.
inrstructure services-
OvnoN B: Pusuc ONEr AND nuvAm OPERA-
Choosing anong alternatives: institutional
nON. Through concessionLs or leases, the public secoptions
and country conditions tr can delegate the operation of infrastructure facilities
(along. with the commercial risk) and the
Institufional options responsibil for new investment to the private sec-
-tor As detailed below, the rights to use publicly.
The four institutional options represent different al- owned assets or to provide exclusive areas of serlocations
of ownership, financing, and operation vice vary by infastucture secto Port leases allow
and maintenance responsibilities, and also of risk the use of public facilities, while municipal solid
between government and the. private sector c(able waste collection ontracts award service rights but
6.1). These options are not exhausive but are repre- usually not excldusive use of publicly owned facilisentative
pc.nts on an underlying continuum of in- ties. Leases and concessions permit private sector
stitutional alternatives,
management and fmiancing without the disman
109

*-dt
________________________
............... .].
777
$ .77
;\. := - -i r1I
f~~:,j- .S
-.
:c::s3
i S 9 E~~Fr I- !i
t
H ElW She- - ;v7:; DiL -1
j -t:-
~~~14 ~ ~ ~ 4
C..ArX020, . . -:
* . i. , S . (
0~--,
110

Box 6.1 Ingedientr. of good peromneunder
alternatiLve institutional forms
Option AM Public ownership and public operation changes in input cost), mechanisms to reolve disputes,
* Co munent roles as ownez wgolato and and sanction for no'perlormince.
tar;dearly separateci. opera- * Contrcts awarded by tnspat selection
-~~~~DPbi -Wwi*.No government -mra : interfeence suje to in detad : manage- -:menc pra mtiWs mn bIye onokcomptzbve bidding
meOt Option Private owne-ship and private operation
* Public enterprises subject to general commeirial Apropriate comnpetitive restructuring of subseclaw
and to general accunting and auditing standards to undieken.
-(operating on 'leve playing privte enlte--
(operating on level playing field"-with private ~
* Practical and statutory barriers to private entry re-
- . - PF
* Tariffs set to acieve cost mcovery as appropriate,
moved - --- - (for - : S examnple, : - restictons on access to aedit and
t p p i
and entrisesubject to hard budget - - -
- - . . * R~~~~~~~~~~~~Iegulabion
in place to proted publc mbnters
-- P--hic- serice: obigatiomn, if any, tareed andcompensated
, . a,, .when ta,,ei competitive discipline is msufficent and to err-
: . a~~ompertsated explicidybrygovanemtt-ansfers -
explicitly-by government transfers.
sure private entrants access to network facilities when
Manags selected by professional qualificathons eleand
compensated appropriately:
i* Apprpriate mnechamsms
in place to obtain feed- Option D- Community and user provision
back fi use- * Participation of users or community members
* Discrete activities and fumctions that can be un- - ~ - n
Am earlest staze of prom preparation to ensure
bmdled open bt private entry (for example, tirough ser- :wilingness topay and ownershipof scheme..
vice contracts).
* contacts). . - anoe - . . - . - * Participation of bneficaries ensued through ap-
= Private managementskfflsobtanedas neededfo prp-b or-iafma masanwItco tin
example through managementconlracts) - m nsnd wit contibuion
Ownership and control sbre wit inhkndprn
* User group
ash
supported by access to hahiing and
sector (for example, as minority shareholder). itenmical assistance from sectoral agency or nongovern-
OptienB: Public p and private operation . mental organizations.
* .asic legal = nock of . 3cI~ * Appropriate consieration given to tehical recre
ibe nenre -rmewhan is, in plac m quirements for interonnection with primary or sec-
- - diMKhblenfolrementmechanis,m inlace--.-
: - . , - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~ondaiy
network ice ifreslevantL
-Contact s dclary spedfyurionitorable performance - .
I .arZii~in s . ..
i
er Sevkce operators appmpnately trained, conipentkeS=b
respo nsidstf ofowner and cperatoc processes -- - ----
- . -
-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~sated,
and held accountable.-
for periodicreviw (especially to acnt forunforesee
tling of exstng organizations or the immediate scale power generation off the national gid-can
crafting of an entirely new regulatory frmmework provide effective and affordable service in many
areas, when those who contnrbute to the costs are
OniONC PIVATE OWNESHIP AND PRIVATE OPERA- the primary beneficaries. Communtity self-help
noN. Private (induding cooperive) ownership schemes must be selected, designed, and impleand
operation are most attractive to the pnvate sec- mented locally-not imposed from outside. They
tor when there is high potential for securing rev- may also offer the ondy feasible approach in inforenues
from user charges and when commecial risk mal periurban settements and rual aeas until the
and political risk are low- This option is likely to more formal supply systems expand their networks
apply most readily in acivities that lend themselves sufficently
to competition, such as telecommunications, power, . Previous chapters discussed experience with
gas, railways, and ports (with appropnate tariff each of these institutional arrangements and the facpolicies);
less readily to waste disposal; and least of tots contnbuting to success or failure. The main conall
to rual roads.
ditions for good perfonmance in each are summarized
in Box 6.L
OPIIoN D: COMMuNIry AND USER PROvISiON. For
municipal and local services, user provision or com- Country conditions
munity self-help arangements that provide smalerscale
infrastructure-such as village feeder roads, Ulmimately, what is needed and what is possible towater
supply and sanitation, and canals, or small- gether determine each country's reform options.
m

Th quantityq , coverage, and quality of existing in- demand for infstructure will be growing rapidly.
frastructre facilities and their effectiveness in The socialist economies in transition, by contrast,
meeting present and future user demands define enpoy high coverage and relatively good technical
what is needed. What. is possible is deterumned by a performance. The main challenge in these countries
country's institutional capacity for commercial and is to reorient supply to meet the changing pattern of
competitive servces in infrastructure-its manage- demand brought about by economic restructuring.
rial and tedhnical capabilifies in the puolic and the Middle-income reforming economies have relaprivate
sectors, the ability of government to ceate tively high infrastructure coverage but weaker peran
enabliHng environment for private activity, and formance, especially in maintenance Improving efthe
private sector's interest and reponsa The im- ficiency is their highest priority, in order to provide
plications for reform are illustrated here for four the service- necessary to restart. growthl Highcountry
types low-income countries, countries m growth economies have comparatively good covertransiLion
from central planning, middle-income age and performance. For them the challenge is to
countries undergoing economic reform (many meet rapidly expanding needs for infrastrucure of
emerging from periods of low growth), and highgrowth
countries.
all types to sustain their 7 percent average annual
gowth in output and to service the needs of urban
populations growing by 4 percent a year-
WnPx is NEEDED? The current suipply of services
and the projecd growth, as well as changes, in de- WHAT FossiBLE? s The bounds of the possible are
mand deterine pnorities in ifrastructure. Indica- drawn by eaich country's capaaty to implement retors
of supply (ifrastructure coverage and per- forms, as defined by three characteristics. Frst is the
formance) and demand (economic growth and country's managerial and technical capacity. Prodemographic
shifts) vary considerably across the viding infrastructure is a techny complex activfour
country types (Table 613-and so do their in- ity requiring engineers and other professionals, as
frastructure needs Low-income economies tend to well as managers who understand the need to meet
have both low coverage and poor performance; consumer demands- Second is the enabling ennearly
every indicator of performance is on average vironment for beneficial private sector involvethree
times worse than in OECD countries. And ment-both attracting investment and channeling
with an urban population growth rate of 6 percent, it productively. The commitment and integrity of
Table 62 Country infrastructure coverage and perfomance
Law- ~~~~~Middk-inrom High-
-ras Tr-nimcion rffwing gm- OECD
Indicator econornis earnonsls erornmies auonasfie rrnasies
Camgeof s-nuruw fh
Main lines per thousand persons 3 95 73 122 475
Households with access to
safe water (percent) 47 95 76 86 99
Households with electricty (Cperc 21 85 62 61 98
Pafomtncrof infistnitunr
Diesel locomotives unavailable (percent 55 27 36 26. 16
Unacmunted-for water (percnt) 35 28 37 39 13
vPaed roadsnotin good condition
(percent) 59 50 63 46 15
Power system losses (percent) 22 14 17 13 7
- Basic indictms
GNP per capita, 1991 (US. dollars) 293 2,042 1,941 3,145 20,535
GNP per capita average annual growth
rate, 1980-91 (percent) -0.2 1 -0.6 5 2
Population rage annual gro7wth tL,
.1980-91 (paent)
: Urban - 6 1 3 4 1
Total 3 0.3 2 2 0.5
:SoAppendix tableA.1;WDItables,25,31.32-
-..

government and e strength of the country's un- lation is required. Where free ertry can be allowed
derlying institutions determine the enabting envi- witbin a competitive enviromment, private sector inronment.
Stability of the macroeconomic and sec- volvement would only require regulation to ensure
toral policy limate is critical for attracting long-term. fair business practices and to protect health, &aft
investments, as are supporting institutions and and the environment, which are common to all
structures such as well-functioning judicial and fi- sectors.
nancial systems. The capacity of regulation and The choices are not simple. Poor service proviinstitutions
to promote the public interest (as dis- sion by the public sector often suggests a need for
cussed in Chapters 3 and 4) is an integral compo- more private involvement To the extent that poor
nent of a climate for private involvement Third is public sector performance occurs in natuxal monopthe
private sector's capacty and will to assemble oly activities, private involvement may not be desirthe
resources needed to supply services in the con- able in the absence of adequate reglatory construction,
financng, and operation of infrastructure. trols-but if the public sector agencies lack the
In low-hicome countries, all three dimensions of capacty to administer regulation or, more fondacapacity-technical
capability, the enabling envi- mentally, if credible govemance is lading, a wellronment,
and private sector interest-are typically regulated private sector altemative will not be poslow.
But large countries in this group, such as India, sible If the choice must be between highly
have a greater depth of technical capacity and pri- imperfect options, cotutries must weigh the altervate
sector interest because of their size, a fact that native of a minimally regulated private monopolist
in some ways makes them distinct In formerly so- that can expand service and achieve reasonable op.
cialist economies in transition, technical capability is erational efficienqc against the alternative of a pubhigh,
but an enabling environument for market activ- lic monopolist that delivers inadequate service at
ity is just emerging (and private sector capacity is bhigh cost to the public teasury To minmize risks to
newly developing). In middle-income reforming public welfare in the case of concessions and privacountries,
technical and managerial capabilities are tizations, public sautiny and tran cy are imgenerally
high, and the enabling environment is rea- portant to avoid the granting of "sweetheart" deals
sonably well established. However, in many such that can quicldy sour the taste for private involvecounties,
low growth restricts private sector capac- ment The introduction of competition is in many
ity. High-growth countries-with generally strong ases the mostimportant step in creating conditions
technical capacity, a favorable business climate, and for greater efficiency by both private and public oPkeen
interest from the private sector-are poised to erators, and the performance of the public sector entake
advantage of all institutional options. terpnises that remai an be furither improved
Differences in country capacity affect the choice through such means as contracting out specific serof
reform. Instituttional arrangements differ in the vices. In high-growth countries, public agences
demands they make on government administrative often perform quite well-and, while the capacity
and regulatory resources, as well as in their degree for private involvement in these countries is greater,
of dependence on private sector participation. As the urgency for reform may be less.
discussed in Chapter 3, the choice between conces- The choice of institutional option can affect the
sions and prnvatization depends largely on whether development of domestic capacity. Concessions or
it is more desirable to regulate private sector in- management contracts can be used to obtain specific
volvement through contractual arrangements or expertise not available domesticaly. Thailand has
through a regulatory agency. Where the economic used foreign exetse in developing its irrigation,
environment is uncertain or evolving (as in low- railway, and airline capabilities; C6te d'Ivoire has
income or tmnsitional economies), it may be easier managed a transfer of skills from expatriate to local
to induce private sector entry through contracts- staff in its water supply concession. Contracts and
both because agreements can be detailed in advance contracting out can also contribute to the developand
because ownership does not change. That ment of a healthy domestic construction and con-
* arrangement puts less private capital at risk At- sulting industry and draw on the talents of former
tracting private investment for system expansion is public employees. With appropriate attention to
another matter. As discussed in Chapter 5, private contract design and supevision, competence and
ownership or Iong-lived concessions are usually expence may often be achieved in the domestic
needed to induce private investmernt The adminis- private sector even in the poorest countries. For extrative
capacity necessary for contracts or for pri- ample, road maintenance is now done privately in a
vate sector ownership depends on how much regu- large number of African countries.
-- ' - .-
., . - '-' .' ~~~~~~~~~~~~

Sectoral agendas for reform
tion. Most elements of these services are highly marketable
and can be provided through approaches in-
. Although cmuntry characteristics are important, sec- volving competition within a market or competition
* to.i characteristics cast the deciding vote among for. the right to serve that market (Table 6.4). The
institutional options. The "marketability" of ira- major exceptions have strong scale economies
structure activities is detemined by the following (power transmission) or require specfic sites and
characteristics: production technology that leads to have significant environmental effects (large-scale
natural monopolr the public nature of consump- hydroelectric generation).
' tion constraints on cost recovery, distributional
concerns; and the importance of spillover effects. TELECwMMUNIcAoNs The marketability of tele-
Table 63rillustrates the diffrences, both within and communication services is high, especially for long
between sectors, in the marketability of infrastruc- distance and value-added services such as data
rhre activities. Each activity is scored from 1 (least tansmission. Falling transmission and switching
marketable) to 3 (most marketable) according to the costs, technological innovations (such as wireless
five chrac cs just specified (the darker the services), and changing patterns of demand have
shadin& the more marketable the activity). For in- strongly boosted the competitive potential of the'.
stance, large networked facilties, such as tasmis- telecommunications industry for most services, Insion
.grids,. primary irrigation channels, and duding in many cases local telephony. Private pro-
;: rilbeds,allow very little competition, while activi- vision is appropriate in countries that have the
ties such as urban waste collection and urban bus capacity to provide the necessary regulatory frameservice
are potentially quite compettive Some m- work Concessions with regulatory constraints emfrastructure
goods, such as phone service or tertary bodied in contracts are attractive alternatives in
irrigation, are entirely private in consumption while countries where independent regulatory capacity is
others, including many woads, are public goods. The unlikely to be effective
last column of Table 63 gives an index of mar- Today, the challengeof meetingthe large andrisketability
potential (the simple average of the five ing demand can be met by moving toward a sector
columns).
structure that is plurl and competitive, with a m
This exercise suggests that the potential for com- of service providers-prrvate and public-using
merialization and competition in infastructure is various technologies and offenng services tailored
more widespread than is commonly supposed. to different user needs. New entry is the single most
Some activities, such as long distance telecomnunui- powerful tool for encouraging telecommunications
cations, urban bus services, or solid waste col[ec- development because monopolies rarely meet all
.ton are adaptable to market provision once they demands. Licensing multiple providers is the best
are unbundled from related activities Other activi- way to accelerate the inveshtent needed to create a
ties, such as urban piped water and power tans- broadly based national network. Additional service
mission, are intinsically monopolistic but provide providers also increase user choice, lower costs, and
private goods amenable to commerial provision bring capital and management skills into the sector.
and cost recovery. Rual roads are intinsically pub- Market liberalization, like privatization, puts preslic
infrasucture, being both monopolistic and a sure on existing service providers to be more effipublc
good with low potential for cost recovery. cient and more responsive to consumers.
The following sections relate the main options to The transition from state-owned monopoly to
finrastructure sectois within three major groups- multiple operators requires new attention to regulatelecommunications
and energy, water and waste, tion. Preventing the dominant operator from abusand
transporL The options suggested are indicative ing its market power (by restricting output and unof
what is most relevant not narrowly presciptive derpicing competitive services) requires proper
of the only, or single best, approach in each country accounting and disclosure requirements, perfor-
0 ;~.i.n-
type.
mance targets, and incentive-based pnce controls.
Tdelecomunicatims and energy
This infrastructure group covers utilities that produce
services for which user fees are charged, typically
based on direct measures of consumption, and
that generalIy use large-scale networks for distribu-
n4
Experience shows that new service suppliers wil
not be able to interconnect with the incumbent operator
on reasonable terms without regulatory aid.
Service providers, both public and private, should
operate at am's length from the government and be
subject to commercial discipline and to oversight by
an independent regulator.

= -ableb 6.Te tspbrhivaof jrnte'
sctortde iveryvanes:by in astruure components
0 ; 6,>;l;, Att /.' ! r - ;~=
0- ---L
molw
f- '.
._ ________ ;vd~ rk
g Long diAe and value-added : :
e airor .a
.rt .
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._
PrinaTdy and s'om2k _ ' .
C. h -ryandsddalrywads=i_ 2il
-. . ~ em ' 'pipednet 2. .
bJtaR cei tabltyid p.vass gweoflipemdi
.| Nunpiped s ystelus - _ E '2BA= -
Pi_ ped seeg and tlstllelt + .+;
Condominalsewng '__ 1 3 zo
?K = = e!! \ p 4 iS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
V e Z
-' ' : ' ' - | ' ' -Caikdtn, ' __ '2ei ' ' .:~~~
.- N (ortnayanxqnc __:4
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=~~~~~~~~~~pin Z . 'kjt a:
- -.
-
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f'.c
. ;X-
''.''~i~--~
D -".'
-. CoUin0 .
-*- - _ .
- '
'*~~,. ~~ - Middle-income countre
-C l------
4r..kg)j2~~3~~
inco me..
2 '
.~ v2 ~ 4oa &neP04~p. 5 .2 ' S _.
''e'c'-timnctios
C 1 , *BSC SC *C 2 ? i..
* .wj~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
- - it"'.'wj'B kAfl
i C .:-
*1 ' SZC
'
The policy options hi telecommurucations are size may be necessary before unbundling becomes
simiar for all country types (Table 6.4). In Iow- worthwhile, hDwever, and in the very smallmarkets
income coDuntries, exteely liwidted- access to of many low-income countries, vertical separation
tetecommunications calls for a h-beral policy on the of generation from trasmisson and distkbution
: : ~entry of private suppL;rs These pioviders can re-. may not produce suffident efficiency gains to offset
: spond tD users who are willing to- pay fDr regular the additional coordination co.sts involved. hIn virtuservice
and can offer alternative communications ally all countries, larg-

elements of natural monopoly and must be -regu- accountable to users and having clear incentives for
latedwhen privatized.
providing high-qualitr reliable services and effi-
Reform of the dominant entities that will remain cient asset management is also desirable. The rein
many countries-especially in power ansus- sponsibilityof government in such situations is, at
sion-should focus on creating financial and man- minimum, to ensure commercial operation, which
agerial autonomy and on promoting commercial can be achieved through delegation to a private
behavion Doing so will often quire private partid- company via a rmanagemnent, lease, or concession
pation in ownership-through joint ventures or di- contracL Public oversight is necessary to ensure acvestiture-and
private management or concession cess for low-income users and to protect public
contracts, although private companies involved in health and environmental quality In countries with
power transmission are best kept separate fom pni- modest technical capacity, concessions can successvate
Companies involved in power generatioiL Insti- fully draw on international experise. Pricng water
tutional change is needed to provide incentives for to reflect the full financial, envirornmental, and ecosuppliers
to seek economic tariffs, which are neces- nomic costs of supply is essential for generating
sary to promote the self-financing of investment, funds to expand service and for promoting efficient
conservation of energy, and more efficient use of ex- use.
isting capacity. Tariffs must also incorporate any environmental
charges paid by power comparies, in SANITAnON. Low-income countries should conline
with the principle that the polluter pays for any sider a two-pronged approach to developing sanitaenvironmental
costs it imposes on others-
tion. Fist contracting schemes, such as concessions,
can apply commercial management to sanitation fa-
GAs5 Natural gas could potentially be competi- cities in urban areas, Second, m poorer urban and
tively supplied in many countries. Often, natural rural communities which are unlikely to be congas
production is vertically integrated with petro- nected to the fornMal supply systems in the foreseelean
production* that is under public ownership. able fitureintermediate technology can be adapted
Ubundlng is required to permit competitive pro- to match users' service requiremns and their willduction
under CDncessions, contracts, or private ingness to pay. These lower-cost tertiary systems
ownership. The main regulatory issue is to ensure (facilities directly serving end-users, described in
competitive access of producers to the transmission Chapter 4) can be chosen, financed, and operated by
pipeline.That assurance canbe handled by a regula- the community with technical assistance The trunk
tory body or through contract terms in leases or ifrastructure to which the terbary systems connect
concessions. Competition from substitute .fuels and the associated treatment facilities remain the di-
(when realistically priced) can provide sufficient red responsibflity-in planning, financing, and opmarket
discipline to obviate the need to regulate gas eration-of the sector utilities concerneL
prices. Private (foreign) investment has oonsiderable
potential to meet investment needs for gas pro- RuIcxnoN AND DRANAGE The policy agenda for
duction and distbution, provided that noncom- irrigation works also varies accrding to the dharacmercial
risks related to the heavy foreign exchange teristics and scale of the systems involved, but it is
requirement of projects can be reduced.
much the same across country groups. The operation
of trunk and feeder facilities can increaswngly be
Water and waske
handled by financially autonomous entities, while
the ownership and operation of tertiar systems
Actvities involving water and waste all have strong may be best devolved to user associations or coopenvironmental
links that make them less marketable eratives. This solution improves both mnaintenance
than telecommunications or energy, and their local and the collection of water charges-two perennial
nature makes some activities natural candidates for problems in mnany irrigation systems
communitY provision (Table 65). User tees are com- User assocations for operation and maintenance
mon in these sectors, although thfey rarely cover the of small-scale irrigation schemes and tertiary canal
full costs of service.
networks have proved successful in countries as diverse
as Argtina, NepaL the Philippines, and Sri
WAIER suw ANrD- SWERAw;G Urban piped Lanka. Colombia, indonesia, and Mexico have sucwater
and sewerage at the municipal or metropoli- cessfully transferred responsibility for operations
tan level should be provided by enterprises run on and maintenance to farmers, even for larger-scale
commercial principles. Professional management state-owned schemes. Careful prparation has been
117

-'== ' R. i :'~ .~~ : T ' ' "' Mideicm c'mtne
'

solid waste disposal through metropolitan or re- RAILwAYS. The essential. elemnent of reform for a
gional entities operated under contracts with the railway is to give it autonomy to operate as a cornpnvate
sector, as int Caracas, Sio Paulo,. and other mercial activity-a commditment that can be
cities in Latin America. Concessions are a useful strengthened through an infusion of private equity
means of obtainiing technical expertise in waste dis- capital and4 private management Railways in devel-
*posal technology-
oping countries. have typicaily been heavily regu-
-lated, structured as monolithic organizationis, and
Transport
saddled with uneconomic lines and overemploymenL
The resulting fiscal subsidies and unreliable.
The transport s'ector allows for a rich midx of options service make the railways less able to modernize
for service provision. Roads offer the least scope for and to compete with other modes of transport. The
private sector involvement (because of pricing prob- presence of interrnodal competition for freight and
lenms), and sectors such as railways need some regu- passenger services calls for a n!form strategy that
lafion because of large sunk costs or to ensure net- wouldt largely remove price regulation from rail serwork
access (Table 6.6).
vices and grant the railways structural flexibility to
El 44 -~ t ~Midleicome % coIMesM --.-
P~ ~ ~~ o--A$ l.
~~~ 2W
-St~~~~~~~~~ @ -c @% V -*74
-U-b$n tZ- -k "
-e ~ ~ -
3UAral - 4&zArt.iC
AA0 ~ :-t.h9kF4.' ~---r.t.,--
*.--i''' .-
N~ ~ ~~.?.sf
4
4
rA4 tP **.Z~
1
"A§tyrr4if$i~24tY~r -- r---C --- ~---.-~~ -
-- -~ A~-'A,~~R t611.A,*toL;
g t~$4~E%~t&. Ut' f~$4~L~ 2?7*fl-"sK; CD t~.WB,
V.~1
PPtioits~~~~~~~~~.Wtft -_ A
Q4,.r ~4 ~ & ~Z
,
au~~~$28 ~4..
'kA
1E V 2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
'4- - 4-~~~ ~ -k ~~" ~ ~ 4~5-fl4Z~~5tZiT A1

permit them to drop uneconomic lines. An exception and- maitain them adequately and that have suffito
rail service deregulation should be made for cap- cient funding to do so. This is of particular importive
shippers without access to altemative modes. tance for network components for which it is diffi-
Vertical separation of track and facilities from iail cult to charge users-that is, the vast majority of the
services-with the latter operated under contract by national, rural, and urban networks that do not lend
entities other than the owners of the rail infrastruc-. themselves to provision through toll roads. ReZformture-is
a strategy being considered or adopted in ing the management of these roads involves assignsome
countries, including Argentina, Chile, Cote ing clear responsibility for operation and mainted'lvoire,
and Mexico. Such separation requires well-: nance to appropriate authorities. It also means
defined access rules and agreements for investment designing a system of economic road-user charges
and maintenance and may not be workable in coun- (ideally, including the axle-load-based costs intries
with modest institutional capacity.
Qicted by different users), instituting a financing
The countries in transition are already beginning scheme that links users' payments to maintenance
to tailor their stocks of railway assets to serve the fu- expenditure (in order to create accountability of
ture needs of a restructured (and geographically road agencies to users), and introducing a mecharedirected)
industrial sector. These countries also nism for users to influence expenditures on road
need to increase freight taiffs to cover costs and to maintenance. The recently restructured road authorimprove
the energy efficiency of their'locomotive ities of. Sierra Leone and Tanzania provide good
fleet. L
models. Botlh include representatives of users (such
as chambers of commerce, automobile associations,
URBAN TRANSPORT. Urban transport services can haulers, and other citizens' groups) as well as engibe
supplied by private operators or under conces- neers and government officials.
sions. Provision of bus and taxi transport in urban As discussed in Chapter 2, periodic road mainteareas
is an activity in which entry and exit are rela- nance (for which performance standards can be
tively simple, and competition can fiourish across more easily defined and monitored than for routine
all country groups. In addition to regulation to ad- maintenance) is increasingly executed more effidress
safety and environmental concens, some con- ciently by the private sector under contract than by
trol over route structure and the allocation of bus public employees. Rural agricultural feeder roads
services to specific routes may be appropriate. Gen- can be maintained in part by local organizations and
eral restrictions on entry or fares are usually unnec- communities. The most successful experiences comessary.
Urbanrail services lend themselves to leases, bine local control of maintenance with some 'govconcessions,
and contracts for service provision. emrnent funding or provision of materials. In low-
A comprehensive urban transport strategy re- income countries, attention should be directed to
quires that all available modes be examined, includ- promoting cost-effective labor-based approaches for
ing subways or other rapid transit, private cars, and road maintenance, and to construction. Privately finonmotorized
transport (which may call for pedes- nanced toil roads can be developed for certain road
a tian sidewalks and bicycle lanes). Strategic choices inks, particularly *najor intercity links where traffic
alout the relative roles of personal vehicle transport flows are high.
and public transport require a hll assessment of
costs and benefits, induding economic, financial, POTS AND AIm'oz. Ports and air transport raise
and environmental impacts and effects on land use. many of the same policy issues-and opportuni-
Traffic management policies have high priority be- ties-as railways. Although competitive provision
cause better-moving traffic provides major benefits of facilities (port infrastructure and airport runways
in terms of efficiency, safety, and the reduction of en- and gates) is not ,onomically efficient (because it
vironental pollution. These policies require en- involves large fixed costs that are sunk), equipping
forcemnent capacity in order to be effective. Eco- and operating such facilities is a contestable activity
nomic pricing of fuels and urban land (especially Leases and concessions are appropriate options for
parking space) and management of demand operating ports and airports. The competitive provithrough
the prcing of road access to urban areas are sion of berths within ports is also feasible.
policies with increasing relevance to countries with When ports and airports are subject to competigrowing
urban congestion.
tion from other traffic modes or from neighbonrng
facilities, prices for port and airport services can be
RoADs. The key issue for policy concerning dervgulated. To ensure the high-quality, reliable serroads
is to develop institutions that will manage vice required for international trade, it is equally im-
120~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

portant that uinstituitional activities suixh as customs to manage hinfrastructure services. Third, external
dlearnce! and initernational communications at the assistan'ce programs can provide financial resources
ports should facilitate, not obstruct, the movement to support countries' sectoral reform-s and to proof
goods. mote sustainable development-for example, by
giving greater priority to maintenance and rehabili-
Payoffs from reform
tation, and by ensuring that the effective demnand of
beneficiaries and concerns of other stakeholders are
Imnplementing reform will not be easy. As discuissed assessed early in project identification. Such actions
in Chapter 2, limproving productivity will often reI- of institution building will take longer to design and
quire firms to shrink workforces. Creating commer- imnplement, and will be less predictable in outcome,
cia enterprises will also mean that prices will rise than traditional development assistance, but they
in many sectors, especially in power and water sup- are essential to foster needed improvements.mn mnplyintcreasest
often reslisted by the powerful frastructure sectors.
m-iddle-class coinstituencies that benefit most from Although countries can acquire the necessary
subsidies. But in many countries, dissatisfaction knowledge, skils, and financal resources for reform
with existing services is so- strong that initiall'- un- from outside, the commritmnento reform must be
popular meas d -es. may become palatable if they are homegrown. But the payoffs are potentialy large,
accompanied by effective efforts to isprove ser- miakng the commitnent well worthwhile.
vices. This provides astute leaders witi an opportu- Reform. wil lead to gains from three sources: renity
to bring about reform. Experience shows that duction in subsidies, technical gains to suppliers,
success requires both a strong commitment from and gains to users. Although the gains wir obvigoverment
and carefurlly designed implementation ously differ from country to country, it is possibe tD
strategies to reduce the costs of refornr-
develop rough estimates of 'the payoffs from re-
Donors can play a role beyond fieancing invest- forms under the first two headings Table 6.7 gives
ments i infrastructe by assisting countries to estimates of the fiscal burden of service provisionstrengthen
their institutional capacity for undertak- costs not recovered fxom users. Even. though (coning
susetain able reform and sectoral development servative) estimates can be made for only iree sec-
Buldingsinstitutional capacity involves formulating torn (power, waterand railways), the total is $123
appmpriate polciest and putting in place mecha- bion annually-representing nearly 10 ptecent of
nisms for their imnplementation, creating etforce- total govenment revenues in develophig countries.*
-able legal and regulatory frameworks, and strength- For some countries, the losses reach remarkable proening
human resources-indluding mianagemnent portions. Before reformi, the subsidy to the Argenexpertise
in the prvate sector and admnistrative tine railway alone reached 9 percent of the total
sla in the public sector. Enhancing histitutional public sector budget, or 1 percent of GDP. Although
capacty in ar of these dimensions implies creaa t eliination of underpricdng would not produce a
a positive ernabling envinronent for the efficient, re- direct resource saving to the econony (as the costs
sponsive delivery of infrastructure services,
would be covered by users), the fiscal relief would
Externmal assistance programs can enhance coun- be eniormous.
tries institutional able Teulatoy egal capacity ftaework, nd by making andstreSect relevant or The somecounrieshelsssrec second source of gains is the remaralepo annual savings
knowledge available; by supplementing poicy ad- to se-vce providers from ihmproving techn.ical effivice
with well-designed programs of technical cooperation
and taining; and by providing financial assistance
for investment and reforl. On the first Table 6.7 Fiscal burden of underpriced
point, donors can help to identify the needs and pri-trs pwre
orities for reform through sectorl analysis and re-
obillion U donr aS. a)
search and by disseminating knowledge of best
Savings fre m
practice across countries. They can also sponsor sys- Befor r m e s tot
tematic data collection and analysis of hiforiation Power 90 Underpricing
about sector performance, both to improve policy- Water 13 UnderprAcong
making wvithiin countries and to proDMOte learing r Illegal connectios
from the successes and failures of others. Second, Railways 5s Underpficed passenger
external assistance can provide training andedun- tecnnni
cal cooperation in support of the efforts of develop- Total 12n
ing countries to design and implement reforms and &rmm Ingam and Fay 199.
121

Table 6.8 Savings from increased efficiency
*bflf-onsar US. doRms) -the
- income, and therefore virtually all countries have
potential to make significant gains.
Sedor SWings Souwreof inefficiency Passing up such gains translates directly into
Roads 15 Annual inveshnentrqyirements - human costs because it means limiting progress in
created by improper maintenance readcing the 1 billion people who stiIl lack safe
Powser 30 Transmission, distnbution, and
generation losses
drinkdng water and the nearly 2 billion who lack ac-
cess to electricity and adequate sanitation facilities.
Water 4 Leakage At current costs of roughly $150 per person for
Railurays 6 Excess fuel use, ovestaffing, and water systems, the redirection over three years of
locomotive unavailability just the annual quantifiable technical losses of $55
Tobl 55 - - billion would mean that the 1 billion people without
Soon= Ingum and Fav 199.
safe drinking water could be served.
Thus, although impossible to quantify globally,
the most important potential payoffs almost certainly
go beyond limiting financial losses and imciency
The savings that could be achieved by rais- proving technical efficiency and would result in
ing the efficiency of operation from current levels to gains both in economic progress and for the poorattainable
best-practice levels are estimated at Better services improve productivity and well-being
roughly $55 billion (Table 6.8). These represent pure throughout an economy. Increasing the reliability of
resource savings to the economy. Although the esti- power and telecommunications will save businesses
mates cover only certain sectors and only some of lost output and redundant investnents. Betterthe
technical losses in those sectors, the effiacency maintained roads will lower the costs of vehide opcosts
are equivalent to 1 percent of developing eration. Improved rural infrastructure can raise the
countries' GDP and are more than twice the annual incomes of the rural poor from farm and nonfarm
development assistance flows for astrc activities. Better water and sanitation are critical to
One-quarter of the $200 billion annual investment in the poor, who spend time and money cmpesatig
infrastructure by developing- countries could be for inadequate infrastructure. All of these improvegenerated
just from feasible tedhnical savings. Not ments will contribute to raising living standardsonly
low-income countries stand to benefiL Al- by increasngwages m more productive businesses,
though access to ifrastructure increases as incomes lowering prices through more efficient transport,
rise, infrastructure efficency is not dosely related to and elhancing the quality of life for individuals.
12Z2

V-~~~~~~ : ~~~~ :: . =
.-s
Bibliographical note
This Report has drawn on a wide range of World Mils, Kyu S51k Lee, Andres Liebenthal, Akin Locus-
Bank sources-induding country economiic, sector, sol, David Lonmax, Milard Long. Sergio Margulis,
and project work and research papers-and. on nux- Costas Mihadopoulos, Pradeep Mfitra, Mohan Mumerous
outside sources. TIhe principal sources are nasinghe, Sheoli Pargall, Anthony Pellegrii Sanjay
noted below and are also listed by.author or organi- Pradhan, D. C. Rao, Jolhn Redwood Ill Alh Sabeti,
zation in two groups: badcground papers commins-, Mary Shirley, Jerry Silverman, Martint Staab, Pedro
sioned for this Report and a selected bibliography- Taborga, Mateeni Thobani, Thomas Walton, Peter
The background papers are available on -request Watson, Steven Webb, Jmim Wright, and Guilernmo
throtugh the World Development Report office. Thie Yepes.
views they express |: are not : necessarily | :: z ::~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2
those of the Many people outside the World Bank contributed
World Bank or of this Report
advice, comments, and m-ateriaL Contributors and
In addition to the sources listed below, many consultation meeting attendees from govemnments
people, both inside and outside the World Bank, and biltendl aid agencies indlude Mueern Aza, Pakhelpedl
with the Report Int particular, the core team istan Ministry of Fimance; Joy Barrett, U.S. Pe-ace
wishes to thanik Sri-Ram Aiyer, Gary Bond, John Corps; Henk Bosch, Netherlands Direcorate Gen-
Briscoe, Robert Burns, Laurenc Carter, Michael eral foDr International Cooperation; Emmnanuel de
Cohen Jean Dayen, Nissim Ezelael, Ian Heggie, Ar- Calan, Mmne. ChedevifIe-Murray, NI. Gardin, and ML
turo Israel, Emmanuel Jinmenz, Shinichiro Kawa- Perelman, Ministry of foreign Affauirs, France; Anne
miata., Johannes Linn, Gobind Nankanti, Guy Pfeffer-. Charreyron-Perchet and Claude Mlartinand, Mnmann,
Louis Pouliquen, Andres Rigo, Everett istry~ of Public Works, Transport, and Toursm
Santos, Zmarak Shalizi, John ShRIling. Warrick France; John Crook, New Zealand Telecom House;
Smith, Anidrew Steer, Richard Stern, Inder Sud, Zou Deci, Chinese Academy of UrbanL Planning and
Vinod TIhomas, Louis Thompson Michael Walton, Design; Gabor Demszky, Mtayor of Budapest; Miand
Hans Wyss.
clio Fukal and KCoichiro Fukui, Japan Development
Others wlho provided notes or detailed corn- Banlc Yoshitaro Fuwa, Japan Overseas Economic
ments mndude Dennis Anderson, Robert Anderson, Cooperation Fund; Tore Gjos, Norwegian Agency
Hans Apitz, Ephrem Asebe, Mark Baird, Zelj-ko Ba- foDr Development Cooperation; Eilif Gundersen,
getic, Richard Brun, Jos& Carbajo, Krishna Challa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, Bnino Gurtner.
Anrmeane Chok-si Anthony Churchill, Sergio Con- Swiss Coalition of Development Organizations;
treras, Dennis de Tray, Shantayanan Devarajan, Ist- Cielito Habibo, Philippines National Economic and
van DoboZI, Gunnar Eskeland, Asif Faiz, John Flora, Development Authority; Ameur Horchani, Mfinistry
Louise Fox, Hernan Garca, Armnon Golan, Orville of Agriculture, Tunisia; C K. Hyvder, Metropolitan
Gnrimes Luis Guasch, Jeff rey Guitman, Kenneth Chamber of Commerce and lndustry, Bangladesh;
Gwilliam, Ricardo Halperin, Roger Heath, Normian Yves Jorlin, Caisse Franqdise Deiveloppemnent; Peter
Hicks, Vijay Jagarnathan, F-rida Johan--en, AJl J.K-alas, Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic
Khadr, Han-d Kharas, Michael Klein, Pierre Landell- Affairs; Patrick Lansmnan and Jean-Michele Sev-

erino, Ministry of Cooperation, France; Boguslaw tdtedeFrance;BardJackson,NationalRualElec-
Leadzki Minister of Thasport and Maritime tric Cooperative Association, USA-.; Tim Kelly,
Economy, Poland; Aladar Madrarasz, Counseor, Intenational Telecommunication Union; Kiwhan
Budapest; Pekka Metso, Ministry for Foreign Af- KFm, Km & Chang, Republic of Kora; David Kinfirs,
Finland; Michael Morfit, US. Agecy for Inter- nersley, Water Aid (U.K); Pierre Laconte, Internanational
Development; YuIcio Nishida, Japan Over- tional Union of Public Transport; D. Lorrain, Centre
seas Coastal Area Developmenthistitute; Paul Peter, National de Recherches Scientifiques, France; Rolf
Swis Development Corporation;- Anna Maria Luders, Universidad Cat6lica de Chile; John R
Pinchera, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ialy; Masihur Meyer, Havard University; Bnidger Mitchell,
RahMnian, Mioistry of Communications, Bangladesh;. RAND Corporation; Rakesh Mohan, United Na-
Gedeon Rajaonson, nistry of Public Works, Mada- tions Uniersity, the Netherlands; Nobuichi Nogascar
Prathap Ramanuam, Minishy of Policy moto, International Engineering Consultants Asso-
Planning and Implementation, Sn Lanka; Jens Erik ciation;,Iqbal NoorAli and Patria Schied, Ali Khan
Bendix Rasmussen, Dansh International Develop- Foundation, USAS; Remy Prud'homme, UniverbE
ment Association (DANIDA); Jacques Rogozinski, de Paris; Colin Relf, Intemediate Tedhnology De-
National Bank of Public Works and Services, Mex- velopment Group and Lnterational Forum for
ico;. Joao Salomao, Minister of Corntruction and Rumal Tfrasport and Development, UK,- Annick Sa-
Vater, Mozanr&ique; Wongcha-um Sansern, Na- lomon, National Wildlife Federation; Anuinar Siamtional
Economiic and Social Development -Board, walk, Thai DevelopmentesRearch Institte;, Byung-
Thailand; Eduard V. Sep, Cousor for Trars- Nak Song,Soul National University Tatsu Sunani,
portation, Royal Netheands- Ernbassy; Mlkael Electric Power Development Company, Japan;
S6derb5ck, Swedish Interntional Development Au- Hideyuki Suzukd, All Japan Prefect and Municithonty
(SIDA); Sugijanto Soegijoko, National Devel- pal Workers Union; Hlisao Takahaslu, Japan Airport
opment Panning Agency, Indonesia; Juia Suonen- Terminal Company; Kunio Takase, International
lahti, Finnish Iternational Development Agency; Development Center of Japaz;, Yasush Tanahaswi,
Jon Wlimshurst, UK Ovre Development Ad- Japan Freight Railways Company; Kunimasa Taruministration
(ODA); and Tony Zeitun, Canadian muzu, Tolao Maine and Fure Insurance Company;
International Development Agency (CIDA). Marie-Aim6e Tourres, SOFRER ; AIe, Wood,
Contributors and consultation meetig attendees World Wildlife Association; Gordon Wu, Hopeweil
from multilateml agencies indude Fabio Ballerin, Holdings LkL; Shuichiro Yamanouchi, East Japan
OECDC; Ananda Covindassamy and Cell Harral, Railway Company and Susumu Yoda, Central Re-
European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- search Institute of Electric Power Industry, Japan.
menrt CBRD); Shashi Desai and L Oketokoun,
African Development Barik (AfDB); Jules A Frip- Chapter 1
piat, UNDP; Luao Gueratto, European Commis
sion; Frederick Jaspersen, Inter-American Develop- This chapter draws on a wide range of both pubment
Bank; Ridcard Jolly, Santosh K Mehrotra, and fished and unpublished sources, including World
Ashok KI Nigam, UNICEF, Jens Lorentzen, UN Bank project and sector documents, as well as aca-
Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS); StephenJ. demic literatame The value-added data in Table 1-1
McCarthy, European Investment Bank, Steven K were derived from official national accounts as
Miller and Tom Strandberg, International Labour maintained by tie World Bank. The discussion of
Organition (ILO); Eustace Nonis and Nigel the importance of infrastructure in an economy
Rayner, Asian Development Bank (ADB); and J. draws from Bennathan and Johnson 1987, Galenson
Bruce Thompson, European Commission.
1989, Japan 1984, and US. Department of Com-
Contributors and consuItation meeting attendees merce 1984.
from p*zate and public seecor enterprises, universities The section on estimating the productivity of inand
nsach insttutes, and nongovemnmttl organiza- fiastructure investnents makes reference to crosstions
include Yuzo Akatsuka, Saitama University; national studies, induding Canning and Fay 1993
Kazumi Asako, Yokohama National University; and Easterlv and Rebelo 1993 Box 11 was drafted
Iwan Jaya Azis, University of Indonesia; Michael by Marianne Fay. For Box 1.1, the studies showing
Beesley, London Business School, William Cos- that causation betwreen infrastructure provision and
grove, Ecoconsult, Inc.; Dan Craun-Selka, National economic growth runs in both directions are Duffy-
Telephone Cooperative Association, USA.; Henry Deno and Eberts 1991 and Holtz-Eakin 1988. Stud-
Ergas, Harvard University; Franqois Georges, Elec- ies that found no noticeable impact of infrastructulre
124

on. grwh once more sophisticated econometric background papers by Eichengreenr Jacobson and
metiods were used hidude Holtz-Eakin 1992; those Tarr, and Kirwan. The concept of contestability is
that found their positive results not to be very much elaborated in Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1988, and
affect are Bregnan and Marom 1993, Duffy-Deno its relevance to infrastructure is further developed
and Eberts 1991, Mera 1973, and Uchimura and Gao in Baumol and Lee 1991.
1993. A review of the literature on infrastructure's The section on the achievements in coverage of
impact on costs of production is in Asciauer 1993. irastructure is based on the data presented in the
The trucking study is Keeler and Ying 1988 Other appendix and hi the World Banks economic and
useful studies on the econonmic impacts of infra- social database. OECD 1993 provides a review of
structure include Arim6n and others 1993; Ford infrastructure performance issues in OECD counand
Poret 1991; Hulten and Schwab 1991 and 1993; tries.
Munnell 1990; and Uribe 1993.
The section on operational inefficiency draws
The discussion of the effects of rural infrastruc- from Galenson 1989, Gyamif. Gutierrez, and Yepes
ture draws from Ahmed and Hossain 1990 and 1992, Howe and Dixon 1993, World Barn 1991'T and
Bimswanger, Khandlak, and Rosenweig 1989. The 1993h, the World Bank power sector database, and
discussion on the value and composition of infra- Yepes 1990.
structure stocks is based on World Bank data and on Guy Le Moigne provided information on irriga-
Summers and Heston 1991. The section on returns tion effiaency. John Nebiker provided data for the
to World Baik proects draws from Galenson 1993, discussion of procurement issues, and relevant in-
Galenson and Thompson forthcoming, Gamn 1987, puts were also provided by Jean-Jacques Raoul and
Kaufmnann 1991, and Sangbvi, Vemstrom, and Francesco Samo.
Besant-Jones 1989. The Brookings istitutior's re- The section on maintenance draws from Gyamfi,
search study is Yresge and Roberts 1971. Table 1.2 Gutierrez, and Yepes 1992, Heggie forthcoming,
vvas obtained from the World Banc Operations Eval- Mason and Thriscutt 1991, Postel 1993, World Bank
utation Department database.
1988, and the Basu background paper. The reference
The discussion of infrastructure's various eco- t0 Cameron was provided by John Schwartz. The
nomic impacts is based on Doyen 1993, IMF 1993b, World Bank railway database and power sector
Kessides 1993a, Mody and Wang 1994, Mody and. database vere also used.
Yilmaz 1994, Peters 1990 and 1992, Rebelo 1992, Details of financial inefficency were obtained
Wheeler and Mody 1992, and World Bank 1992a. from Besant-Jones 1990b, Galenson and Thompson
Box 12 was drafted by Thawat Watanatada. The forthcoming, Heggie and Quick 1990, World Bank
sechon on ifrastructure m Central and Eastern Eu- 1993h, and Gvamnfl, Gutierrez, and Yepes 1992.
ropean countries draws from various World Bank On the unresponsiveness to user demand,
sector studies, including Bennatian and Thompson sources include Besant-Jones 1993, Singh and others
1992 and Blackshaw and Thompson 1993. 1993, and World Bank Water Demand Researh
Box 1.3 was drafted by Marianne Fay using Team 1993. Box 1.5 is based on Bell and others forth-
Hicks 1991, Meyers 1986, IMF 1993b, World Bank comin& Humplick, Kudat, and Madanat 1993,
1993a, and data on publi sector deficits from East- Madanat and Humplick 1993, and Sethi forthcomerly,
Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel forthcoming. ing; Kavita Sethi wrote an early draft of the box. Box
The discussion of poverty in India draws upon 1.6 derives from Lee and Anas 1992 and from Lee,
Lanjouw and Stern 1993 and National Housing Anas, and Verma 1993. Data on telephone fault rates
Bank of India 1992. Box 1A is based on Epstein 1962 and waiting time for connection are from the Interand
1973 and Lanjouw and Stern 1993. The discus- national Telecommunication Union 1994.
sion of infrasuctures ects on the urban poor The section on service to the poor draws on Bhadraws
from Kranton 1991. Caroline 0O N. Moser tia 1992, Cfnara and Banister 1993, and World Bank
contributed information on Ecuador from research sector work on BraziL The example of transport dework
in progress. The civil works programs men- mand assessment in Tanzania was provided by
tioned are discussed in Dreze and Sen 1989. The sec- Steven K Miler.
tion on environmental linkages draws from the The section on environmental impacts is based
Ruitenbeek background paper, Rabinovitch and on many environmental studies and assessments
Leitmann 1993, USAID 1991, and World Bank 1992c, produced inside and outside the World Banlk Addias
well as World Bank sector work on Thailand. tional material included Bartone and Bernstein 1992
References to the historical development of infra- and Bartone and others 1994. Box 1.7 was drafted by
structure and the private sector's role draw from the Peter Whitford.
125

The section on new opportunities draws from Trivedi 1990 provided useful details on the develop
many academic studies and other sources both pub ing country experience with performance agreelished
and unpublished. References to digitalization ments, and Debande 1993 and the Debande and
in Brazil are from Hobday 1990. Albert Wright and Drumaux background paper supplied detailed in-
John Courtney provided infornation on alternative sights on the European experience with perfortechnologies
for sanitation. Riverson and Carapetis mance agreements.
1991 and Colin Relf provided examples of improve- Many of the conceptual insights in the discussion
merits in nonmotorized kmnsporL
of the roles of incentives in the organization of gov-
Valuable suggestions on the drafting of this chap- erinments were inspired by Laffont and rirole 1993
ter were provided by, among others, Jean Baneth, and Milgrom and Roberts 1992. Box 2.4 and the dis
William Easterly, Harvey A. Gam, and Gregory Sta- cussion on Korea throughout the chapter draw on
ple. Inputs to the sections on envirounental links material in Ciss6 forthconming, Shirley and Nellis
were provided by Carl Bartone and Josef Leitmann, 1991, and Trivedi 1990.
and additional comments on this subject came from The information on Brazifs highway depart-
Carter Brandon, Mauree Crpper. Alfed Duda, merits draws on intemal Bank documents and addiand
Rogier van den Brink Others who provided tional data provided by Jacques Cellier. The data on
very helpful commernts on earlier drafts indude Mexico's Federal Electricity Commission were pro-
MarcJuhel, Guy Le Moigne, Herve Plusquelec, and vided bv its staff. The discussion of management
Yan Wang.
contracts benefited from the ongoing work by Mazi
M-novi, Hafeez Shai]kh, Thelma Triche, and specific
ChJapter 2 suggestions by John Nellis and Louis Thompson.
Electricite de France, Philippe Durand, and World
The data on cross-secoral comparisons in this chap- Bank 1993h are the sources for Box 235. Box 2.6 on
ter are from the World Bank database on adjustment AGETIPs draws on PNan 1993. The examples on
lending conditionality and implementation (ALCID) subcontracting are from Galenson and Thompson
for structural and sectoral adjustment loans. Most forthcomin& Miguel and Condron 1991, and Yepes
examples and anecdotes are from appraisal reports, 199!2 The data for Figure 2.1 on Togo are from hitercompletion
reports, and other evaluations of pro nal Bank documents.
Jects managed by the Bank over approximately the The survey of cost recovery and pricing issues
last twenty years. The recent Bank study of opera- has benefited from the discussion in Bahl and Linn
tions and maintenance in Latin America by Gyamfi, 1992, Julius and Alicbusan 1989, and from ongoing
Cutierrez, and Yepes 1992 provided invaluable in- work byCarlos Veles on Brazil and by Zniarak Shalformation
on the quality quantity, and nature of izi on the road sector.
government mvolvement in infrastructure, particu- Many of the examples on the consequences of
larly for roads, power, and water.
failing to minimize costs are from Gyamfi, Gutier-
The quantification of the gains from privatization rez, and Yepes 1992; from Bhatia and Falkenmark
in Chile's power sector is discussed in Galal and 1993 for the Asian, Haitian, and Mauritanian examothers
forthcomin& Box 2.1 draws on a 1992 inter- ples; and from Yepes 1992 for the Latin American
nal evaluation of the Bank's experience over the last examples. The willingness-to-pay study for Espirito
twenty years in the water and sanitation sector. Box Santo comes from internal World Bank documents.
2.2 was drafted by Stefan Alber. Table 2.1 was com- Heggie forticoming provided data on road-user
piled from detailed data extracted from ALCID. The charges in-Tanzania. Newbery and others 1988 is the
examples on Brazil, Ghana, and Indonesia, includ- source for the data on Tunisia. Box 2.7 is based on
ing Box 2.3, are from internal World Bank docu- work by John Besant-Jones. Box 2.8 reflects extenments.
Ian Heggie suggested the discussion of New sive comments from World Bank staff in the Trans-
Zealand and the wads corporations. The data on the portation, Water, and Urban Development departlarge
water utility in East Asia are from the World ment and from infrastructure staff in the Africa
Bank's own 1992 assessment of its experience in the departienL Useful backgound information was
sector. The example on the gains from changes in found in Altaf, Jamal, and Whitffngton 1992, Hau
road construction technology in Rwanda is from 1990, Johansen 1989a and 1989b, and Whittington
Martens 1990- The overall discussion of the section and others 1990.
on corporatization and performance agreements Finally, the foilowing contain additional material
draws on Cisse forthcoming, Galal and others forth- complementary to the chapter. Bouttes and Haag
coming, Nellis 1988, and Shirley and Nellis 1991. 1992 discuss the economics of networks in infra-
126

structure and explain the importance of infrastruc- The presiption for allowing all new entry and
tuSe in the context of European integration; Leevre easing barriers to exit was stated by Baumol, Pan-
1989 provides a wider discussion applicable to . zar. and Willig 1988. The example of competition in
OECD countries, focusing on transporL CaGlEaud cellular telephone provision is from the ntenmaand
Quinet 1991 and 1992 propose a useful method- tional Fnance Corporation background paper.. Bauology
to assess the effectiveness of incentives in the mol and Lee 1991 noted the desirability of allowing
design of various types of contracts between the large manufachurers to sell their excess generating
French government and bus operators. Mougeot capadty, Triche, Meiia, and Idelovitch 1993 proand
Naegellen 1992 extend some of this discussion vided the examples of concessions in Buenos Aires
to more general public procurement policies, and Caracas
Pestieau .and TuLkens 1992 survey the determinants The case for competition for the market is articuof
public enterprise performance- Seabright 1993 lated most forcefully by Demsetz 1968. WilLiamson
provides important insights on public provision of 1976 cautioned that the franchisee (winner of the
infrastructure services in South Asia. Tirle 1992- competition) has incentives to neglect maintenance
presents a more general theory of the internal orga- of assets toward the end of the contract period.
nization of government and provides explanations Kuhn, Seabright, and Smith 1992 review research on
for some of the issues raised in this chapter. Useful competition.
matenal illustrating the benefits of appropriate tech- Gains from pnvatization are documented bv
nology choices can be found in Edmonds and de Galal and others forthcoming and Vickers and Yar-
Veen 1992, Gaude and Miller 1992, Guichaoua 1987, row 1988. Infornative case studies and reviews of
and von Braun, Teldu, and Webb 1992. Information experience with privatization and competition are
on, labor redundancy was obtained from Svenar in Alexander and Corti 1993, Baumol and Sidak
and Terrell 1991,
1994, Fukui 1992, Im, Jalali, and Saghir 1993, Rama-
Overall the chapter benefited from detailed com- murti and Vernon 1991, Roland and Verdier 1993,
ments, suggestions, and inputs from Yao Badjo, and TaIcano 1992 Links between reform, privatiza-
John Blaxall, Jos6 Carbajo, Jacques Cellier, Nichola tion, and investment are descrbed in Besant-Jones
Ciss6, Pierre Guislain, rmothy Hau, John Ndllis, 1990a, Churchill 1993, and Helm. and Thompson
Znarak Shalizi, Sudhir Shetty, Vimaya Swaroop, 1991.
Louis Thompson, Kazuko Uchimura, Joris Van Der The discussion of i derconnection financng
Ven, and Carlos Velez, within the World Bank, and draws on the background note by Mitchell, on Baufrom
Jacques Cr4mer (stitut dEconomie Indus- moIl and Sidak 1994, and on personal communicatrielle,
'oulouse), Mathias DewatLipont and Richard tion from Henry Ergas and Dan Caun-SekaL
Schlirf (Universit6 Lilbre de Bruxelles), Paul Sea- Much literature exists on the different instubright
(Cambridge University), and Barrie Stevens ments of price and profit regulation. Recent sum-
(OECO).
manes of the underlying theory and experience can
Chnpter 3
be found in Braeutigam and Panzar 1993, Liston
1993, and the backgound paper by Sappington.
This chapter draws on academiic sources, back- Willig and Baumol 1987 discuss how competition
ground papers, journal publications, World Bank can be used as a guide for regulation. The theory of
and International Finance Corporation documents, yardstick competition is discussed by Shleifer 1985,
personal communications and comments, and ex- the Chilean power example is from Covarrubias
pert consultations both witiin and outside the and Maia 1993, the Chilean telecom example is from
World Bank.
Galal 1994, and the French example is from Lorrain
Sectoral unbundling irn the electric power sector 1992. Reviews of experience with regulation and
is discussed in Bemstein 1988 (Chile), Littledild regulatory reform are in Bennathan, Escobar, and
1992 (U.K.), and Tenenbaumn, Lock, and Barker 1992. Panagakos 1989, Carbajo 1993, Churchil 1992, Cor-
For railways see Moyer and Thompson 1992 and dukes 1990,- Guasch and Spiller 1993, and Vogel
Nilsson 1993; for telecommunications see Bruce, 1986.
Harrell, and Kovacs 1993.
For methods of involving consumers in regula-
The unintended consequences of regulation tion in industrialized countries see Triche 1993 and,
when substitute services are available are described in a developing country context, Paul 1993. On selfin
Viscusi, Vernon, and Harnington 1992 for the regulationby theindustry,see Gwilliam 1993 for the
United States and in the Kwong background paper case of urban transporL Regulation of quality is disfor
Hong Kong- cussed in Rovizzi and Thompson 1992
127

-Box 3.1 is based on Moyer and Thompson 1992 forthcoming, and Silverman 1992. Comments from
and the Stewart-Smith bacground paper- Box 32. Tmt Campbefl, Rui Coutinho, Bob Ebel, Jim Hicks,
and Box table 32 are based on Viscusi, Vemon, and Maureen Lewis, Julio Linares, Remy Prud'homme,
Harrington 1992 and Winston 1993. Box 3.3 is by David Sewell, Anwar Shah, Sudhir Shetty, Andrea
Ashoka Mody. The source for Box 3A is Triche 1990. Silvennan, Jerry Silverman, Kazuko Uchimura, and
Box 35 is based on personal communication with Yoshine Uchimura, of the World Bank, together
Akain LocussoL Box 3.6 was drafted by Robert Tay- with the comments of Richard Bird (University of
; ' ' lor Material for Box 3.7 was gathered from the En- Toronto), Jacques Cremer (University of Toulouse),
ternational Fmance Corporation background paper and George Zodrow (Rice University) on earlier
- - The source for Box 3.8 is the Naidu and Lee back- drafts, significantly improved the text. Useful reground
paper The material for Box 3.9 was gath- lated work included Afonso 1989,_ Castells 1988,
ered from Hill and Abdala 1993, and that for Box Derycke and Gilbert 1988, Kirwvan 1989, Kitchen
310 is from Levy and Spiller 1993. The source for 1993, Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne 1993,
Box 311 is Paul 1993.
Prud'homme 1992, Rondinelli 1991, and Wunsh
In addition, many individuals contributed valu- 1990,1991a, and 1991b.
able comments to this draft, including, among oth- The section on participation draws heavily on
-es, Veronique Bishop, Robert Bmce, Michael En- Naravan forthcoming and on World Bank docuhorn,
Ray Hartnan, David Haug, Hugh Landzke, ments, including Bhatnagar and Williams 1992 and
Subodh Mathur, Barbara Opper, David Sappington, a recent survey by Gerson 1993. Analytical work
Mark Schankerma Richard Scurfield, Mark Segal was based on a database compiled by Deepa Na-
Claude Sorel, Martin Stewart-Smith, and Thelma rayan, who also provided comments- In addition,
Tiche.
the section benefited from written communication
from Allain Ballereau. Messrs. Kroh and Pichke of
Chpter4
the German development agencies Gesellschaft fur
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and Kreditan-
This chapter draws heavily on numerous intenal stalt fir Wiederaufbau (KfW), respectivelv, pro-
World Bank reports Useful discussions and com- vided important background material on their
ments were received from many people both within agencies' expenence, as did MiiIIer-Glodde 1991.
and outside the World Bank, including Carter Bran- Much of the material on budget allocations drew
don, Michael Cernea, David Coady, Maureen Crop- fromr- World Bank public expenditure reviews of varper,
lionel Demery, Jean Dreze, Stephen Howes, ious countries as well as from other interal docu-
William Jack, Valerie KozeL Jean Lanjouw, Herve ments The background papers by Asako; Naidu
Plusquellec, David Steers, Lyn Squire, Nicholas and Lee; Reinfeld; Swaroop; and Uzawa provided
Stemr, Elaine Sun, and Vmaya Swaroop.
useful material, as did Lacey 1989. Qian and Xu
In additionr the Canadian International Develop- 1993 provided evidence on township and rural enment
Administration, the International Forum for terprises in China. Anand 1983 supplied an analysis
Rural Transport and Development, the International of poverty in Malaysia during the 1970s.
Labour Organisation, the Netherlands Ministry of Aside from internal documents, the section on
Overseas Cooperation, UNICEF, and Water Aid srlbsidies drew on a study of five Latin American
(U.K) provided. useftil written material and perti- countries by Petrei 1987 and on material made availnent
advice.
able to the team by Gaurav Datt, Richard Jolly and
The section on decentalization draws on a data- colleagues at UNICEF, and Carlos Veles.
base compiled by Frannie Humplick and discussed The section on externalities draws on World
in Humplick 1992 Data on the evolution of decen- Bank intemal documents and on Bakalian and Jatralization
are based on IMF statistics, and the dis- gannathan 1991, Bernstein 1993, Blackshaw 1992,
cussion draws on backgound papers by Bird; and Whittington and others 1992. Piotr Wilczynsli's
Crdmer, Estache, and Seabright; and Estache and information on Poland, Vaandrag

1993, Drtze and Stern 1987, Goldstein 1993, Jack risk sharing in project finance are in IFC 1993 and
1993, Little and Mirrlees 1990, the Meier and Mu- Pyle 1994. Material on new projects is taken from
nasinghe background -paper, Redwood 1993, Rui- various issues of the trade journals Putblic Works Fitenbeek
and Cartier 1993, Squire 1990, and the .nandng and Latin Firnace. Information on private
Ruitenbeek background paper.
tansport projects is based on-G6mez-lbafiez and
Box 4.1 is based on materiaI provided by Andrea Meyer 1993. Coverage of country risk, and espe-
Silverman. Box 4.2 was provided by Vijay Jagan- cialy the role of export credit agencies in insunng
nathan and Albert Wright Box 43 was. partially against such risks, is described in the Zhu backdirafted
by John Riverson (on Ethiopia) and draws . ground paper.
on material from Aitken, Cromwell, and Wishart Banks for municipal infrastructure in developing
1991 (on Nepal). Box 4. is based on the Naidu and countries are described in Davey 1988 as well as in
Lee background paper. The Ruitenbeek background personal communications from Sergio Contreras
paper is the source for Box. 4.5. Box 4.6 draws on and Myrna'Alexander. The case study on FEC in
Bryceson and Howe 1993, Pankaj 1991, and von Morocco is from Linares 1993. The financng of con-
Braun 1988. Ian Heggie, John Roome, and Joel tractors is discussed in Kirmani 1988. Description of
Maweni provided. material for Box 4.7. Box 4.8 the new infrastructure funds was provided through
draws on intenal reports of the World Bank's Oper- personal communications by Per Ljung (Pakistan)
ations and Evaluations Department, the Operations and Krishna Challa (Jamaica).
Policy Department, and a review of the Bank'spro The links between privatization and capitalject
portfolio. Box 4.9 is taken from the Meier and market development are described in a background
Munasinghe background paper. Fmally, Box 410 is note prepared by Joyita Mukheree Municpal bond
based on internal World Bank reports.
markets are discussed in US. Municipal Securities-
Rulemaking Board 1993, Shiling 1992, and US. Se
ChapterS
curities and Exchange Commiission 1993. Mesa-
Lago 1991 and VitLas and Skullv 1991 descrbe the
This chapter draws on academic sources; back- evolution of contractual savings institutions in deground
papers; jourmal publications; documents veloping countriesfrom
the IFC, the IMF, the OECD, the US govern- The source for Box 5.1 and Box 5.8 is Ashoka
ment, and the World Bank -personal communica- Mody. The material for Box 52 and for Box 5.4 is
tions and conmments; and expert consultations both from the International Finance Corporation backwithin
and outside the World Bank.
ground paper. Box 5.3 is from the Eichengreen back-
The discussion of the theory that governments ground paper. The sources for Box 5.5 are Miceli
might be able to raise financing more cheaply than 1991 and Williams 1993. Oks 1993 is the resource for
private investors-but that these gains also need to Box 5-6. The material for Box 5.7 is from IJSAID
be balanced against greater efficiency of provision 1993: The source for Box 5.9 is Carzon 1992. Figure
under private ownership-is from Kay 1993. Lane 5.6 was compiled by Ashoka Mody.
1992 is the source for the fact that govermments face Valuable contributions to this chapter came from
a rising cost of finance and also potential liquidity many sources, including Myrna Alexander, Mark
problems if excessive debt is accumulated. The dis- Augenblick, Anand Chandavarkar, Stijn Claessens,
cussion of tying of aid is based on OECD 1992 and AsIi Demirguc-Kunt, David Haug, John Giraudo,
other documents of the Development Assistance. George Kappaz, Sunita Kikeri, Trmothy Lane, Ken-
Committee of the OECD, as well as on comments neth Lay, Julio Linares, Laurie Mahon, Subodh
from Fabio Ballerin.
Mathur, Barbara Opper, Robert Palacios, Thomas
Projections of infrastructire investments in Asia Pyle, William Reinhardt, Jean-Franiois Rischard,
are from CS First Boston 1993. The IFC background Hari Sankaran, Anita Schwarz, Mark Segal, Claude
paper is the source for estimates of IFC's infrastruc- Sorel, James Stein, Martin Stewart-Smith, Jane
ture lending. General descriptions of trends in pri- Walker, Al Watkins, and Ning Zhu.
vate international capital flows, and especially the
shift in foreign direct investments toward service Chapter6
provision, are described in World Bank 1993i and
IMF 1993a.
This chapter draws upon the analysis presented in
General principles of project financing may be earlier chapters and the bibliographic references
found in Nevitt 1989. Discussions of case studies of used therein. Additional references are noted here
129

1~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~ f
'zto on
th Lee o
PurchmrcueEmi
Table 6.1 was derived from antecedents provided in Estadie, Antonio, and Sarbajit Sinha. 'TMe Effect of Decentral-
Coyaud 1988 and Kessides 1993b. Box 6.1 on the
conditions. for good performance of eah instit- .
- and Ingrmm Gregory, and Marianne Pay. 'luing hIfrastructure
Tbnal option as the related discussion draw oin StoksA and Gains from Imprved Performancoe
Dia 1993, Lorrain 1992, and Martinand 1993, and International Finance Corporation. "Financing Private hfracomments
by Colin Relf. Helpful comments and structure Projects Emerging Trends from JFCs EVience..
sugestonson this disctussion.were provided by,es
suggestions onhers tbhis Disssiande provided by . Isham, Jonathan, Deepa Narayan, and Lant PritchetL "Backamong.-
others, Abhay Deshpande and Thelma gon oe atcpto n efrineEoont
Triche.
~~~~~~~~~~~gwund
Note: Partidpation and Perfomiance-Enornoet-
Triche. -- rnc Lssues with Project Data."
For the section on sectoral priorities, sources in-. Jacobson. Charles D, and Joel A. Tarr. "Public or Private?
eluded Bartone 1991a and 1991b, Bartone and others Some Notes from the Historv of Infrastructure."
1994, Cointreau-Levine 1994, World Bank 1992c, Knr Chrine. and Lesly Ctron. "Background Mote
World World.
Bank1993g,
Bank 1993g, and and Wellenius WeHenius and and others others 1992.
i
Kirwan, -Household Richard.
Expenditures
'Private Sector
on nfwastructure
Involvement
Services."
in hnfrastruc-
People who contnrbuted to the specific sector agen- ture in Europe and Austraia"
das include Carl Bartone and Joe Leitnann (solid Kunioni, Morio. 'Methods of Financing Infrastructunre The
waste); John Briscoe (water supply); Anthony Case of JapaneseSystem"
Churcbil (power); Eric Daffern (gas); John Flora, K-won& Sunny Kai-Sun. "Infrastructural and Eoonomic De-
Jeffrey Gutman, Kenneth GwflJiam, lan Heggvopentin Hong Kongf
Meier, Peter, and Mohan Munasingha "Power Sector Plan-
Zmarak Shalizi, Antti Talvitie, and Louis Thompson ning the io Public Inteest
(transport); Nilkola Holcer, Tmothy Nulty, Peter Mitchell, Bndger: "ackground Note: Netork interconnec-
Snith, and Gregory Staples (telecommunications); tion-A Primer.'
and GuyLe Moigne and David Steeds (irrigation); MMukherjeejoyita. "Background Note Privatization and Capital
Market Development"-
The estimates of gains from increasing efficiency Naidu, G, and Cassey Lee 'Infrastrucht -in the Economic
and correctng mispricing are from the Ingram and Development of Malavsia."
Fay background paper, except for those for the Peskin, Henry N!, and Douglas Barnes. Bacground Note:
power sector Energy inefficiency, transmission, and What Is the Value of Electricitv Access for Poor Urban
distribution losses for the power sector were basedls
on estimates from World Bank 1993c as wee the
Reinfeld, WlianL tInfrastructure and Its Relation to Eco-
- nomic Development The Cases of Korea and Taiwan,
timated gais om coecng mspicing in the sector.
AdditionaI materia was provided by Dennis Rtitenbeek, IH Jaac -Infrastructure and the Envionment
Anderson and Edwin Moore.
Lessons and Directon
Sappington, David E N. "Princples of Regulatory Policy De-
Backgrond papers :Schlirf,
-sign."
Richard- "Background Note Introduction to the European
Asako, ICazumi Infastructure Investment inJapan.i
Communitv Financing Policv for Infrastructure."
Stenvrt_-Srnith, Martin IndustryStructure and Regulation
Basu, Ritu. "Background Note Rates of Return for Construc- Swaroop, Viava. "The Public Finance of Infrastructurm Istion
and Maintenance Projects."
sues and Options."
Basu, Ritu, and Lant PritchetL -Background Note: Channels Uzawa, Hirofimi. 'The Envimonent and Infrastructure"
of Effective Participatiorn.
Vaandrager, Rene. -A Trasport Structure Plan."
Bird, Richard . "Decentralizing Infastructum For Good or Wade, RoberL "Public Bureaucacy and the Incentive Prob-
-for mr1-?- lemr Oraniabonal Deemnrts of a -Higih-Qualitv Grvil
Chandavarkar, Anand. 'Infrastructure Fnance Issues, Servicent l gsti- India and Koreai
tutions and Policies."
Yuan, Lee Tsao. 'he Development of Economic Iifrastrac-
CrAner,. Jacques, AntoDio Estache, and Paul Seabright. tu The Smgapoe Experience."
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*:: Appendix: Infrastr cture data
Table A.1 presents summary information on infra- Figures for inigated land were obtained from the
structure stocks as well as electricity production and data files of the Food and Agriculture Organization
irrigated land. Table A2 offers data on access to (FAO). The data are available from the FAO for 1961
drinking water and sanitation. The two remaining onward.
tables provide data on financial commitments and
support to infrastructure Readers should refer to Table A2 Access to drinking water and sanitation
the "Definitions and data notes" for an explanation
of the country groups used in these tables. Tables Access to drinkin -ater means access to safe water
Al and Al list economies in the same order as in Fty either standpost or house connections. Safe
the World Development indicators -*vwater is defined here as treated surface waters or
Although the data reported here are drawsn fromn untreated but uncontaminated waters, such as from
the most authoritative sources available, compara- protected springs, boreholes, and sanitary wells. Acbility-
may be limited by variations in data collec- acss to sanitatioI includes access by either sewer contion,
statistical methods, and definitions.
necton or other means such as septc tanks, communal
toilets, pit privies, pour-flush latrines, etc
Table A.1 Physical measures of infrastructure Data are primarily from the World Health Organizap-rovision
tion 1980 and 1990, complemented by Gleick 1993
and World Resources Institute 1992. (Data from
Data for paed roads are from Canning and Fay 1993 WHO are provided by govenments and are not
for the years prior to 1990; figures for 1990 were verified independently.) Quinquenmial data are
compiled from the US. Central Intelligence Agency available from 1970 to 1990 for the total and from
1991 (primary source), the Intenational Roads Fed- 1980 t 1990 for rural and urban catoes
eration (IRF), various years, or the International
Road riansport Union (IRLTU), vanous years- Where
1990 data were not available, figures for 1988 or
1989 were used. Quinquennial data are available TheWorldBankscentrallendingdatabase(ALCID)
from 1960 to 1990, but the data are available yearly is the source for annual figures for 1950-93. Infrafrom
the IRF andthelIRTU. -structure commitments are included for the fol-
Both net installed canacty of electricity-generating lowing sectors: irgation and drainage; powern teleplants
and electricity production are from Canning communications; water and sanitation; and total
and Fay 1993 for the years prior to 1990. Figures for ts t
1990comefi-m
UntedNatins 991-Quiquenial -transport. Total trrnsport indudes aviation, high
1990 come from United Nations 1991. Quincinennial ways, ports and waterways, railways, and urban
data are available from 1960 to 1990; the data are transport as well as commitments to the overall
available Avalablne yearly yearly from firomze
the UJN
UNS a
sourceseIephoue
transportation sector. Sector adjustment loans (SE-
Atlephonemain lineisa telephonelinethat con- CALs) are included. These data do not include
nects the subscriber's terminal equipment to the *or ifrstrucure components of projects in
public switched network and has a dedicated port other sectors, for example, rural development or enm
the telephone exchange equipment This term is vunentat projects.
synonymous with the term mnain station, which is
commonly used in telecommunication documents. Table A4 Official development finance for
Data for main lines are from the International infrastructure
-Telecommunication Union TU) 1994 Quinquennial
data are available, but the data are available The OECD provided data for the years 1984-92. The
yearly for the years 1975-92 from the iTL's elec- figures given here are based on total official flows as
tronic database.
defined by the Development Assistance Committee
Information on kilometers of railroad tracks is of the OECl:) Total infrastnrcture indudes communifrom
CannIng and Fay 1993 for the years prior to cations, energy, transport, water supply and sanita-
1990. Figures for 1990 are from the World Bank; tion, as well as river development and other infraquinquennial
data are available from 1960 to 1990. structure not classified in the previous categories.
139

Table Al1 Physical measures of infrastructure provision
Paint roads
EJcriridty- 8Vencnling rawidly
Efecaricily prdacirion
(kiounefers) CftIwnimds of kilorats) (miltilios oftliloxwtt -ourns)
Craenn 1960 1970 1980 1990 1960 19701 1980 21990 19q60 1970 1980 1990
Lowv-income economies
I Mozamnbique .. 2152 3,860 4,949 122 355 1,u0 2,358 22 682 4.00 8
2Ethiopia 1,935 11,320 13,198 95 167f 316 393 102r 520 675 906
3 Tanzania .. 32314 3,376 3,506 44 143 251 439 155 479 710 865
4 Serra Leone 401 1,034 .1,201 1,510 21 76 95 126 41 197 235 224
S Nepal 599 1,380l 2045 2.805 10 46 78 277 11 76 213. 739
6 Uganda 1.200 2,218 3.87 2Z416 141 162 163 162 421 775 650 603
7 Bhutan -- - . . .
SflBurundi so 365 1I011 7 8 43 .. I I 106
9 Malawi 485 7513 1.905 Z,320 49 106 . .. 145 434 -
10 Bangladesh .. 3,610 423 6,617 .. 990 Z.52 Z... 2653 80356
11iChad .. 3,315 20 378 3 16 38 31 8 421 64 82
12 Cuinea-Bissau . . . .-- -
13 Madagascar 3. 31474 *10,124 10,503 66 90 100 220 107r 246 426 566
14 Lao PDR.. . .. . - - - '-
l5 Rwanda 43 78f 405 731 .. 2 39 60 81 163 176.
l6ENiger -. 486 2.16721 4)11 3 15 23 63 8 .39 60 163
17 BurLina Faso -. 666 706% 1.3 4 14 38 59 8 27 113 155
18 India 254,446 324,758 623,995 7-59.764 5.580 16.27 332300 73,995 20,123 61,21 119,150 286,M4
19 Kenya - - 2.57T 5.558 6.901 82 174 463 723 " 583 1,490 3.044
2D MaIi 1,596 1795
3002
5,959
1.02 13
27
805
42
2,230
87
4)14
..
554
57
1.550
110
6,899
214
9.946
21 Nigeria .. ~~~~~~~~1516
22 Nicaragua 620 1,235 1.612 .. 9 17-0 356 395 187 62~7 1.049 1I138
23 Togo 516 1.480 1)133 2 20 35 34 5 .61 76 41
24 Benin . - . 93 1.03 6 1D 1s 15 10 33 5 5
25 CGntml African
Republic 0 63 410 486 6 14 30 43 5 47 67 95
26 Pakistan 16.860 24,776 38.03 .86.839 - - 3,51 9,137 - - - 15;277 43,903
27 Ghana .. 4,62 8,05 5.250 103 665 86W 1,187 374 2,92D 5,317 5.444
28 Chin .. . . 24,180 67)100 137,89 58.50 107)30o 300,60 6-1200
29 Taildstan . .. . .. - -. -- .
30 Guinea .. 512 3,636 4.424 IOU10 175- 17,6 -. 385 SW0 518
31lMauritamia .. 6 744 800oo 25 55 105 7-3 102 140
32 Sri Lanka . .. 17,704 . 94 251 422 1.289 302 816 1,668 3,150
.33 Zimbabwve . ,4774 11,788 12.896 .. 1,192 1,192 2.03 . 6,410 4,541 9.558
34 Honduras 110 -844 1,737 2,400 33 89 234 290 91 315 928 1,105
35 Lesotho. -. - 76 53MO-. --
36 Egypt, Arab Rep. . 11%059 12,68 14,601 1,167 4,357 3.583 11.738 2.639 7,991 16,910 39,545
3/7 Indonesia 10,973 21,073 56,500 116,460 391 907- 2786 11,480 1400 2,300 6,981 44,255
38 Myarmar 6,153 - - - - 250 256 636 1,116 432 600 1,340 2,601
39 SDmalia 8117 4,60 6,199 5 15 30 60 10 28 75 230
40 Sudan .. 332 2~~~~~~~~~~,975 3,419 44 117 3003 50( 4 39 ,0 1,32
41 Yemen,Rep. 533 1,389 Z.360 -.. . 275 .. . . 910
42 Zambia Z.2877 5,576 6,198 .. 1,025 1,728 2,436 .. 949 9,204 7,771
Middle-incomeconomies
Lower-middle-income
43 Cbtedvoire 829 1,25 3,15 4.216 32 175 953 14173 67 517 1,743 2.36
44 BoliVia 569 947 1,391 1,769 147 267 489 735 446 787 1,56 1,955
45 Azerbaijan . . - . - .- - . -
46 Philipphine 6,356 1.5,523 27,649 22,23 765 2,176 4.63 6,869 2Z731 8,666 15)132 26,329
47 Armenia- .. .-- .....- - -
48 Suwegl Z-2097 3,445 4)000 56 105 165 231 127 330 539 684.
49 Cameroon - 931 2,496. 3,59 160 179. 339 627 908 1,163 1,452 2Z705
50 K(iqyz Republic -- - -- - - - --. - . -
51 Gcoo*a- . -... -
52 Ulzbekistan..- - . .
53 PapttaNew Gunea .. 211 82 16 69 313 490 57- 191 1,252) 1,790
140

Piual aolai Ekd rkrilytarnyftig' nzpa7g Electriwfpmdud (dli
(kilornd as)
(tlzonsernds of kAiwtous)
(milDms Of AtnntT4zows)
Cout rby 1960 197(1- 1980 1990 1960 197 198 7990 1960 1970- 1980 199-0
54 Peru 4,116 4.85 6,299 7,511 541 1.677f 3.192) 4.137 2.656 5529 9.55 13,51
55 Guatemala 1279 2,333 2.850 3.485 83 216 392 696 251 7,59 1.617 2._25
56 Congo .. 378 561 9155 . 32 118 149 .. 76 15.5 398
57 Morocco 17,633 21,058 25,358 29,130 366 582 159 Z366' 1.1012 1,935 4,924 9W62
58 DomiicnRepublic 4,248 5.163 14.126 .. 10 327 97-0 1.447 350 1I3 ,43 5,2
599 Ecuador 7-19 2.910 4,290 632 11$ 304 1.118 1,657 387 949 3.0)0 6.326
*60 Jordan 1.488 2,42 3,950 5,680 - - so 400 1.04 -- 200 1.1,1 3,65
*61 RomWaniV. . . - 1.7779 7,346 16.115 22,479 7.65 35.05 67.5(11 64,307
*62 ElSalvador 984 1-338 1.511 1,719. 74 205 S01 740 250 671 1,543 Z.296
63 Twurkmeistan . . ~ -. -
*65 Lithuania.. - -. - .. ....
66 Bulgaria .. .- . . 925 4,117 8.249 11,129 4.657 19,513 34.835 38917
67 Colombia 2.998 5,980 11.950l 10329 911 2,427 5,130 9.40i 3.750 5,651 22,1935 36,001
Jamaica 1,561 WI67 - 142) 4(5 7225 732 508 1,5412 "-45 2,730
Paraguay 25-4 516 1.518 3.00 44 155 338 5,50 96 218 930 Za43
* ~~~~~65
* ~~~~~69
71 Kanicbslan . .- .. . - -- - - . - -
* .2 Tunisia .. 6245 9.106 12-7278 17,5909 129 258 928 1,524 316 7,94 2,797 5,537
73Uk-rabie -- - - . . ...
74 Algeria .. 32,963. 38.929 44,191 439 75-0 2.006 4,657- 1.35 1,979 7,123 15,992
* 75 Thailand 2.740 9,656 23,613 39,910 191 1,336 4310 9,722 5994 4,545 15.112 46.150
*76 Paland .- - . - 6,316 13,710 28,110 30,-7( 293017 64,533 121260 136,311
77 Latvia.- -. - -- -- - .-- . .--
78 SlovuikcRepublic ; - . . . . - - - - -
.79 Costa Rica 1,400 2R44 5,680 10_4 46 93 48 8 226 3,609
50 Turkey .. 18.990 35,637 45,52 1,62 2,312 5,719 16,316 2.515 8,624 23,2735 ,4
531 Izm ar.saniclRep. 2Z312 10,484 33,70 .. . 2,197 5.300 17,554 . 6,78 1-7.150 55.997
82 Panama 602 1,531 2,17 2.360 136 347 745 992P 504 1,74t 2,451 2,901
83 Czech Republic *. .. . -. .- -- -- - - -
84 Russian F-ederation.m - -- --
85 Chile 2.64 7411 9,82 10,983 1.142 2.143 2,940 4.079 4.592 7.531 11,73 15,372
86 Albaia a. . ...
. - - 755 194 944t 2,450 3.190
88 Syrian Arab Rep. 2-.95 8,09 13,00 24(118 . 13 30Y1 t112 3,717 368 947 32837 10,601
*Upper-middle-iCDme
89 South Africa .. 33,115 46,634 51.469 . . . - .- - - -
go Mauritius .. 1,593 1,63 1,699 68 102 220 313 150 220 438 77u
92 Brazil 12,7(63 31568 8/7,045 161.503 4.800 11233 33,293 52,592 22,86 45,460 139,485 222199
93 Botswwan In2 1,148 2,311 --- - . - - -
Malaysia 946 135 2041 7,0 .. 936 2,430 5.037 - 3,543 10,156 2-4.722
95 VenezuI!1b 8,20 17.999 22.879 26295 1,353 3,1772 5,471l 18,647 4,65 12Z707 35,935 60,994
* ~~~~~94
97- Hungary . .. . .. 1,465 2.497 4,642I 6,60 7,617 14,541 -23,873 28.411
98 Uruonay 1,471 6,00 9.7P92 -- 406 560 835 1I68 1.244 2Z200 4.559 737,1
99 MaDdco 25,6567 42,64 66.92 S2.02 3,04 7,318 16,985 29.24 10,82 28,70 66.9550. 122.482,
100 Trinidad and Tobago 4,344 3.984 -. -- 2 334 756 955 470 1.20 2,033 3,450
IOIGC.sbon -- 150 451 609 8 40 175 279 20 97 53 915
102 Argentina 22.7712 33,373 52194 57.25 3,47-4 6,691 11,988 17,128 10,460 21.-30 39,69 50.904
103 Onman -- 10 2.177 . .. 33 3921 1.531 .. 105 957 5.345
.105 Puerto Rico . .. - -- .- - -- - ..
106 KCoea, Rep. 733 3,618 15-,58 34.248 .439 2.764 10.-72 24.05 I.758 9.597 39,979 118,40
107- Greece 9.504t 15.393 22.279 28.87 615 2.458 5.324 8.50 2.277 9,51 2,652 35,00
108 Portugal 17.013 32,424 44,819 60,347 1,35 2,129 4,44 7,38 3,261 7,45 I526 28,528
109 SmudiArabia 3,50 8,652 22,10 - . 316 5,904 18,510 .. 1,060 18,907 '17,404
Olovk continua on thefillmving piseJ
141

Table A.1 (continuald)
Pavrd roads;
EILrtrid! y-gien:titig airMcity Ekdcrkiciy predutcfi io
(hi binder)
(U,ionusds of kilouwalts) (induhrnvs ofkibloauf4f-Iurs)
Colnnhy 1960 1970 1980 1990 1960 2970 2980 2990 1960 2970 2980 1990
Wght-incuute economies
110 Ireland 33,315 71,593A 87.6779 86,764 725 1,630 3.15 3N807 2Z26-2 6,091 10.W5 14,516
III New Zealand. 22.277/ 40,599 47,0 52.410 1,566 3,79 5,927 7,504 6.35 13,706 21.982 30,159
112 tlszel .. 4,118 4,596 425 127 2Z832 4,135 2,313 6.55 12.525 20;729
113 Spain .. 94*656 150,831 239,582 6,567 177,9122 29.353 43.273 18*615 56.490. 110,483 150*33
114 fHong Kong 948 907 1,161 1,484 365 1.341 3.22 8.342) 1,301 5,097 12.649 28,938
115 Iinmgapare 323 1I20 2,180 2,75 152 644 1,90 3,400 699 2205 .6,940 15,620
116 Australia 50800 167,920 244,086 263,527 5,906 15.594 25.746i 36,782 23,19,7 53,89 95,891 154558
117 United Kingdom 319,314 334,232 339,804 356.517 36,70 62,06 73.643 73,05 136,971) 249.016 2854,937318,9776
118 [tlaIr. 26Z,188 285,319 303,906 17,68 30.408 46,824 56.549 56,240 117.421 155.741 216.922
119 Nedthelands 70.000 78-551 92,525 92,0(39 5,262 10,163 15.32 17,441 16.516 40,859 64,806 712874
1T0 Canada 138,515 186,939 164,160 2599210 23,035 42,526 81,999 104,140 114,3.75204,723 377.515 484.752-
121 Belgium 23.343 94,00 119,152 129.603 4,520] 6,257 11,005 14,140 15.152 30.52 53.6412 M70.19
127 Finland .. 234174 35,950 46,61 2.834 4,312 10,422) 13,220 8,628 21,186 38,7710 54,506
123 lUnited Arab
Entitaes . . - .-.
124 France 626,44!] 690,950 730,697 741,152 21,85 362)19 62,I1 103,410 72,115 146,966 246,415 419,534
125 Austria 32063 94,83 106,303 125(0 4A08 7,976 12.930 16,839 15,965 30,036 41,96.6 50,416
126 Germanv 115,976 41,600 466,675 495,955i 25.393 417,540 52.585 99.750A 115,986 242,611 363.785 454,66
127 United States. 2.2021014,67.350 5,169,092 -186,534 360.327 630.111 725396% 844,1881,63,771 2Z354.384 3,031.02
128 Norway 12,28 46.579 61,356 6,0 290 20,238 27.195 31,121 57,606i 84.099 121,58
129 Dewnmark 41,28 50.676 68,909 71,063 1,953 4,488 6,768 9,133 5,179 2D,04 25.A38 25,728
130 Sweden 57,68i9 80,022 78,700 94,9017 . 5,37 27,416 34,1899 . 60,646 96,985 146534
131 Japan 37,785S 15-2,03 511,044 782.04 23.720, 68,7710 143,69 194,763 115.498 359.539 577.21 85-7,34
132 Swifteriand. 56-58 59,233 64.029 71,106 5,840 10.50 13,99 16.300 19,073 .33,173 45.33 a5,84
Sdedeed ecounoie not incduded in main WVDI tables
Angola .. 5.3 . 7,914 88 3127 600 617 143 644 1I5O 1,540
Barbados 1216 1.158 1,45 1.399 122 39 94 140 38 146 332 468
Cyprus 1.71 3,596 5.097 5,452 85 185 269 471 .236 610 1,0134 1,975,
FIJI. 267 1.20 9 54 117 200 55- 15 306 435
Gambia,The -. 282 462 549 4 9 11 13 5 13 40 67-
Guyana 223. 713 4,829 52 160 162 114 92 323 419 22
Haiti 442) 551 585 629 28 43 .121 153 90 118 315 475
Iceland - . 3627 2.264 142- 353 743 9toi. 551 1,4770 3,155 4610
Iraq 7,316 4,77 f3 14,166 26,040 350 680 1,200 9,000 852 2.75 8.0 29,160
Kuw%ait .. .. 285P -. 6,79M. . 20,641
Liberi . 32 1,80 2,27 22 224 305 332 100 502 900 565
Luxembourg . ~~~~4.447 5X07 5,045 269 1,157, I'38 1,238 1,3 ,148 1.111 1,374
Malta .. .. ~~~~~~ ~~1,223
.. 2 110 122 250 67 285 5277 1.100
Surinarne 459 Z.- 23779 29 260 395 415 79 1,32 1,610 1,501
Swaziland .. 182 447 688 . . .- .-
Zaire -. 2,110 2Z175- 2,500 650 86 1.716 2,831 2,456 3,230 4,160 6.155
(Table aontinks an tlrfacing pzge
142

*TLqdqmrc Main (rsRaiilwad tracks Irrisrtrd Iaind arcv
(simujbrrof arnnzrthmls) (kilomners) (tlzonsamds of hrdara)
Coutiti 1j975 1980 1990 2960 197-0 1980 1990 2970 2980 1990
Lowv-income economies
I Mozambique 29,7`00 35,400 417.439 3.218 3.703 3.845 3,150 26 65 115.
2 ELhiopia 53.100 64JJ80 125,39 11)9 1,090 987 7181 155 160 162-
3 Tanznia 211.500 39,771] 73.011 3.545 5.895 2.600 2.60 38 120 150
4 SierraLeorke . 11,450 26,550 500 4419 84 84 6 211 34
5 Nepal 770. 731 . - 101 52 117 51 20
6 Uganida 20,000 19,600 27.86 1,300 5.595 1.145 1,241 4 6 9
S8Buunmdi 2,000 10.26 0 0 .0 612 27 56 72)
9 Maalawi 9,300 14.374 26.17 0 509 566 782 78 4 15 20
10 Bangladesh -. 89f] 241.824 .. . .9 W iJIS 1,56 2936
11 Chad 2,40) - 4.015 0 a 0 0. 5 6 10
12 Guinea-Bissau .-. .- .. .-
13 Madagascar 15,100 19,100 30.00 86 564 883 .1.030 330 645 920
14 LaoFDR ..-- -- .. .- . -
l5 Rwanda Z,300 3.3UO 10,38 0 0 0. 0 4 4 4
16 Niger 3005.870 9.27'2 a 0 0 0 is 23 40
17 Burkirna Faso 2.600 4.000 51 -. 17 517r 304 4 10 2)
18 India 1,465.00 25,25530 5.074,734 56,962) 59,997 612140 755333 30.440 38.475 45_500
19 Kenya 571)0 50.3)O 183,240 6,55 6,933 4,531 Z.652 29 40 54
20 mani. 5,380 11,169 645 646 641 632y so 152 205
2, Nigeriia -- 163,360 260.00 2.864 3.504 3.52 3,557, S02 825 87
22 Nhaoragua 25,300 30,900 4.00O0 403 403 345 331 40 so 85
23 Togo 4.5(1 5,500 10.516 445 491 442 514 4 67
24 Benint 6,900 11,410 . 14.-778 579 579 71 92 6
25 Central African Rep- - 617 SAM0 0a 0 0 a- --
- -
26 Pajdsza 27.000x 303,00 843,346 8,57-4 *5.56 8.815 12,62-4 12,9550 14,60 16.96
27 Chana 33,900 37oo43,0 5 95,2 92 5( 7 8
-28 China 3262.00 4.1866.O 6.8502300 3.. 63.-- 0 44.8 47,403
29 Tajlldtan -. 140,000 240110.. . . .- 617 690
30 Cuinea 6,60 10,380 12,100 505 819 662 910 5 8 25
31 -Mauritania .. 2.31 6,248 675 6751 650 650 8 11 12
32 Sri Lank-a -- 54,20 121388 1,445 1.535 1,453 1,555 465 5725 520
33 Zimbabw%e 84,00 95,600 123.665 3,100) 3.239 3.415 2Z745 46 157 220
34 Honduras .. 31.P26 58158 1,230 1I02 2(5 955 70 82 90
35tLesotho . 447 1300000 0-. -
36 Egyp Arab Rep. 353,000, 430J]0 1.71749S 4,419 4-234 4.667 5,110 2,843 2,445 2,64
37 Indonesia 219,400 375,500 1.0691)15 6,640 6.611] 6,637 6,964 4.370 5,415 8,177
38 Myamnar 25,900 28,20 .. 2991 3,098 4-345 4.664 839 999 1.00
39 Somialia SM 800 15.000 0 0 0 a) 95 105 118
40 Sudan 43,200 45,355 62A000 423 4,756 4.787 4.784 1.625 1.770O 1,9(X
41 YenmenRep. .. 24.1771 124.516 a 0 a 0
42- Zambia 28.400 30,400 651)57 1,158 1,044 1,609 1,894 9 19 .32
Midde-hiacnmeownomnies
Lorwer-middle-income
43 Cote d'Ivoirw 24,600 52,1580 64.177 624 656 650 650 20 44 64
44 Bolivia .. 142,000 W5.55 3,470 3,524 3.328 3,462 .80 140 165
45 Azerbijar 390.000 620100.O- D. 1.195 1.401
46 Philppines 304,000 420J11 6102037 1.021) 1.052
47 Armenia .. 340,000 560.000.- .....
12159 478 8326 1,219
27
1.56
30
48 Senegal . 18,90D 44.326 9771 1,186 1.04 115 110 170 150
49 Camerooa . 15,11 37,414 517. 925 1,168 1,104 7 14 30
50 Kvrgyz Republic -----. - -- 955 1I030
51lGeorgia ... . - ' . . 409 466
52 Uzbekislan .. 660,000 1,402.844 .- -.-. 3,476 4,159
53 Papua NewC uinea 17,00 25,400 -30.187 0 * 0 0 0 * - . .-
54 Peru 254.000 321,651 564.504 2,559 2.235 2.99 2.5(5 1.106 1,160I 1I2M
143

Table AL1 (cos:thzuntf)
Tdtpl lines mar maria ~ ~ RaflaUtd lnrcs
irrignateJad usarm
(mrunnrr of cnnections) (iontrJ(thousands of kretres)
Country 1975 1.980 _q990 0 19 1970 1980 T99 1970 1980 199
55 Guatemala .. 9.6711 191,938 1,159 819 927 1.139 56 68 7
56 Congo 6,1)1 8.551 15M5 515 802 795- 510 I 3 4
57 Mnxuju 123.100 167.00 402.410 .1.785 1.79 1w.756 1.901 920 1.217 1,270
58 Dominican Republic ~ . 113,910U 341.201 27O 27 59 .5 1275 1657 22"5
59 Ecuador 176.000 227.00U 490,508 1.152 990 965 965 41] 520 O5M
60 Jordan ,. 71.64 243500 3771 371 618 618 34 37 63
61 Romania
62 ElSalvador 55.700 725D50 1243969 618 618 602 6-74
71
20
Z0
110
X
120]
63 Turmieistan - 120.000* 220.0 . -.- .. 927 1,240
64 Mloldova .. 2404Jo0fl 462.12. . .. 217 290
65 lithuania .. 420,3164 731w.95. ....- .-
66 Bulgaria .. 1.144.3(U 2.173.413 .. .-. . 1.001 1.197 26
67, Colombi 861200 1.073711 2,414,226 34161 3,436 3,403 3,239 250 400 520
68 jaumkai 49.700 56,204 106.152 330 331 293 339 24 33 35
69 Paraguay 32.00 49,50l 112,452 441 -141 441 441 40 60 677
,70 Namubia.---.- .. .. -
71 Kazakhstan 9001)00 1,740130.. . --. 1.961 2.30
"72 Tunisia 71,30 112.000 30328 2.U14 1523 2,013 2.71 90 156 M22
73 Ukraine -- 3,400.000' 7=13280 .. . .1 .
74 Algeria 172.1400 311.400 794311 4.0735 3.933 3.907 4.63 238 25-3 38;4
75 Thailand 23,10 366.0 1324522 2.100 2160 3,73 3,940 I'M6 3M05 4,300
7i Poland . -- -. . 213 100 100
77 [atva 47jJ,jjQ=flJl-
78 SlavakRepublic -.-- -- -
79 Costa.ica01 5A0 8,3 665 62 865 696 26 61 11$
80 Turkev 7-I0,OA10 M130558 6.893267 7,89 7,985 8,193 8,695 1.80 2Z90 227i0
S1 Iran, Islamiic Rep. S14,10 1.02,403 2Z254.944 3.577 4,412 4.5671 41396 5.31 4,94 5.750
82 Panamia .- 126.700 216.026 158 158 118 238 20 28 32
83 Czech Republic - .. .*. . . -
84 Russian Federation - . . ----. . . -
85 ChIle 308,00 363,00 86U0.075 8.415 8281 6_302 7-99 1,180 1.255 1.265
86 Alania ... . - .284 371 423
87 Mongola .66.33 -..- . 10 35 7
SS Syrian Arab Rep. 137.000 239.000 496,3Wf 844 1.04 2Z017 2Z398 451 53 69
Uppermiddle-income
89 South Ahica IM900 1.632.00 3,315,02 20553 21.391 20,499 23507 100 1.128 1.125
90 Mauritiu 16.30 .23.60 59,927 0 0 0 0 15 16 17
92 Brazil 2.45.000 4).67,00 9,409.230 38287 31.847 28671 2Z,12 796 1/"0 2700
93 Botswaa. 5.00 7,817 26,367 634 .634 7714 714 1 2 2
94 MalaysiaW 134,000 396,000 1.58.744 2.1100 2,160 2,12 2,22 262 320 342
95 Venezuela 578.00 8597-39 1,494,776 474 295 280 445 7-0 13,7 ISO
96&au .. -* -- 163 149
977 Hungr-y - .- .-- -- 109 134 204
98 Uruguay 193.00 220,00 415.403 3,134 2.9w3 3.0 3,002 52 7-9 120
99 Mexico 1A,53000 2.5776,0 5.354,500 23.369 24.468 20.158 26,334 358 4.98 5,180
100 Trinidad and Tobago 42.2(X 4400 P73,965 175 0. a 0 15 21 22
101lGabon .. 10.440 20.754 0 0 224 683 -
102 Argentina 1.6751)l00 179100 36,06964 43,905 39,90 34,0777 35254- 1280 1.580 1,680
1030Oman 6.30 13.200 104X34 0 a 0 29 38 58
10o4Slovenia -- .-- - --
105 Puerto Rico-... .. . ...
.106. Koirea, Rep. -- 3,32.00 13,276.449 2Z97,6 3,193 3,135 3,091 1,184 1,307 1.315
107 Gremee 1,806,000 2.270,O00 3,948.654 2.583 2,571 2.461 2,784 730 961 1.195
108 Portugal 820,602- 989.470 2.379,265 3N.59 3,563 . 3.588 3_598 622 630 631
109 Saudi Arabia * 141,00W 407,O0 1,234.00 402. 57.7 747 1,380 365 555 900
.144

*Teplephmein lines Railnnd tmcts rsialedsilnsdarem
(nzumberrofcosmedwoasl (kilewdrs) (lwusmnds ofhedtnns)
Cosutntr 1975 1980 299 196D 297-0 1980 199 1970 1980 1990
HihW co4 ecwmies
110 Ireland ~ 357/00 453.000 983/00 2911 2_190 1.96 2.464 -
111 NewZealand 1.114,996 1,102,740 1,469/100 5264 4,1 4,449 I11 153 250
112 tlsrael 63200 SWAB10 1,626.449 420 470] 52 1,145 172 203 200
113 Spain 5,118.00 7,229,00 12.602600 18/13 16.5992 1572 19.089 23779 3,029 3,402
114 tHwlog KCong 910,1100 1,279/U) 2.474,998 56 61 92 .. 32
115 iSingapove 249.00 523,400 1,040,187 -- 38 38
116 Australia 3,700/10 4.43/ED0 7,7,86,89 424Th6 43-38 39.463. 411.475 1.476 1.50 1.3
137 United KIngdom 14.059.00 I7,696/E 2536800 29.562 18,969 1802 16A62 as 140 164
115 Itay 10,166,0010 1301.o0w2.5010 nao
21.277r 3.212 16,133 25258 2.56 2.87 34230
3.6124-00 4,82/0 6,9

Table A.2 Access to drinking water and sanitation
(pereatior of paptintivii)
Acms f io sqfc dripiking water
Accrss to sanitation
Total Urban - Rumi Total Urhm Rwi
Coulitry 1911-0 1980 1990 19so 79-90 1980 7990 19M 190 Iwo im 1.990 1980 7990
LAnv-inwmeeamwWes
1. Mozambique' 44. 17 21 61 11
2 Ethiopia- 6 is 70 11 12 97
375nzaniaa 13 52 75 46 -77 76 77
4 Sium Leime. 12 14 39 so 80 2 m 12 39- 31 55 6 31
5Npal 2 11 31- 83 66 7 3-4 1 2 6 16 34 1 3
6Uganda 11 33 45 - 60 8 30 -fs 13 60 40b YZ 10 .60
7 Bhutan 7 34 50 60 5 30 43 so 377
8Burundi 23 46 .90 .92 20 43 35 19 40 64 35 16
9WIMP 41 77 66 37 49 83 IOU 81
10. Bangladesh 45 39 I-s 26 39 40 89 6 3 12 21 40 1 .4
11 Chad 27 Ff
12 Guinea-Bissair' la 25 Is is 8 -77 is 21 21 30 13 18
43 Madag3scar' 11 21 21 Su 67- 7 . 10 2 -- 9 -- --
14 Lao PDR 48 21 28 21 -rf L) 25 4 11 11 30 3 8
15 Rtvmida 61- 55 69 48 84 55 61- 23 6U 88 5D r,
16 Niger 20 33 53 41 98 32 45 14 36 71 3 4
17 Burkina Faso 12 31 a 27 44 31 1-10 7
3gb 35
5 5
is Indii 17 42 7 3 77 86' 31 69 is 7 14 44 1 3
19 Kenva 15 26 49 85 15 49 30 - - 89 - 19
20 16bli 6 11 r, 41 0 4 14 24 79 31 a lu
21 N-igeria 36. 42 60 100 30b 71 28 80 11
MNicaragm 35 39 55 91 776 10 21 is is 35
17 38 0 7 u 100 31 61- 13 24 47 10 16
24 Benin 29 is 55 26 1-1. 43 14 16 Z 48 60 4 37D
25 Gmtral Afrion
Rq-blic - - 24 19 26 46 45 46
26 Pakistan 21 35 55 82 20 42 - 13 25 42) 53 12
27 Ghana 35 45 j-2 63 33' 55 26 61 47 63 17 60
28 China4 72 8 7f .68 85 i(O 81
29 -Tapistan
30 Guhma 15 P2 69 100 2 .37 11 11 - 54 I 0
31 Mauritania 17 66 so 35 I - D
321 Sri Lardm 21 28 60 65 90 is 55 65 67 50 so 68 63 45'
33 Zimbab%%e 84 95 so 40 95 - 22
34 Hondtwas 34 59 64 50 85 40 48 24 31 62 40 39 26 42
35 Lesotho,' 3 15 47j 37 59 it 45 11 14 21 13 14 14. 23
36 Egypt, Amb Rep. 93 84 90 88 .95 64 86 26 50 45 Bb 10 26
r, Indonesia 3 23 34 35 35 19 33 13 23 45 29 J-9 21 30
38 Mvanmar is 21 74 38 -79 15 72 36 20. 22 35 50 15 13
39 SomaliaO 15 32 36 60 50 20 29 - 177 17 45b 41 5 5
40 Sudana 19 51 34 90 31b 2& 12 12 63b 40 d 5
41 Yemen, Rep. 14 24 100 Is
42 ZambW 37r 46 59 65 76 32 43 17 i-o S loob 777 34
Middk-income ownoniks
Lowcr-middk-'uxvm.
43 C&e d'.voire 44 69 3-7 so 91 81 100
44 Bolivia 33 36 53 69 76 10 30 13 19 26 37f 38 4 14
45 Azerbaijan
-46 PhiUpphin 36 45 81 65 93 43 12) 5s 72 da 81. 79 6i, 63
47 Arnx-nia
48 Senept 43 :44 33 (Lq 25 26 3 47 5 rf 2 38
49 6memn 32 44 41- 45
50 1vrgyz Republic
-1 Gem
52 Uzbek-isWn
S'Papua Netv Gui 70 16 33 S 94 la 2U .14 15 56 % S.-, 3 56
54. PL-r -u 35 .50 53 68 68 21 24 58 57
36 3/7 76 0 20
146

Acress to safe drIPAIng zmfer
Acem to.-widlefibit
Total Urhm Ridmi Tdat Urbart Ritmi
Coijutry 1970 1980 1990 1990 im 1990 1990 291-0 1980 19W 1990 1990 19so 190
.55 Guatemala 36 46 62) 89 92 18 43 22 30. 60 45 n m n
56 Conpm 27 20 39 36 92 . 3b 2 6 17 0 2
5/7 MOMCOD 51 56 100 iw 18 30 100
53 DoniinkanRepublic37 60 68 85 SI 33 .45 577 is Ff 25 95 4 75
59 Ecuador 34 50 54 82 63 16 44 26 48 39 56 14 38
60 Jordan 77 86 99 100 IOD 65 T, I-o 100 94 100 34 100
.61 RonianLe. 95 100 .90 gIf- ICU 95
62 B Salvador 40 50 47 61, 97 40 15 37 47 59 30 85 26 38
63 TurkmQnistan
64 Moldova
65 Uthuarda
66 Bulgarke 99 100 Ni IOD ice 100
67 Colombia 63 86 86 87 1-49 82 50 66 64 100 84 4 18
68 jantaice 62 51 .72 95 46 94 14
69 Nraguay 11 21 39 61 10 92 47 95 31 89 60
.10 Namibia . .177 90 37f 13 .24 11
71 Kazgdistan
.7-1 TURWO 49 60 a IOU 100 17 31 63 55 ri loo 7I 15
73 Ulaaine
74 Algeria to-
.75 Thafland 17 63 7.1 65 63 85 45 64 41 86
76 PolmWa 89 94 82 100 100 too
777 Lahia
78 Stmk Republic
'9 Gosia mma 74 90 92 im 100 68 84 53 87,f % 93 100 82 93
80 Tiurkey, 53 76 84 95 - 100 62 70 92 56 95 90
81 ban, L-Jmm-c Rep. 35 66 89 82, IDD 5D -15 74 71 I 100 35
82 Panamie 69 81 84 100 100 65 66 45 85 62 100 28 68
83 Czerh Republic -- --- -
84 Russian Fedemtion
a5 chne 56 1134 8701' 100 100 17 21 29 85 99 100 6
86 Albania 100 95 100 100 100
r, Mongolia so 100 58 7s 100 4rl-
88 Syrin Amb Rep. 71 74 1-9 98 91 54 68 50 63 74 .28 55
Uppermiddk-:-c-
89 South Afiica
90 mauritiLs 61 99 95 100 100 98 92 8 94 94 100 92 90 96
91 Estonia ..5
92 Brazd 55 72 87 so 95 51 61 55 21 71 2 32 84 32
93 Bots%wana 2Q - 90 100 89 88 - 100 85
94 Malaysia 29 63 78 90 96 49 66 57, 70 94 100 94 55 94
- 45 877 90
95 Vemuela IS 86 92 91 5D 36 Ja 72
96 ilelarus,
-Hungary- 00
9, 98 Too 95 1 100 100
98 Uruguay 92 Si 95 % 100 2 59 59 60
990 MeAm 54 73 89 64 94 43 23 33 51 B5 12
100 Trirddad arkd
Tobago 96 grf 96 100 100 93 83 92 98 95 100 88 92
101 Gabona 66 90 50
102 ArgmUiW 56 54 64 65 17 17 85 79 89 89 100 32 29
1(13 Omne 46 37 42 40 iw 34
104 Slovenia
105 PuerbD RicD
106 -Korea, Rep. 53 75 93 86 IOU 61 6 90
l(ri Greeoe - 98 100 95 98 100 95
108 Pwh3gaP 92 90 9ril loo 95
109 Saudi Arabie 49 90 93 92 .100 .87 95 29. 0 81 81 IW 50 30
147

Access to safe dri,kfim inter
Acce*tss itasg iolnl
Total Urbn Ruiral Total Urbani Rural
* Country 2~~~970 2980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990.
High-inome emonomes
liflirmland .. 9 100..o10 100 00 . 94 100 IUD0 . 100
III NewZealand . .. 97 .. 10 . 82 ;. . . . . . 88
112 tIsrael .. 9 100 .. 100 .. 97 . .. 99 .. 99 .. 95
11 llSpain 82 90 100 .100 . 100 .. 90 100 . 100 . 100
l114 tHonglKong .. 10 100. 100 100 95 96 4. 94 58 100 90 .. 50
ll5 tSingapore .. lO 100 100 100 .. . Su 5 .. o8 97 -
116 AustralIa 99 .. . . 1101 100 .. . . . 0 . 0
117 UnfiedKVingdom 99 99 00 .. OU1 .. JO *. 85 100 .. 1OD . 100
Ilaitaly 85 90 100 IO1U . 100 .. 99 10 . 100 .. 10
119 Netherlands 99 100 100 .. 111 . 10 100 . 100 100 O .. 100
120 Canada 96 98 100g 100 .~ 100 .. . .. . .. .
121lBelgium 95' 98 io.101 0 100 00 . 99 10 .. 10 .. 100
12ZlFinland 53 70o 96 .. 99 .. 90 .. 72 100 100 . IOU0
123 tUnihed Arab
Emirate . 92 .100 95 100 81 .100 so 8 95 93 100 22 77
124 Franw 92 98 100 .. 100 100 .. 5 100 100 . 100
125 Austria .. 0 100 I0OD . 100 .. 5 100 .. log (11)
126Gerni any 100 100. . 1D .100 . .. 100 .. 100 . 100
127 United States .. 100 4.. . .. 98 .. . .. .
I2l Norwvay 98go10 100 .
100 00 . 85 1Wo 100 4 100
129 Denniark 90 100 1(0 00 100 .
100 100 g .. 100 100
.l3oSweden 78~.1 56 100 .. 100 100 85 100 10 410
132 Switzerland. 97 98 1004o 100 .. 100 .. 5 100 100 4 100
Seleced economics not induded in wain WDI tables
Angola 26 40 85 73 10 20 .. 20 22 410 25 15 .20
Barbados 98 99 100 100 100 28 100 100 44 100 . 100
Cyprus 100 100 o 100 100 10 1 0100 100 I 7 IWK 96 IO10010
Fiji . 37 77 SD 94 96 66 69 70o 75 85 91 60065
Gambia, The 12 44 7 85 100 *. 48 67 .. 0 ..
Cuvana 7-5 72 7-f9 .. 10 60 7t 100 86 85 100 97( 80 81
Haiti .. 19 41 48 56 a 355 4 25 44 .. 17
Iceland 4 .. 100 .. 100 44 100 .. .. 10 100 .. W
Iraq 51 77 . 93 41 48 .. . .. 9
Kuwvait Si 8 . 100 ... . .. *44 100 4 4
LUberiea 15 .. 54] 93 16 22 16 6. 5 . 4 .. 8.
Luxembourg 44 4 100 *. 100 100 .. .. 10 . 100 44 100
Malta..10 100 IU lOU 100 i 100 190 . 97 100 0 100 84 100
Surinme, 55 68 52
7 hb 56 4 . 64 36
SwvazIlanda. . . 31 100 ;. .. 45 .. oo . 25
Zaire * 11 . 39 *. 68 .. 24 6 .. 23. 4 46 .. 11
tEconomies classified by the United Nations, or otherwise reprded by their authorities as devdloping&
a. 1990 data refer to 1988; World Resurces Institute 1992.
b. World Resouroes Inttt 992.
c. For range estimates, seemap on access to safe water in the intinucion to thec WDL
148

Table AS3 IBRD and IDA commitments
(miillions of ctrmest U.S. dollarsj
tlflDand iDA
WIBD IDAWaea! th. Toa lw
FY lufusInctre Tota laftara ut ure Taut amUmiuuc Aranitatia.Wi w 1&u tamkimlI bmpd RWnvys Howurns Parts uwspjair Other
19.50 132 179 . .. 26 72 a 17 0 34 34 0 0 0 0
1951 171 297 i.s1 87 a a 0 65 23 25 17 0 0
.1952 161 2W9 * I itO 0 a 0 49 40 0 3 0 6
1953 62 179 .. . 0 a 0 a 0 42 39 3 0 0 0
1954 187 324 - . 0 107 0 a 0 50 50 26 4 0 U
1955 226 410 .. 18 76 a a a 1372 101 LI 20 0 0
1956 302 396 ; .. 0 175 0 a a 127 43 52 32 0 0
1957. 121 388 , a. 83 0 a a 38 0 15 8 0 15
1958 55) 711 . .. 7 230 a a a 32 209 60 53 0 0
1959 543 7703 0 286 0 a 0 2577 161 77 20 0 0
1960 432 6599 . . 16 225 a a a 192 63 40 62 0 37
196 561 610 101 101 138 125 0 0 0 399 191 180 28 0 0
1962 739 29 139 149 -71) 512 3 13 0 281 61 184 36 0 0
1963 354t 464 244 260 62. 179 42 3 0 312 148 132 32 0 0
1964 7 03 825 169 283 9. 394 10 54 0 405 7 0 300 35 0 0
1965 837 1,065 241 309 109 360 33- 34 0 542 237 300 5 0 0
1966 672 839 96 284 64 255 42 272 0 386 17-9 153 54 0 0
1967i 647 839 37 356 19 345 40 2 0 28 32 208 39 0 0
1968 633 935 68 i0s7 300 47 14 0 265 146 119 0 0 0
1969 1L039 1,507. 159 385 134 440 51 41 0 503 112 302 89 0 0
1970 1,2111,68 327 606 218 57-2 96 33 0 62-1 158 391 -48 0 24
1971 1,371 Z,030 311 584 Ah 561 1%6 189 5 659 220 3121 97 0 30
1972 1,08 2Z041 497 1,000 148 521 114 55 10 748 258 275 150 0 65
1973 1,1332Z154 641 1,357f 289 322 248 279 20 637- 134 266 215 16 6
1974 2,09 3,302 422 1,095 427 77/7 108 186 53 1,017 248 449 230 60 30
1975,1,7824,415 456 1,577 50D7 504 199 121) 93 909 437 295 164 0 13
19762,489 5,047 727 1,655 528 949 64 .297 54 1,373 325 768 230 26 29
1977 2.80 5,830 536 1,307 83 952 140 337 13 1,07-3 126 651 247 25 24
1978 2.88 6,208 WI 2,313 940 1,146 221 3.75 264 1,197 259 556 163 105 14
1979 3,88 7,335 1,633 3,022 .946 1,375 110 1,169 294 1,920 333 1.365 89 16 67,
1980 4,36 8,307 .1,9983,933 1,319 Z.67 131 640 303 1,601 337 7796 312 56 100
1981 3,375 8,899 12394- 3,482 1,356 1,323 329 590 411 1,172 290 570r 58 90 164
1982 4,03010,333 1378 2,686 826 2,131 396 441 375 1,614 103 1,05 331 0 125
1983 3,70411,136 1,810 3,351 9341 1,768 57 781 529 1.924 450 I,00 258 0 208
1984 5,68311,947 1,34 3,575 *869 2.649 167 61 344 2,74 67" 1,58 334 146 2
1985 5,28011,356 1,1453,028 1,051 2,250 122 781 325 2,192 7755 823 382 53 1779
1986 5,09813,17791,22 3,140 1,405 2Z787 50 580 573 1.498 330 782 385 0 1
1987 5,89 14,188 1,3163,486 418 3,017 682 969 1,09 2,122 380 1,218 148 376 0
1988 5,18914,762 1.1334,459 942 2,007 36 515 672 2,523 85 1,314 260 180 213
1989 4,79 16,433 1,662 4,934 580 3,033 161 791 937 1,906 332 77-4 17 75 550
1990 6,93415,180 1,306 5,52 714 3,218 617r 906 556 2,785 40 2,352 3T7 0 356
1991 3,M7216,392 1,66 6,293 980 1,344 340 1,225 306 1,492- 115 910 268 104 95
1992 6,24515,156 1,444 6,550 1,010 3,042 430 911 624 2Z296 550 1,22 15 186 325
1993 6,9O 16,945 1,974 .62751 9270 2,613 353 1,154 148 3,837 701 2,146 159 669 162
Table AA Officia development finance commitments
Wmillioms of curment U.S. dellars)
outer
Wzairszapply infmsfructwr Total
year and sanitLfalku Transport Connurmnkatkms Earsnj setors inf rastructure Total
1984 I'M9 5,938 940 8,565 330 17,666 599,485-
1985 2,555 .5,303 786 7,675 286 16,608 56,183
1986 3,2113 4,690 1,141 7,595 5r72 17,214 67,092
1987 2,858 8,466 1,080 8,733 1,030 2ZI167 8Z,306
1988 4,319 7,697 2,519 8,-759 1,454 24,748 87,072
1989 1,979 7,503 1,628 6,570 2,817 20A497 75,115
1990 2,642 6,16 2,373 6,32 2015 20,168 92,96
1991 2,90 7,380 1,421 8,969' 3,298 23,758 101,589
149

-
::'--:
. .
.
.
. .
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s ' '
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f= ' .
-: - : WorldDezlelopmafl ors
.
.

* ;;\ * i Contents
Key 154
Introduction 157
Tables
1 Basic indicators 162
Production
2 Growth of production 164
3 Structure of production. 166
4 Agriculture and food 126
S Commercial energy 170
6 Structure of manufacturing 172
7 Manufacturing earungs and output 174
Domestic absorption
8 Growth of consumption and investment 176
9 Structr of demand 178
Fiscal and monetary accounts
10 Central government expenditure I80
11 Central government current revenue 182
12 Money and interest rates 184
Core intemational transactions
13 Growth of merchandise trade 186
14 Structure of merhadise imports 188
15 Structure o; nercandise exports 190
16 OECD imports of manufacturedgoods 192
17 Balance of payments and reserves 194
Exteral finance
.18 Official development asiistance from OECD and OPEC members 196
19 Official development assistance: receipts 198
20 Total extenal debt 200
n Flow of public and private external capital 202
22 Aggregate net resource flowvs and net transfers 204
23 Total extedal debt ratio 2-6
24 Terms of exenal public borrowing 208
Human resources development.
25 Population and labor force 210
26 Demography and fertility 212
27 Health and nutition 214
28 Education 216
29 Gender comparisons 22S
30 Income distribution and PPP estimates of GNP 220
Environmentally sustainable development
31 Urbanization 2m2
32 Infrastructure 224
33 Natural resources 226
Table la Basic indicators for other economies 228
Technical notes 229
Data sources 250
Classification of economies 251
153

E Key
hin each table, ecDonomes are listed withiin their the.sources, as well as more hinformation on the.
grusmnascendingorder of GN1'per capita,except sources, are givent hin World Population Projections,
that those for which no GNP' per capita can.be cal- 1994-95 Edition (forthcoming).
culated are italiczed, hin alphabetical order, at the Figures in colored bands hin the tables are sumend
of their group. The ranking below refers to the mruay measures for groups of economies..
aider in the tablet.
The letter wo means weighted average; nz, median
The key shows the years of the most recent cen- value; t, total.
sus and of the latest demographic survey or vital All growth rates are hin real terms.
registration-based. estfimates. This information is Data cutoff date i s March 24, 1994.
included to show the currentness of the sources of The symbol - .means not availabledemgahcindicators,
which can be a reflection The figures 0 and 0.0 mean zero or less than half
of the overall.quality of a countrfs indicators. Be- the unit shown
yond these years, demographic estimnates may be A blank means not applicablegenerated
by projection models, extrapolation rou- Figures int italics indicate data that are for years
tines, or other methods. Other demographic indica- or periods other than those specified.
tars, such as life eqxpctancy, birth and death rates, The symbol t inldicates economies classified by
and under-5 mortality rates, are usually derived the United Nations or otherwise regarded by their
from the same sources- Explanations of how World authorities as developing.
154 Bank -: Ks---: estimates and projections are derived from
Cot mt, 1
-aking
Papakk IlmInfantf
Tota
tableS censs molialily nefily
~~~~~~~~~in
Albania 86 1989 1991 1991
Algeria 74 19872 1992 19
Argentin 102 1991 1990 1990
Armenia 47 989 1991 1991
Ausiralia 116 1991 1992 1992
Austria 12s 1991 1992 1992
Azerbaijan 45 1989 1991 991
Bangladesh 10 1991 1991 1991
Belaru. 96 1989 1991 1991
Begium 121 1991 1992 1992
Benin 24 1992 1981-82184
Rhutan 7 1969 1984
Bolivia 44 1992 1989 1989
Bolswana 93 1991 1985 1988
Br-azil 92 1991 1986 1986
Bulgaria ~~~~~~~~~66 1992 1992 1992
Burkidna Faso 17 19855 1976 1992
Burundi 8 1990 1987 1987

mairking Popzdaliou: hrf htt Total
Comutiy in fblesn cowlus "winoblfy frtility
Cameroon 49 1957* '1991 1991
Canada 1201 1991 1992 1991
Central African Republic 25 1988 19755 1959
Chad 11 1993 1964 1964
Chiile 85 1992 1991 1991
China 28 1990 1992 1992
Colombia 67 1985* 1990 1990
Congo 56 '19S4 1974 1974
Costa Rica 79 '1954 1991 1991
COte dvohe 43 1988 1979 19588
Czech Republic 83 1991 1991 1991
Denmark 129 Ig81a 1992 1992
Dominican Republic 58 1981 1991 1991
Ecuador 59 1990 1959 1959
Egypt. Arab R-ep. 36 19W& 1988 19902
m Salvador 62 19927 1988 1988
Estonia 91 1989 1991 1991
Ethiopiab2 1984 1988
Finland 122 1990 1991 1992
France '124 1990 1992- 19921
Gabon 101 1980 1960-61 '1960-61
Georgia SiL 1989 1991 1991
Germn"ye 126 1991 1992- 1992
Ghana 271954* 1988 1988
Greece 107 1991 1992- 1992
Guatemala 55 1981' 1987 1987
Guinea 30 1983 1954-55 1954-55
Guinea-Ubissau 12 19793 -'1950
Honduras 34 1988 195748 1987-88
tHong Kong 114 1991 1992 1992
Hungary 97 1990 1992 1992
Irxdia 1s 1991 '19927 1992
Indonesia .37. 1990 1991 1991
bran, IsIamic Rep. 81 1991 1991 1991
Ireland 110 1991 1991 1992
tLsmael 112 198?a 1992 '1991
Italy' 115~~~~~~~~~~Il 1991 1992 '1992
Jamaica 65 1991 '1989 1990
Japan 131 1990 1992 1992
Jordan 601 1979' 1990-91 1990-91
Kazakhstan 71 1989 1991 1991
Kenya 19 1989 1989 '1993
Korea, Rep- 106 1990 1992 1991
Kyy Reubics 1989 1991 1991
Lao PDR '14 1985'i 1988 1988
Latvia 77 1989 1990 1990
Lesotho 35 1986' 1991 1991
lithuania 65 1989 1991 991
Madagascar 13 '1974-75a 1992 1992
Malawi 9 1987 1992 19927
Malavsia 94 1991 1991 1984
Mali 20 1987 1957 1987
Mauritania 31 '1988 1975 1987-8
Mauritius 90 1990 1992- 1992
Mexico 99 1990 1987 1987
Moldova 64 1989 1991 1991
Monigolia 87 '1989 1989
Morocco 57 '1982 1992- '1992
Mozambique 19BOa 1980 1980
Myamar 38 '1983 1983 1983
is5

Counli y
ranking Population Ifanfilt Totalf
Owiunry in tabh&s aruISuas mavrt thy
)btiffly
Namibia 70 1991 1992 1992
Nepal 5 1991 1987 18
Netherlands 119 197P- 19912 1992
NewZiealand ill 1991 1991 1991
Nicargua 22 1971 1955 1985
Niger 16 1985 1992 1992
Nigeria 21 1991 1990 1990
Nopaly 128 1990 .1992 1991
Orthan 103 1989 1989
Pakistan 26 1981 1990-91 1990-91
Panama 82 1990 1985-87 1990
Papua New Guinea 53 1998 . 1980 1950
Parguay 69 1992 1990 1990
Peru 54 1981 1991-92 1991-92
Phippines 46 *1990 1988
Poland 76 1988 1991 1992
Portugal 108 199! 1992 1992
Puerto Rico 105 1990 1991 1991
R1om.ania 61 1992 1990 1991
Russian Federation 84 1989 1991-2 1992
Rwanda 15 1991 1983 1992
Saudi Arabia 109 1992 1990 1990
Senegal 48 1988 1992-93 1992-93
SPerra Leione 4 1989- ? 1971 1975l
iRSingap.re 115 1990 1991 1991
Slovak Republic 78 1991 199S 1991
Slovenia 104 1991 1990 1990
Snmali- 39 1987 1980 1903
South Africa 89 1991 1980 1981
Spain 113 1991 1992 1992
Sri Lanka 32 1991- 1988 1959
SU&m 40 1953 1989-90 1959-90
Sweden 130 1990 1992 1992
Switzerlad 132 1990 1991 1991
Syri Amab Rep. -8 1981 1990 1981
Ta*l5pstan 29 1989 1991 1991
Tanzania 3 1988 1991-92 1991-92
Thailand 75 1990 1959 1957
'lbgo 1930 23
1989 1988
Thiudad and Tobago 100 1990 1959 1989
Tunisia 72 984a 1985 1990
Turkey . S 1990 1988 1988
Turlcmenistan 63 1989 1991 1991
Uganda 6 1991 1991 1991
Ukraine 73 1989 1991 1991
tUribed Arab Emirates 123 1985 1987 1987
United Kingdom 117 1991 1992 19S9
United Sates 127 1990 1992BS 1992
Uruguay 98 198O 1990 1990
Urbekistan 52 1989 1991 1991
Venezuda 95 1990 1989 1990
Yemean,Rep. 41 986/88 1991-92 1991-92
42 1990 1992 1992
Zimbabwe 33. 1992 198S-89 1988-89
Note Economies with spane data or withpopulationsofnmowe than 30000 and fewer than 1 milion areinduded as partof the countFvgmups in the
manin tables but are shown in greater detail in Table la. For da ta comparability and coverage duughout the tabes. see thc technal notes.
a. Supplemrnted bv more rcent offiial demographic estimates.
b. In all tables data indude Eritza, unless othernjqe stated.
c. In an tables data rfcr to the unified Germany. aunless othenrise stated.
' " -f ' ' 156

.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~I .-
Introduci-ion
This seventeenth edition of the World Development ports of goods and services and of GNP has re-
Indicators provides economic, social, and natural placed total external debt as a percentage of exports
resource indicators for selected periods or years for of goods and services and of GNP
207 economies and various analytical and Table 25, Populition and labor force, includes popugraphic
grouFs of economies. Although most of the lations age 15-64 for 1992 and labor force growth
data collected by the World Bank are on low- and rates for 1970-80,1980-92 and 1990-2000-
middle-income economies, comparable data for
high-income economies are readily available and Classficaton of economies
axe also included in the tables. Additional infonna- As in the Report itself, the man criterion used to
tion may be found in the World Bank- Atlas, World classify economies and broadlv distinguish different
Tables, World Debt rables, and Sociia Indicators of stages of economic development is GNP per capita.
Development. These data are now also available on This year the per capita income groups are lowdiskette
through the World Bank-s Socioeconomic income, $675 or less in 1992(42 economies); middlerTue-series
Access and Retrieval System-*STARS*. income, $676 to 58,355 (67 economies); and high-
Changs in this edition
Changes in this edition
income,
moe
$8,356 or more (23 economies) F-conomies
with populations of fewer than I million and those
Because of space limitations in the main tables, an with sparse data are not shown separately in the
economy must have reasonable coverage of key main tables but thev are included in the aggregates.
socio-economic indicators to be indluded. Addi- Basic indicators for these economies may be found
tional basic indicators for economies with sparse in Table la.
data (Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegov- Further classification of economies is by geoina,
Cambodia, Croatia, Cuba, Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, graphic location. For a list of economies in each
Dem. Rep. of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libena, group, see the tables on classification of econo-
Libya, Macedonia FYR, Viet Nam, Fed. Rep of Yu- mies at the back of this book. Aggregates for segoslavia,
and Zaire) are presented, along with coun- verely indebted middle-income economies are
tries with less than 1 nillion population, in Table Ia. also presented.
Other changes have been made to a number of
tables. Although these are described more fully in Methodglogy
the technical notes, an outline of the changes may be The World Bank continually reviews methodology
of interest
in an effort to improve the international comparabil-
A new table, Table 32, fnfiustructure, has been in- ity and analytical significance of the indicators- Difduded
to highlight key indicators of the service ferences between data in this year's and last year's
level and coverage of infrastructure (see the techni- editions reflect not only updates for the countries
cal notes).
but also revisions to historical series and changes in
The table on the structure of consumption has methodology.
been deleted because updates have not been avai-- All dollar figures are current US. dollars unless
able for most countries since 1985.
otherwise stated. The various methods used for con-
In Table 23, Total extenal debt ratios, net present verting from national currency figures are descnrbed
value of exteral debt as a percentage of total ex- in the technical notes.
157

Summary measures
Terminology and data coverage
The summary measures in the colored bands .on In these notes the term 'country does not imply
each table are totals (indicated by t), .- eighted aver- political independence but may refer to any tern-
: ages (wJ, or median values (in) calculated for groups tory whose authorities present for it separate social
of economies. Countries for which individual esti- or economic statistics.
mates are not shown, because of size, nonreporting, The unified Germany does not yet have a fully
or insufficient hlstory, have been implicitly incuded merged statistical system. Throughout the tables,
by assumig they follow the trend of reporting data for Gennany are footnoted to explain coverage;
countries during such periods. This gives a more most economic data refer to the former Federal Reconsistent
aggregate measure by standardizing public, but demographic and social data generally
country coverage for each period shown. Group ag- refer to the unified Germany. The data for China do
gregates include countries for which country- not include Taiwan, China, but footnotL to Tables
specific data do not appear in the tables. Where 13,14,15, and 17 provide estimates of international
missing information accounts for a third or more of transactions for Taiwan, China.
the overall estimate, however, the group measure is
reported as not available. The weightings used for
computing the summary measures are stated in The indicators in Tables I and la give a summary
each technical note.
profile of econromies. Data in the other tables fall
be ekonomnue
-mamfe~ormfie ~
Daw a noptavi aNe
73- _ ;_ 'c_v_ _
~ .-
''.'tsa Z t -
Zse.l
,~~~~~ ~ ~ 5 -
_p ; _ ;*
,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~W .o15
.~~~~~~~~~~~... .~ S..
:5'

into the following broad areas: production, domes- Technical notes
tic absorption, fiscal and monetary accounts, core
international transactions, external finance, human The technical notes and the footnotes to tables
resources development, and environmentally sus- should be referred to in any use of the data. The
* tamable development. The table format of this edi- notes outline the metlhods, concepts, definitions,
tion follows that used in previous years. In each and data sources used in compiling the lables. A
grottp, economies are listed in ascending order of bibliography at the end of the notes lists the data
GNP per capita, except that those for 'which no such sources, which contain some of the comprehensive
figure can be calculated are italicized and listed in definitions and descriptions of the concepts used.
alphabetical order at the end of the group deemed Country notes to the World Tables provide additional
appropriate. This order is used in all tables except. explanations of sources used, breaks in comparabil-
Table 18, which covers only high-income OPEC and ity, and other exceptions to standard statistical prac-
OECD countries. The alphabetical list in the key tices that World Bank staff have identified in nashows
the reference number for each economy; tional accounts and international transactions.
here, too, itaLics indicate economies with no current Comments and questions relating to the World
estimates of GNP per capita. Economies in the high- Development Indicators should be addressed to:
income group marked by the symbol t are those Socio-Economic Data Division, International Ecoclassified
by the United Nations or otherwise re- nomics Department, The World Bank, 1818 H Street,
garded by their authorities as developing- N.W., Washington, D.C 20433.
. ~ ~ ~ -IUJ:z.'½F. ~
.
-- -tjrt~f - - '-
- ~
-r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
77:
hma.
W-.;
*~~~I - a-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i
-t. -
__ r-t
(C __
C~~~~~~~~~~~7
(I - -F ~~~*-~~
- M u-I
, -.- I
tax
J~~~~~~~~~~~~
dI~~~~r~~~n.~~~~.U-

f~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
; 1* jlp0 k,' 0 @
' I'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7
. . ' , . !.~~~~

: - .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4
: ~~~ ;
:n r
i~~~~~~~~~ .af
SzAS)ov, ,j, s e,> Y,. - L
Fr watezi 199 >- -s;, . :* -
- - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ w
* 2 ~ D ~_ -F messithan25~ ~.~
t B }P~~~~n
-'.-C.d -ofd
.- :-;t>~~~~~~~~~n s -- t lapmpiayelue:Forinomdetails, see te tecia -- t fo.r ---:
-; Jrt Dabno^ alabe; = ; 1 - -b1e 32.;
< D =
J6~~~~~~~~~6
- ffiles: ,. - ,,3 H : a ...........
----; . . : _- - -1 6r.1-

Taible 1. Basic inmdicators
Pepalsia. Arm _____________ Af mud AdWdab di&a s)
tailMa) frunt DWyA am azmwk "4*" MISJ Fend, Tire
mid-199 4q$. ha) 1992 ( 5). 1950-92 1931- 1910-9 M99 mg9 199
[aw-IucaueemnouIs 34191.3:t 38,929 390 w 3.9 w .. 2.2w 62 w P. w 4D w
Eid.adiag Chlna&InIa IJMili t 6MMSI 370w 1.2wr 153 21w6w 56w 45 w
I Mazambique .16.5 BE2 60 -3.6 .. 38.0 44. 19 67
2 Eahiopia 54.8 1.22 110 -1.9 4.3 2-8 49 -
3 'Tamanit 25.9 945 110 0.0 14.1 25.3 51
4 SicnuLeon 4.4 77 lE0 -L.4 12.5 60.1 43 89 79
5 NqmI 19.9 141 170 2.0 3.5 9.2 54 97 74
G Ugaud 17.5 236 170 ..... 43 65 52
7 Bhutm .1.5 .47 18D 6.3 .. .7 43 75 62
Shhonmdi 5.3 23 210 1.3 .10.7 4.5 48 60 so
9 MWalign 9.1 lIs 210 -0.1 LB 15.1 44
10 Bangdl;lsh 114A4 144 220 1.8 20.3 9.1 55 78 65
lItChad
12 Gaainc-Bimau
6.0
LU0
1.28
36
220
220
3.4
1.6
7.7
5.7
0.9
59.3
.47
39
82
76
70
64
13 Madapasar 12.4 537 230 -2.4 9.9 16E4 51 27 20
14 LaoCPDR 4.4 237 250 .... . 51
15Rwanda 7.3 26 230 -06 5. 3.6, 46 63 50
IG6Niger 8.2 1.267 2ND -4.3 10.9 1.7 46 33 72
17 BudkinaFas 9.5 274 300 1.0 8.6 3.5 48 91 832
18 IniW8.6 3.23 310 3.1 8.4 85 61 66 52
I9 Kenya
20 Mali
.25.7
9.0
530
1.24
310
.310
0.2
-2.7
10-1
9.7
9.3
3.7
59
48
42
76
31
63
21 Nigia
22 Nkcaaga
101.9
3.9
924
130
320
340
-0CA
-5.3
15.2
12.8
19.4
656.2
52
67
61 49
23 Togo 3.9 57 390 -L9 8.9 42 55 69 57
24 Benin 5.0 113 410 -0.7 10-3 1.7 SI 84 77
.25 Central Afrimn Rqmbllc 3.2 623 410 -1.5 12.1 4.6 47 75 62
26 PAIsmn . 119.3 796 420. 3.1 13.4 7.1 59 79 65
27 Ghan 15.3 239 450 -0.1 35.2 33.7 56 49 40
28 Clbis 1.162.2 9.561 470) 7.6 .. 6.5 69 38 21
29 TailIcitan 5.6 143 490 .. .. 69..
306Guinea 6.1 246 51 - - . 44 37 76
3 lMauuiania *2.1 1.026 530 -OS1 9.9 833 48. 79 66
37-Sui Laka 17.4 66 540 2.6 12 11.0 72 17 12
33 Zimnbabwc 10C4 391 570 -0.9 9A4 14.4' 60 40 33
34flgpd4 5.4 112 .53D -0.3 LI1 7.6 66 29 27
35 Lcssho 1.9 30 590 -115 9.7 13'2 60
36 ErJtF.A[bhRCP
3lliwndoast
54.7
184.3
1.002
1.905
640
670
L.B
4.0
9.6
21.5
13.2
3.4B
62
60
66
32
5
23
SSAJpmnrw 43.7 677 ... 11.4 14. 60 28 19
39 Sjrt L3j3 15.2 49.7 49 36 76
40 - ajg26a 2.506 .. ~ .14.5. 42.89 52 BK 73
41 Yme, Rep. 13.0 528 ...... 53 74 62
42 Zambia 8.3 753 ... 7.6 48.4 48 35 27
Mwlddiaeuneeamaunils 1,413.71 f2.7411t 2496w
Leww-middik4eemnae -. 941.0*i 40.903 t ...
-0.1 w 31l0
2319w
105.2w
49.7 w
63wv
67 w
43 Cflwditvdac 12.9 322 67(F -4.7 13.0 1.9 56 60 46
44 Bolivia 7.5 1.099 680 -1.5 21.0 220.9
45 Azbaijanb 7.4 37 740 ... .71
60 29 23
46 Phllipuc 64-3 3110 770 -La0 13.3 14.1
47 AmaevJa 317. 30 780 .. . - .70
65 11 ID
48 Seneda 7.8 197 780 0.1 355.2 49 75 .62
49 Caumea 12.2 475 820 -1-5 9.8 .3.5 56. 57
50 KyrgyzRlepbliCb 4.5 199 82 . . . 66
72
Slueoauiab 5.5 70 850 .....
46
52Uzlielcib 2I.5 447 850 ... .69
53 Papua NewGuinea 4.1 463 950 0.0 .9.1 5.1 56 62 48
54 Pau
55 Guatenala
22.4
9.7,
I.23
109
950
980
-LB8
-1.5
30.1
10.5
311.7
16.5
65
65
21
53
15
45
S6Cmugo ~~~~ ~~~2.4
342 1.030 -0.8 8.4 0.5 51 56 43
57 Nowucco 26.2 447 LOAD1 L4A 83 6.9 63 .62 51
53 Dominican Republic 73 49 1.050 -0.5 ..9.1 25.2 63 13 17
59 Ecuador 11.0 284 1.070 -0.3 13.8 39.5 67 16 14
dOjionla 3.9 59 1.120 -5.4 . 5.4 70 30 20
61 Romania.: 22. 238 1.130 -LI . 13.1 70
62EI Salvador 5.4 21 1.170 0.0 10.7 17.2 66 30 27
63 Tudaneaisanb 3.9 488 120L.. . 66 -
64 MoIdovab 4.4~ 34 1,00 ..... 68 -
05 Lithoaniab . . 5 11 L . 2771
Mflulgasia
~ ~~ ~ ~385 111 1.330 -1.2 . I07
67 Colomia 33A 1.139 1.33 1.4 22.3 25.0 69 14 13
6h laznaica 2.4 1 1.340 0.2 17.3 21.5 74 I 2
69. Pazagmny 4-5 407 1.33 -0.7 12.7 25-2 67 12 10
70 NaIbm 1t5 824 1.610 -L0 IZ 1.3 59
71 Icazaksnd 17.0 2.717 1.680 ... .68.. -
72 Tunisia 3.4 164 I.720 1-3 87726 4 3
Nafe: For odaer economics see Table la. FDr datacompsabity andcovernge. seeheKey andte technical nasa. Pigumasin ialis am for yearsother thn thse
s flOuL.
162

Pqm&uem Airs GN'perafii -AY an!A UjfrqsM.ata AdhMw (SI
uwikn) (kxniat Dolin Arg. aL mnvkvda M Mrth (yru Fannie Tan!
.114992 nfz Lu) M9 (5.? - 19109 19,1-9 MD2 90
74 Algeria
75 Thnland
263
53.0
2.38
513
1.340
1.340
4.5
6.0
145
9.2
1.
4.2
6755
69 10.
4
7
76 Poland 38.4. 313 1.910 0.1 -- 67.9 70 -. .
77 Latvisa' 2.6 65 1.930 0.2 .. 15.3 69
78 SkowakRepnbic 5.3 49 1.930 ... .71
79 -Costa Rica
SOorey
3.2
58.5
51
779
1.960
1.930
0.3
2.9
15.
29.4.
22.5
46.3
76
6
7
9
7
1
S1 rmn.Isnanic Rep. 59.6 1,648 2.200 -1.4 .. 16.2 65 57 46
S2 Panum 2.5 77 2,420 -1.2 7.7 2.1 73 12 12
83 CzccbRqubIic 10.3 .79 2.450 ... .72
14 Missian FedC12ti0nb 149.0 17,075 2.510 ... .69
H ChiIc - 13.6 .757 2.7300 .3.7 137.1 20.5 7M 7 7
36 Alhantia 3.4 29 .. ... 73
S7lMazsaia 2.3. 1.567 ..... 64.
88 SysianArabfRep. 13.0 INS .I . 1.8 15-5 67 49 36
Upper-mkldle4neomne 477.7 t 21,8137 a 4,32w 11.w 343 w 1SL.8w 69 w 38 w 15wv
19 SaudhiMflka 39.3 1.22' 2,6700 LI.. 13.0 14.3 63
90 Manikins LI 2 2.700 5.6 15.3 8.6 70
91 Esroniab ~~~~ ~~1.6 45 2.760 -23 .. 20.2 70 -
92 Brazil 15.9 8.512 2.770 0.4 38.6 370.2 66 20 19
93 Buwanwa 1.4 582 2.790 6.1 11.6 12.6 68 35 26
94 Malayia
95 Vaunaucla
13.6
20.2
330
912
2.790
2.910
3.2
-0as
7.3
14.0
2.0
22.7
71
70
30
17
22
8
96 BL4aSb 10.3 208 -2.930 -.. 71
97 Hungary 10.3 93 2.970 02 2. 11.7 69
93 Uumguy 34.1 177 3.340 -ED0 63.9 66.2 72 4 4
99 Mexico 85.0 1.95 3,470 -42 1ILI 67-4 70 15 13
100 Trinida and Tcbago
lOl Gabon
1.3
1.2
5
268
3.940
4.450
-2.6
-23.7
18.5
17S
3.9
2.3
71
54 52 39
102 Argentina 33.1 2.767 6.050 -0.9 134.2 402.3 71 5 5
103 Oman . 1.6 212 6.480 4.1 28.0 -2-5 7.0
10O Skovnia 2.0 20 5.540 . -73.
105 Puerto Rico 3.6 9 6.590 0.9 6.5 3.374
106 Kamea. Rep. 43.7 99 6.790 8.5 20.1 5.9 71 7 4
107 Greece 10-3 132 7,290 1.0 14-5 17.7 77 31 7
10g Porftugal 9.8 92 7.450 3.1 16.7 17.4 74 19 15
109 Saudi Arbia 16.8 2.150 7.510 -3.3 24.9 -1.9 69 52 38
LOW-MAnu
Al4aer.-46101 t -161469* 1,64Gw 0.9w- -26.2w -75.7w 64w 46wv 36w
Sub4uImraAOIca 50.0: 74,274* 533w . -01w 13.6 w M56w 52w62ww
FatAala&1adflc. .1,EUUzr-- 1636 763 w 6.1-w 1.w 667w 65w. 34 w U2
- -.-- SouthAsla4~~ 14177.91 5333f . -315w -~~ 3.0w '9.7w L85 4. Sw i 69w- 55w
EuropeaudCentsiJAsIa
4343* 34373* 2,83w - 18~~~ILT w.w 473w 70w_
MMieEfl&N.Afr1n~~~~~~~~~~~,
2525* - 11,615*- IJIEw e -. 23w w 17.0w iv .101 10.1w W 64w 57w 45w~~~~~~~~~~~~M
.ALadaAmekmcadbae .453.2i-- _20,57- -,66 . .2lw . 4.7w 1- 2.3W. 6W_ fi
Is3w- ISw-
,-~SeverdyIndebted----- 5U46t--fl,d3t %.-
- - A24Lw--Lw .w: - Iiw _67w .25w.: 23-w
lIlhincirne eeonrnin ai .1 t 31.7019t 22,165 n' 2.3wv 9.1 W 4.3 v 77wv
110 lunlars 3.5 70 12.10 3.4 14.2 5.3 75
III New7ealand 3.4 271 12.3W1 0.6 12-5 9.4 76 e c
112 tlsucit 5.1 21 -13.220 1.9 39.6 78.9 76
113 Spain
114 tHoeg Kag
39.1
5.8
M0
1
13.970
15.3EV
2.9
5.5
16.1
9.2
8.7
7.8
77
78
7 5
11s -ti iaaoe2.8 1 15.730 5.3 5.9 2.0 . 75
116Au la17.5 7.713 1726 1E6 11.3 6.4 77c C
117 UnitedKingdom 57.8 245 17.790 2.4 14.5 5.7 76 e . c
113 Italy 57.3 301 20.460 2.2 15.6 9.1 . 77 e c
119 Netderlads 15.2 37 20.480 1.7 7.9. 1.7 77 £ £
120OCanada 27.4 9.976 20.710 ES . 8.7 441 789 c . c
121 Belgium 10.0 31 20.8150 2.0 7.8 4.1 76ee
M2 Finland 5.0 333 21.970 2.0 12.3 6.0 75 e e
123 tUuiaed Arab 'HimmS 1.7 34 22.020 -4.3 0.8 72 e c
124 Fiance 57A4 552 722.W 1_3 10.2 £-4 77ec
125 Austia 7.9 34 22.380 2.0 6.5 3.6 77 e c
126 Germany 80.6 357 23.030 2.48 5.15 2.75 76 e c
M2 United States 255A4 9,37 23.240 137 7.5 3.9 77 e c
128 Nornay 4.3 324 25.820 2.2 3.4 4.9 77 e c
129 Denniak 5.2 43. 26.00 2.1 10.1 4.9 75. e
130 Swedn .8.7 450 27.010 1.5 . 10.0 7.2 78
131 Japan 124.5 378 23.190 3.6 3.5 1.5. 79 c e
I32.SwitzeLand 6.9 41 36.080 1.4 £0 3.8 78 C C
. --~r 548t-

Table 2. Growth Of production
19-8 1983-9 193- 1980-9 1970-8 198-92 19798 1980927 IP9O -80 19-9
Lnw-Incmncecuua.nlus* .. Li~~~6. w .. 8 w . 7.5 w ... . 71w
ExdndlngChbnu&Ium1 . 4.8w 33.9 2.1 w 2.6w: 6.4 w 4.2 w 5.7 w 6.8 w 61.5w 4.3 w
I Moicmnbique . 0.4 .. 1.3 .. -0A....4 -1.5
2 Ethiopia .1.9 .1.2 0.7 04 1.6 0,9 2.5 038 3.9 2.3
3 Tannin 3.0 3d1 017 3.3 2.6 2.2 3.7 0.6 . 9.0 .2.21
4 Sfrna Lemr 1.6 1.3 6.0 2.3 -3.2 -1.3 -2.1I -4.6 2.3 . Ii
5 Nepal 2.7 5.0 0.5 4.3 . .
6 Uganda.. . .. . ...
7
a
Ohtn.
Bunandi 4.2
.
4.0
.
.3.2
4.4
'3.0
..
11L6
18
4.7
..
3.8
13.2
545
..
3.5
7.
.5.5
9 Malawi 5.8 2.9 4.4 1.4 6.3 3.5 .. 4.0 .70 3.8
10Lk lugldesl 2.3 412 0.6 2.7 5.2 Si1 5. 3d1 39 5.5
IIaCuadc .. a 5.3 -0.4 3.9 -2.1 6.0 ... 2.2 6.7
12 Cuinea-Bissau 2.4 3.6 -L.2 4.2: 2.1 2.3 .. 12.3 . 3.2
13 Madagscar 0.5 LI1 0.4 2.4 0.6 0.8 ... .6 0.3
15 Rwanda" 417 1.4 .. -0.3 .. L 4.9 1.6
16 Niger 0.6 -0.7 -3.7. 11.3 ... . 1.4
17 BurkdZa Faso 44 3.9 LO. 3.0 2.5 .3.8
18 India 3.4 5.2 La9 12 45 6.4 .
4.1
4.6
2.9
6.5
19.7
4.6
.5.1
6.3
19 Kenya 6A4 4.0 4.2 2.9 3.6 3.9 9.9 .4.8 6.8 4.3
20 Malic 4.9 2.9 42 2.5 2.0 4.4 ... 7.1 2.1
21 Nigaia 4.6 2.3 -0.1 316 7.3 0.2 5.2 9.5.6 3.4
22 Nicaragua' 1.1 -117 1.9 -2.0 1.1 -3.0 2.8 -3.2 OA -1.0
23 Togo 4.0 1.4. 1.9 4.9 7.7 LI . 2.5 3.6 -0.7
24 Beainc 2.2 1.4 1.8 5.2 U. 3.8 .. 5.0 .27 0.6
25 CentralAfuicanRepuhli: 2.4 1.1 1.9 2.2 4.1 2.8 -. . 2.3 -0.4.
26 Pakkistn 4.9 6.1 2.3 4.5 6.1 7.3 5.4 7.4 6.3 6.5
27 Chant -0.1 3.4 -0.3 1.2 -1.0 -4.0 -0.5 4.1 1.1 6.7
29 TajIkism . . . . . .. ..
30 Geinea . .. .. . . ..
31
32
Mauritania
STi LUIIC
1.3
4.1
IS9
4.0
-1.0
2.8
1.5
2.1
0.5
3.4
3.9
419
...
1.9 65
3.6
5.7
1.1
4.6
33 Zimbhabwe 1.6 2.8 0.6 Id. IA L.9 2.8 2.8 2.4. 3.8
34
35
Hoeduris
LasnolI
5.8
tO
2.8
5.4
2.2
O12
3.0
0.5
6.7
27.8
3.5
8.5
6.9
ItO
3.7
12.
7.1
13.6
24
5.3
36
37
ESYF AUIb Rep.
Indonceia
9.5
72
44
5.7
2.8
4.1
2.4
3.1
9.4
9.6
3.9
6.1
...
14.0 12.0
17.5
7.7
. 5.8
6.3
3SliMyninar 4.7 0.6 4.3 0.5 417 0.9 4.2 -0.2 5.4 017
39 Smi-a . 4.8 2.4 625 3.3 -2.8 1.0 -.0.3 -1.1
40 Stem 5.6 . 3.3 .. 4.5 .3.9 ..
5.8
L
0.9
41 Yowna.Rep.S
42 Zanbiac 1IA 019 1 131 1.5 0.9 2.4 3.7 1'.2 0.2
Tnermiddl-icome.. . ... ...
43 Ckted'Ivoire 6.8 0.0 2.7 -1.0 9.1 4.4 ... 10-3 -1.4
44BOIvia' 4.5 0.6 3.9 1.8 2. -0.3 6. 01 7.6 0.2
t
45 Araenija
. .e. . . .
46 PhIlppne'6-0 1.2 4.0 1.0 8-2 -0.2 6.1 017 5.1 2.3
48 Smcncgl 7-23 3.0 1.3 217 5.3 3.8 2.4 Sd1 2.0 3.0
49 Crntmon 7.2 1.0 4.0 -1.0 10.9 0.5 7.0 10.6 7.8 2.6
51 Geoigia' . . . . . .
52 Uzbekcistan'c_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
53 Pap.. NewGuinmea
54ftP.C .
2.2
3.5
2.3
-0.6.
2.3
0.0
I-7
Li7
-.
4.4
3.3
-0.5
.0.1
3d1 -0.7
..
4.6
2.0
-0.9
55 Gutweranla 51 1.4 .4.6 1.7 7.7 0.6 6.2 1.1 5.6 1.6
S6 Cougge 5.8 2.4 2.5 2.8 10.3 317 5.9 4.5 1.
57 Moscco'c 5.6 4.0 LI1 5.3 6.5 3.0 .. 4.2 7.0 4.2
58 DoNIiIIjO Republic' 6.5 1.7 3.1 0.4 8 .3. 1.6 6-5 0.9 712 2.3
59 Ecuador t 9.5 2.3 2.8 417 13.9 1.2 10.5 0.2 9.4 2.3
60 loidnhn. 0.8 .. . ...
61 Rocunia -. -LO . -42 . -2.6 ... .13
62 El Savadorc . 1.3 3.4 0.1 5-2 1.9 4.1 1.7 4.0 1.3
63 redkmenit'.. .... . ...
64 Moldov'.. . . . . .
65 Lthuamiac . -0.2 . . .3 . - 4A4 .. .. -0.1
66. BulgaTia . . L . -LB . 2.2 .... 2.9
67 Colmbia 5.4 3.7 4.6 3.2 5.1 4.7 5.3 3.5 5.9 . 3.1
63 lamaimca. -1.4 1.1 0.3 1.0 -3.4 2.6 -2.1t 2.5 0.4 1.1
69 Pxagmgy' BS 2.3 6.2 3.4 11.2 0.4 7.9 2.2 8.6 3.6
70 N4anibia LO1. . -0.5 . L . 2-5 .2.6
71 Ixakhstanc
72: ibtisa 6.3
.
318
.
4.1
..
319
.
3.7 3.1
.
104 6.3 6.6 4.3
Mae.e Fordatcmnpmabfihryancownage.see the Key ad te technicalmots. Figuresinitalics at foryeaiodlerthan those specified.
164.

GDP AgmIrflun"y Alatmqjrmd Senrrk. te.h
1970-8 19892 19704 1910-92 19340M 191921 1970f 1981-92 197f040 1910-9fl
73 Ukuaince
74 Algeria 4.6 2.6 7.5 5.3 3. 137.i-. 4.6 3.3
75 Thiullrnd'! 7.1 8.2 4.4 4.1 9.5 10.1 10.5 10.1 6.1 I.1
76 Polandc . 0.6 ... ...
77 Latvia .. 0.6 -. -0.7 .. 1.3 .. 1.3 .. 0
78 SI=va Rpblic. . ... . .
* 79 QsRla 5.7 3.3 2.5 3.5 3.2 3.3 . . . .
80H Turkcey 5.9 4.9 3.4 219 6.6 5.1 . 6.7 6.5 5.3
13 Iran. lslamic Rep. .. 23 . . .. 4.4 .. 5.8 OA0.
12 Pfanama' 44 0.9 1.8 2.5 4.2 -2.6 2.8 0.1 4.8 IA3
13 Czech Republic' . . .. . .
14 RussianPederainela . . .. . .. ..
15 Chile' 1.1 4.8 . .6' 0.2, 4.2, -0.8 4.2 2.8 S.1I
16 Albania .- ... . . .
11 Syrian A rob Re.' 9.9 La . 0 . 7.6 11.1 0.3
Upper.niMdirlueanom. 6.06w 2.6wr 3.1wv 2.12w 6.5wr 2.0 w 6.8wi 2-5 w 6.2 w 2.7 w
19 South Alties 3.0 i! 3.2 3.7 2.3 -33.1 4.7. -41.2 3.8 2.1
.90 M-ruitius 6.8 6.2 -33 2.1 10.4 9.2 7.1 10.1 10.9 5.6
93 Estonia' . -1.8 .. -2.3 .; L ..- .1.2
921 Snacil LI 2.2 4.2. 2.6 9.4 IA 9.0 3.0 SAl 3.4
93 Botsuana' 14.5 30.1 8.3. 3.4 17.6 10.1 22.9 3.9 14.1 11.7
94 MalaysIa' 7.9 5.9 .. 3.6 .. 8.0 .10.0 .. 5.1
95 Venezuela' 3.5 1.9 3.4 2.6 0.5 . 2.1 . 5.7 1.6 6.3 1.7
96 Bd1aruase. . .. .. .. .
*97 liungary' 5.2 0.0 218 -0.1 6.3 -2.5 ... 5.2 2.1
98 Unagay' 3.1 1.0 0.8 0.7 .4.1 0.2 .. 0.5 3.0 1.7
99 Meaiceo 6.3 1.5 3.2 0.6 7.2 1.6 7.0 2.3 6.3 1.5
IOU Trhiidad and Tobago 5.9 -3.7 -1.4 -6.8 5.6 -6.6 1.7 -Li7 74 -2.0
*101 Gabone tO0 0.5 .. 13 .. Ls 4.7 .. -LO*
102 Afgentina 2.5 0.4 .*2.5 1.2 3.9 -0.1 1.3 0.4 2.9 0.6
.103 Oman'n fi2 7.7 7) 9.6 . ft"a 6.0
104 Slovenia . .. . .. .-
105 PUeetoRicO' 3.9 4.2 23 2.2 5.0 3.6. 79 t324.7
106 Kwra. RcpP 9.6 9.4 .2.7 1.9 15.2. 11.6 37.0 31.9 9.6 9.3
107 Greece 4.7 1.7 1.9 0.2 5.0 132 6.0 0.3 5.6 2.5
108 Pornugalc' 4.3 2.9 ...
109 Saudi Atabia 30 I 0.4. 5.3 14.0 102 -2.9 6.4 LI 10.3 -0.2
~-'3.6,~Pt4J#t4t:LrwS~!j>
~-~3i
J' 36 ½ * ir
t7w..-3.6w 112w. C-44.3w"3 '14:4r r 49W M~ 233w
!,X 33
* .r:.... i~~~~~2w..~.63-i wt ½.tr&A:s6Iw.
Hlh-ucmeecomanfles .3.2 w 2.9 w 0.7 w .. 27 w .. 3.4 W 317w
1 M2tlssnel 4.8 3.9 ... ...
313 Spin .3.5 3.2 ... . ...
114 tHIang Kong 9.2 6.7 . .. . . . .
115 tSlngapom' 2.3 6.7 IA -6.6 1.6 6.0 9.7 7.1 83 7.3
116 AustrAlia' .3.0 3.1 . 2.9 .. 2.2 .. 14 .3.3 4.0
117 UnitedKiUngdom 2.0 2.7 . .. . . .
11l Ialy . . 0.9 0. 3. 2g.8 2 4.0 2.7
119- Neuliedmnds' 2.9 *.2.3 ... ...
320. Canada . -4.6 2.82 1.2 1L6 32 24 3.5 '4 6.6 331
121lBegiunfc 3.0 2.31 . 1.5 .. 22. 3.0 .. 19
322 Finland 3.1L ZA 0.2 -0.3 3.0 24 3.3 25 3.9 3.)
323- f United AnbEmimles .. 0.3 .. 9.1 .. -.. 3.3 .431
324 :FiTanc' 3.2 .2.2. . LB . L I .. 0.9..2
3125 Austrie' .3.4. 2• 2.6 0.9 3.1 2.22 3.2 26 317 24
126 Gennntd 2.6 2.6 1.1 1.6 1.7 Li) 2.0 1.6 3.5 3.0
3,27 United States' .2.8 2.7 0. . 2.1 .3.0 .. 3.1 2.9
128 Noarway 418 2.6 1.3 1.2 7.1 . 5-3 1 I2 0.4 3.6 0.6
129 Deanurk 2.2 22 2.3 33. 1.1 2.7 2.6 1.3 2.6 2
130 Sweden 1.9 1.9 -1.2 1.3 M. 2.3 3.0 20 3.3 1.4
-131 Japan' * 4.3 4.1 -02 . 0.7 4.0 5.5 .4.7 5.8 4.9 3.7
a.-,Because ninnurnetuing is raeneUy die most dynamic pan of the industrial sector its gmwvth maw is shown sepwatey. b. Services. etc. includes unallocated
itenas C. GDP anIisctpnnsaaptlaevie.d aatfrote Fde Republic ofGCenuay bdbwxem6flvcation.
165

Table 3. Structure of production
MP Owy- .0 hdmtq U-uf-~ serviros. d,.b
JV70 192 1970 1992 t970 (W. 1970 W 19779 1992
Low-inconve Mies. 1,146,142 t 29 w 31 w 40 w
OWuding Chim & India 9012 t 427-M t 30 W 29 . 16 W 41 w
I MMmbkpic 965 61 15 21
2 Ethiopia 1.66 6.257 56 49 14 13 9 39
3 Tmnnia 1.174 2.345 41 61 17 12 10 5 42 36
4 Siena Leone 383 634 28 39 30 16 6 5 42 46
5 Nepal 861 2.763 67 52 12 la 4 9 21 30
6 Upada I 2."11 57 1 4 32
7 Bhuto 238 42 27 9 .31
8 Burundi 2ii 986 71 54 to 20 is 19 26
9 MaLlwi 271 1.671 44 28 I7 22 15 39 50
10 BangLidesW 6.60 23.783 55 34 9 17 6 9 37 49
I IChmdc 302 U47 47 44 18 21 17 16 .35 35
12 Gainct-Bismu 79 220 47 44 21 8 21 31 47
13 Madqascar 995 2,767 24 33- 16 14 59 53
14 Lao PDRc 1.195
15- RwandiF 2i6 1.5P. d i 9 22 4 16 30 -37
16 Niger (47 2-U5 65 37. 7 17 5 7 29 46
17 Barldm Fam 335 7-790 42 44 21 20 14 12 37 37
19 India 52,949 214-M 45 32 22 27 is 17 33 40
19. Kenya 1.453 6.U4 33 27 20 19 12 12 47 54
20 hwic 338 2.827 61 42 11 13 7 12 29 45
21 wigeyb 11.594 29,667 41 37 14 38 4 45 25
22 Nimagoac 785 1,847 25 3D 25 19 20 16 49 50
23 Togo 253 1.611 34 36 21. 21 10 10 45 43
24 Beninc 332 2,181 36 37 12 13 7 52 50
25 Cmtcd Aftican Rqmblic 169 [XI 35 44 26 .13 7 39 43
26 Pakistan 9.1m .41.904 37 27 22 16 18 41 46
27 Ghamc ZaI4 6,W 47 49 18 16 1 9 35 35
28 Chinc 506.075 27 34 38
29 TajWscm 3.793 33 35 32
30 GuineaF 3.M 33 32 3 - 36
31 Mauritania 197 1.080 29 29 39 27 5 11 32 44
32 Sri Lanim 2.215 8.769 29 26 24 25 17 15 48 49
33 Ziinbabwe 1.415 5.035 Is 22 36 35 21 30 49 43
34 Handums 654 2.813 3_7 22 22 29 14 17 45 49
35 Lcsodio 67 536 35 1 1 9 45 4 17 56 45
36 EUM.Amb Itep- 6.599 33,553 29 Is 29 30 12 42 52
37 hwIDomize 9.657 126.364 45 19 19 40 10 21 36 40
39 Mywvnar 2.155 37.749 38 59 14 10 to 7 48 31
39 Somw& 286 879 59 65 16 9 9 5 25 26
'40 - Sudan 1.764 43 34 15 17 8 9 42 50
41 Ymen. Repc 9.615 - 21 - 24 10 55
42 7Ambiar 1.799 3.831 It 16 55 47 10 36 3.5 37
3"" t
Lower-aridd3eninconve 119511V t
43 C&ed'lvoiie 1.147 8.726 40 37 23 23 13 36 39
44 Boliviae 1.1020 5270 20 32 13 49
45 AzerbaijanC 5.432 3i 40 -.- 53 29
46 Philippinft- 6.691 52.462 30 32 33 25 24 39 45
47 AwicnW 2-718 20 46 34
48 ScncgWc 965 6.277 24 19 20 19 16 13 56 62
49 CanxTaoiF 1,160 10.397 31 r- 19 30 10 77 50 49
50 KyWz RcpuWicc 3.665 29 45 27
51 Gmw 4.660 27 37 75 37
52 Uzbekifte 27
14.975 33 40 29
53 PAptia New GtiineaF W 4= 37 25 22 38 5 9 4 1 37
54 Ptrmc 7.2-U 22.100 19 32 20 50
-.55 GmuenvW 1,9D4 10,434 2S. 20 55
56 Cmqpc 774 - 2.916 is 13 24 35 13 59 52
57 Moroccoc 3.956 28.401 .20 is V 33 i6 19 53 52
59 Dominican Rcpublie 1,495 7.729 23 is 26 26 19 .14 51 56
59 Fkudorc 1.674 IZ691 24 13 2.5- 39 is 22 5 1 49
6D JoFdan 4,091 7 29 is 65
61 Romania 24.438 19 49 45
24 19
62 El Salvadorc 1.029 6."3 28 23 19
48 66
63 Twkmenistme. -- -
64; Mokkwac 34 37 42 30
65 Lithuaniac 4,922 21 53 26
66 But 10,847 14 45 41
'-57 C, 7.199 49" 25 16 28 35 47 49
iamgdcar 1.405 3.2% 7 5 43 44 16 20 51 51
69 Panignayc 595 6.416 32 24 2 1 23 17. 17 47 52
70 Nwnibia 2.1D6 12 26 6 62
;7I Kazakhshuic 29.590. 28 42 - 37 .30
72 'Thnisin: 1.244 - 13.1191 20 19 24 31 10 17 56 51
Nor
FordatacoinpambilkyandcovcmgcseetbeXcyandtbcuxhmicemuotmFigumsinkgicswefi)rymsotherlhanthosespedfwd.
466

Disurihhhiuuefgrmd dmndprSarrf 11
GDP' O1&IaS Agtjwarr- In&SOuY Ma-ifflosine &n*t. dt.
IW 1921970 1992 19)9 192 1992 190
1992 193 ]M i
73 Ukminec.
74 AIreia
.
4341
94.831.
35.674
.
11I
23
15
..
.41
43
47
..
15
35
50
.
43
33
33
* 75 Thuiu,C 7.087 110.337 26 12 25 39 16 28 49 49
76 Polane: .. 83.823 . 7 .. 51 *. . . 42
* 77.awvia .. 5.033 . 24. .. 53 .. 46 .. 23.
78. Slovak Republic .. .9.953 . 6 54 .. . . 40
l9 Costa RMet 985 6.530 23 1s 24 27 . 2053 55
ZilTurkey I31.40D 99.696 .30 IS 27 30 17 23 43. 55
SI Ilmn.Islasrc Rep.
. I MISS5 . 23 .- 23 . 14 . 49
2. PMUUIC 1.016 6.001 14 1 19 14 13 8 66 76
* 3 Czeh ReubIc" .. 26.187 .. 6 .. 61 .. - . 33
84 RusshnFPedcrAitlu". 387.476 .. 13 .. 49 .. 49 .- 39
85 ahirc 8.185 -4120 7 .. 41 .. 26 .. 52
88 SyrianrArmbRepc 2.140 17.236 20 30 25 23 - -. 55 48
Upper-rmlddle4neume. 194,393r 1,969,7531 12u .. lw -. lw - So w
89 Sotith AficI
90 Mauritius
16.293
184
103.651
2.566
.8
16 4
1 40
22
42
33
24
14
25
23
52
62
54
56
9lEflujC .. 42.9 - 17 .. 49 34
92 Bria 35.546 360.401 12 11 38 37 49 52
93 BotwamS t 84 3.700 33 5 28 52 6 4 39 43
94lIIuIaysiaC 4.200 57.568 2,9 .. 25 .. 12 .. 46
* 5 vcnezuela 13.432 61.137 6 5 . 39 41 .1 654~
96 BlmsaF 30.125 .. 21 .. 50 .. 47 --.
53
28
97HunguyC 5.543 35.213 18 7 45 30 -- 24. 37 63
gS Unipuyc 2.311 11.405 16 11 31 29 . 22. 53 61
'99 Meaieoc 393315 329.011 12 a n9292 20 . 59 63
100 Tuindml and Toapu 775 5,383 5 3 44 36 26 8 51 6
lOl Gabane 322 5.913 .19 9 48 46 7 5 34 45
I0 M ATgemtinm 30.660 .228.779 10 6 44 31 32 2 47 63
103OmaimF 256 11320 16 4 77 52 0 4 7 44
104 Slovenia . 10.655 .. 5. 403. 34 55
105 PUcrwORICOC
106 Kwaea.RepA3.57
5.035 33.969
296.136
3
26
1
8
34
29
41
.45
24
21 .
39
26
62
45
58
47
107Grec 8.60D 67.278 Is . 31 .. 19 .. 50 -
lOB PngaF 6.184 79.547 -
109 Saudi ArahiaF 3.866 111.343 6 76 - 0 731 4
~~uIICtUItz~~ iZttC~~~~4~At?4,Ep5M5 t$..; -. .:.~21
½5t.sabaran ~ $Ut$46,St½7 3 w..3w . 3. 1wF 45w'46
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~_
~~ 44w '32. ~~ '-26. 14. 16w'-~~~~444w 42
~ 4 I6u m5 w5w _.. 6w -
Elighaincmacecouomies; 2,105,694 t l8,3t12j6ot 4 w .. 39 w . 29 w .. 53
110 ImImnd 3.323 43.29 17 10 37 10 24 4 46- W
1 1 New Zcalandc 6.415 41.304 12 .. 33 .. 24 55 -.
112 tlarne 5.603 199.762 . ..
113 SpukC 373569 574.844 .. -.. .
II4 timsg Kong 3,463 77.828 2 0 3 2329 16 62. 77
115 JSHIg2pOM- 1,996 46.M5 2 0 30 38 20 28 68 62
117i9634u29 76 6 3 39 30 24 15 S5 67
I?.UnitedlClgdom 106.50A2 903.126 3 .- 44 .. 33 .- 53
1181Sfly f37,435 L.M2962 8 3 41 3227 20 5St 65
.119 NetIedmldsc 34,049 32032.9 4 2 9P f7 67
120 Canada 73,847 493.602 4 .- 36 23 .. 59 -
121 BeIgiun 25.242 213.836 Z. 30 .. 20.. 6
123 PUisamdib icfs9.762.93.869 .12 5 40 30 27 22 48 64
* 323 ftjnimdAmbEini.ies .. ~~~42467 2 .. 56 .. 9 -. 43
.124 Fra= 142.869 1,319.83 . 3 .. 29 . 19 .. 68
125 AusuiaC 14.457 185.235 7 3 45 36 34 23 48 61
* 126 Gemnaqyc 184.508 1.789.261. 3 2 49 39 38 26 47 60
-127 LJihedstresC 1.011.563 .5.92,i99 3 .. 34 .. 25 .. 63
128 Korway 11.133 112.906 6. 3 32 35 22 1.62 62
129Deuuark. 13.511 123.546 7 4 35 27 22 :17 59 69
.130 Sweden 30.013 -220.134 .. 2 32 . 20 .. 66
331 Japaut 203.736 3.670.979 6 . 2. 47 42 36* 26 47 .56
132 Swunlzeduml 20.733 241.406 .. ... .-. .*-- --
a- Beeuse unnurueturu is- generaly the '-.K dynamic purt of the ixndsuia sror its gmwtb rate is, sinus separatey. isbeic. etc. includs twAalocated
itnem. c..GI)P and its coupo =nszetpurhasev.2Ues d. Data frerer to the Faded Republic ofGemany beoret mtrILou. es
167
I -

Table 4. Agricultur and food
Fenterremvynbt rFeed (navg Mnvv
(Ma&R ~ ft&inrlt OkMMW4 land) mae. %J pmiutefrupfr
198 199 198) 1992 197919,8 19918 1939P3 199182 197"-2 198 199
ILow4neueecmomlm . 336,172 t 35,947 t 44,437 r 6,93t 8,92
EadmIlm CkM. & India 32.306t 129853 t 22.571 29.732 * 6,576* r SAW7
475 w
205 w
1,655w
411v w53w
.7 w 6.3 wt
6.4 wt
I baamiu 1.136 .. 368 1.16$ 151 591 78 16 -2.1 3.9 3.0
2 Ethiopia 3.887 2.9K~ 397 1.045 -113 963 27 71 -133 0.0 0.0
3Tanmaia 2.030 1.439 399 252 89 25 90 153 -Li2 6.3 739
4SiernaLcone 334 26i 83 133 36 45 46. 9 -Li2 15.2 1039
snquI 14127 1.440 56 15 23 8 90 27 3.3 0.2 0.3
GUpIICI 893 1.711 32 22 17 25 .* 2 0.1 7.6 7.2
7Blintan 3W. 101 5 37 3 4 8 8 -LO0
SfBunuxdi 53G 535 tg .19 8 2 7 4 0.0 1.6 3
9MaIawi 413 473 36 412 5 321 193 447 -5.0 4.3 5.1
10 Banglnlcsl' 6.429 8.197 2.194 1.339 1.480 1.429 '14 2.098 -0.3 .5.0 4.8
1 (limp ~ 388 547 36 63 16 61 .. 27 0.3 9.4 9.9
12 Guinc-Bissu
13 Madagasr
47
14)7
97
925
21
130
82
147
Is
14
16
41
5
.25
36
31
LI1
-1.6
3.1
2.9
2.1
4.4
14 LaolPDR" . 1231 4 3 10 3 28 -0.1 2.9 2LI
15 Itwa2da 533 630 36. IL 34 11 3 14 -2.2 0.2 0.2
16 Niger 1.080 870 .90 .135 9 46 5 1 -2.0 0.9 02
I7Burkina Fao 548 .. 77 14$ 37 .. 26 72 2.8 0.7 0.9
18 1.3k 59.103 69.682 424 3.0(4 344 299 313 752 1.6 1.7 1.6
19 Kenya 2.019 1.844 387 669 86 162 169 391 a. I .4 2.9
20 Ma1IP
21INigi
951
24.673
1.197
10.333
87
1.82
97
1,26
22
-.
36
0
69
36
71
132.
-0.9 6.0
75
3.5
35
22 Nicaugm 497 562 349 336 70 128 135 273 -3.2 0-5 0.4
23 Tago 312 580 41 .124 7 5 49 38 -0.7 6.9 8.4
24 Bcuinii
23 Camal AfrionRqapblic
498
300
705
549
63
32
212
40
5
3
*4*
3
7
1
60
4
1.8
-1.1
7.5
4.0
439
3.0
26 Pakistamn 6279 11,416 633 2.044 146 322 488 989 1.0 (1.9 039
27 GhanO 24575 3.343 247 339 310 184 fi5 29 0.3 17.4 18.7
28 0hdm' 92.6W9 137.677 123952 11,661 12 172 3.27 3.043 2.9 2.2 3.9
29 TajIlisu . 125 . 550 .. ..
30OGuiea' 1. LOSS 373 3389 2 31 31 27 -0.5 4.2 4-5
33 MmIIaSia 202 309 166 290 26 41 108 73 -IS5 3.6 3.3
.32 Sdlaa*akl -. 1.037 2.308 884 3.055 170D
33 Zhnbabwc 702 1.113 156 1.493 ..
442
116
776
443
931
528
-2.1
-3.3
11.6
IA
9.9
1.1
3L Hodamns. 544 619 339 121 27 122 Ill 166 -1.3 0.3 13
35 Lesotho 75 57 107 140 29 29 144 174 -2.2 OS9 0.8
36 EgyptAmbIRep. 3.99 6.079 6.0M8 7.330 1.758 1,611 2.469 3.437 IA4 2.0 2.4
37 Indoticsia' 18.701 24.27 3.534 3.178 831 82 440 1.093 2.0 8.3 8.7
lU Myusiw :2.69 22.420 16 21 II - 93 69 -. 93 6.7 6.2
39 S&mrsa
40&ahnK
388
2.097
.
-.
221
236
296
654
337
212
114
431
1
27
..
72
-6.0
-2.2
1.3
0.6
1.2
0.5
41 Yena. Rep.- . . 12 596 2.185 19 59 98 322
42 Zambiaz 552 6113 498 651 367 330 114 119 -03 5.0 4.3
71; ' 12!y . 1,7934,336*
t 673:v 53: 73: 63:
Lawft-milk-hicime 31" 74305t 1,21164,66t 653 w 544 w. 6.2w
43 C&cdivoh*e .2.633 3.257 469 568 2 37 165 104 0.1 9.1 8.7
44Bolvia 564 .. 263 381 150 26 16 27 1.3 3.9 0.6
45 Azclr.ijsna . - 2M252 200 . . . .. . -
46 Philippies' 8.150 11.380 105 1,333 95 .7 444 348 -1.2 21.6 20.9
47 Anncia . 1.319 .. 400 .. 3
49 Smeneal 568 1.217 452 585 61 53 323 66 -0.2 9.7 9.8
49 Camemscn 2.089 2.28 140 424 4 *8 .17 26 -1.7 6.4 6.7
50 KyzyzRepuMic"- .. 1,474 . . . . .
51 Gciga'.. .. . 500 . .. .
52 Uzbcisa' . 4.929 .. 3.1W . .. ..
53 P.pualNew Guhnea 844 1,046 152 23 . 0 153 263 -.41 13.1 113
;54 PeW 2.113 1.309 2,015 109 ~~464 338 .206 0.0 3.9 30.6
550un3t .. ~~~~~~ ~~2.639 204 29 10 253 582 759 -0.3.0.40.
S6 OCapl 199 366 38- 130 4 4 6 6 -0.5 2!.! 22.3
57 Marcceo" 3.468 4.22 1.321 3.095 119 208 240 357 2.3 2.8 2.
58 Dormbican Rpublic' 1.336 13.36 365 715 120 .14 517 671 .- 1.8 5.4 2.8
Sf9cuagdoi' 1.423 1.669 387 446 8 45 319 309 0.7 7.6 6.8
60 ioidan 3004 505 1,578 72 257 433 509 -u.s is5 Li
61 RonuLia .. 4.617 2.369 1.779 375 1.365 461 -3.2 2.7 3.3
62 B S.ev2adoa 992 598 144 242 3 96 1.030 1.058 1I4 1.3 0.7
.63 Tudoncdisma'. . . . . . .
64: Moldovaa . 2.555 .. 135 . . .
65 Lizhmisaia -. .9 .. 415 .. 185 .. .
66 Bulgdara 2.819 1.5 693 131 200 1.92 1.020 -1.6. 2.0 1.7
67 Colombia 6.466 7.607 3.068 1.662 3 3 603 996 1.0 2 IA
63 lanai.' 220 . 177 469 ~~~~ ~~~~~459
117 183 503 948 03 I .
6,9 Psagluay 1.333 1.57 75 47 II 3 36 88 0G4 0.4 LO0
70 iNamlbia 4 54 1388 . . . . -2.5 . .3.4 3.5
:~71 KXxalkhstana . 9.752 . ..
42 Ttaisia 1.235 2.467 837 .0LOI 165 79 122 203 IA4 3.1 3.7
-Note Fordeacompmiuity and coveugc.sceediKeICyauddwdxctlialelanus.-Figrs is uietdiat forycnzmlicrunduoscspecilied.

Frnltioirruapm
Food pnafaai
fndia $1 Iim)rhmuzafrj ksQ sme. Si prxmdaspf)
193 M 1992 lg 13 1 192i9AlS 1991892 399/J 199182 1979-92 1930 1990
73 UkrXmaie- 26,680 ... . . .. ..-
l4 Algeuia 3,453 5.403. 3,414. 4,685 19. 20 227 125 0.9 1.2 2.1
75 Thailanda 7.467 13.06% 213 992 3 75 160 365 0.3 .11.1 12.0
76 PMand'l. 6,119 7.811 2.2 .. 10 2,425 771 0.9 4.8 4.8
l77Latvia . 1.1... .. 195 .
78. SlovakRepublic 813 555 .. 50
19 ConfRictR 860 1,174 180 434 1 90 1,573 2.276 0.2 4.6 2.2
SonTu*cy 12,165 14-56 6 605 16 13 451 638 -0.4 2.9 2.3
81 Iran. LsmniicRep.. 16,268 25,711. 2.779 4.350 .. 104 297 748 .0.8 0.5 1.6
82 PAama,' 354 655 87 215 2 1 540 392 -1.5 8.4 7.4
83 Czech RepUbic- 2.104 1.357
84 Russhianpederaidor . 612388 .. 25.600 3
. 1.264. 1.095 2 13 333 761. 60 78
85 Chile' ~~~~~~~1.992
*9 Swim Arab Rep' 2,642 £138 726 1.440 74 13 224 549 -3A 0.3 0.1
-Upper.%,iddle-Iineame 22J6t .. 33,167 51136 * 17 t 232*t 694 w W3Sw 9.2 w 71 w
89 South Afiica 3.743 4.069 159 4.85 . 0 726 590 -2.1 3.6 3.3
90 Mau*ius 119 281 181 207 22 9 2.564 2.599 0.8 9.7 8.5
91lEuon'a .73 -- 76 .. 195 . .-
92- Bazil 2-3373 .38.787 6.740 5.854 3 9 755 527 1.2 3.1 2.6
93flssWau' .126 188 68 s0 20 0 3 6 -3.1 1.6 1.3
94 Mialaysh'a 5.365 . 1.336 3.198 .. 1 912 1,911r 4.0 184 13.8
95 Venezuea' 3-363 .3,355 2,484 2.012 . .. 599 1.001 -0.1 fi- .7
968Bdazus'. 7.131 .. 3.10D . . . ... . -
9lllungrasy 3.796 2.494 155 156 .. . 2.8 671 0.2 1 1.3
98 Umgnay' 1,371 1.22 45 311 7 Q- 633 604- GA 19 1
99 Mexico' 16.036 27.198 7.26 7.634 .. 69 465 626 0.1 3.3 3.3
too Trinidad andTabago 140 144 252 246 .
IOI Gboaa 289 525 27 71 ..
.
0
670
3
733
13
-0.1
-1.2
4.8
19.2
3.6
12.9
Il022Argntina 4.89 t3.706 a 20 . 48 61 -0.3 1.5 1.7
103 Oaman'l 152 374 120 332 . .. 306 1.336
105 PuertoDRico' 380 462 .. . . .. .. . .
106 KCota. Rep.' 9.347 22.393 £.143 10.489 184 .. 3.857 4.517 0.8 12.4 15.8
107 Gnmece 6.337 .. 1.199 517 . .. 1,480 1.650 -0.1 4.5 4.8
108 Porual' 2.517 . 3372 2.027 267 .. 77 788 2.8 10.4 15.0
109 SIdi ArIbi' 1,397 6.M4 3.061 6146 . .. 115 2,139 10.9 3.1 2.3
_ S4,335tI~~~Ct3M7t:X 02
13,512n4025~~4423 U< -ac 36 .w 'T 1~
~~Luurm -tIC~~~~~'*, 1726r> fl
- ~ *4991,313 r::.~~~~ 4,flfl rt329 t2.55B t. §3 j323~~~W v.273w0 . 1S~i4
11.tsmls7 t1 .- ~ .601.,., .1•3,871 35tn240t

Table S. Conunerckd energy
E-vwe fWefftkW) atsof
E-up-beff- E-W;;Z;Z; P-CWM Otri GEAPd&'4WFerAf($)
im-m 198"2 1971-M . i9W&7 1971 IN-7 J971 19r- 1971 1W-
Law-Incoute economks 6.7 w 4.3 w 6.8 w SA v 171 w 335 w I.I. w 7 w. 9 v
Excluding0lan&hNflo. S.6.w 3.7 w 6.3 w 5.2 w RI w M w U w IS w 7 w 11 v
Mammb' r-9 -24.7 -1.7 -4.6 103 3-1 2.0
Ettiopia 6.4 6.0 0.9 6-1 19 21 3.4 5.9 14 47
3 Tanzania 10.0 -0.7 2.4 -1-1 51 3D 2.0 3.5 12 40
4 Sierra Leow 0-4 0.3 133 73 1.2 2.21 10 is
5 -11.9 U& 7-3 9.4 6 2D 12.6 7.5 10 23
6 Uguda -4.0 2.4 -7.0 3.7 58 24 0.0 7.6 1 73
7 Bhutm 0 -15 11-5
Bmandi 9.4 7.9 II
7.5 .7.6 7-3 .9 24
9 makm 11.4 3.9 7-6 1.4 37 40 2.1 5.1 17 29
10 R"g!Ldc. 11.4 13.6 9-0 9-5 is 59 5.2 3-5 31 21
It Chad 4.1 Is 16 5.2 13.4 39 26
12 Guioca-Bissm 4.1 2.1 3S 37 4.1 5.8 im 97
13 Madagascar -0.9 -3.7 1.8 65 38 2.7 6.4 10 19
14 L-w PDR 40.0 -0.9 -3.4. 2-5 55 41 6.7 271 46
15 Rwanda 3.3 3.8 I&2 0.5- 1 1 29 5.2 7.6 -
16 Nigw 9.2 11-9 2.3 17 39 9.6 7.3 12 21
17 Burician F2so 12.7 1.1 9 16 7.4 18.6 28 58
Is India -1.0 4.7 6.8 112 235 1.0 1.2 12 26
19 Ketip 15.9 17.6 4.t 3.0 .116 92 1.3 3.4 23. 19
20 Mi-fli 8.4 5.6 7.9 2.0 16 21 4.2 14.1. 16 57
21 NipWo. 25 2.0 18.7 U 40 128 6.6 2.4 1 I
22 N-r4= 2.9 2.7 3.5 7-5 249 253 1.6 1-9 9 59
23 Togo &4 9.0. 0.9 51 46. 2.7 9-0 7 16
24 Brain M4 1-6 -3.4 40 19 3.1 2s-7 7 26
25 CmtW Afi=n Rqmblic 4.8 2.7 -0-5 3-1 40 29 2.5 14.7 2 10
26 Palissan 6.9. 7.3 5.9 6.9 III 223 1.5 1.8 12 21
Gham 7.1 1.7 3.3 2.4 106 96 2.6. 4.6 9 5-1
28 China 7.8 5.0 7.4 5.1 291 6W 0.7 1 4
-9 743dsm
30 Gakm 14-1 3.9 2.3 IA 70 61 7.9
31 hEmnitan'm 5.0 0.4 las 109 1.7 S.3 4 8
32 Sri Lmh U 7.6 2.1 1.3 81 101 2.3 5.6 2 12
33 Zhuh3bwe 0.2 6.9 1-1 5.3 443 450 0.7 1.2 16 28
34 Hondwas 13.1 3.7 6.3 1-9 .192 175 1.5 3.5 10 19
;35 Lesotho a a.
36 EMLAxabRep 14.2 AA -8.9 6.1 213 586 1-2 1.1 9 4
37 Indonesia 7.7 3.5 125 7-2 r- 3(13 1.1 2.3 2 6
38 Mvwvnar &O -1.4 2.7 -0.6 56 42 1.4 210.7 it 9
.39 Saujarm 22.7 -9-1 16 7 4.6 8 8
-40 Sad= 16 i.0 25 4-4 62 69 2.4 3.3 8 41
41 Yemm Rep- 7.6 7.1 III 241 3.3
42 7mnbia 65 .- 3.3 0.9 -2.7 335 im 1-1 7 21
-Wdle4ncame 2.9 w Q9 w 6.2 w 9.0 w 734 w t,912 w 0.9 w tA v 12 w 12 w
lawersoiddle-incogne, LEI w 0-9 J
43 Cftc d7lvoirc 21-9 -9-5 6.3 1.6 B7 125 1.8 6.3 4 17
44 Bolivia 3.4 0.1 9.6 0.6 169 255 .1.5 2.7 1 5
45 Amub*n
46 PhflWbies 31-0 5-9 5.3 3-1 221 302 0-9 2-7 15 27
47 AnneWa I.OM - 0-7
49 -qcnqg .5.6 0.3 121- .111 1.7 7.2 11 23
49 Cunimm 6.5 8.3 1.6 OD 77 3.1 11.0 7 1 -
50 KyWz Rcpabik 1.148 0.7
51 Georgia
52 UzbddM
53 P4= New Gumea 12.0- 13.1 6-7 2.4 136 235 2.1 4.4 11 12
54 PCM 12.9 -4.0 3.6 -0.8 429 330 1.4 3.0 3 11
55 Guatemala 21.4 3.6 6.6 1.9 155 161 2.4 6.7 5 32
56 CDngO 33.2 7.3 1.4 0.3 177 131 1.4 &S 5 2
57 MoloccD 2.9 -2.5 9-3 3-7 153 278 1.9 3-9 9 28
59. Dominican RqmWic 22-3 3-9 5.0 1.1 235 347 1.6 3.0 19 132
59 Ecuador 28.6 3.6 16.0 2.5 199 524 1-3 2.2 14 3
6D Jombn 142 43 334 913. 55 49
61 Rmmanb 2-7 -4.0 5.7 -1.8 I.M I" 0-5 42 55
62 m Salvador 16.7 3.6 7.9' 2.3 16D 225 1.9 .5.3 6 36
63 Urkmenistas -
(4 Moldova i.600 0.8
65 Ulnww. da
66 iltdiifh 4-2 1-2 5.2 -1-7 2.223 2.422 0.5
67 CAembia .- I-7 12.9 4-0 3-9 .443 670 0.8 2.2 2 5
68 Jarnaka 0.0 -5.1 -2-4 3.4 996 I.U75 0-8 1.3 23 29
69 J'3 14.1 51.0 1.0-3 6.1 94 209 2.9 6.8 17 30
70 Nznliia Ja
71 Kazolcitstan .4.722 OA
72 Tmdsia 4-5 -1.0 9-5 4.6 2ii 567 1-2 3.3 7 12
Noic
Fordaucampncobft=dcovemLtr-scc&eKcyandthekdmicaI;wt=Flgumsinibticsmcforyc=otbcrdmndwwspecifie&
170

E-wapro&d-rrm &-VWrvaimdVf Penwifr Ad GDP input perlg Ill rdkSdiittaWf
1.97140) 193-92 1971 -3. 193-9e 1971 lit 1971 199 1971 19927
73 Ukraine .. . . . . 3.885 .. 0.5
74 AIlgeri 5.0 4.8 14.9 5.5 255 983 1.4 2.7 52
75 Thailand .10.1 27.6 6.8 10.1. 177 614 Li.
57 -1l .2.494 2.40?7 .
.3-1
039 17 10
19
iGPoIand 3.5 ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~-13
78 Slovak Republic .. . . . . 3.02 . 0.6 -
79 Costa Rka
W0Tultrkey
6.8
5.8
6.1
4.0
5.8
1.7
337
5.3
443
377
566
943
1.4
0.9
3.6
2.0
7
1I
22.
26
SN hun.Islamie Rep. -737 6.9 LI1 7.0 704 1.26 . - I 0 0
82 Panama 17.2 1123 -0.3 -1.0 820 520 0.9 4.6 61 60
13 Czech Republic .. . - . . 3.873 .0.7
SI Russian Feaderton
95 Chile
. - -
-L
.-
2.1 02 4i
.
708
.5.665.
937 1.5
0.5
3.6
.
9 1
87 Mmorta6i 4.4 1-4i2.i 632 LO1S!
88 SrriznAmbR&p. 7.8 IO.0 -11.5 5.0 .418 823 LO .. 91
Upper-anidde4neoie 4.1 w 1.8wv 6.7w 4.5w 862 W 1,658w W 6.9 W 2.5 W 11W laOW
89 SmithAfrim
S0amauriri
8.1
1Ii
3.8
7.7
3.5
4.6
3.6
3.2
1.993
22
2.487
335
0.4
1.3
1.2
7.2
0P
8
O
12
91 Esronk . . . ..... . .-
:9ZBrazi Si1 8.4 8.4 339 360 6R1 L.4 3J8 is 14.
93 Bsafwana 9.2 0.4 10.6 2-9 247 395 0D7 6.9 -..
94 Malavsha 19.! 12.6 8.3 9.6 .435 1.445 0.9 2.1 fl . 4
.9S vn-clica 4.47 L7 4.3 .2.0 2.094 2.296 0.6 1.3 1 1
96 Belanas . . . . . . 4.154 . 037
97 Hu±ug-z 2.4 6.1 4.6 -0.3 1.374 2.39 0.3 1.4 30 16
93 umguay 0.3 537 Di 0.2 748 642 1.3 5316 13
99 Mecxo 16.6 1.9 10.3 3.1 653 1.52 1.2 2.5 a 6
1001 Trinidadland Tobago 5.3 -0-3 3.9 411 2.730 4.910 0-3 0.9 637
101 Gabon 5.6 .5.3 4.8 0.6 310 714 0.9 63. I I
I2Af~genrima .2.7 2.3 2.5 1.2 1.285 1.351 LI1 5.1 7 .4
103 Onn.n . . L 8.8 41.2 11.1 132 3.070 3.4 2.3 I I
105 PuertRico -3.9 2.1 .- '.6 0.6 -3.874 2.018 0.5 43 .
10OGKorea. Rep. 5.2 83, .11.1 .9.2 507 2.569 0.6 2. 13 19
107 Greece 7.8 7.0 6.0 3.5 1.036 2.173 1.2 3.5 23 23.
IOU Porugal 2.3 2.7 5.2 4.9 755 1.816 1.1 4.4 15 13
1O9 SatudiAmbis 7.5 -03 21-0 £5 IJ065 4.463 019 1. 0 0
-'47Sw -W5.w m'Tvr . ' -3 '~ i 3
.2SsAtZt2ant~zt~.~t~tc53v~ttA w E9 ~--3 w' ~ts~L~jA1Uw5
- Li . 13w 11w 3
fllgJz.hxameecuumnim
L~~~17 w 1.8 W 2.0 w 1.5 W 4,467 w 5,161 w 6.3W 4.4w 12 w lO W
.IID.Ireland LI9 2.8 2.2 2.1 2.37 2LUll 0.6 4-8 13 4
I11 NewZealand 5.4 3.1 2.5 4.7 2.443 4284 1.1 2.8 8 7
11t2 fISFme! -46.1 -10-3 2.7 3.9 2.070 2.36 1.0 189 9 I1I
114 tHong Kan 6.6 '2 t-% LU2 I 28 16
.115 ftingppore. . 7.5 . 637 1.551 4.399 0.8 337 23 15
116SAustmia 5..4~ 350 2.4 4.035 5.26 0.9 3.2 4 6
117 UnitedKlriagdomn 8.4 0.2 -0.3 .1.0 3.778 3.743 0.7 4.3 34 5
118 Dtaly -5 24L .6 . M.43 23755 1.0 7.7 I8 9
119 Netherands 6.4 -0.4 2.3 1.3 3.918 4.56' 0.8 4.6 14 8
120 Cegias 2.8 3.6 3.9 1.6 6.261 7.912 0-7 2.6 5 4
121 Belgim
122 Finland
2.9 3.8
~~~~~~~~3.2 2.9
1.3
2.8
1.6
L.9
4.131
3.9927
:.100
5.560u
0.7
0.7
4.3
3.8 16 II
123 tUnitalAmb Emiitms 637 5.9 27.3 9.9~ 4,325 14,631 . 1.4 . 4 5
* 124 Ffanc 1.4 . 7.1 1.9 2.1 3.019 4.034 1 5.7 .14 9
* 125 Ausuria 0.2 LI1 2.0 .1.5 2.567 3.266 0.9 7.2 11 6
326 Gennay 0.6 -0.6 137 0.2 3.930 4.35 . 5.5 .. 7
.127 UnitedSatrs 0.1 0.7 137 1.2 7.615 7.662 0.7 3.0 .9 14
128 Norway 30.1 8.9 337 1.5 3.564 4.9275 0-9. 5.3 12 3
129 Demnark .14.3 25.8 037 037 3.860 3.729 0.9 7.4 1s 4
13O Swedemz 9.5 5.2 NJ3 I.E 4.57 5.395 LU0 53 12 .8
131Japaa- 2.6 4.6. 2.5
'132 -Switzerland La8 2.8 1L7 .
2.6
2.0
2.59
2.69
3.586
3.694
0.9
1.5
3.2
9.5
20
8
16
4
a:.tFgrsbheL
SouetiFrth fsiscanustoms uno opiigSouth Africa. Namibia. Lesarh. BDana13 and Swazikud air included in South Aftican dccc trde mamog
dreiomnpanenemerrhodes
~ iscaduded. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 17

Table 6. Structure ofmauctrn
Mui.MadJhemdathsfh%
hv-ga. rcuafnm anpw
noaPhtin basilaR) ad RWM dmk*, qauOIimb OAtt's
1970) 1991 19071991 19701991 1970 1991 1970 1991 1970. 1991
Exdudlug Chin. &loftI 7,96 t 60,047:
I' M I ique ~~~~51 1. 3 .. 5 .. 3 .. 28 -.
2 Eanthiopia 149 5 46 48 31220 0 2 2 4 21.27
3 Tanzania lII 91 36 .. 28 .. S . 4 .. 26 -.
4 StefmLemn 22 34.. ... -.. .
5 Nepal 32 203.. -.. ... ... ... .
E Ugadnd .102 40561 20 12 2 3 4 6 34 19
7 Bhuuan .. 22 .. 20 C 5 0 .. 21. 52
Bfumindi 16148 53 83 25 9 0 0 6 2 165 7
SMulawi ~~~~ ~~~ 51 ~ .. ~~259 17 .. 3 20 .. 2 .
10Bmguldesbb 387 2.041 302147 38 3 1 2 20 20 14
II Oat .~~~ ~~~~51
19 . - . -- - --
12 Giainea-Bisaau 17 ...- . . -
13Madsigascar . ... 36 .. 28 6 .7 .. 23
24 LawPDItb- . *--
I5 Rwandtb . 245 86 .. 0 .. 3 - .8
16 Niger .30 156 . . .- . . .
I7DaBurkina Fg 41 32 69 .. 9 .. 2 I2 19 -
IS India 7.928 39.254 13 13 21 12 20 27 14 .532 .35
19 ena. 174 849 33 40] 9 9 16 10 9 .9 33 33
20Mni 25 294 36 40 - - 4.- 5 .. 14.
21iNigeria 426 36 .. 26 I. 1 6 -. 6
31 -
22 Nicap n 159 303 53 . 14 . 2 .. 8 23
23 Togo 25 170 - . . .. . ..- ---
24 BDatA 38 145 . . -- .- - .-- . - -
25 CaamlAlArican Republc 122 57 .. 6 .. 2 -- 6 - 8
26Pakimana 1.462 7.099 24.-. 38 .. .0 . 9 23.
V Gbaahb 2532 612 34 - . 16 -. 4 .. 4 .1. 41
2S Cbinab ... - 5 -. 14 .. 25 .. 13. . 34-
29. Tajfldsaun
4SSennj~~~1b .2~41 745 51 62 l 191.t 2 4 6 022 1
49Cameroonb 1I9 2.526 50 6) 25-13 4 5. 3 5 27 42
50' Kyuzjz lteablich ..-. . . . . .
S1 Gecogiab .. 3.497 . . . . .
5
52 IJzbdista
. 4.504.. ... . .. .
53 P*.4 NewG 1
ab 35 363 23 I 35 -4.* 37
54 Peiub 1.430 .. 25 14 -- 7 7. 47 -
42 42 14 9 4 3 12 16 27 29
56 CDngob .. 309 65 .4 223.
57 MOIUcco 641 4.937 - . 32 I.23. 0 - 17 -. 19
SS Dominican Repq bicb 275 967 74 ~ 5 1 .6 -. 14..
1
59 ECUador ' 305 2.428 413.71 14 13 .3 7 S j; 32 39
60 Jotdan. 505 21 27 14 1 7 4 6 17 52 45
6lRlanania .. 14 .. 22 .. . 40
6ZE-I0Sutvado#b 1!4 1.109 40 39 30 13 3 3 2 19 18 25
63 Tuzlanenstanb .. . . . - . .- -
64 MoldoVtb .. Z238. . .. .
65 Lthuaiab .. .-
. . . -
66 Bulgara
67 Colomzbia 1.487 8.393 31 30 20 16 8 a 1I IS 29 32
.69 Jammki" 221 663 416 42 7 5 *II 9 5 7 30 37
69 b P=
~~~99 1.060 56 .. 16..I .5...21
70 NItbao 1 . . .- .
7U jKgj.bstan. 10.472
72'Tunisia 121 2.939 29 20 18 17 4t 6 13 a .36 49
Note. Fordatacompaabitliyandcovenge.see tbeKIeyand the cimc]us awk nalntFuikia axe rarycrs oter damn thspedlied.
31Mauritmin 10 101 . - . ' -- -- .- -
32 Sri Lannk 369 1.155 26 019 29 10 4 I11 5 33 22
33 ZImbabwe 293 1.629 24 29 16 16 9 7 II1 7 40 40
34- Hondima 92 435 53 48 10 9 1 3 4 6 29 34
35Lesothao 3 74..-- .
36 Egyps. AnbRep. . 3.669 17 25 35 17 9 7 12 12 27 39
S7lridonesiab 994 24.033 65 24 14 16 2 12 6 7 23 40
58 Mjyawnr 225 2.070 - -. . . .. .
S9 smawIa 27 41 58.. 6 .0..1 .6.-
40Ohid&t 140 -- 39.. 34 . 3 5* 19
4lYnnm.Rep..b .. ~~~~ ~~792 20...- 50 ... - . 28.
42 7jAMabb 1i! I.39 49 45 9 1 5 7 10 I11 27 26
MIddIe-iueaeeaanmnies 9. 3230t
-LowMMiddue-incmm .. 4 M,77
43 Cladid'votie 149 .277 16 . 10 . .5 .. . 42
44Boliviab 135 ~~~~~ 37 ~~~ 34 ~~~33 8 1 1 6 6. 26 47
45 Aeaia.. 2.90. . - . .. -- . ..
46Pb' pp b1.66.5 11.497 3 36 S 1I a 3 23 12 32 33
172-

Drnbmdnlnfmafaaummtwdwhirdalf%J
1979!gg nm7 ur9n mm2 nw9 "91m 197 ml 9Mm m
73 Ubuineb 40.0139
74 Algeria 652 3.334 32 22 20 )9 9 )1 4 3 35 41
t
75Thniiiand ' 1.13D 27.779 43 25. 13 24 9 14- 6 3 29 32-
76 Posdm' . 20 21- 19 9 24 26 a 7 25 37
77 .Lwmv 4. -
. . .
-M Slovk Rqaulk c
79CAtaRib 03 1.2349 47 t2i i 7i 9~ i2ii3
80 Turkey 1.930 22.774 26 17 IS 13 5 is 7 10 45 42
SlIIran. Islmn* Rep. . 16.P24- 30 16 20 21 .15 16 6 10 26 37
82 pa"mtu 127 452 41 52 9 6 I 3 5 9 4 30
83 cmh Rqmbicb -. . . . . . .
SI Fedensisib Russia
-. 1i0o799 - - -.-
s.scwieb 2.088 - 172512 8 11 5 5 t0 Si 52
* 86 A&Vdra. .. -...-
87 .MCqCMt...... .
55 Si,Vdm A,&rjtfj -- . 37 33 40 27 3 6 2 4 20 Y2
Ulpptr-ddk4n-Irnr- 47,455*r 399,993:
* 9 SouthAfaia,- 3Al 24.107 Is 16 13 3 17 17 10 10 45 45
g0 Mamuits 26 5,29 75 26 6 42 5 3 3 5 12 15
91 Egoujab 27J -
-~~Bnzi1 10.421 90.116" 16 IS 13 11 222210 14 39 38
9tMzlnysi Sa0o 26 II1 3 .6 535- 9 I!7 54 37
95 vc'aduhi 2.163 5232 30 21 13 6 9 s 2 13 39 53
96 Bdarusb .. 14.115 - - -
.97. Hnus"- 8.697 12 10 13 5 2 268 14 39 4
9lUumat69 2A436 34 32 2! 17 7 10 6 10 32 31
S9Mezfrd' 5~~~~449 63.754 2524 15 9 13 16 11 14 34 38-
IW0 TrinidadsmdTobhqo 195 434 1is 3 -. 7 -. 2 ;. 70
* lOlGabeb - "269 37 - 7 -. 6..6 -- .44
lOlArgemim ~~~~9.96 46.266 is520 17 10 17 13 8 12 4 4
103 ooMmab 0 439 . . . . - -
IOSloveuia -. 4.008 .. is 16 .21 II . 37
lOS Poem Rieob 1.190 12.762 . is .. S . 17 -- 47 -- 16
106 Rqp~b1.580 Koma.
77,321 I6I. 17 11 .11 33 11 9 36 36
.107 Gtecce 1.632 - .2025 20 20 13 12 7 5 40 35
log Pofnupb
-18) is
19 19 13 14 10 10 39 39
I09SmldlAinbhzb ~~37' 7,AJ. 7 .. I . 4 . 39 - 50
SAUdmraS&NAfrka? .~i, 45=,566t~ -') *
BlgWneanmmis
~603,M6 a.
[tolliela 786 1 523 31 27 19 4 1327 7 20 30 23
III NewZealand' 1.809. 24 27 13 5 15 14 4t 6 43 45
11l fLwr.a. 15 14 14 9 23 31 7 8 41 39
113Spuinb 100.002 13 IS IS S 16 25 11 11 45 39
114 tHoug Kong 1.013 124159 - 4 9 SI 36 16 21 2 2 36 33
Il5jtSlngaoporb 379 11.701 12 4 5 3 28552 4 ID SI5 31.
116 AutxmIa# 9.5q50 44.001 1 6 19 9 6 24 19 7 .5 43 49
117 Unimdllmgdom 35.415 .1.3 14 9 5 3 1 3 1 10- 12. 37 37
-118 tmiyb29.093 241.346 1 0 8 13 13. 24 34 13 S 40 37
119fNethedm&db 54-375 17 16 8 3 27 24 13 15 36 39
l2O10CanacI 16.752 .. . -16 IS 5 5 23 26. 7 10 46 43
121 Blelgionmb -- 43.280 17 IS 13 7 25 22 9 .14 37 39
122 Finland 2.558 20.4tg 13 16 10 3 20 22 6 5 Si SI-
123 ItUnkWe Acab Emnimla 3.541 - --
124 Frnne' . 24S.409 1i 13 10 6 .26 30 5 9 4 42
125Aunstab . 4.37 42.775 17 16 12-6 19 25 6 7 45 43
126 Gemny=b.c 70.885 46730 13 10 5 4 32 41 9 12 35 33'
lZ7.Unitrdsmareb 254.115 .. 12. 13 5 S 31 31 10 12 39 39
125 Norway - 2.416 14.25 15 227 2 23 26 7 3 49 42
129 Dennmak 2.929 21.073- 2023 58 4 24 23 a 1I 40 39
.I30 SuCdeu 43-27 10 11t 6 2 30 32 5 9 49 47
131 Japrb 73,342 970.454 8 9 5 5 34 40 it -.9 40 37
132 Swireuandb .-- 10. 7 -. 31'- 9 -- 42.
a. Inluckes uIImocatO dha&- se the nebuicl! notes b. V21oa added in nmaufnauing datm age at pumrdmaser values. c.. Data Terer to tIe Faet ep!AuIbiEc of Genm_y
bcfoewuniracadan
173

Table 7.MUfCUiI
annsadoutput
AYE Send
Tan! enzrdqz a
mnraw
Eudcding China & alkb
1919-NJ 19N0"9 2W 199 1991 197. 1989 1me ml9 191 1989 1990 1991
I Moambispe
2 Edn 4.6 -0- 93 87 24 20 20 . El 61 I 1029 I
-
3Ta aa. .. 42 .12
4 SiermLEzone.. ....
.. ~~~~~~~~~~~~29.
7lBhutna. ... 27.. .
SflBiunAri -7.5 .. 121 129 123 .. 17 21 19 .. 9293 82
9 Mnawi . .. 36 .126 . . .
10 Baug!L"di -3.0 -0.5 78 .. .- 26 32 . .206 101
12 Guinea-Bbs . .
13 Madupscir -0.8 36 -1 6
14 LtaoFDRt
IS Rwmla. .. __ _ . .
16 Niger ...
18 &OS 3.4 .131 14146 43 4 3218720324
19 Kenya -314 -1.3 95 9283 M .43 4340 4 1 3 4
M Mali... 46 39 - - -
Z1iNiped -0.8 18- 82 . . .
2flNiram a -2.0 16 210
23lTogo . .
24 Benin -
25 Cctsd AfuikanRqxzdi . 43 41 .. 153 142 .-
26iPakisu 3.4 21 50 . . .
27 GIzaa -14.8.. .. . 23 193.
29Tajliunn .
306utinca .
..
31 Mamnimauia
32 SriLZIJ 1.4 100 95 17 18.- 70 134 138
33 runbubwe 1.6 -0.3 10M 105 101 43 30 3029 98 113119 116
34 Hoaktms .40 38 36
35 Laiso .
36 EMpL Aub Rqp. 4.1 -2.3 93899.-- 54 3434 19224234..
3T hMoUed2 5.2 4.4 155 166 169 26 20 19 19
38 Myeurir -
42. 204213 216
39 &mnn1k- - - 28 .
40bSudan 31
41 Yemen.Aep.-
42l 7nmba -32 35129 107 136 342726 26 109 93 100 100
43 cedtcrloh -0.9 2-7 -- 71
44DBolivia 0.0 -6.4 55 4943 727 C
45 Azednjan.
.46.I ~is-3.7 5.8 -159 .169 190 21 2421A 24 104 107 115 100
47 Amna ..
4Seegl105 ... St .. .i-- 37 - .
49Camezuau 72 .29 47-45 80 99 121
50 KyigyRepablic . .-.
52 Uzbdda .
53 PapuaNew Guiue 2.9 40
55 Ousednla -3.2 -Ii 99 ~~~~~ -. ~~~~97 20 20 .
56Comgo .. .. . 34. .
57lMoroucco. -208989 . 36 38 .. 10 10387
58 DomiuiemtteRublir -L-I 35 63
S9.Ecmdar 3.3 -1.7 80 9i1 27 3339 83 101 116.
60IoITdan .2.9 87 79 73 37 r 24 26
61 Ronxnim - . . . 30 ..
62 E Soilvmadr . . 38 28.. .. 18 71.... 58
.63 Thzkmcuitan
-:65 lidmania
66 Bulgaria
67Qhlkamhia -0.2 1.2 117 116 110 25 15i 5 14
154 128 138'
36 158168 161
.6llaumica -0.2 -3.4 97 90839 43 35 32 33 99 71 77181
-70. 4zauia. ..... .....
71 Kazulcst.- .. .. .
7ZInii 4.2 44 94 .. .
Nate.rord ntw4r btandcovenge.seethe Key ad ct=he sdmal ns.Fguus hmicAicseatryan awdrdnathsepedtind.

73 Ukraine.. ...
74 Algeria ~~~~~-.1.0
AV.~ iumma
Tdtl enranig dS
grailh mye telx fU=U jr&radaI(19)-M
Gn-WnppwereaW
19-rn OIwo-n na iwo 1991 193V M9V9 io m9i ie io so n9i
... 45 . . . l
75 Thailand 0.3 6.5 17l 17 T . 24 28 2 .
76 Pabrid 5.5 -0.6 114 71 76 24 19 IS .
77 107 110
77 latwia.. ...
78 Sloakt Rqblic . ...
79 CosluRim . 41 39 39
so TarIcy 6.1 101 122119 26 1927222 10i 1H1199 205
I IItan.1slamricRep. .. -7.9 40 51.. 25 44 43 ... 89 97
U2 panama 0.2 1.8 122 127 132 32 37 37 37 .67 1 90 90
1 3 Czechliepubtic .- -
84 RussanflcmLIIn ~ i 0 0 0 9 I i
SS Chile
1 i i 5 1 76
.86 AHbania ..........
835pannzftp.2.6 -4.7 66 70 68 3 2726 .70
so0ii
-Uppeir-niddle-4nco.e
89 SouthAfiika 2.7 CLI 106 106 10$ 46 4949 49 64 36 LI 50
90 Msntius LJ 0.4 97 101 107* 34 45 46 46 139 75 76 76
91IEstonia . -
*92BrzIa Sl -2.4: 93 81 I 80 22 20. 23 23 82 97 95 97
93 Botawun .. ..
...
Q4 M22ay.Sia 2.0 2.4 123 129 135 28 2627 27 96
95 Venezuela: 4.9 -5.3 63 52 61 31 21 16 21 103 103 121 118
96 Bedaras.. .
97lHonngz 3.6 2.0 127122i115 28 36 41 43 41 103 99 87
Yl Unngay -. 0.5 107 109 110 -- 27 27 27 .. 11 120 128
9Meuico 1.2 -3.0 72 75 79 44 19 20 21 77 1327 139 144
100 Trinidad and Tobago.. .
101 Gabaon. -
IOAzueln .- 2.1 -1.3 7682 - 28 16 20..75 32 113
1030 .. . 2 2.
104 Skowenia . ... 76 76 80
105 Pucrio R. . . . ... 2
106. Korn. Rep. 10.0 7.9 191 209 227531 28 27 40 193 231 245
IOIF areme 4.9- 0.7 112 113 112 32 4041 40 55115s
IOI Pauugu 2.5 0.7 103 106 -. 34 3636 .
109 audi Arabia 2
-: .- - . .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Web-bwomeeconondes ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~,~.'t
11 S. n .912 11 1.4.6 7 2
110 IrHlng 41g 19 112 112 116 49 2 27 27
1 ISjSngapore 2.9 5.0 165 175 125 36 30 32 33 73 129 135 135
116 -Austraia 2.9 -0.3 101 104110 52 41 39 39 .. 136 147 15
117lUnhedKingdorn 1.7 2.4 124 125 125 52 0494
11 tDal 4.1 0.9 112 109 103 41 42 42 42 50 149 149 143
119fNetherlands 2.5 LU0 102-108 107 52 48 43.48
1200C,nada: LI 0.0. lot lo1 1t10 53 44 "-646 68 112 -
*121 Bcigiumi 4.7 0.3 101104K104 463139 42 .145 14
122lhinlnd. 2.6 2.7 126 130 129 4743 47 52 73 143 150 154
123 tUnite Arab Efimnres . ..
124PFrnuic 1.7 114 Il7 121 9 02.. 14 12 2
125 Austruia . .3.4 1.8 116 120 122 47 53 545s4 64127 130 133
126 Germany' 3.5 1.9. 114 116 119 46 41 41 -.- 60 114 115118g
127 United States 0.1 0.5 106 103 103 47 35 36 36 63
12Z Norway 2.6. 1.6 110 112 115 50 54 57 58 74127 135133
129 Denmark 2.5 0.1 104 -9697 56 51 5755 64 10583689
130Sweden 0.4 08107 106 103 `2 4 356. 3123
132Jn3n 1 2.0 1202122 123 32 33 33 33 7 48 1,31 139 143.
a.. DMrnfefrtoDtie edeWalRqazblicofGernmy befoeunifiudn.m
175

Table S. Growth'of consumption. and investment
Qw1dg"wMwtw Pdtuw Gwa
ew.
ionnxxrw
19" 1989-9z 19" 19M-92 19" 190-E
I[Aw4ncometwoomles
Exdtidox Chhm & hdh3 6.2 r 3.0 w 43W Zs w 3.4 w LO w
I MOZIkMbkpW -1.5 1.7 3.1
2 Eddopm
3 Taourlis 3.1 5.6
4 Sirrm Lome -2.4 -0, I -1.2 -2.2
5 Nepal
6 Ugm1&
7 Bhumn.
9 Domadi 3Z 4.5 4.5 4.2 16.3 3.0
9 MdEtvi 7.9 5-5 3.5 2.8 4.2 -0.9
10 Bangladesh, a a 2.3 3-5 4.8 -LO
I I Chad
12 Gttinen-Irmw 1.3 2.9 _L8 3.5 -1-7 5.9
0.1
13 Madagascar 1-5 -0.2 -0.9 0.4 2.4
14 LaoPDR
15 RwatMa 7-5 7-3 4-3 0.4 10.4 3-7
16 IVigcr 3-0 a -j.7 0.3 7.6 -7.6
17 Budd= Pan 6.6 5.6 4.7 2.5 4.4 9-1
18 Inda 4-1 6.9 2-9 5.1 4.5 5.3
19 Kenya 9-2 3.1 6.4 5.2 2.4 -0.2
20 Wi 1.9 4.1 6.5 2.0 3.3 7.0
21 Ntge& 11.4 .- 3.4 7.8 -1.0 11.4 -6.6
22 Nwmagm 10.7 - u 0.9 -1.0 -5.6
23 ToLto 101 1.0 2.3 4.5 11.9 -1.6
24 Benirt -1.9 ag I I 1.1 IIA -4.3
25 CeWrA Afikan RqmMic -2.4 --&6 51 2-3 -93 2-5
26 PWdnm 4.1 9.5 4.2 -4.6 3.7 5.6
27 Gham 5-1 1.4 I j 4-7 -2-5 8.9
29 Chirm
29 T2jwh-mm
30 Guinea
31 Mautitna 11.4 -3.3 2.7. 3.6 8.3 -52
32 Sii L-oka 0.3 6.1 5.0 3.4 13.8 1.9
33 Zknbabwe 12.1 7.8 3.8 02 -4.2 1.8
34 Hookim 65 1.9 5.9 2.6 9.1 4.5
35 Lcsotho 17.8 2.9 10.6 02 23.4 9.0
36 EUX Arab Rep. a 2.9 7.4 3.1 18.7 -0.6
37 EWonesia 13.1 4.9 6.5 4.9 14.1 6.6
33 M)WMW a a 4.1 0.3 8.0 -1.5
39 Swurm a 5.3 18.1
40 Sa*w 0.0 -1.5 6.9 81
41 Ye"un.
42 Zonbin IA -3.2 0.2 3-7 -10-9 a2
buffillit-in(Mme
econmuies
Lower-mkldk-hwme
43 CdmcrIvoim 0.0 -9.4
9.6 0.1 6.6 10.1
44 BoUvia 7-9 -0.4 4-5 2.2 2.3 -5.8
45 Azcdabon
46 Philiplw 6.9 11.3 -0.6
47 Armena
Swep] 5.9 2.5. 3-0 2-6 03
49 4-0
49 Camemm 5.2 514 6.2 -OA III -3-9
50 KyqWzRcpttblic
51 Gwigia
52 Uzbekigm
53 Papua New Guiam -13 0.3 4.5 0-5 -5.4 0.0
m pem 4.0 -0.9 2.2 0.0 6.5 -10
.55 Gumemaii 6.5 3.0 5.3 1.7 7.9 1.1
6.1 -0.5
56 Congo. 4.1 1.5 1.5 -9.9
57 Morocco 14.0 4.9 5.5 .4-0 9.9 Z6
59 Doninima Republic 2J 0.1 5.6 1.9 9.4 41
59 Ecowor 14.5 -1.4 9.1 2.1 11-0 -2.0
60 Joidan
61 Romania -3.1
62 M Sdvador ili ig 0.9 7-3 3.2
63 Todmmnistan
a
Maktm
65 labuaiiia
66 Bulguiy -0.1 7.4 -0.4
67 CDlombia 5.4 4.0 5.3 3.2 5.0 0.9
-0.2 -9.6 3.6
511 Jamaica 6-5 1.4 1.9
69 Pamgikay 4.8 2.3 &7 01 18.6 0.8
70 Navrlibia 3.0 3.4 -62
-71 Kamakhmm
72 Tunisia' 7.9 3.9 8.9 3.5 6.1 -0-3
r vrdabcomp2mbRityandeavemgr-seetheKeyandtbewchnicalnulmRgafesimitalicsareforymodierdo
thosespm
'-1761

Gewmt~ ~ Awgsaagsns 1
1970-80 *fl3)927 1970-3 192-927 197010-3 198192
73 Ukraine
74' Algeria 115 4250 1913.6 -3.3
75 hailand .9.8 4.7 6.3 6,1 7.2 12.4
76 Poland .. 0.3 .1.0 .. -1.0
78 Slovk Republic . ..
79 CostaRica 6.6 1.3 4.8 359 .
so Turkey 6.3 3.4 4.8 6.2 6.9 2.5
SI Iran, Ilalmunc Rep. .. -3.8 - 4.2 .. 0.8
83 Czech Republic....
84Rusian Fedcrmzion.. ...
85 chIle 2.4 0.6 0.6 2.7 -2.1 9.2
87 Mangalia
635w 4.0 w 6.2w 3.0 ),w1.
90 Mtanidus 9.8 3.4 9.2 5.9 10.0 11.0
91 Estonia . .. 4.2 .-... -4.2
927 Brazi- 6.0 5.8 tO 1.i 8.9 -0.3
93fButsw=n .. ..
94 Malaysia 9.3 3.5 7.5 5.3
95 Venezuela .. 2.8 2. 1
10.8
7.1
5.5
-1.9
96 Belatus.....
97 Hungary 2.5 1.9 3.6 -OA 7.5 -2.3
98 Uruguay 4.0 1.9 -IS9 1.7 1037 -4.6
99 Mexico 8.3 1.9 5.9 2.4 10.7 -ILK
100 Trinihdadnd Tobago. 9.0 LS5 6.4 -3.9 14.2 -7.1
101 ChIE 30.2 0.2 7.3 0.4 13.6 -4.4
lIhIPArgentina a 2.3 0.6 3.1 -2.6
305 PUenwuRico.48... 68
106 Koren..Rep. 7.4 6.9 7.4 8.3 14.2 12.7
I07Grbeece 6.9 2.1 4.2 3.5
108 Pomorua 86 .. 4.5 .3d1
- 2.1 -05
109 Saudi Arabia
w- - . . jl~~~'
. 5
IIIghNew7camueecnm 3 .76 Lo3 31.7 3.11 2dm0 21
112 tlsracl 3.9 037 5.8 5.3 0.6 5.1
313 :Spain 5.8 5.4 3.9 3A4 1.5 5.9
114 tHoigxong 8.3 5.6 9.0 7.0 12. 4-.8
tis iSngpo
116 Ausuaia
6.2
5.1
6.2
3.7
5.8
3.2
6.1
2L
. 7.8 5.0
.
-117 Kingdom UniMd
.4 1L2 1.8 3.6 0.2 4.5
lis - iwy
~~~3.0 2.6 4.0 . 3.016 .
11:9 Nedierlands 2.9 1.6 3.8 1.8 . .
120 Canada ~~~~ ~~~~~3.8 2.5 5.3 3.1 5.7 . 4.1
121 Belgium 4.1 -0.5 3.0.02140
122. Fminand 5.3 3.3 .2.8 3.9 0.504
123 tUnited Ant Emintrs . 1.4.
7
124 France 342233 2414 2
125 Asniria 3.9 1.3 3.8
126 Gennanyb .3.3 1.3 .3.3 .
2.6
2.6
.2.
0.527
.7
I1l7 United Sales 1.1 2.7 3d1 3.0 2.8 2.3
128 Norway. SA 2.8 3.8 0.9 3.3 -0.9
-129 Denmnark 4.1 0.9 2.0 1.6 -0.8 2.3
_:-130 Swcden ~3.3 1.7 . 1.9 1.2 -0.6 3.0
.131 - Japin
~~4.9 2.3 4.7 .3.6 2-5 5.8
A32 Switzed2nd ~1.8 2.9 1.1 1.6 -1.8 3.8
a.- Genceralgovemmnur oimprian ligums ame ON available sepwaralr. dhey ate included in private consumnption. cat. b. Dat mfetr to die Federa Repubic of
Germany befiDrc unirication.
.177

Table 9. Structur of demand
* -pme WS~~Gmn rsiamusfgnmnurdrpaia 4(I)- 1 ew
J 970) 1K 19 71f92 197 1992 1) 197 1992 13 197 9 71992 1929197 /970
LAe-hicuieecononds . . - . . . .- -
ExWdudiaChin&Ind . lliv . 2 W . fl Is 1W -. 22 w . -S W
I ------ iu .. 23 .. 96 .. 47 .. -19 .. 29 .. -66
ZEd2 aia10 IS 79 36 It 9 II -1 Ii 7 0 -9
3lbz n11 it 69 35 23 42 20 5 26 21 -2 -38
4 Sicnamcaae
5 Npal
12
a
9
'0
74
97
BD
78
17
6
12
22
IS
3
II1
12
30
5
25
19
-2
-3
-1.
-t0
6 iganda a 7 84 g5 13 14. 16.-I 22 6 3 -IS
7 Bluimn. 24 -.. 701 . 338 . 5 .. 34 .. -33
8 lumaudi ID 10. 87 92 5 19 4 -2 1 9 -I -22
9 Mulawi 16 19 73 so 26 19 II1 2 24 23 -15 -17
lO BangLiadsh 13 14 79 SO II1 12 7 6 39 tO -4 -6
I1IChad 27 15 64 lOS Is .2 10 -20 23. 17 -8 -u
1lGuimam-Bissau 20 3 77 119 30 26 3 -22 4 a -26 -48
13 Mudagsar 33 S 79 89 10 I *. 7 3 19 17 -2- -9
14 L-acPDR . .. . .. -- *-16
I5 Rwanda 9 26 33 75 7-16 3 -1 12 6 -4 -17
I6Niger 9 17 89 31 10 5 3 2 II 14 -7. -4
I7iBmkinaFraso .9 17 92 78 12 24 -1 5 7 Il -12 -19
is India 9 II1 75.67 17 23 16 22 .4 IV -1 -2
i9PKenya 16 I6 60 63 24 17 24 15 30 27 -1 -2
20 MAj . 10 12 so 84 16 22 10 5 13 14 -6 -17
21 Nigeria 8 6 30 71 15 13 12 23 a 39 -3
22 Nicuugua
23lTogo
9
16
19
17
75
58
95
is
13
is
17
17
16
26
-15
3
26
so
16
32_
-2
It
-32
-10
24 Benin 10 3 35 38 12 13 5. 4 32 23 -6 -9,
25 Centnl AfAut Rfepublic 21 10 75 87 19 12- 4 3 23 12 -IS -3
26 Paidsma . 10 14 31 72 16 21 9 .14 3 17 -7 -7
27. Ghan 13' 13 74 35. 14- 13 13 2 -21 16 -I -11
*
29 TajWId=. 19 -- 64 -. 18 -. 17 .. ...
30 Gui=u . 3 . 2 .. 16 -. 9 . 21 .
0
-7
31lMmrlnitan 14 16 56 32 22 15 3D 2 41 39 a -13
32ZSrimIt .12 9 72 16 19 23 16 I5~ 25 32 -3 -e
33 Zimbabwe 12 20 67 71 20 20 21.10 .. 32. . -it
34lHoudums 11 1I1 74 72 21 26 Is 17 28 23, -6 -9
35 LcsotI 12 23 120 112 12 78 -32 -39 II 19.q -44 -118
3d EVMy:anbftp.
37Ihudommm
25
8
14
10
66
78
SD
53
14
16
139
35
9 7
14.37
14
13
27-
29 -2
1
3
338 (wunnr a a 89 87 14 ISA I 13 S.5 2 -4 -1
39 Somalia 10 a 13 112 12 is 7 ~. 12 10 -5 -289
40&Srwa 21 -- 64 . 14 15 . 16 2
41lYawn. Rp. .. 238 . 74. .f - 2 16 -.
42 7mbfa 1, .10 39 78 28 13 45 12 54 29 17
23
-I
*43Ch ed'lvaiuc 14 13 57 68 22 9 29 14 36 34 7 5
44DBoivia I 16 6 30 24 Id 24 5 25 15 0 -II
45 Azeliu - - - -. . . .. . .. .
46 PhulifpiMi -9 10 .69 72. 21 222 13 22 29 .1 -s
47 Armneia - - 22 .. 71 - ; 27 -. 7 -. 201
4t Seneg 15 12 74 so 16 13 11 7. 27 23 -5 -6
49 Cmncwon 12 13 70 77 16 11 is 10 26 20 2 -I
50 Kyrgyz Republic . . . . . - . -
SlUzbekistmi .. 2 46 .. 40 .. 32 .. -.. 4
53 FaptmNew Glinea 30 23 . 64 53 42 21 6 19 1a 47 -35 -3.
54 Pem .12 6 70 31 16' 16 17 13. 18 to 2 -3
55 GsawanmIa. a 6 .78 35 .13 la *14 .8 19 18 I -10.
56 Ccqag 17 31 82 46 24 17 1 16 .35 37 -23 -I
57 Matucca
- 1216 ~~~ ~~~ 67 ~~73 lB 23 15 17 18 23 4 -6
5SsfaDomincanltepuhlic 12 9 77 75 19 23 12 16 17 29. *.7 *.7.
59 PEasdor.
11 I 7. 75 61 13 22 14 25 14 31 -5 3
d0 ordan - 24 P4 -9- 32 .. -IS 43 .. -49
61IRaamini. - 14 . 63 .. 31 24 -. 25 .. -7
6S2EllSulvadar 11 II 76 89 13 16 i3i 0 25 14 0 -16
63 Tarbneciga . . . .- .. . . -
MMoldlova .. I . 6) . 31 . 25 .. ..
65Lidmania 17.IT . 52 .. 22 . . - ..
9
66 BnIai
67 Ccdombia
.
9
6
~12
..
727
71
67 20
22
18
-.
18
2
21
.
14
491
19 -2' 3
E8iJamaica 12 .- 61. 32 .. 27 .. 33 .. 4..
Sparaguny . 9 9 77 78 IS. 23 .14 13 IS 22 -1 -ID
70 Namibk t 32 - 67 .. 12 .. 2 .. 57 -- -10
iKazakhstm
.72lii
. .
.17
30
.16 66
62
63
..
21
31
26
-
17
...
21 22 33 -4
-24-
-5
Nose Farnawacopmraiityand covenge. eethe Key and thetzeeiuial sats. igumainitalics ae foryeamaciertItan tese peified.

Aimor GOUANWnk Gniadonmk piomm
camawpdmttn botgoom _W6w WKtffSffFkff hiamr
j9m M MM 190 igm -7 j9m IM im m 1970 "M
73 Ukcdm 25 -07 2
'U A%czk ts 17 56 R 315 .29 29 31 m 27 -7 3
AS Tha'dand 11 10 69 S5 26 40 21 35 tS 36 -4 -5
76.-. Pdand 9 68 23 20 -1
-77 Lawk
_X SWV2kRCPMk
35 25 t5
-to
n COMM= 13 t6 -61 21 29 23 29 39; -5
:80 .Tudkcy 13 is 70 63 20 23 17 20 6 21 -2 -3
91- lcm.ManficRep. 12 59 - 33. - 3D 14 -3.
82 panam is 19 61 59 2& 33 24 21 39 37
71 25 29 59 4
la
Rmssian%lcraiiom 23 40 32 37
Onk m to 69 65 19 2,& 3D 36 15 31 1 2-.
.36 AAwjia
97 - - ts - - M .30 -3
as t7 14 7-11 79 '14 16 10 7 ts Z4 -4 9
Afaxsarm
AwimAmbft.
:14 75
Upper-agMe-imome .10 w. 65w 24w Isw w
89 SainhAfiica LIP 2t 63 .60 29 15 24 19 m 24 -4 4
90 lwmuitim 14 It 75 64 IG 29 II. 25 43 C4 I -3
91 r. .10 63 19 26
r- Brog it 14 69 65 21 117 20 21 7 10 3
93 Batman& m 79 -41
95
Maby!da 16 13 58 52 M 34 27 35 42 79 4 I
veoczocia 11 9 m 71 33 23 37 20 21 25 4 -3
96 Beimmts
9T Eusqpfy to LI-P 59 70 -44 31 19 30 33 -2 -1
98 umguay is 14 75 73 M 13 is 13 B 21. -1 0
99 MeNdw 7 9 75 74 24 19 17 6 13 -3 -6
100 TnaxladandTobago 13 6D 26 27. 43 I
101 Ciabou 2D 17 37 44 32 4it 50 42 .12 It
102 AT-dna 10. a .1% 95 25 rT 25 15 7 7 0 -2
103 Mnan I3 '19 14 69 74 54
109. Skrienia .21 52 16 60 le
105 poempice 14 74 6Z 29' 16 10 24 44 - - -19 9
-106 Kbo:m. Rep- 10 - - 75 - - 25 - - t5 - 14 - - -10 --
107 Grn= 13 19 69 73 29 19 20 9 10 23 -9 -9
108 PMUVI 14 26 - - 2D - 24 -7
109 .-SmodiAzabia 30 34 16 - - 47 - 59 31
Mlmio_
Z1
-MM
EMO,
w
bt6Pwil-
-w z oa.
16W 17 w a w 61 v nw 21 w 24 w 22 14ir. w
110 T 15 16 69 56 24 16 16 28 37 -4, 12
III Ncw7,ml, 13 16 65 6'& 25 19 20 23 31 -3 1
112 t192d 34 26 Ss 57 2T 23' 9 16 25 29 -20 -7
113 Spain 9 t7 65 63 ZT n 26 2D 13 Is -1 -3
.1 14 tHon Kong 7 9 69 61 21 29 25 30 9-P 144 4 2
115 12 to 70 .41 39 41 Is 47 102 174 -20
116 14 19 59 a 20 V 19 14 19 0 - I
117 United rmgtim 19 72 .67 rA 20 15 21 14. 23 24 1 -2
Ila itay 13 17 60 63 27 19 29 .2D 16 20 0 a
119 Nctbcdands M 14 59'. 60 2& 21 77 2s 43 57- -2 4
120 Cumb 19 22 57 60 22 19 24 19 23 V 3 -1
121. Ddsism .13 Is 60 63 24 20 27 23 52 70 2 3
122 Fbdand 14 25 57 56 30 17 29 19 26 27 -1 I
L'23 tUnitedArAb Emimin 19 - - 47 22 35 - 69 13
124 Fcmw is 19 58 60 27 20 27 21 Ii 23
A25 Aust[ia 55 55 30 25 31 26 .31 40 1 I
126 Gen=Myb 16 la 55 54 29 21 30 29 21 33 2 7:
I27 UnitedScm 19 19 63 67 19 16 is is 6 11 0 -1
129 Norway 17 22 54 52 30 19 29 26 42 43 -1 7
M Denmirk 20 25 57 52 26 15 23 23 29 37 -3
t3D Swc&n 22 29 53 54 25. 17 25 19 24 28 -1
131 Japan 7 9 52 57 39 31 40 34 11 10 I 2
M Swkwdand 10 14 59 59 37 24 31 27 33 36' 4
a- Cvcncw gvwernment con-mpti- rP-
_Gcrinasyb6ofeunificadon-
mc na avaWe sqncudr. dwy arc bxiudod in p&m coasompfim etr-- b.. Data refer to die Fakni Repubr= of
179

Table 10.; Cen,tralgermnexndte
H*wv& . EOMa* opfwe nkd*fj
* 2Edwk~ - . 0.l . 3-7 . 5.4 .. 23.823. - -
3Taozmia 92 .13.3 .. 6.0 . 2.5 .;42.9 .. 26.1 .. 28.8 - -8.4
*4S~i,= [gO0 4J19.9 14391B339.19.6 3.6 -3.! .29.0 6U335.229-819.6 -13.2 -62
Nepal 6.7 5.9 9.9 .10.9 3.9 4.7 IJ7 6.8. 581 431 19.1 282 14.2 I8.7 -3.0 -63
* ~~~21.
7 BIutn - . . 2 0750 48 4.9 82 56.8 .4Z 20.5 28.2 40.6 '40.9- 0.9 -2.5
8Em 6
.. 21-7 .. -3.9 .
9 Malaw1
121 ~~~ 9.0104 ~~~48 55 7.8 .1.6 42 43.7 -35.6 '7.-3 37' 37.6 2CL6 -17.3 -1.7
10 gldslb9.4 .11.S . 6.4 5.3 .46.9 .20-4 10I.0 .. 2..
It Chad * . ... 32. .- 5
13 Madagscar-. 7.5m .17-2 .. 66 .. 1.5 .. 3.9.3 .2 .16-1 .- 5.9
14 LwnPDR.. . ..
is ramIae t3.1 .. 188.. 4.5 . 4.1 .. 41.4 .18.0 . 14.3 26.1-1-7 -7.2
16 N-ger . 3.3 *..1.0 .4.I1 . 3.3 .. 32.4 .. 38. I. 3. . -4.8
.17 BokinaFao 17.0 .15.5 .. 5.8 7.6 .19.3 .. 4. .14-1 .. 0.3
Is india 19.8 15.0 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.6 4.3 5.7 242 18.6 48.3 57.0 13.2 16.8 -6.5 -4.9
19 Keniab 16.4 9.2 -19.6 20.1 7-.8 £.4 5.1 3.4 22.7 181 232 43.2. 261 30.7 -4.6 -2.S
2D MaFi 110 5..7 . 3-1 .. 3.0 .11.2 .56.0 .21.6 ..- 4.7
Nigola" . .....-
22 Niauagu 11.0 11..6 .. 146. - 7.4 *.. 20.6 -. 34.9 . 32.339-3.-7.3 -17-7
M8Tog 7-2 . 16.7.. 5.3 - 120Z -.- 252.. 33.7..31.9 .- 2. -
24 Bcoin .. .
25 CaumaAflikaaRqmubl 9.7 .. 176 .. 5.1 63 .. 19.6 .. 41. . 2.9 -3.5
26 Pakista 30.6273- 2.7 L6 t.5 1.0 4.1 3.4 372 11.6 23-9 54.6 17.7 21-7-5.8 -62Y
27 Gm 3 'a 3.7 .22-0 .7.0 6.8 .207 -
.-.- 39.8 -.. 109 .. -4.2
29 Tajkista...
30 Giuea 23.1 .- 339
31 Manjiata .
32 SdLTuub - 1.7 8.5 637 10.1 4.9 4.8 12.7 1I.1 15.9 24.0 58.2 36.5 41. 28.2 -18.4 -7.2
33 7jmlubwe 25.0 -. 15-5 .. 5.4 -- 7.8 .. &I1.2&2 -- 35.3 34.8 -11. -6.7
-3Hfladwas,
35. Lscmho a 0. 6.5 15. 219 6.2 u.5 I-3 5.5 35.9 31.6 41-2 23.1 22.7 33.2 -3.7-3
36 EgyprAzabRep- 114 .. 8. .. 2.4 -- 13.1 . 7.2 .. 57.7 .. 53.7 -. -12.5
37 Idxlneiia -13-5
38 M)waaw 21.9
6.8
22.0
8.
10.6
9.8
114
2.5 2S 1.8.
~~~~~5.3 6. 1.
2.0
1I
40.2
33.7
29.6
19.
33.7 49.1f
17.9 22-.1
23.1
1.9
19-2
15.
-2.3
1.2
OS.
-5.0
39Siw5ar...
40 SwAm 3 b 132 .9.8 1..4 0.9 .19.8 .54.9 I.9. . -3.3 -
*42 Zbd& 0.0 .114 .61. 4 4 .2. .4. .A.0 .- 20.0
43 C&dIwfr- 39.9 .. 16.3 .. 3.9 .. 4.3 .13.4 .58.I .33.3 31.2-11.4 -3.7
44 Bolivia .. 9.3 .. 166 .. 82 127 .. 16.1 .. 36.6 29.0 22.5 0.0 -2.3
45 Aeabaijan ...
46 PhIpiI"15.7 9.9 13.0 15.0 .45 4.1 6.6 4.4 .56. 26.8 3.4 39.8 13.4 19.4 -1.4 -12
47Anu...
48Suea116.8 .23.0 ..
49 Cameuom 9.1 .12.4 .
4.7
5.1
9.5
8.0
.14.4..31.6
.24.0 .41.4
.25.9
.15.5
..
203
0.9
05
-
-2.2
50 KyigzRcpmb1lic.
51 Geotgiz ..
52 Uzbekisu .
53 Fag= NcwGuIDea 4.4 4.2 16.5 15.0 8.6 7.9 2.6 1.4 22.7 21.6 45.1 49.9 35.2 36,.0 -2.0 -5.9
54 Boa 3 ' 21.0 .. 15.6 .. 5.6 0.0 -. 22.1 .. 35.7 - 20.4 12.5 -2.5 -1J
5S. Gmkm.a...... 14.4 .. -3.9
56 caoul 9.7 .11-0 .. 5.1 7.0 -.342 .. B.30 .54.6 .. 8
57 Motucta 17.9 12.8 17.3 - 18-2 3.4 3.0 6.5 5.8 27.8 15.2 27.1 44.9 34.2 2P.8 -10.0 -2.3
58 DwniniunRqmblic ~7.8 4.8 12.6 102 9.3 14. 13.8 202Z 37.1 36.5 19.3 14.2 17.5 IZ3 -2.7 6
59 Fxiadmb 12 12.9 34.7 .182- 7.8 11.0 1.3 725 21.1 11.8 22.6 43.6 15.0 1539 -1.5 2-0
60 Josdan W321E7 7.6 &933.7 S2 14.515-1 23-3 10.7 20.6 29.5 .417 .. -3.1
61lRmnania .. I0 - .- 10.0 .. 9.2.. 26E6 .33.0. ..- 10-9 .37.0 .. 2.0
62 El Salvadab 18 16.0 19.8 12.8 9.0 7-3 5.5 437 21.0 19.4 36.0 39.7 17.6 11-2 -5.9 -0.8
63. 1Tubnmmicum
6l Moldova...
..
65 Lzbimnia ..
66 Bulgaria -. 5.6 .. 62 . 4.8 239 .46.6 -- I2. --. 42.4 .. -5.1
67 Coloabia 6.7 -- 19-1 .. 3-9 21.2 .Z7.1 .22-0 .13.5 -.- -1.8 -
63ljazmia....4.7 -17.1 *.
69 Paraguay ~~~~12.4 13.3 129 12.7 3.6 4.3 19.2 14.8 18.9 128 33.0 42.1, 9.8 9.4 0.3 1-0
70 Namibia . 6.5 .72 .. 9.7 .. 14.8 .173 .29.5 -. 44.2 ..- 69
7! Kazakhstan ...
.72 Ttuisa 1-22 5.4 17.0 17.5 7.2 6.6 13.4 18.6 Z7.5 22.5 22.4 29.3 32.5 3. -29 -2.6
Norte: Fordatacom mubl1iaadcovegr-etcKeyandtmetwchira1zuk.FigimsiniWcsamforya3s.ducrd.n
iosespecificd.
ISO

D!~~me. MasSe limit ~~mar.w-fftw sfm ofra~ rS.GfVn ______
.74 A1geia. .. - -
75 Thailand 2L7 17.2 19.9. 21.1 .4.1 LI 5.1 637 242 262 2541 2037 19.1 15.4 -439 3.0
76 Pdmnd ----.- - --
7T Latvia .- --
79 CosnaRia .2 24.6 J9l 28&7 32.0 95 13.3 1&2 £6 164 27.0 26.3' 25.5 -718 -L4
.UC TD*q 15-2 1.314.2 21t 3263-5 6.1 3-9.34J119526-9 41-.826.3 29A -319 -6.2
uinn RuaIsanlq 15.9 10.3 21.3 2'2.7 6.4 7.6 3.6 1939 2410 212 2337 189 .3526 1937 -1337 -1-4
82 Faux0.0 4.9 13.4 1M! 123 2k 13.5 2221.9 1231 33.4 19.9 33.4 30.4 -537 6.0
33 CzdRparmnl . ---
54 RussianFedemtim .-- ---- --
85 Cbile 124 926 14-5 13.3 74.4 IL 37-1 39.0 13.8 1.0 14.8 29.02 22.1 5.6 2.4
85 Spi-rnAa&Rp- 3523 43 5.5 56 QS 139 11.3 (04. 32 1 1 4. 71 9 .
* Uppouldfmiidh4nca
89 SautAhbfd- - - . - . - - - .. 5M -2.5 -4(7
90 taudkins 1. I5 17.6 14.6 75 3.1 21.4 1.5ii 1. 16.6 41.0 392 27.4 24.7 -10.4 -0.3
91 Blan 3-. ,O -7 3i3i2i i i .i i i 2 4
933 DBswa,b. 9.8 133 72 2r40 5.4 4.7. 739 14.0 26.9 '172 2739 29-7 36.5 40-4 -0.2 11L4
91~ Ralayia 1429 10.9 M53 19.6 1-1 519 7.0 11.6 30. 19.4 2437 32.7 2926 29.4 -6.2 0.3
95 VceGak 5.8 -- 1939 -- La -. 9 -. 20.2 -- 3537 . &T 22.4 0.0 -.32
96 Belams-
97 f1n1gar1y 44 6 L 2.7 7.9 2723 353440.21024t7 273958.3.54.7-2.9 0.8
90 Uugmyw 134 6.5 LS 6.8 439 SO 485 54-1 11.4 7.7 13.0 20-0 22.7 25.7 0.0 1L0
199 MaCic. 2.3 24 IL0 13.9 2.4 19 135 .131 312 ISA4 276 55-5 1754 17.9 -3.1 as8
IODTunibdadndTnbmp 1.7 I..1. .S2 15.9 .43.5 -- 21.5 .32.0 .. 726
101 Gabo#--.-0os 3A. 6.8 -LB8
1I2 Argenta . - - - - .54 I.
-- -5.3 -
1(S03 n 51.23i 421.0 i 2.9 .7 2.0 13.0 13.4 1i 2029 23.4 43.1 4T.9 0.5 -14.7
105; POuenkoR
106 Koam.RIep. 34.322.117416IL 12i Li 7.5 12515.616S24.3 31.5r1717.6 -2.3-0.9
107 GMee 12.6 - - 10.0 -- 101.3 - 31.3 -- 16.6 . 19.2 .34.4 667 -48 -29.0
log Pbinigal 7.4 5.3 11.2 12.0 10.3 5.0 27.0 25.6 19.9 10-5 24.2 36.2 39.6 4r.3 -1041 -3.3
109 Sao&Arabiak- -- --.
-. ~~~~-. t-~~~~'4~~~j~~ . 0. *

Table U1. 'Central goenetcurrent
revenuie
PffagEe.fvITgrw
FEihiapa 20.9 .. 0.0 .. 24.3 .. 35.7 .. 3.7 .. 15-4 1.
3biunnia 3235 0.0 - . 40.8 . 17.3 1.6 *.. 7.5- 172.6
4 'SienLeouacb 22.4 33.9 0.0 0.0 16.3 25.4 49.6 34-9 1.5 0.0 10.1 2.5 16.9. M3.
5 n]5.5 9.9 0.0 0-0 36.8 3(7 33.2 3(1 3.2 5.5 16.217.1 7.5 9.6
6 UsgmnI 115. : 0.0 -. 41.0 -. -44.3 - 0.2 . 3.1 .. 3.1
7 BIdaIa 13.8 7.5 a10 (10 39-I 16.6 0.4 (14 2.3 0.6 443- 7510) I1.4 18.
SEBanmdi 19.3 ..- I0 . 25.3 -. 40.4 .. 8. - 5.6 .. 14.0
9 Mnat%ib 33.9 369 0.0 0.0 30.9 3310 22.0 16.3 0.3 0.7 12.9 13.1 2C.7 21L7
lOau0 ks 10.1 ..- 0.0 .. 2535 . 28-6 . 339 .. 31.9 .. 11.3
13 Madagascar 16.6 I5.3 -11.3 0.0 39.3 19.5S 7. 44.5 2.7 LI 2-4 19.5. 13.4 -9-1
15 -Ruuan& 17.8 15.6 4.1 2.4 193i 34.7 42.4 31-1 .4 4.2 14.0 12.0 12.8 13.7
16 Nier 23.5 . 4.0 .- 23.0 36.4 .. 2.6-.. t5.3 ..
*I7 2mlna.Faso, 17.T . 7.5 -- 153.9 . 43.7 .- 4.3 . 035 ..
14.7
13.6
It Indra 133 17.0 0.0 0.0 42.5 34.4 MD. 25-5 0.6 0.4 16.6 22.8 11.7 14.4
19 Kcayat' 29.1 261 0.0 0.0 35.8 47.9 1.53 14.2 1.0 1.0 12.6 10.8 226 26.2
20 W4Ii 17.9 ..- 0.0 -. 36.5 .. 17.9 . 19-5 .. 8.0 -. 110
21 Nige6ab
= NicaigM 7.5 - 16.9 8.9 1139 37.3 37.5 252 17-.6- 107 10.5
M Tog.3.4 . 5.5 I. 1.3 . 32.0 . -1.7 .
10.1
14.2..
5.8 .243719.5
31.4
25 CamulAfaicanlcpublic 16.1 -64 . 202.8 -. 39- . 7-2 . 9-1 . 1(4
26 Pakistan 13.8 10.0 0.0 0. 33.6 322 344 302 0.2 .03 17.9 27.2 16.4 16.7
27 G1.aaa 20.5 .. 0.0 -. 2&2Z . 44.2 . .0.2 .. 6.9 .. 6.9 -
3O Gainca. 281 . 10 . (4 2i 7 74.4 0.7 24 35.8 Sr . 13.5
31 Maudni2,i . . - ..
32 SriLTanh 15-5 112 0.0 0. 26.5 47.5 50-5 27.6 1.9 3.5 5.3 9.5 20.3 20.1
33 luibabwe 46.2 44.4 0.0 (10 27.9 26.3 4.4 19.0 1.2 L.0 20.2 9-3 24.4 3a6,
34 Hodadms 30. . 0.0 -. 23.5 - . 372 .. LB . 6.5 .. 15.4
35 [mcwi. 13.4 169 0.0 0.0 10-2 1617 61.3 51.8 1.2 of 11.9 14.5 171 28.0
36 Egyw.ArabRep- 16.2 .. 9.1 -. 151 . 3 . 7.7 .. 34.6 -- 47.1
37 ndoucsa 78.0 5810 0.0 0.0 .6 263 7-2 -51 12 ZS8 4.9 72.8 22.2 19.7
3SJIjyagw- 239 114 0.0 0.0 42.3 32.6 14.9 16.5 0.0 0.0 39.9 39.6 ILI1 9.7
39 mwxEfa . . . . .
40 & &mzb 14.4 .. 0.0 . 26.0 .: 42.6 0.7 1 6.3 .. 14.0
42 7Anbi 35.1 .. 0.0 .. 43.1 .. 5. . 3.1 . 7.3 .. 27.0
LMiMi4anme
43 C8edlvoire 13.0 1(.14 5.8 (17 24.8 27.3 42.8 29.1 6.1 .11.1 7-5 9.4 24.0 28.0
* . 44~~~BaIlvia .. 5.3 .. 5.5 .. 37.3 .. 7.0 -. 9.1 .. 32.8 1. 6.9
46 fthlippiacab1 21.1 293 0.0 0.0 41.9 26.2 24 87 2.2 3.2 10.6 12.6 14.0 17.4
48 Saaegai .84 .. 3.7 ..- 26.0 - . 342 .. 11.4 .. 6.3 .. 2439
49 Cawcauan 21.7 I52 8.0 0.0 18.0 17.5 35.4 155 5.9 11.0 79.9 34.7 162 18.1
* ~~71
52 UzbeListan. . . . .. . . . . .
53 PUazNcwWGUI3b 60.5 45.1 0.0 0.0 12.1 11. 16.4 24.1 0.6 2.0 10-5 17.0 23.5 25.0
54 pbuUb' 25.9 13.0 0.0 0.0 37.2 57.4 27.1 9-5 2.2 52 7.7 14.9 17.9. 10.6
SS Guarauala 112 -. 11.2 -.. 26.4 .. 30.2 .. 11.1 .. 9.9 .. 113 -
56 Congo
57 ?damucro
4&8.8
19.2 23.6
4.4..
5.4 4.0
7.6
34.7
..
376
13.0
20.8
..
17.8
2.7
7.4
..
3.6
23.5
12.5
..
13.4
39.1
24.0
-
27.3
58 DomninkRcmhic . 19.3 Z1.4 .3.9 4.5 21.6 22.5 3I12 40.3 1.7 2.3 22.4 10.0 14.7. 127
S9 Ecuadarb 44.6 56.9 0.0.0.0 17.4 21.5 30.8 143 3.0 5.5 4.3 1.7 13-518.0
6D jonla 13.2 12.2 0.0 0.0 7.319.1 47.8 29-1 9.5 9.5 22.2 302 Z 3(0-
61 Romuiaia
62 MlSalvador 6 .35.2
23.2 20.4
..
0.0
28.9
0.0
..
29.8
23.2
49.5
..
37.0
3!
17.0 5.6
LS .5
6.7
..
4-5
&I
6-5
..
31.7
3Z3
9.7
63 Th*kmcaistan -. .. .. . -. .. .. -. ..
64 Moldova .: ~ . . . - . . .
6O Bulga&i .. Z7.2 .. 3L5 -. 15.3 . 6.5 -. 6.9 . 127
67 Colombia 24.9 .. 11.2 .. 22.6 .. 20.6 .. 6.8 . 13.9 ..
.-
12.1
37.1
6SIJamaica
69 FPzupay
33.7
15-2
..
£3
3.7
-13.1
.
(0-0
49.3
17.7
..
19.5
3.1
24.8
.
20.1
6.3
20-5
..
24.8
4.0
5.8 26.2
31.9...
10.6 12-3
70 Namibia 2. 3.4 .. (0 . 25.1 .37.5 .. 0.5 .. 5 . 35.9-
Kazalkstan
72 Tunisia 14-6 123612.4 23.9 23.7 24.7 28.5 5.6 4.5 27.0 18.3 32.3 29-5
Naber Fordazacmnnpmblityadcovcmge. se the Key an u*ndth hnoa cs.Figurest lksase Ibaodr Oh ma KIaaxdfimd.

Perauagrq
JwL node riseiiv
swim na m sM P Mw im am m n Jim sem i -W ai
74 Algeria . - . *. - . - - .
-75 TluullamI 17.7 27.5 0.2 LO0 46.0 41.6 26.2 16.7 LB 33 i 93 15 L
-76 Nolan.. . -- . - -. - -- .- .. -- .- -
77 Latvia . . - . - . - . - . . . -
79 CAnmRica 133 5.9 2339 25.6 30.4 27.7 18-.9 19.7 2.3 LI 51i 14.0 133 242
SOTdrc 4941 39.9 0.0 0.0 19-7 33.9 6.0 4.5 4. 23 07 19 2.3 ..
81 Inu.sa,micflrp. .3.9 124 7.4- 6.0 3.6 5.4 11.7 15.0 513 4.0 682 57.2 21.5 17.9
f Patnama 21.2156 212 22.2 16.7 1627 10-3 10.9 3.3 3-2 26.7 25.9 27.7346
33 Czech Rqxubrk. c. . . . .. .
- .
84 Rossi=n ESession . . . -- . . .- ..- -
as Chile 17. 15 .r71 7.1 35.3450 43 96 4 tO 1MS .121 332 24.4.
588 Sp=oAMbRe. . 3. 0.0 110 53 J.6 a4 . s 1041 326 60.7 2116 26. 21)
39 Soth Afiica 55.3 50.5 LI LU9 23.8 33-9 33 3.36 3-2 27 127 7.5 25.0 .30.1
90 Maurhius [5.3 13.8 0.0 £.0 17.2 22.7 51.6 40.3 4.3 537 116 33 21.0 24A4
97 naZil 14.3 1721 2M. 30-3 236 2.12 7.1 23 3.6 50 17 2421 23.4 fLU
93 Bomswa' -333 30.1 00 ao0 0.7 2.0 39.1 19.3 0.1 a3 26.7 48.5 -366 59.4
94MSayisi 37-5 342 0.4 0.9 16.3 20.0 33 .0 149 3.3 3-2 10.526.9 273 30.
95 Venwdac 6t-4 51L5 4.6 5.3 4.2 6.6 .6.S 10.3 Ls 2.2 15.2 23.6 22-2 192
97 Hungar 18.5 17.9 15.3 32 '383 31.3 6.9 £89 L8 02 1611 15.5 555 5516
9 tumgnay .1039 59 23.32 433 35.2 14-2 5.2 237 1.L 53 4.1 23.1 29.7
99 Melee 36.7 36.5 14.1 1uS 233 56.0 27.6 416 -17-6 -15.3 5.3 7.7 15.6 14.5
IOD TmidqandTb2gD -P-70.0 - 3.9 -. . -. 0. --- 16.1 -. 443 7
I01 Gaboab 3939 27-6 0.0 0.8 4.3 23-7 19.7 17.4 2.0 1.2 3333293 39.4 31-7
l0lArgcmina 04) W.67 ..- 16f.7 -- 0.0 -. 33.3 .- 33.3 -- 15.8.. -
* 1030On M 26.00. 0. 0.0 03s 0.9 1.4 3.6 0.3 0.6 71.3 74.3 42.9 3
104 Sloveuia . . . -. . .
105 NoenRic . . .. .
106 Koma.Xtep. 22.3 33.9 14 5.3 453. 3537 15.0 3.4 3.2 6.8 123' 939 133 132
107 Gacec 17.4 215S 25.3 25. 32.6 425 5.0 0a1 9.6 -LU 10.6 83 2937 352
103 Parmuzp [9.4 23.6 26.0 27-3 3337 353Y 5.! 2-3 33 -32 7.1 82Z 31.1 .37.9
109 SamdiA=bzlk.. . ..-. .- -- . -
ApbbhmmmAt 4 .mm
-.
IIOIredand 34.336-3 134 14.4 30.1313 92 5.1 [19 3.4 111 65 37.7 429
IIlNewzealardb 67.3 57.3 0.0 0.0 13.0 26.7 3.2 2.1 1.3 235 10.3 11II 3439 35.4
112 fLame! 40.7 3435 10.1 6.3 2435 37.4 3.6 1IS 7.0 4.2 14-1 15.3 52.0 37-7
113 Spoin 23-2 322 43.0 353 12.6 22-1 3.8 L6 4-4 0.4 .0 5.4 24.4 3117
115 iSlugapor 32.5 . 27-0 0.0 0.0 15.8 228 639 2-2 13.9 14.5 30. 33.5 26.3 2
116 Australia 60.3 64.8 ItO 110 23.3 20.6 5.4 3.3 0.3 1.5 10.1 9.9 221 27.6
117 Unircdklngim 37.7 36.4 15.6 16.2 273 0. 0.1 W1 537 7.9 13.1 5.7 35.2 37.5
118 taly 30.0 36.6 3437 233 2437 2937 0.1 0.0 7.5 2.5 3.1 2.3 31.2 40.7
119 Netherands 29.6 29.8 3643 .37.3 2039 21.3 0.0 0.0 2.7 3.0 10.6 3.6 493- 49.6
l12 Canada . 52.6 . 10.4 -.- 16.6 -. 7.0 -. -0-2 -. 13.6 .. 19-2
121 Belgim 335 333' 30.6 363 242 243 00 0.0 235 2-5 4.3 32.z 44.0 43.7
in Flubjal ~~~~~26.7 25.2 11-5 1L.4 49.1 45-2 20 .8 30 3.3 737 ILO 273 fl
123 tUlnikcd Arab Tnas .. . . .. . . .
12 Fume 1737 17.1 412 44.6 30.9 26.3 0.1 0.0 237 4.2 7.4 7-2 39.4 40.9
125 Austria i1Ll J9.6 35.0 36.7 25.6 24.7 1.6 15 9.1 5.7 737 5.7 3439 35.5
126 Gmunyc 13.7 160 54.2 51.0 25.1 27.5 0.0 110 0.1 -4&4 3.9 6.0 23.7 30-3
127 Unftcd ne 56.6 -504 232 3535 4.4 339 1.4 135 1.2 1.0 32 30 1939 19-4
123 Naway flA~~~~.7. 166 22-3 242 39.6 34.4 0.6 0.5- 1.1 2-3 339 2310 42.4 47.5
2.3 32 4&I . . 3.3 3.2 11.6 13.9 36.4 40.!
l29Dennuzlc ~~~~~35335.0
ISO Swieden 1 3.2 63 332 39.0 29.1 302 1.2 019 43 3.0 14.! 153 352 44.6
131lIapatb 7038 W2 0.0 ao 20.3 169 2.4 1-3 0.3 7.4 52 52 216 2 4.5
I3iSwkmcdhud 14.0 -. 43.0 1. 93 9..5 . 2.0-. 73 .. 139
~~~ .. ~~~~~~~t.
I - - i $~~~~~~~~~~~13~
IS '- -. - -
a. Seenetch=nical trs. b,. Dawrehorbadgcazyaccarncsly. c. DatmrefrtdaeFedeml RquublicofGermany before unfliadon.
mi~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3

Table 12. Money and interest rates
-Exdu,DugCbha&ludIa
AT- hmgmfld hew Namg uewg mm of hu
CS) a,u.MpdGeqIRP Dqaumauite bgrAupuz
1925.83 191J -9 2 198 BE9 1983422 198 159 PwJ 1922
I Elhhpia 14.4 .12.8~~~~~M 14.0 253 65 53.6 . .
3 Tauzaia .22.6 .. 22.9 372* .25.3 4.0 . - 11.5
4 Nkm epal 1939 5.1 12.6' 20.6 124 W0. 9.2 5.10 6.
5NqnI ~~~~~~~~~~19.9
10.6 21.9 35.7 9.2 4.0 a'; 14.0* 14A4
6 Ugumla 28.1 16.3 12.7 . & 1 35.8 M0 3C.4
7 Uatan - 3D.i . 22.7 8.7 3.0 .. 17.0
8~~~uum1i ~~~~~~20.1 9.9 941 13-5 - 4.5 2.5 .. 12.0 -
* 9Mala~~42wi. 147 8. .21. 20 7 1521 7.9 16-5 16.7220
* 10~~~l U.ug1ashd -. 17 . - 84. 31.1 9.1 .z~ 10.5 11.3 15S.0
11 -Chad .15.2 7.6 9-4 20.0 20.1 0.9 5-5 7.5 11.0 16.3
12. Gudm-neaUi 59.6 . 12.2 59.3 . . 39.3 .. 50.3
J= gMaigmr= . 38 60 17.3 22.3 20.7 16A4569 .
14. r~~~~~~~~~WPDR ~~~~~7.2 14.0 4.8 15.0
14 RwanaP 2L5 103 13.6 17-3. 3.6 6.3 7.7 13.5 16.7
16 .Ngcr. 23.9 45. S.2 13.3.19.6 1.7 6.2 7.8 14-5 16.8
1
19
BudinaraFas
boda
21.5
17.3
10.3
16.8
9.93
23.9
15.9
36.2
21.2
4C.I
3.5
85
6.2 759 14.5
16.5
1659
18.9
19 Kaay . 1913 1518 312 3619 44.6 9,3 5.8 13.7 10.6 .18.8
20 Mau: 12.5 8.1 13.8 17.9 20.7 3.7 6.2 7.8 14.5 161
21 Nlgeda 34-3 180 9.2 2318 19.5 19.4 5-3 18.0 8.4 24.8
22 M&an 22 14.1 22.1 6562 75S
23 Tolp 22.2 5.9 172 29.0 352 4.2 6.2 7.8 14.5 17.S
24 Bniia 1910 6.1 10.1 17.1 28. 1.7 6.2 7.8 14.516.8
25 CmAdalqdhlc 16.0 31 16.0 I8. 16.6 4.6 5.5 7.5 10-5 163
26 Pakfista 17.1 13-7 4tL2 38.7 3910 7.1 -.
.27 Gain 36.4- 425 18.0 162 145.3 38.7 11.5 16.3 19.0
28 Chid - 25.6 -. 255 66.6 6-5 5.4 -. .5.0
31 Maijuiiak 21-5 11.4 9.5 21.3 255 8. 5.5 5.0 12.0 10.a
32' StiLanka 23.1 15.3 22.0 35.3 352 11. 14-5 18.3 19.0 13.0
33 Tmhabwe -- .- - . 36.0 144 3.5 3.8 17S5 15.5
34. Hoodtosa 160 13.9 19-5 22.6 30.7 ~ 7.6 7.0 12 185S 21.7
-35 Lesatwa- 16A4 . . 3519 13.2 . - 10.6 11.0 18.3
36 EgyjA.AbRqp. 26.0 21.7 33.5 52.2 91.4 132 8.3 12.0 13.3 19.0
37 Indonesia 35.9 26.3 7.5 13.2 42.6 8.4 6.0 20.4 24.0
38 MJtyuw 15.1 15.8 23.9 23.9 27.9 1419 1.5 .- 80
39 Somwa& 24.6 . 17.6 1-7.3 9 49.7 4-5 .- 7.5
40 So&Im 283 34.9 17-5 32.5 .42.8 6.0 ..... -....
41 lbuea.Ritp. .. 18.7 9.3 .-
42 Zabi 10.7 .. 29.9 32.6 484 7.0 485i 95 54-.6-
43 COledvaire 22.6 3.1 24.7 26.7 313 1.9 6.2 7.8 14.5 1618
44 BolIva .29.4 236.7 1459 16.2 32.5 220.9 180 23.2 28.0 45-5
45 Azedmiarn . . . .
46Thlpin .19.2 IT.0 .29.9 26.4 34.3 14-1 12.3 14.3~ 14.0 195~
48 aegl 19.6 5.5 14.0 26.6 22 5 .62 7.8 14.5 1619
49 C=mmoo 22.5 6.0 .135 18.3 26.0 3.5 7.5 Le' 13.0 16-3
50 KyrgzRephlic . . .- .-
51 Geiaq . . . . .- .. .-
S2 Uzbekisa . ... .-.. . -
53 Papu&Ncw Guine &. 3 . . 32.9 33.1 5.1 6.9 7.9 112 14.5
54 FMt 33.6 296.6 1759 16.4 11.A 311.7 .. 59.7 . . 173.8
.55 Gustnawa 18.6 18.6 17.1 2D.S 23.3 165 9.0 10.4 11.0 19.5
S6 caago. 15.7 6-5 165 14t.7 22. 0.5 65 719 110 16.3.
S7 wuolm 18.7 14.5 31.1 42.4 .. 6.9 4.9 .5 .7.0 9.0
53 DominicanRlquubl 18.3 29.0 17.9 r2.0 24.7 252 -
59 Eadr242 37.2 20.0 202 13.4 39.5 .. 47.4 9.0 602
60 Joidan 24.3 12. . 126.7 - . 3.3 . 91
61 RIncmnna. 13.8. 33.4 23.6 13.1 .- -
62 BSalvuadr 17-3 1758 22.5 23.1 30-5 17.2 . 11.5 . 16.4
63 lhdimuoistan . .. . .
64 MOldv . . . . .
65 Lidwazama. .. . . 20.7 .
66 Bulgpea .. . . . .11.7 54.
67 Coko)ida 32.7 .. 20.0 23.7 27.9 25.0 .. 26.7 .. 37.3
68 Jamaica 15.7 26.1 31.4 35.4 41.2 21.5 10.3 38.4 13.0 53A4
69. Puapgay 27.0. 35.9 7.7- 10.1. 23-2 .252 ..- 20.1 . 28.0
70 Namil& . . . . . 12.3 .. 11.4A 202
72 Tunisia 2D.3 155 3. 4-1 *2 2is 7. 73
Note PordnatacapwamblIad cow e. see sheKcyaurddie technical es. Fmpnlaks isforycazsoibertanu espefifcd.

19M410 1.931-9 Sm 193 199 I93-92 PM3 1992 iPS 1.9
l3 Ukcine .
74

-T able 13. Growth' Of
AWdmm&evmk &Mb4)
trade
Eq-
h"M
lm lm "M-W 19W-p- 192" lgm-r- f9sy M-7
Low4acomeemmanis - 177M3 t. II&M t 33 w CL9 W &O w 2.7 v 106M 90 n
53 -oj v 106 at
E:acbW&3gChiua&bdia 72,Mf 39.SM t L9 w 3.9 w w
:2 Ediepra 169 7" -23 -43 -0.6 -1.4 117 79
3 Tmutania 400 .1.2w -7.S -1.2 -0.6 -1.3 101 71
4 SicuaLzooci 164 149 -5.6 0.7 -t.4 --&O 106 so
5 ll&qw 369' 687 13.9 9-7 2t.5 4.S 99 97
6 Usailk
7
164 405 -&2 1-9 -3.0 -3.2 143 42
8 Bmmdi 77 22[ 0.2 9.9 .5.0 0.1 M. ..39
9, Malawi' 383 719' 5.4 SA
.10 Bmgbdob
1.0 3.6
I" 23n 3.8 7-6 -2.4 1.4-
122
90
lm
.11 Chad 194 .. 339 &S. 9.S -&I 9.2 109 78
12 Guinea-Bissm '6 94 15-9 -&4 -5,2 -0.2 91 -115
13 Naftmw .296 469 -3.0 -1.6 -0.9
14 LWP!E)R
-1.5 99 95
L14.2 30-1 -23.0 19.4.
9t
106
241 90
15 RWZIk
16. Noer 291 21.0 -43 10.9 -5-9 126 100
17 Dniiina Faso M .503 7.3 7-7 6.4 13 JOB 98
19 India 19.79S 22.530 4.3 5.9 3.0 1-9 96 gr-p
.19 Ncoya 1.339 1.713 19 4-1 1-9 -1.0 114 67
20 MA 389 740 9.3 6-5 5.2 3.7 95 86
21 N-w& ilift &II9 (L4 1.7 .19.4 -10-5 167 84
27 Nsmmgn Mg 91F7 -4.8 0.1 -4.1 tog 75
23 Tqp ZOT 410 4.9 2.9 11-2 0.3 lis 91
?A Ben-m III 383 -11.6 w 4.0 -2.4 .103 74
25 Cmed Afiican RcpaMic 1 M -0.6 S-1 -2.9 3.9 107 61
26 FWdscm 7-*& 9-VA 0.7 11-1 4-2 3.6
27 Gham 9-p- 1,597 -63
29 Otine
&O -2.2
84-940
1.9 106 45
SD-W 9.7 11-9
.109
11-3 9.2 99.
29 Ta-jddsmb
30 GW=
31 mauthalin SW 6m -2.0 5.4 t-4 5.2- 113 107
32 SdI"Im 49T 3.470 2.0 6.5 4-5 2.5 103 90
33 Tm*2bwe 1,235 2-306 2.2 -0.8 -4-7 .2.1 100 101
34 Ekm&= -736 1.057 3.8 -0.8 2.1 -0.9 Itt 79
35 Usadez
36 Emit, " Rep. 3.0% V93 -2.6 3.1 7.8 -1.2 JR 95
37 kKionesia 33.915 V.= 7.2 5-6 13-0 4.0 131. 91-7
38 Afjmmw 539 826 1-5 -4-5 -3.9 -1-4 106 119
39 Sxnmrw 40 150 fi.4 -&4 5.3 -7-0 107 .97
40 'Smim 412 997- -3.5 0.2 -0-6 -4.8 Jos 91
41 Yknw4 pgp_
42 Znn2bia 1.100 uli6 -0.2 -3.2 -9.2 -0.7 90 109
SBOAN t 6461=1 4.0 w 3.7 w ai W. .2.2 W logn gem
LYwer-middL-income 234JW t 27.W6 t 107m 96M
43 Cftcd'lvoim 6.22D 4.7 7.6 9-1 1.1 Ito 65
44 Bdivia 763 1 IM -0.9 6-1. 7-3 Ol 167 53
45 Ambarjmb 739
46 PhT 6.0 3.3 4-5.
wim 9.790 15.465 3.7 93 105
47 Amiiiab' 40 95
49 Songg 672 970 1.9 23 3.7 1.9 106 106
49 Camcwou 1.07 1.3" 4.2 10-4 5.4 -1.6 139 66
SD KyrgyzRqmbrirb -33 25
.51 Gwqoab
52 Uebb M 929
53 PVuaNewGub= 1.076 ISW 15.6 4.0 1.2 2.4 III 81
54 pan 3.5B 3.6W 3.3 2.5 -1.7 -1.6 III 86
55 Goaamala I.M 2,463 5.7 0.0 5.9 -0.1 109 79
56 CMV 1= 1.071 16.9 7.8 5.3 6.4 145 .86
57 Morawo 3.9n 73M 3.9 5.5 6.6 4A 99 iw
58 Domin6c:anRcpWirc: 566 Z178 -2.0 -2.2 1.3 2.5 .109 113
59 FA r 3.036 2,501 W .4.8 6.8 -2.0 153 91
6D joidan 933 3,251 19.3 6.1 15.3 -0.1 95 116
61 Rommaia 4aW 5" 6.3 -10.4 7.3 -3.1 66. tOO
a a salvad" 396 1.07 1-3 -0-4 4.6 -2.9 t26 65
0 TUflmeUjSt3Ub 1.083 545 -
64 MoldoWab 195 205
65 Lfflmanbb 560 340
.66 Bidpria 3.501) 3,500
67 CatornW - 6.916 6.684 1.9 12.9 6.0 0.2 140 79
69. Jamaica 1.107 1.758 -1.7 1.1 -6.9 2.0 95 96-
69 Pamgny 657 1.420 93' IIA 5-3 5-4 109 99
70 N=-biaa
71 Knakhsmb I _U6 1.609
72 T1WiSi2 4.040 6.425 TS 6.4 12.5 3.1 105 97
*Data fbrTaivmn, Clfinq6 arm 91,337 70,071 15.6 11-0 10.6 too 109
Note: Fordam
mdcovcmgcseetheKeyandthetccbnicalnoomFiguminhalimamforyeamodwdmdxisesp=WxdL
U6

hfar~uNzr,,~r(udWrnSIAwwunqem-fgmi.ihme
1%)Ttrifw
Ezpimz bUMS ~~~~~~Ewaut Iur4mrr (1987=1011
1992 ~~1992 J900 199997070 UI 98992198 192
73 Ukzaiae 8.1110 8.900 -.
74 Alera12M.0 73763 -0.5 4.3 11-5.1 174 86
75 Thailand 32.473 40.466 10.3 14.7 5.0 1 1.5 91 91
76 PaLaid 134.32 15.30 4.5 3.0 5.6 1.8 91 86
77 L-gvb 429 423 . ..
78 SlovkRepubli
.79 CostaRtica 1.83 2.458 5.2 5.2 42 3911
SOTtuiccy. ~~~~~~~14.715 22.87 4.3 9.0 5.7 9.6 82
8
11
81 Iulslm nc i Rep. 18.25 26.744 -6.8. .14-5 11.0 8.6 160 92-
82 Panama SW1 2.009 . -7.3 2.0 -5.1 -3.0 13 93
893 CzebhReptbi . . ..
84 PRissian A~~jnb 40.000 36.900
85 Chile 9.646 9.456' 10.4 .5.5 2.2 3.5 102 113-
S6 Albua a ..
..
88 Syvi=AnzbRgp. 3=6 3.36 7.0 19.4 12.44. 125 89
UjPj*r.usdcdle4uamse .. 35taWK: t -7370,6t :2.2W 3.7w 6.3w .5wm 100 in
89 SourhAfricaa. - 23.892 1.6 1. . -1s -2.5 105 101
90 Manidus . 13 1.774 .8 9.7 8.2 10.8 83 102
6
.91 Estodab
242 230 . ..
92 BAzIl 35.956 23.115 5.5 5.0 4.0 1.5 108tO
93Boeswana~~~~~~~~ . .. .935 4.8 11.3 3.7 7.9 .. 9
95 Vaezzadla 13M9 12.222 -11.6 0.6 10.9 6
-0.6 174 157
.96 BeLaums
1.061 751 ..
97 J(*~~~~~p~~y~~ 10.700 uIsA 3.8 162.0 0-.5 104. 102
98 Unigay .1.620 2.010 6.5 2.9 3.1 1.3 89 97
99 Mesico 27.166 47.977 13-5 116 5.5 3.313 2
100 TrndailandTobagp
101 GabutL
Jim6
2.303
. .46
913 . ~
-7.3
5.7
-2.4
4.3
-9.6
11.6
-9.7
-I-8
156
140
1100
89
102 Argentina 12.235 14.861 7.1 2.2 2.3 -L7 110 110.
1033 oma 5.555 3.674- 2.1~ 8.6 40.9 0.0 112 57
105 PueRcsoR. . . .
106 Kore. Rep. 76-39 St8.413 235 11. 11-6 11.2. 153 106
107 Greecc 9.842 23.407 10.9 4.8. 32 5.9 94. 101
tog Portual 18.541 30,412 I11 11.6 1. 10.4. 85 101
.109 Sumal Acabia 41.83 -32.103 3.7 -2.4 35. -6.2 176 83
EI _ .mt93 -
Blghiacmneecouuounlrs 2.811,389 t 2,95,98 t .4 if 439 W 2.4w 5.3 w 93m 99 M
110 Irelad 28-33 22.469 11.7 8.3 4.7 4.8 97 92
III New7ealand 9.33 9.200 3.4 3.4 -0.3. 4.1 88 -106
112 I1ame. 13.111 18.66 10.0 6.0 3-5. 5.1 - i5 11.2
113 Spain . 64.302 99.473 M . 32 1.9 10.9 91 122
114 tBong Kog 30.251 123,427 937 5.0 7.8 12.6 97 98
113 ------or 63.386 72.067 4.2 9.9 -5.0 8.3 99 97
.116 Asrla .33.065 42.140 3.8 4.9 1.5 5.0 III 105
117 United Kmgdom 190.481 221.65 4.4 35S .03 .5.0 103 101
113 Itay 178.34 184.510 6.0 4.1 0.7 5.7 84 108
119 Neduedands 139.919 134.376 3.3 3.3 LI1 4.4 101 9
120 Canada
121 .. BEgiume
131.771.
12.132
1215893
124.656
2.0
5.6
.5.9
5.3
0.4
2.9
6.9
.4.5
110
94
98
100
122 Ebdaml 23.515 20.74t 5.3 2.6 0.1 . 337 a5 98
.123 tUnited ArbEmirate
124 Fmac
18.058
231.452
1720
238Z29
4.9
6.6
4&8
5.2
273
2.4
1.1
4.5
171
96
87
101
125 Austria 44.425 54.084 6.2 6.5 4.0 63 17 91
126 Gemuayd. 429.751 407.172 5.0 4.6 2.8 5.7- 82 99
12 UnitedSmtat
I29 Norway
.420.812
~35.178
551.591
5.9
6.5
7.9
3.8
7.2
43
013.1
6.1 100
130
101
129- Denmak . 39,570 33.601 4.3 6.5 -0.4 4.8 93 101
130 Sweden 55.933 49,849 2.5 4.0 -0.2 3.4 94 103
131 Japan 339.492 230.975 9.0 4.6 0.4 6.6 71 109
132 Swtzerland 65.616 65.603 4.9 4.6 2.6 3.7 86 93
a. Data are for the Smutb AfreAn. Cusoms Union comprising Sout Afiica. Namibia. Lesotho. Elotswana. and Swaziland:- trad among the eopoames fterrories is
excldex. b.Excludes ntc-epubhic tade. c- hicludcs.Luxembourg. d. DuatanrtotheFedestlPRpicofGcm tan belbreumifcadoo.
187

Table 14.
of merchaniffise-iinports
GWrpff-3 AfiwKvny& Odwr
Fad Fs& mun-eq* moulfba-
19M im 1970 JW- 190 Nm 1w_ IWA 1992
Low4nemnLeconornies 16 w 9 v 6 w w 7 w 9 w 31 w 34 w .40 v 40 w
Fichoft Chiew bWo 17 w 13 v 7 w lo w 5 w I w 31 w 34w 41 v 35 w.
9 Is 8 10 3 3 35 45 45 29
3 7 6 9 13 2 4 40 43 42 33
4Siem F 26 21 9 29 I 2.. -21 25 43 -32
smqw 5 9 11 12 0 14 25 24 60 41
6Upoda. 7 8 2 30 3 2 34 2n 55 34
7Bhutan
aBUMMU is' 19. 7 7 7 6 23 28 45 40
9Malawi Is 9 5 is .7. 3 -3D 27 44 48
10 Ru&desh 23' 16. .13 16 If 2D 2? 17 3-7 31
It Chad 21 is 15 15 3 2 .23 -17 39 38
Ll. Clubwa4fissals 31 35 7 7 1 16 Is 45 43..
-13: Madagascar 12 11 7 12 3 2 .30 41 49 :34
14 L2DPDR 24 33 23 17 1 2 19 22 34 27
15 Rvanda
16. Zripr .14 17 4 2D 4 4 26 29 51 31
17 Burkioa Faw 20. 25 8 16 7 3 27 2-t 37 31
Is kkat 21 5 9 m 19 12 23 19 29 42
19 Kcnya 6 6 10 is 4 4 34 39 46 37
20 Mali 29 20 9 30 6 1 21 m 36 25
21 ?rW&- a is 3 1 3 5 37 36. 48 41
22 PrKacgua 10 -. 23 6 is 3 I 28 26 54 34.
23 Top 23 22 4 9 3 2. 22 M 47 45
24 Besdu 19 25 4 7 :3 2 21 21 55 45
25 CmmzlAfmaReWc . . 17 19 1 7 2 3 36 33 44 39
26 pakic- 21 15 6 16 7 7 31 35 35 .27
Z? Ghan 21 10 6 31 4 2 26 26 44 31
28 . cune 7 5 1 4 9 9 39 39 43 44
29 T2jkbnn -
30 Gaines
31 Maniitmia 23 23 9 6 1 2 39 42 29 7-7
32 Sti T -n" 47 W 3 9 3. 3 is 21 29 51
33 rxnbabwc 3 3 Is L5 7 7 39. 38 37 37
34 Honduras 12 .11 7 13 1 3 29 26 51 47
35 tgsolhoa
36 Egyjx.4zabRcp- 23 29 127 lo v 29 .34
37. Indonesit 12 6 2 8 4 9 3.5 43 47 34
39 At)mmxr 7 8 6 6 3 3 .29 35 55 48
39 SmoUs 34 20 6 2 6 6 17 50 .37 21
40 Sarkm 21 19 9 19 3 3 Z7 22 41 37
41 YMAM PqL
42 ZwdWa It 9 10 Is 2 2 39 35 38 37
Middkobacumeeconowks -13w UV 10 w 10 w 9 w 6 w 34 w 38w. 34w .35 w.
lower-mkwkqncome
.43 Oked'lvcim 16 19 5 2D 2 2 33 24 35
44 Borrvia 20 11 1 3 2 3 37 47 40 36
45 A=barjan
46 if 9 12 14 9 6 35 29 33 44.
47
49 Swegal 29 29 5 16 4 4 25 21 39 30
49 Camaoon 12 15 5 I I 2 32 34 49 47
50 KyWzRqmblic
51 Geeigm
52 UzbcVtstan
53 Pq=NewGuinw 24 17 II a I I 30 40 34 34
S& 20 20 2 11 5 3 35 35 39 31
55 Gaammuk it .12 2 17 3 3 V 26 57 42
56 Coop 20 19 2 3 1 2 33 35 44 41
37 Monxw 21 14 5 15 10 10 32 28 32 32
58 kxninicauRqxib1k is 16 15 34 5 3 ?A 19 39 . 29
59 Emador 9 5 6 4 2 3 35 44 49 43
(Jo Jordan .31 21 6 14 4 3 17 25 42 38
61 Romania 10
13 42 40 11 23 16 16 21
6Z ESdvador 14 16 2 13 4 6 23 24 56 41
GTurkmmisma
64 Mokbu
65
66 Bu%aria
67 CdFwnbia 8 9 5 8 7 46 37 44
68 . jamaka 22 19 Is 17 5 3 21 2D 37 40
69 pwaguy 19 13 15 14 I 1 32 39 33 33
70 NmibiO
71 Kazakhsmn
72 Tunisia 2t 8 5 .9 9 7 26. 30 32 47
*Data forTabran. Chbm arc: 15 6 4 8 Is 10 35 40 29 36
FordamcmuparabWtyandcovenWseedieftanddwuxbakdnotmFp=iakgksawforyemodwdmthmspedfied.

0hsrpflra Maudhmer& Dinf
B21) 1992 )70 .1992 0 1992 1 971 19M IYM) 1992
'Al
O 126 2 .6 5 373 44
74 Al3g42r3a
lST.75 nd5 6 91 8 7 8 36 41 43 37
76 Poland 17 10 21 17 II 9 28 33 23 30
77 latuia .- - -
78 SIovakRqmblic-
79 CosaRica .I 1 8 4 17 3 429 23 .53 4
OTrkey a 17 8 9 41 35 36 .33
81 lICuL51UDiRip.
Psaniam
7
job
12
.10
0
19"
0
15
8
2b
4
2
.41
277)
45
28
45
42b
39
45
83 CmczeRepubric. . ---- ---- --
St Russian Federatin--.--- - -- - -
SS -Chile 15 6 6 12 7 3 43 42 30 37
86 Albiania-. - .--- - . -
-Uppw-aniddlkecomnme 12w lO w 9w w lolw 6w SEw 40 w 33 w 34 w
89 SoudAfrkat 5 5. 0 1 7 6 48 54 40 34
* 90 Maurkus 36 137 92 3 13 25 41 so
91Egtonia.36
92Bmazll ~~~
37
~~~~~~11
9 1 228 635 33 3 29
93 Boiswaut a -- -
- -
94 MaIaysia 22 7 12 4 8 5 . 28 55 31 30
9S VCnCzudaL 10 . 10 1 1 5 6 45 51 38 32
.96 eaz -- - - - - * *
97 i azy11 6 9 15 19 6* 31 30 31 43
9SUguy13 9- 15 10 I2 4 31 34 29 42
990Triniddad7aait1 3 3 9 5. 50 48 31 33
IOD - rhtiddandTbago t .1753. 9 1 5 13 29 22 39
tOl Gabon
lOAr mmn6
14 17
.6
I
5
I
3
1
16
2
S 31
4
46
39 4
42
3
40
103Oman 13 19 5 2 3 1 41. 42 38 36
101 Slowenia .-- .-
105%c uetRico -
106 Kamm.Rep. 17. 6 7 189 21 1230 35 25.. 28
10O Grece
-logPatugal
I1
14
.15
iIy
7
9
10
8
9
13
4
5
48
30
34
38
23
34
33
37
109 SandlAcdmbi 28 16 1 0 3 3 33 36 35 45
~LgdMdt4Unmtt~$)
A~U3t'rJSw~~ 9ttZt0w t~ w~ 7it 13w~ 37w ~. -,
'n...
35w>~36w
W' 37-
4~~. ~~~---- -~~~~ 22w r 31wC~~~'3 39w
~~sE.r.,eaindC~~~~~ika1A~~i$L2~~~
,C~~ l W . r --
- -39
HIgh-iuazuzeecuumma
~~~16w- -low Owv 9w 16wv 6w 25 w 35 w 33 w 41 w
IlO0heland
ItIINewZaIand .7
14 12
7
8
7
5
7
8
tO
3
4
27
34
36
39
.43
43
44
43
112 tsaeI 14 7 5 38 8 4 30 32 42 49
113 Spain 16 12Y 13 10 17 5 26 37 28 35
I14 tHonglKong 20 7 3 2 9 4 16 30 52 5
Il5tSlgngpore 16 6 13 13 12 3 23 46 35 32
116 Austmliai 6 5 5 6 7 3 41 40 42 47
I1.lUnitedKlngdom 24 II 10 6 20 6 17 37 29 41
H181z4y 19 13 14 9 21 9 20 32 26 37
119 Nethedaads i5 14 1 S 10 5 25 30 39 42
I20 Canada 9 6 .6 4 6 4 49 50 31 35
121lBeIhunl
12ZFiindai
13
10
11 6
9
I11
3
13
13
9
7
8
26
33
25
33
33
37
49
40
123 tUnitedAuab Emiraz I11 17 10 7 2 3 37 31 39 43
I24 Frmu 1.5 II 12-9 15 6 25 34 33 41
125 Austria
l2Oemayd19
9 5
10
8
9.7
5 . 12
18'
6
6
31
19
39
34
39
36
4
42
127 UnitedStutes 16 .6 8 I11 12 .4 28 41. 36 38
1I28 Nocmwy 9 7 8 3 13 7 .35 37 .36 46
129 Denmark *I1 13 10.5. 9 5 2 2942 48
130 Sweden II 7 1 9 10 5 30 36 39 43
I31IIapaa 17 17 21 23 37 13 11 16 14 31
I32Switzidal 13 7 5 4 9 4 27 30 46 54
-~~r~y35rt -Itrsr& -icr. --9w-' - 14w--~~~~~~~~'6w> '---Z:7w-3Sw , -" i3-3r----40w-i
~~ ~
a. Data ame for the South Afkcan Cuskoms Unio comtprising South Africa. Nalumbia. Lastic. Bocswana. and Swazlant nuade among die cornponcot trictores is
excluded. b. Fxcludes the CarA! Zone. a.Icuc Luxembourg. d. Datareferrotde FederalRepublic orGermany beforeuniflica..-
189

Table 15. Structure of merchandise exports
1970 1992 19W 199 1970 1992 1971 199 1921 199
Low4ncmmnaninj 29 w 21 w -44w 17w 4w 9w .2Am w 3w 1w 26w
EududlmCluhm & Tdaf 36 w 4Sw 51 w 21 w aOw 2w 32 w 37w 7 w: 21 w
3TanZia 7 4 s0 S1 0 I 13 15 2 7
4SiemiLeame
5 Nea
15
0
34
0
22
65
33
6
0
0 0
63
35
32
94
0
25
0-
85
6lIganda 9.3 90 96 0- 0 0 0 0 0
SBanmdfi I 1 97 ~97 a 0 2 .2 0 .0
9Mzakwi 0 0 96 96 0 0 3 4. 1 3
I0flBnmtadesh I 0 35~ 18 I 0 6C 31 49 72
li Chad
12 Goinca-Bisaa
0
0
5
0
95
93
90.
97
1
I
1
0
4
1
4
3 .0
0I
0
.13 Madqpscar 9. S 34 73 >2 .2 5 is I 10
14 LaoPUR 36 24 33 :72 30 0 1 4 .0 0
-15 Rwanda -- . - * - - - - -
16 Nigecr 0 36 96 12 .1 0 2 I 0
l7 BukrinaFrawo 0 0 95 BB 1 4 3 3 0 2
18- India 13 S 35 21 5 7 47 64 .25 25
19 Kaxya
'PoMa
12
I
16
0
75
39
55
92
0
0
10
0
12
10
19
S
I.
S
3
7
21 Nigua .62 96 36 3 .. 1 1 0 0
22Nkza3 ~ 2 S1 90 0~ 0 16 7 3 1
23TaOP 25 45 69 44 2 1 4 10 1I 3
24 Beni. 0 3 39 67 3 3 3 23 6 .1
25 CeamnlAfticanRepubli 0 1 55 55 I 0 44 43 1 0
26 Paliscum 2 1 41 20 0 0 57 79 47 69
27 Gana
2S.CVit=w
13
11
IS
7
36
19
54
14
.0
15
0
LS
1
55
1
64
0
29
0
30
29 Tajiknns. --- - - - - - -
31lMauuizamia 38 84 11 8 0 7 0 I 0 0
32ZSdUdka I I 98 27 0 2 1 71 0. 52
33ZImnbabwe I8 17 47 51 2 ~4 33 29 4 6
34 HaduxIas 9 .3 C2 84 0 0 a
35SLcsthoa 3 . - - - . . -
13 2 3
36.EgyAzanbRep.
37 Mdancsia
5
44
51.
38
63
5it
14
is
1
0
1
4
26
I
34
4
19
0
13
ii
3SiA1ymumr 7 6 .92 91 0 0 2 3 0 0
39 Semara .0 0 94 99. 4 .0 2 .0 0 0
40 &san 1 3 99 96 0 0 0 I 0 1
4lYoam,Rq.
42 7AbNa99 gI I 0 0
Miaddle-wuone emmomin4 Ow: 3,2w 33 w 19w -9w 1 w' 13 w 3t1w 4w lO w
43 Cked'Ivoive
4BolIvia
2
93
11
66
92
4
79
22
1
0
2
3
5
3
9
9
1
0
2-
2
45 Azeabaian . . . . . .
46 PhbIIppines 23 8 70 19 0 17 3 56 I 10
47 Anneda-i-- -. -
43 Searga 12 22 .69 56 4 2 is5 20 6 I
49 Canmuon 10 28 82 55 3 7 6 to 1 2
S0 Kyrgz PApublic.-- : -.-
- .
51 Gem&i -- - . -
. -
52 Uzbdldswan . . * *
53 PapuNewGu:uv= 42 52 55 36 0 10 3 2 0 0
54 -Pan49 49 49 31 0 2 1 19 ~ 0 10
57 Morocco 33 15 57 ~~30 0 6 9 49 4 25
59 Ecuador
E0OJonIan 24
49
34 59
51
16
0
3
I
2 13 48 3 4
61 Romania
EZEI SaIvador
21
2
16
3
6
70
8
56
29
3
27
3
44
26
49
37
9.
1 9
15
63 lbrkvmeiamn . .* * -- - -
6E Moklova--. -. - *-
65 UsInineia. .. . . - -
66 Bulgpria
67lColombia -11 29 81 39 1 2 7 29 2 9
6S Jamaima
69 Pmgua
25
0
I3
1
22
91
27
84
0
0
0
0
53
9
55
15
2
0
13
2
70 Nanubiam . - . -- *
71 Kazkhstnu .. .- - - -- -- . ---
l2 hmisia 46 16 35 11 0 9 19 64 2 40
*Daa. Cna.a=2 orTiwa.
2 22 .5 17 40 59 53 29 .14
Ncr-c-Fordatacomnpabiltyuand convege. see the Keysanud tirbicdail .o. Flgums bn kdchawe frayeasoter-dian those specifl

P---rAgetrefurerd.ds&rcpans
FiEs. nAagik. OAerpiu-rv Madcin&&
f9u 199 1970 192 1970 1992 1970 1992 1970 1992
73 Ukmuiae. . ... ... .
74 Algai 73 97 20 0 2 1 5 2 I 0
7STluaiand . I 2 .77 32 0. 22 a 45 1 17
76NPanmd -19 20 a 16 41 IS ½32 49 7 5
:77Latvia. . . ... .
78 Skovak Repulic..
9 Cbsta Rica 0
.....
I 80 7 3
.-
4 17
-
234 5
so Turkey. 8 4 83 24 0 9 9 63 5 39
SlhInn,Islmnic Rep.. 90 90 6 6 0 0 4 3 3 3
S2 Panamann I 75b 73 -2b 4 2b 17 cO' 6
83 Czeh Repubic . .- .- . *
84 Russian Fedeadon .. .-
bS CbiL- 88 47 7 38 I 2 4a3 I
86 Aaaznk.. .. . ...
I7MyrigAraRe. .. .45 -.9 17 3. 13-4 2
46w 3 2 Isv 6w -22w 17 w 31 w 4w 9.'
90 Mlauritius 0 2 98 31 0 2 2 65 I .54
91 Butnih- -.-.--
9-2Brazi I 11 13 75 29 4 -21 1 1 37 1 4
93 Dcxswma,r- . . . . .
SMalaysia ~~~ ~~~ 17 ~~~30 63 22 2 38 6 23 1 6
* 95 Vseuehd 97 86 2 3 0 1 1 9 0 a
96 Beams . . . - .-
* 97 Hutmay 7 S 26 232 21 35. 45 14
* 9l Umnz y I1 1 79 58 1 4 20 37 14 16
* 99 Mexico 19 34 49 13 .11 31 22 21 3 2
If00TdnibdzandTobago 7iS 6 9 6 1 .1 .12 29 1 I.
lOl Gabon 56 89 35 7 1 0 a 4 0 0
10O-Argatina 1 10 as 641 4 .8 10 19 1 1
103Oran100 94 0 1 0 4. 0 I 0 C
104 Slovenia-- ..-- --- .- .
105 P11estD RioD
106 Ko= aRcp- . 7 3 17 4 i 40 69 5336 20.
107 Gite 14 11 .51 36 1 5 33 49 7 27
lOS Patulga 5 5 31 12 8 21 56 62 25 30
10l9SaudiAmbia 100 99 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
A.t -r~&~;Q the
~~~~ VSr S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~37wn
E

'Tablel 16DECD iprsOf
maufactured goods
tArn %bynqfmmjf..
Cemotadaa of 1992 hwun of mimslw er 51
hyarf~~~a ~ flTatkawchlkmny. TrMwmVn
193 192 chahbs dmkul vkaM ea'r Other
law4neuneeennn,ulu 1,264* 91M8~~~~~~~~~~~WASt 9.7 w 4.w 7.w- 73
1.3 w 47.2 w
Eacludlngchlaa&Iudla ~~437* r 21,670 51.IJw 2.3'v 2.4 w 2.4 w 46.9 w'
I m ~ ~ -12 ~~~7 41.7- to. o.o 0.0 58.3
2 Ethiopi.a.4 .40 10.0 7.5 -25257.
3 Tanzaniia 9 41 63.4 . 0.0 2.4 4.9 29.3
.4 SiamLeone 2 220 -0.0 0.5 0.5 .0.5 98.6
5 NalI 328 93.5 0.6 .0.6 0.3 7.0
67 gnd 3 . 33.3 tO0.0 0.0 66.7
* Bwuandi .0 2' 0.0 0.0 0050.0 50.0
9 Malwi 12 7000.0 -0.0 0.0 30.0
10 Bangladesh .. ~~~~~~ ~~1.859 39.7 0.1 0.2 3.5-6.
I IChad -. . I. .. .
* .. 12 GOjpnBjw
* ~~~~13 Nadagmew 7 flu8. .900 . 23.5
14 Lao PDIt . 0 39 .94.9 .. 0.0- 0.0 5.1
*. 15 Rwuanda .. 3......
16 Niger 0 ISO 0.0 95.1 .0.0 0.0 3.9
17 BhrkiuaFas 5......
18India. 534 10.539 43.3 .5.3 . 1.2 .43.7
19 Kenya 16 120 26.7 8.3 5.0 175.
20 Mali 2 ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~61
1.6 0.0 32.8 0.0 65.6
21 Nigeria . .13 .167 7.8 15.0 . 3.0 4.8 69.5..
22 Nmicaragua- 6 17 2335 29,4 0.0. ILK. 35.3
23 Togo -. .. ..
24 Besin 12 25.0 58.3 0.0 8.3 8.3
25 Ccmtr Affiims Republic 12 78 ....
26 PWitsan 20Y7 3.474 85.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 13.7
27 Ghana - 90 LI112.2 1.I 94.4
-28- China .243 -59,429 33.3 4.1 11.0 0.9 50.2
'29 Taj'icisa .01.
303 130Guinea. 0.0 0.0 87.3
31 Mauritania 0 5 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0
32 Sai Lmab 9 1.717 74.2 1.2 1.5 0.1, 23.1
33 Zimbabwe 0 266 22.9 OA.15. A73-
*34 Honduams 3 460 36.1 . 090.0. 0GA 12.6
35 LAmohoV .. 0.. 9 0.. 0.4 12
- - ~~~36 EIndon absi 33 1,011 50.9 7.3 0.7 23.i .1749
37 Indonesia 15~~~~~~~t 9,75D 36.5 2.2 .- 4.2 0Ci 56.3
* 38 Mpzwuer 4 54 61.8 040 1.9 .1.9 31.5
39 Somari . . I... . -.
40 SW1Wn 1 7 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 85.7
41 Yema. Rep- 28 0.0 o.o 7.1 35.7 57.1
-42 Tambra 4 - 28 42.9 to0 o.o 0 3.6 53.6
-NlddI.incueeommles 401r11 203ANt 24Aw 6.w 133w. 73~w 43-5 w
LAZ-aidrl-laine 1,26 t 67,342 - 343wv 7.5wv 11.7 w - 4.1 it 42.8 w
43 ChAtd 4 lvoire 7 267 16.9 1.5 -0.7 11.6 69-3
44 Bolivia 1 63 15.9 ILl1 0.0 0.0 73.0
45 Azerbaijan 5 60.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 20.0
46PhIlippions 108 :6.703 30.9 - 2.0 323 0.5 34.2
47 Anenua .. 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 87.S
48Senega - 4 24 12.5 8.3 1617 0.0 62.5
49 Caywonpu[i 4 49 163. 2.0 -0.0 2.0 - 7.9.6
51. Georgia-. 6......
S2lUzbekWi=a 2
53 PapuaNcwGuiona 4 22 9.1 0.0 0.0 4.5 86.4
54 Pam- * 12 456 57.0 7.9 1.3 0.4 33.3
55 uawtemala 5 580 83.4 2.8 040 040 8.8
Cong 4 - 369* 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 99.7
57 Moatucc 32 .702 .67.7 11.7 L 2.0 - 9.5
53 DomninicantRepublic - 10 2.264 57.1 0.7 -7.6 - 0.0 - 3.-6
59. Ecuador -3 83 22.9 2.4 4.8. 7.2. 6.7
60 Jordan 1 84 19.0 - 19.0 6.0 25.0 31.0
61 Rumania i33 1.386 37.3 4.8 2.5 3.1 51.3
62 El Sulvador - 2 265 73.2 1L5 16.6 - 0.0 - 8.7
63 Twtunenistau . 6 . ..
64 Moldova - 4 50.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 -- 37.5
65 Lithuania .. 133 22.6 43.6 2.3 -0;8 30.8
66 Bulgaria 63 774 38.1 11.4 6.1 0.9 43.5
67 Colombia 52 1.177 35.8- 5.8 0C4 0.3 57.8
68 Jamaicam 117 801 47.3 4. . . .
69Fhgua 5 77 11.7 - 22.1 1.3 1.3 63.6
70 Nanabia 5 . .... .-
71 Knzakbuas - . 64 - 0.0 26.6 to0 0.0 73.4.
72- Ibmisial 19 2-59 70.6 6.2 8.9 3.2 1.
Note: Fordatracmpamblity and covemag. see theKey and die techinial notes. Figure in itafics are foryeazs otherbtan those specfifd.
* ~~~~56

73 Ukruin 339 10.3 33.0 3.2 IDA) 43.4
74Alge&i 39 1,35 05.2 0.1 0.1 945
:75 Thailad 321 15.197 20.4 139 17.6 1.0 59.3
7S Poluind 287 6.897 24.3 1139 6I 1.8 4939
77 Lirvi III 15.0 36.0 5.4 139 35.7
78 Slowakitepmbli
79 CostaRika S 90 70. £.1 9.e 0i riO
so Turkey 47 7A899 704) 2.7 6.5 25 13.0
81 Iran.IdamicRep- 133 735 53.8 .0.5 1.8 0tS 1331
' PaOnaNa ggb 475 13.1. 3.4 1.9 215.6 5331
83 Czcmh Republic -- .181.
SI Chsiae duison765 7.0 24.3 0.5 - &
56 A41wiir I 40 27.5 5.0 tO0 0.0 67.5
S7 Mim 8 .AI 0 13. 92.3 o.o tO - 727
88SyrtonArabkep. 2 75 70.7 0.0 1.3 [.3 26.
upper4samlnem2334t< 15.553t 191 w SA9w 22w trw A 4.w
*9 SoshAfuicam 325 3.25 5.4 13.7 2.4 4.1 73.4
90 Manus 1 8a3 863 0.5 0.2 0.1 1239
91. Esoioa .146 354 16.4 5.5 4.5 34.9
92 Sinai 197 10.510 5.2 9.6 45 ISA 67.3
.94 Malaysia 39 16.425 12.9 2.2 47.4 Ut 36.4
95 Veczjuda 24 757 2.9 24.4 1.7 9.8 61.2
96 thans .. 99 941 33.3 641 4.0 47.5
97 Haugmy 210 4671 233 143 12. 5.0 45.1
98 Urugua 23 304 47.0 4.3 0.3 LB0 47.4
99 Maeyi 50 30.66 5.5 4.0 3139 20.4 352
1O0 TTIIidadaUIdTObaDg 39 309 0.6 64.4 0.6 0.3 34.0
101 iGaba. 3 '73 1.4 54.8 4.1 2.7 37.0
IM Argeuun 104 1.202 5.8 23.5 1.? 9.2 60.3
.103 Oman 0 259 36.7 0.4 &I1 13.9 .40.9
104 Skocuija .. 2,366i 21.7 3.2 129 13.4 45.8
.-
105 Pli ...--.
IOSmoua. Rep. 524 39.456 i_! 3.5 21.t . 53. 47.6
107; OmCe 15 4.018 61.0 5.2 4.1 Li 28.
108 Pngul 396 14.155 35* 4.5 lOS 7.5 395
109 SandlAzabim 16 1.837 0.3 39.4 10.6 Li 41.6
-esi
Itew -4mzs.ir
4
* .- .. -33wkWsj1r .:ir..il A 33
--1 Nw lanct. i12- 49 2.54 9.22 .94.3w 5: t0
112 tLmit 305 8360 10.7 14.1 11.3 237 61.2
113 Spain .773 36.271 .4.0 .9.1 5.4 37.3 412
* 114 jHouggK,ng 1.86 25.661 42.0 0.7 12.7 0.5 44.2
115 jSlngam112. i 22.90 5. 5.2 2535 1.3 63.0
116 Autla471 6.681 3.7 27.4 4.8 13.7 50.4
117 United Kingdom . 10.457 115.249 5.3 15.0 939 1337 53.1
IIS Ita 7.726 115.669 16.3 &I1 7.7 10.5 57.4
119 Ncheduinds 5.675 77.689 7.2 262 8.6 9.3 45.6
120lCauada 8,06 79.162z IS 7.8 7.6 39.9 43.1
121 Rklgionu 7,660 54,56 5.6 20.9 537 21.7 4331
122 rishend 1.170- 17.144 2.5 8. 9.0 5.0 72.3
123. tUated Anb fzni 1 958 4437 7.9 32 7.4. 36.7
124 -Pacne 9.240 145.55 5.8 16.3 9.0 25.2 43.8
125 Austia 1.637 31.703 838. 1037 52 63.7
126 Genmn 23-342 251.743-. 52 -145 939 Z2.0 48.4
127 ,United &ss .21.215 216.1062 . 2.3 127 13.4 19.4 52.1
128 No4rway 1.059 8.900 1.5 21.6 7.3 10.0 .59.3
129 Denmark 1.413 20575 7.9 14.8 0. 4.1 63.2
1I0 'Swedem 4.143 39668- 1.5 . 1137 9.?, 16.9 60.2
131 'Japan .85. 198.011 1.1 3.9 1339 2938 46.3
132. Swigzedand 3,56 50.817 4.9 24.1 9.6 23 9 55.6
NaeDaftcoverhigb4noxnmeOECDouuiet impos ny. For 1970.dtheeaze buMoS amKit viuimIan laud ino2 for 1992. -a. DamaacfarthesathAfricm
Cinier Uniont comFprisi South Afttn. Nainibia. LA=osh. Bowensr. and Swauilauk t uSe amon fthe wmpmas terie is excluded. b. Exclude fth Cal
Zoesym c. Includm[ALxembourg. d. DahitareafindFadeS PepuMicofOnrunybdfbre unrication.

Table-17. 'Balance of pamnsad
reserves
.2 Edipa-n
MDW 199 192 392 1W 1992 193 192 M92
LnwJ'amneeeua.unia .. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
t 3A ww
Erluiingaila&hdls 2.6891~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
35,ZI t 3.5 w
I Monmubique
.. -351 -. -881 -. 58' - - 711~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~V 2.2
41' -43 .41a .. 316 72 271) Zs5
.3TUZDK-36 -297a -37 -866 - - 65 327 241
4 SIenL=a .- 16 -. -20 - .39
SNepa -la -2422 -25W .Z79a *9
2
51868
6 UPO&d 20 -1138 19 -346'2 s- 57 91L 1.5
.7Bha . 13' . -25a ... . 78 8.5
Itnazll .2' -51' -2' -219' .. 13 IND 6.3
9 Malawi -35 -223' -46 -3472' -4 .. 29 44 0.7
*10 BngLiadeh -114a 301'1 -234 -516' an 848' - - .533 5-5
110Chad 2 -91 -33 -325 -6 -39 2 51 1.8
2lGuinea-issmz
13 Madagnear.
. -.
-136
-
-42
-121
-2m
..-
-26
I
-1.
--
37
17.
19
1.6
12
.14LaDPDR -41 . -1172 ... 6 --
I5lRwm01d 41-5 -12 -246 -4 .. 79 25
16.Niar 0 -38 -32 -156 -3 -37 19 229 6.0]
17 BEwliaElso 9 --95 -21 *-460 16 91 36 345 4A.
.15 Indi -385' -4.309 -391' -5.165' go 2.056 1.02 9.539 3.6
19 Kenya -49 -in -816 -312 - -3 22D so 0.4
20 Mali. - -2 -91 -22 -414 -1 91I 314 4.0
21 Nqgeak -368 2Z268 -412 t.53 . 22 223 1.196 1.2
.22 NMug1n1a -40 -695 -43 -1.074 -. 10 49
23lTogo 3. -105 ~ -14 :-190 -32 35 27 4-9
24 mm . .-3 -29 -23 -1S? 0 99 16 249 3.9
25 CcIfral Afiican RePUbli -12 -57'R -24 -ID'a -4 -3I 10t 3.7
75 FaRina ~~~~~~~-66 -1.049 -705 -1.499 86 1.468 195 I.524 1.4
27 Glum. -a8 -378' -76 -59' -9 . 3 43 417 .
28 Cilia' -81' 6.401 .-Ii' 63150 01' 21:3 .. 24.W3 313
29T4lkuitwn .. 1 ..
-V -. y -6 5- 3- . I-.
32 &jLtanka .59: -431 -71 -63 3 548 43 980 2.9
33 Zlndubalwe -14' -617' -26'. -839"2 59 404. 119
34.- Houdnas -61 . -224 -68 -379 . . 20 205
35 LTndis1m 38 -1' -397 29' .. 1. IS
1.6
1-8
36 ESYPL, Azal lRep. -145 2.605' -452 1.27'a 29 5.430' 165 11.620 9.3
37 Indonesia -310 -3679 -376 -379 . 184 16D 11.482 3.4
38JFwnffumr -63 -418. -81 -44 96 364 3-5
39&iSulkz -6 .. -IS - 21..-
40 SkAm -42 -1.446' -43 -1.714' - 1242 22 24 0.3
41 YasmHq.. . 1.82 -1.7' .3' .--
42. 7fg 105 -307' 107 -568a -48 -19 515 .192 -
bmidIaueumcxzmai5 .- 23267e 251,759 t 3.9w
IswnrmiddIe4imcme l2.478e 34.760f 4.0w
43 Cftdrlvofme -38 -1307 -n3 -1.465 -56 -424 119 22 0.1
*44Boliuia 4 .-533 2 -754 . -1 46 480 3.7
45 Azcb.janm 503 .. 503 .-
46 PIuIij,incs -48 -99 -138 -1.343 .. 314 . 255 5.336 3.3
47 Anaeumi .. -135 -. -140 . . .-
48 Senegal
49 Canfon.
-16
-30
-267
-84'*
-.66
-47
-547
-ne8
-16
-1i
32
.-312
22
S1
22
30
0.1
0.1
53 KyWzRepubli . . -101 .- -123 ---
51 Geonuia..--
32 Uzbelcisma -369 -369
53 Papm New Goiea 489' -466' -239' -725'2 71'2 260 1.1
54 Pm2(12 --2.065 146 -zi 33922 3.456 641
SS GatnammaI 4 -706 -5 -758 1. 73 79 . 06 3.2
56 Cong -45' -306 -53' -402 -3' -,64' 9 II1 0.1
57 Mownee -124 -427 -161 -V 27 2148 142 3.319 419
:58 Dominica Republic -107 -393 -103 -473 25 347i 32 506 2.0
59 Euadler -113 -81 -122 -201 .- .. 76 1.016 3.2
258 1.030 2.6
- 1-595 2.9
60 lo,dan
61 Rumuian
-20
-21
-741'
-1.506
-130
-23
-1.089'
-1I-2
. 800'
62 El Salvador 9 -148 7 -374 .. 686 64 57 3.4
564 Moldaria -. 32 -395
57 Colombia -293 912 -333 925 6 630 2D7 7-5518.
6SSiamaim -153. 117 -149~ 25 29 1St 139 106 0.5
*69 PauAga -16 .- 596 -19 -596 . Is 1 573 341
.71 Kazakhastan .. -1479 -. -1.479
72 Tunisia -53 -945 .43 -1.03 20 566 60924 1L4
*DaaforTaiwan.Chia.e I 7.879 2 7.936 ... 62.7 86.820 11
AWr -Fordsecoqmp.miiy
.194
aid coveage.-seethe Keyand the tedunicaltnoasFlgpm i itals maroryeamotherumban seqiseifled

MD3 599 197f 19 197) 199 ami 1992 i
73- Ukriit . -210 .. -210. ...---
74. Algeria -125 I337* .463. j337a 178 774 352 .3318 3.2
75 Thailand -250 -6.682 -296i -6.731 ...- 911. 21.183 5.2
76 Padand .. -658 -. -3357 ... .4.257 2.2
78 Slovak Rpuhlir. 19. .. -725
79 Caum Rica -74 -361 -n7 -446 .. 16' 1.032 3.9
OD Turkey -44 -943 -57 -1.85 273 3.O08 440 7.508 3.0
S1Iramn. laertRep. .- 507 -4.6S1a -5Ii :-4.65I1 . . 217
82p Pa.-41 -79 .- 282 ... 16 501 0.8
87Mmv~~~~~oIk
. ... ~~~~~~31 .. -73 .. 0
88 SMW4jwbRrp. -.69 5.5 -n -258 7 550 57 -
Uppnnidule-hcuwe 1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 166,993 ~~~~~~~0.78f
3J9r
89 SonldzAMfca -1.215 1.385 -1.253 1.314 -.. -- 1.057 3.206 1.4
970 UMauitins 8 -12 5 -17-.. 46 541 4.8
* 91IEswnia -- 152 . 5- .- -
92 Binll --837 6.275 -861 6.25W . . 1.190 23-65 7.6
93 Eouwa. -30 -4 -35 -ZM1 -9 .. 3.845 17.6
94- Malaysia a -1.649 2 -1.646 ... 667 13.02 4.5
95 Venenicla -104 -3365 -98 -3.35 J885 .=1 13.381 8.1
* 97 Iflnpry .-- 3522 . 337* . 4,462 3.7
98 Uruguay -45 -2D7 -55 -236 --.. 186 .1.185 5.1
9Mexico-i -22.211 .-1.09 -22.924 .. 2.068 756 19-171 3.3
* 00 TrinibdaandTabapo -109 127 -104 123 3 6 43 190 Li1
1IO) abn .- 3 -135 -15 -147 4 -142 is 75 0-3
* 10 Aipurmin -163 -8.370 -lEO 48.370 -.-- 682 11.447 5.9
103 Ontan .. -366 .. -355 .. -1.118 13 1.765 4(7
104 Sloenia . 932 .. 885
105 POItnRioD
106 KoRta Rep. -62 .- 429 -706 -4i.5D& .. 10 17.229 2.2
107 Gic -422 -2.140 -424 -6.198 333 2.366 316 5.938 3.0
JOB Nags!p -1598 -154 t5W -3216 SN.'A 4.650 1.565 24.481 8-7
109 Saudi Atbia 71 -19-431 152 -17,931 -2183 -12.700 670 7.467 1.5
83. QCkh Repuc . . -ISP .4548 -
81PRussmnFademiuag .. -1.600 - - .- 4.600 .
85 chile -91 .- 583 --95 -940 ... 392 93790 8.4
86 A&mauk. -3r . IN-0 5 7.075.-
O~~EacA PMa&7WCfe' -. 9:S 3.5 w
.- ,. . unt:.zsn,: 32w
r~~~~~Eumpeaud . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~9,t sW.- --
trMIdiIeEint&N.Aftta - - ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~-4#477f- -0,4 -3.-
Slgb4ncumeecmsies
72,5441~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~W
9541,WCt 2.7 w
110 .1icland -198 2.629 -228 -399 698 .3.560O 1.2
I II Cw ZCland -232 -763 -222 -707 16 267 258 3.0`79 2.8
112 tisml -562- 86 766 -4.141 452 5.130 2.2
:113 gSpain 79 -1.8 7 21.678 469 1.841 [MI5 50.708 4.5
116 Ausuzlk -785 -10.677 -01 -10-W ~ ~ ~ -
1
1.709 13.852 2.5
17Uited3nLU 1.970 :20.714 21176 -1218 . 2 .0t2 329484 1.7
118 Jlay 798 -25.427 1.09 -21.297 446 . 12 5.5*7 49.862 2.1
119 Nerhedands -489 6.570 -513 9.S2 -51 . -356 . 3362 36-581 2.4
12D Canda 1008 --23.012 960 -22.405 ... 4.733 143745 1.0
121 Belgium 716 5.409 901 7.42 3 -274 .-
122 inlmnd -240 -4.943 -233 -4.411 ... 455 5.881 2.1
12 tUnkedAzab Emia 90 [OD10 . 5.9771
124 -Fiance -201 3.480 189s6 -611 -187 5.199 54.306 137
15Austria. .-79 -703 -77 .- 505 -7 74 1.806 19.026 2.8
126 .Gczuzrc 837 -25-56 133 -I.22 -1.3 -4.375 133879 122.686 2.6
127 United Samu 2.330 -6635O 4.68 -47.95O -5 -7.55D t5.237 147.526 2.3
129 Norwy -242 2.925 -200 4.231 .. -257 813 12.33 3.1
129 Demnark. -544 4.700 -510 5.061 ... 488 11.59 2.1
1.30 Sweden .-265 -5.229 -160 -3.130 -. 54 775 24.647 3.5
131 Japan 1990 117.640 2.170 120.950 ... 43876 79.697 2.4
:132 Switdachnd 161 13.419 203 14.028 -313 -2.141 5.317 61.007 637
a. Would Dank estirnar
b. Includes Luxcnbubarg. e. Dama priorzoluly 1990 fetra the Federal Republic of Gemnany befibwunirocdaa.
195

Tabe 8.Oficaldevelopment assistnce-from OECI) and OPEC miembers
OECIkTaIntfiowt
- it~~19 197 -195 in9 M . is InW a9n - .an9
illidancid 0 0 3 30 39 57 49 57 72
IIItNcwZmmd .. 14 66 72 5410 7 95 100.
116 Auiralkm 119 212 552 667 749 1.101 1,020 955 1.050
.117 U.ilelUngdom 4772 SOD 904 1,854 1-530 2.64 2.537 2.633 3.248
* 113~~li Itay .60 14 182 633 1.093 3.193 3.613 3,39 3,352
* ~~~~119 Necdnlands 70 196 608 1.630 1.136 2,231 2,094 2.59 2-517
120 Camnad 96 337 380 1I'7 1li31 2.347 2.320 2,470 2.604
121 Ddigimn 1102 120 378 595 440 601 703 38 331.
122 Rntmad 2 7 48 110 211 608 706 3u6 930
124 France 752 971 2093 4,162 3,995 6.365 7-450 9.33 7.484
12S Austuia 10 It 79 .78 23301 233 394 543
Is aesuyrb 456 599 1.639 3.567 2.942 4.731 499 6-30 6.9
127 Uniredtmtues 4.02 3.t53 4.161 7,138 9.403 10.141 7.676 11394 11.26
12 Norway 11. 37 134 486 574 935 917 1,20 1.175
129 Daumak >13 59 205 481 4410 922 937 1Li7i 1,200
130 Sweden 38 117 566 962 54 153 1,799 2.012 2.116
131 Japan 244 453 1,148 3,35 3.797 9.1.34 8.965 9.069 10.952
132 Swilzedad 12 30 104 .253 302 617 558 750 3so
Totad .448D 6,968 13,855 27.296 29.429 48,117 46,713 55.63Z 57.1.97
* ~~~~110 Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.19-
II[ -NewZmdand .- 0.23. 0.52 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.22 .0.23 0.25
116 Australia 0.53 0.59 0.65 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.38 0.34 0.38
117 United JGagdIoa 0.47 DA41 0.39 0.35 0.33 -0.32 0.31 .027 0.32
18Ialmy .0.10 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.39 0-42 0.32 0.30
119 Nbecrlands 0-36 0.61 0.75 0OM 0.91 0.98 0.94 034 0Om
120 Canada .0.19 .0.41 0.54 0A43 0.49 0.50 0.44 0.44 0.45
121 Belgium 0.60 0.46 0.59 0.50 0.5 0.39 0A46 0.45 0.42
12 Finlad . 041 0.06 0.18 0.22 0.40 0-59 0.63 0.64 0.76
124Frnc 0.76 0.66 0.6Z 0-63 0-73 0.72 0.78 0.79 0.62
125 Austra 0.11 0.0 0.21 0.23 0.33 0.24 0.23 025 0.34
126 Gcmanyb 0.40 0.32 .0.40 0.44 0.47 029 0.41 0.42 0.41
12 Unied Smnr 0.53 0.32 0.27 or2 0.24 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.2D
123 Norway 0.16 0.32 0.66 . 0.87 1.01 1.13 1.05 1.17 L.14
129 Deunmark 0.13 0.38 0.53 0.74 0.80 0.39 0.93 0.93 0-96
130 Sweden 0.19 0.38 0.82 0.73 0.36 0.36 0.96 0.90 0392
131 Japan 0.or on2 on2 0.32 0 .29 on3 0.31 . 31 onU
13? Swknitarad 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.36
Agnatew!rends
llO izdand(nmlliamofpounds) 0 0 4 15 37 37 34 35 L1
lit -NewZmatand(nrillionsofdollam) . . 1355 7 0 5 4 6 8
116 Ausuuik(mllliansodaflars) IDE'- 139 402 . 591 966 1.404 t.236 1.22 1.3
117 UniodradKngdm(mnillions of'pounds) I5J 209 -409 798 L.13D 1.485 1.57 1,473 1.736
118 Italy(billionsaflirc) 38 92 119 535 24197 4.156 4,95 4.D68 3.859
119 Neftbdhnds (millioansoafguilder) 253 710 1.53 3.241 3.773 4.410 4.440 4.720 4.306
120 Canada(inillionsofdoflams) 10 -353 895 1.257 2.22 2335 2.747 2.33Z 3.009
121. BDemgi (millions offuiarcs) 5.100 6.00X) 13.902 17.399 26,145 22,038 27.714 29.720 26.050
12! FHlanld(mlfliosofmadcka) 6 29 177 414 1308 2,542 3,031 3.236. 3.845
124 Fiane(mfrlors of fiai) 3.713 539 3.971 17.539 35,39 40,897 47.529 51.076 38.777
125 Ansuria(mmikrnsorschllmngs 260 . 236 1.376 2.303 5.132 3.722 3.737 -4.477. 5.361
fL5 (GaM..(miiMostIltlenbfaksf)b 1,324 2,192 44155 6.484 8.661 8.19 9,30 1021 10.446
12 Unitedsite(rrulllomofdoliars) 4.023 3.153 4.161 7.138 9.403 10.141 74676 11.394 11.26
128 Norway (uillionsofkIroner) 79 264 962 2Z400 43946 6.418 6.335 7.542 7.037.
129 Denmadk (uilhomasf tane) 90 443 1.173 2,711 4.657 6.204 6350. 7.247 7,096
130) Sweuden (millions ofkopwj 197 605 2,350 4.069 7.26 9.396 11,600 11.99 11.704
131 JabllliNrsofyen) 89 165 341 160 749 1,171 1.236 1.313 1.371
132 Swhzedaad(mlhhrnoffianc) 52 131 268 424 743 903 912 1.0)41 1.170
ODA(currenmpricr) 6.5 7.0 13.9 272 29.4 49.1 46.7 55.6 57.2
ODA (Il7 puic) 23.2 2523 29.8 36.3 39.4 44.9 43.6 47.6 47-1
GNP'W(currenat pices) . 1,374.0 2,079.0 4,001.0 7,418.0 8,550.0 13,547.0 13,96.0 15,493.0 16,818.6
Percent
COLAts a pmtagcofGNP 0.47 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.34 036 0.33 0.36 0.34
lads (1987=10)
GoPddieDacr 23.0 27.6 46.5 74.1 74.6 107.1 107.5 116.3 121.4
196

OECD Net bilatral flows to
1ew4ineouieecno,ies ~ 1965 -1975 297 198 Mu8 196 18 18 9% "Pt1
Asperrnran.fdawGNP
110 Iln.. . - 0.01 0.03 0OM 0.02 0.0 0.01--
III NewZelad . . 0.14 0.01 0.0 0.01 1101 0.01 0.00
116 Anualia 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04L 0.06 0.05 -
117 United lCigdo.m 023 0.09 0.211 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 - 0.05
15ital 0.04 0.06 0.01 0410 0.0 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.09
119 Nethbalans 0.05 0.24 0.24 0.32 02m 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.23 -
-120 Canada 0.10 0.22 0.24 0.13 0.14 LI13 0.13 0.09 0.10 -
121 Bdgituu 0.56 0.30 0-31 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.0 0419
122 HuMand .. .. 0.6 0.03 0.09 0.10- 0.24 0.22 0.17.-
124 Fence 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.11. 0.10 0412 11.14 0.13.-
125 Austia 0.06 0.05 0172 0.11 .0.0 0.03 .0.03 OW0 0.10
126 Gcrnmant ~~~~~0.14 0.10 0L12 0.017 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.10 .-
L7Z? United Slat 0.26 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.03 Om1 0.05.
123 Koaway 0.0t 0.12. 0.25 0.21 0.34. 0.43 0.37 *0.32 0.37
* 19 Dezumrfk am0 0.10 0.20 0.17 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.24
* 30 Sweden 0.07 0.12 0.41 0.26 0.24. 0230 0.21 0.2 0.2 .
131 Japan 0.13 0411 0.05 0412 0410 0.10 0413 0.13- 0.10
132 Swized-an 0.02 0.05 0.1 0-)7 0311 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11
Total 0.20 0.13 0.11 .i OA5S.0 0.13 p.09 0.05 om .
OFEQ- ToWa net flows t '1976 I98 . 93 no3 1986 .1987 PM8 1959 1.990 1591
MBrm of US ddarfs
2lNigesi OD 35 51 45 52 30 14 70 13
Qatar
150~~~~~~IB 277 10 S 15 0 It -2 1 I
74Mgmia 11 S1 52 51 114 39 13 4O 7 S
at 1e.YslamiWctp.. 751 - 52 -72 69 -10 39 -94 2
95 Vemczncda 109 135 90 32 85 24 55 52 i5
frng ~~~~ ~~~~123 361 -nZ -32 -21 -35 -22 21 55 a
IJbjv 95 376 24 57 65 66 129 16 4 25
109 SagatiAmbi& 2,791 5.682 3.194 2.630 3.517 2.888 2.04 1.171 3.692 13704
123 t'JklAMp hFanrhnp 1412 1,118 . 85 M f 87 15 -17 2 M5 S58
Mmwair 706 1.140 1M02 771 725 316 105 169 1.666 387
TOWa OPBCY
'Tol OAPEC
51)77
4.93T
9.,65
9338
4.59
4366
3.615
3.610
4,704
4*498
3.33
3.29
2369
2.26
13514
1.417
6.3441
6.313
AsrXmrnMWqfdmwGNW
21 N4iged 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.1 0.05 0.25 0436
Qatar 7.35 4.16 0.15 0.12 0.36 .0.00 0.05 -0.04 0402 0.01
74 Algeda . 0.0 0.20 0.10 040 0.19 0O7 0.3 021 00 0.01
Stl InLdu.Is nclp. LW1 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.0!
*9S VcnezcI 0.35 0.23 0.16 0.06 0.4 0.06 .0.09 0.13 0.03
- frgq 0.76 2.36 -0.05 40.06 -405 -0.05 -0.01 0.04
Liby 0.6 1.16 0.10 024 0.30 0.30 0.63 OA41 0.01 0.09
109 Sudi Axabia. 5.95 .4.37 3.20 2.92 3.99 3.70 .2.5 1.37 3.90 1.44
123 iUz&n Aah lawnmts 5.95 4.06 0.32 0.45 0.41 .0.07 -0.0 0.02 2.65 1.66
&nmufr ~~~~~ ~~41)2 3.5 3.95 2.96 2.54 1.15 0.40 0-54
-TOWa OpEd .2.32 1.85 0.76. 0.60 0.75 0.52 0.34 021
-TOtDCAPEC* 4.2 3.2 1.60 2.39 1180 1.10 0.56 ... .-
a.Orgma2bnin of Ewonawi Coapezuta mnd Dcvelopmicat b. Data fefer no tie Fedesa Republic of Gernnany'befic uifiatfion c. See duetehcl
noun. Owpnitimuof Puewn k Expoting Commtds. a. OrganiwioaofAabPtrlmz mExposiag Couwties.
197

Table 19. Official development astnc:receipts
He qf disiwnemem ODA frra*& are
is)
meN ilK 197 298 MP8 199 1991 1991 1991
*Lsw4zeomneCCammnisA 17,Wlt* 19,533: 20.963: 24,004: 24430: 30,441: 31,711t 10.2w .7 w
Esrudl.gChda&bndI 14,535 * IS,785: t 1143± 19,931t 20.482t 26,836: tP.015:t 25.1 w 7.0 w
I Mabqc300 422 651. 393 772 935 920 57.1 6927
2 Ethiopia 710 636 634 970 752 1.014 1.091 21L6 1.
3 TaMN&mj 484 681 882 982 920 1.141 1.07 42.7 33.3
*4 SlenaLeaC 65 37 63 102 100 65 lOS 2437 .13-9
5Nq 234 301 347 399 493 430 453 23.4 13.6
6 UJganda ISO 198 230 363 443 551 525 31.1 20.5
7 Blatn 24 40 42 42 42 49 54 43-8 25.4
8. Bwundxll 139 187 202 139 199 265 253 4&.7 21-6
~9 Malawi 113 193 280 366 412 481 495 56.2 22.6
10 Bangldesb 1.131 1.455 1.635 1.592 I.80 2.048 1.636 14-6 7.0
litChad 181 165 198 264 241 303 262 44.9 20.2
12 GIIIQ4YWZ53 71 III 99 101 II? 10 101.3 43.4
13 Mfadapascar 185 316 321 304 321 386 437 36.4 16.4
14 LaoPDR 37 48 58 77 140. 152 131 30.8 12.7
15 Rwanda 180 211 245 252 232 293 351 49.1 21.5
16 Nige 303 307 353 371 296 391 -375 47.6 16.2
17 BuxrkimaaFaso 195 234 281 298 272 336. 409 . 44A1 14.8
IS India 14592 2.120 13839 2.097 1.895 1.54 2.747 3.2 1.1
*19 Kenya 430 455 S72 SW8 967 1.053 87 35.0 10.9
20DMali 375 372 366 427 454 467 455 522 183
21 N-eina 1.032 59 69 120 346 250 262 2.6 0.8
22 Nicargua 102 150 '141 213 225 320 826 219.0 47-6
23 Togo III 174 126 199 183 241 20* 54.0 12.4
24' Bcini
25 Cental euli
94
lot. 0
138
139
138.
176
162
196
263
192
271
244
-256
17456416
52.4 13-5
26 Plskbaa 769 .970 . 8i9 t.408 1.U29 1.149 1.226. 10.6 2.7
27 GIl.. 196 371 373 474 550 498 724 47.2 10.3
23 China 940 1.134 1.462 1.98 .153 2081 1-954t 1.7 0.4
29 Tajibkstan
30 Guine 115 175 Z13 262 346 296 371 62.6 I11.7
31 Mamitania 207 225 185 184 242 202 208 102.9 18.4
32 SriI ank 469 570 502 598 547 674 814 47.2 9.0
33 Zlnib.bwc 237 225 294 .273 265 340 393 39.2 6.0
34 Hondwns 270 - 233 253 321 242 450 275 52.2 91.1
35 Lesath. 93 38 107 10g 127 139 123 67.9 20.5
36 Egypt Amabflcp. 1,760 13716 1.773 1.537 1.56 5.44 4.98 93.1 15.2
37 IndonesiaL 603 711 1.46 1AV32 1.839 1.724 I,8M 102 1.6
38 Myasw.. ... .-.
.39 SaIms .353 511 580. 433 427 485 186 23.1
40 Satan 1.128 945 89 937 772 875 837 34.4
41 Thazeifiqp. 392 328 422 304 370 405 313 25.0
.42 Tattlei 322 464 430 478 392 486 814 110.2
MIdEe-ncumeeceunoies 9,057 . 9,470 I ,437I 961w I 10,06: 35,457: 15,535 16A w 0.7 wv
Lower-middke.iaoam 6X37 * 7375t 3,60:t U79at 8.41t 13.152:- 13.453t 2.4Aw LB9 w
4Z3 Cited`oIvd: 117 186 .254 .439 403 693 633 50.9 637
44 Bolivia 197 322 318 394 440 506 473T 64.4 9.4
45 Azxubaijat .. .. . . .
46 Philippins 460O 956 770 35 844 1.279 1.051 16.7 2.3
47 Armcnia.. . ...
48 Senegal 289 567 641. 569 650 788 577 7337 10.2
49 Cunewou ~153 224 213 284 458 431 501 42.2 4.3
50 Kyegyz Republi - . . .
SI Gecega. . . -.
52 Uztkiin. . - . . . -
53 Papa New Ouji 257 263 322 380 339 416 397 10041 10-5
54 pam 316; 272 292 .272 305 39 SW0 26.9 2.7
55 Guatemnala 83 135 241 235 261 203 197 20.8 2-1
56Cong.
57 Kom=cc
69
766
110
403
152
447
89
480
91
450
214
1.026
133
1.075
56.7
41.9
4.9
3.9
58 DoFminmu Repubflic
59 Eauador
20F7
136
93
147
130
203
II8
137
142
1EO
1OD
155
66
220
9.1
20.4
0.9
1.9
60 Joidan .. 538 564 577 417 273 884 905 247.1 22.2
61 Rmanotia .. . . .
62 E Salvador M45 341 426 420 443 349 290 54.9 4.9
63 Tlxhkuiun . . . .. .
64Moldova. . . . . .
65Lrkiheania . .. . . . . .-
66 Btdgaxia.
6 Colmnbia 62 6 7 6 67 88 123 380.3
6E Jamaic 159 178 168 193 262 273 166 .69.7 4.7
69PAmtgua 50. 66 II 76 92 56 144 32.6 2.3
70Wunambia 6 15 17 22 59 123 184 12441 . .2
71 Kazakhstan
72 Tunisia 163 .222 274 316 283 393 322 39.1 2.4
Hrte Fardatacomnpoauablynd covuer.esee dueKey and due rcllcl oteFiguresin itaisaitreorJ anozhrdmu mIiespecdlied.
193

~~~~~~~Fcquaa
MSraefMIm
Par iS&f WV
1915 1916 197 19 193 mYe 191 ml9 1991
73 Ukrn . . .. . . -
74 Algeuia 173 165 214 1III 152 217 310 124 0.
75 Thailand 459 496 504 563 739 a02 T22 12.6 0.7
'76 PbLmnd . . . . *
71 Skvak Reptlic . . . . . . .
79 CoitRica 280 196 223 187 226 227 173 5535 3.1
s0 Tuilcy 179 339 376 267 140 1L219 1,675 2912 1.6
31 Ian.Idanic Rrp. 16 27Z 71 32 96 105 194 3.4 0.2
SZ PSnau 69 52 40 22* 18 93 101 40.9 1.8
83 Cfda RqpubIic.. . . ....
SI RussiauFemdesi. . .. - .
895 Cie40 65) 21 44 61 102 120 9.0 0C4
86 A&bmfin
SlAfaegoIla 3 4 3 3 6 13 70 30.
83 SvrikmArnbRqp. 610 721 681 191 127 634 373 29.3
Upper-miDddleitfCorme 2.26£ :1,59 t 1,3317t 1,5101 t 1,654t. 2,365 t 2.66 c 5.3 w 0.1w
S9 SashAfiia.. . -6.
91 Evmoia
92Brazil 123 173 239 210 206 167 132 1.2 0.0
93 Beansm 6 10i 156 151 160 149 135 102.5 3.7
94 MalAysia. 229 192 363 104t 140. 469 239 15.9 0.6
95 Vaenru1a 11 16 19 is 21 79 33 1L7 0.1
96 Bdlams.. . - . .
9thuua-Y 5 27 is 41 33 47 51 16.3 0.5
99Mczreico - 144 252 155 173 36 141 115 2.2 0.1
100 TiinidadandTolugo 7 19 34 9 6 1s -2 -1.3 0.0
101 Gbon 61. 79 32 106 133 132 142 121.4. .26
'102Agmn 39 83 99 1.52 211 171 253 7.7 0.!
103Ouan71 34 16 1 13 66 14t 3.3 0.1
104 Slovenita.. . ... . . .. .-.-
105 Puefio Riw.. . . .-
l0O Konea.Rp -9 -13 II O 57- 52 St 1.3 0.0
I07 GM=c 11 19 35 35 30 37 39 3.8 0.1
109 Sadi Ambia 29 31 22 19 36 44 45 2.7 0.0
4vZa.ImiS...7 ~~~~Ž~26, t -23,911SE L T tsl 5:3,Wt 94,U £j47$Sk 417w' IAni
r 6k37VOtt 131 z$ 71t( r '
110 lielimI. . . . . ---
I1I NewZcdard
11t2 tIsul 1.97$ 1.-937 1.251 1.241 .1.192 1.372 1749 M32.28
114 tHougLKog 20 18 19 22 40 38 36 6.3 .0.0
[ilslSingnpou 24 29. 23 22 95 -3 .3 2.3 0.0
* 116 Atmin . -- - . - . . .
* 117 United Kingdom.. . ... ... ...--
119 Netheuands.. . .. .-.. ...--
122 FxdnduI. . .
123 tUnited ArabEmzitats 11 3 115 -12 -6 5 -6 -3.7 0.0
124 France
125 Auu* -. . .. -. .
127 United Sta s.. . .
-
128 Norway.. -- --. . .-.
129 Deucuk.. .... .- ...
* L305Sweden
*132. Swimculand- . . . . .- -
~~ tik flJNt .3%Sdrtts,m rSC,6StZ~~~r49J93.tV 12.2w -~~ - 199

-Table 20. Total external debt.
Lag-nmdek Ihee(IMFcs Shan.mnuM TdWarn!
ith LDOD
armWku bCwmsIno Sifa W_______ (WInSW) wwd
Low.hruoteeu.uui
RvidudlnClmuln.Ink
llhlozmnbiqne ~~~~0 4.153 0 175 0 601 ii 4.929 0 -1.708 85
2 EdIIOpi 688 .4.168. 79 19 57 166 824 4.354 1 718 68
3Ta ua1399g 6,660 171 221 306 435 2.476 61715 23 3.355 .67
4 SlemmLmne 323 680 59 92 53 492 435 1.265 25 354 78
SNepal 156 1.747 42 44. 7 7 .9 10 3 47
6 Uganda. 543 .2,496 89 344 61 151 .697 23991 103 437 61
Tflbutnaf
BuruZndi
0-
iII
83
947
0
36
0.
62
0
12
1
13
0
166
84
1.023
0
0
4
.7
55
45
9 Ma1ai 625 1.557 s0 92. 116 50- 821 I.699 4 7 50
10 >'1eh3.417 12.226 424- 732 212 231 4.053 13.189 0 it 51
lItChad 20Q$ 657 14 30 II 33 229 729 35 .41 52.
12 Guhu-Bitu 128 510 1 S 5 49 134 634 6 123 66
13 Madagscar 892 3,805 -87 106 244' 474 t.22 4.385 20 1.146 76
14 LaPDR 279 132 16 28 3 2 296 L.95 6 23 24
l Rw3Aak 150 804 14 12 26 57 190 873 0 28 47
IGNiger . ~~~~687 3.567 16- 61 159 33 163 1.711 2 156
16 Ntgcr .98 0.82 768
105 69~~~~96
17 aso Bmkima 2 .. 99 15 -9 35 53~ no 1.055 0 35
19. Kenya 2.499 . 5.214 254. 393 640 759 3.394 6.367 6 430- 78
2O M2i 669 2.472 39 65 24 57 732 2,59 76 287 57
21 Nigeri 5.382 28.789 0 0 3.553 23170
472 2.109
8.934 30.959
2.192 11.126
0
44
3.422)
4409
98
22 Nicamgua 1.671 8394 49 ~~~ ~~~23
23Tcop 899 1.133 33 77 113 143 1.045 1.356 42 53 63
24 Bcnin 334 132 .16 22 73 .23 424 1.36 19 26 54-
25 CennnAfriezoRqmzblic 147 88 24 30 25 63 195 901 54 .96 56
26 Pbiksm 8.525 18.550 674 1J127 737 4.394 9.936 24.072 0 0 77
27 Glua 1.171 3.131 305 740 131 404 1.407 4.275 9 88 62~
28 China 4,_01 58.475 0 0 0 30.84 4.504 69.321 0 0. 94
'29 TailcLun ~.0 to0 0 0 0 0 . 10 0 0 52
30 Guinea 1.00 2.466 .35 64 71 122. kIlO 2-651 122 268 64
31 Mmaitani 713 1.855 62 58 65 389 840 2.301 .54 536 77
.32 SdiLT -a 1.231 5.706 391 464 220 231 1.841 6.401 0 0 .62
33 -Zinitwe 696 3.085 0. 216 90 706 186 4.0n 0 0 86
34 Rotuwas 1.167 3.28 33 112 222 178 1.472 3.57 3 1.56 Si
3S Lesotho 57 442 6 25 5 71 42 54
36 EEJyAZ2bRCp. 16.477 36.425 411 22 4.027 3.391 20.915 40.018 457 1I58 60
37 Jmgcs. 38.169 66.180 0 0 2.775 11.20420_944 84.38 0. I 92
3I Mymwur 1.390 4.974 106 0 4 352 1.499 5.r26 0 1.103 72
39 &amalia 595 t.898 1i1s4 395 660 2,447 23 1.069 SD
40 Sdwm 4.147 9.480 431 924 585 5.790 5.163 16.193 245 10.160 90
41 Thn4Rez1p. I.45 5.341 48 0; 183 1.256 1.68 6.59 8 1.337 78
42 Zamifi 2.227 4.82 447 847 586 1.37 3.261 7.041 39 1.23 SD
43 a8tedlvoire
44: BDivia
6,323
2-274
13.30
3.818
65
126
267
249
1.059
303
4.429
176
7.445
2.7072
173497
4.243
0
24
3.331
29
92
73
45 Aze.tmijan.. . .. . .. ... - .. ..-
46 Phfllippirs 8.817 27.034 LW14 1.300 7.556 4.363 17.417 32.498 1 12 94
47 Armeni 0 3 0 0 0 7 0 10 0 *O 89
48 Senegal 1.314 2382 140 271 219 354 1.473 3.607 0 153. 68
49Caerona 2.183 5.759 .59 63 271 732 2.513 6.554 6 462 89
50 KyqyrRepublic.- .. . ... ...
52-Uzbdicstmn 0 16 0 0 1 9
53 PhpsNew Guium 624 3.26 31 59 64 412 719 3.736 0 0 90
54 Fern 6.82 15.645 474 631 2,084 4.017 .9.38 20.293 0 6.698 97
SS GuateuIa 831 2.245' 0 31 335 473 13166 2.749 0 517 .90
56 Congo .1.257 3.87 22 6 246 168 1.526 4.751 34 1.520 90.
57 Momucco 8.475 20.536 457 439 778 331 9.710 21.305 6 344 931
58 DoxninicaRepublic 1.473 3.32 49 123 .480 698 2.002 4.649 20 855 92
59 Ecuador 4.42 9.932 0 100 3.57 2.249 5397 12.28 1 4.20 98
60 Joedan 1.486 6.914 0 112 416 904 I3971 7.92 30 1.087 92
61 Romnanla 7.131 1I32 328.1.033 2.303 1.166 9.762 3.52= 0 .0 97
62ElSaIvador 659 2.021 32 0 220 303 911 71333 0 -32 77
63 Tlulanaoison . . . . ...
64 Moldova
65 idwnia0
0 31
10
0.0
0 24
.0
0
a
5
0
0
38
38
0
0
0
0.
88
82
66 Bdulgri .392 9.951. 0 590 0 I.605 392 12.146 0 6.56 100.
67 Cotombia 4.604 14.368 0 0 2.337 2.136 6.941 17.20 0 156 100
68 Jlamaica 1.496 3.624 309 357 99 .322 .1304 4.303 28 392 56
69 Paagutay .780 1.483 0 0 174 264 954 1,747 2 231 90
70 Nanlbia . . . . . . .
71lKamlhsmmn 0 .16 0 0 0 9 0 25 0 0 96
72 Tunisia 3.390 7.644 0 290 136 541 3.56 8.475 6 13 89
Naez Fordamcouiparbllkand covernge.-seSe IKey and wthe tehcolunit.Rguzrsinitialcs ase brycass ochr Lin tose peiried
200

TowdrreTaRr
-- Inc~~t mz2 ]m im mm nsz in inm 1
.73 Ukminei 0 415 0. 0 0 0 0 435 0 0 91
74. Algeria 17.034 24.762 0 795 2.32 793 19.359 26.349 2 0- 98
75 Thailand. 5.616 24.697 348 0 2.30 14327Y 1.29 39.424 0 0 97
76 Poland -6.594 43.169 0 92 2.30 4,53 LII. 48.521 334 6.139 94
77 Latia .0 .26 0 35 0 0 0. 61 0 0 88
78 Skawak ILulenIk -
79 CosaRica 2.112 3.5tI 57 82 575 341 2.744 3.963 2 119 93
so Tudccy. 15.575 43.071 1.054 0 2.49$ 11.701 19.123. 54.772 26 0 97
81 Iuxn. IslamilRep. 4.508 3.065 0 0 011.102 4.50 144167 1 82 100
82 PWnaMa 2271 3.770 23 110 690 2465 2974. 6.505 0 3.202 98
13 Czech Repubic.. - .. - .-
14 Russian Fedeutar220 170 989 0 12.W 224 7n.65 6 r.69
85 Chic 9.399 14.924 123 722 2-56 3.714 12,091 19.360 0 0 99
86 Albeaka 0 112 0 13 0 499 0 625 0 36 95
S7 M.gufla 0 296 0 19 0 59 a0 375 0 14 76
89 Swvimn Arab Rep. 2.918 14.341 0 0 631 2.140 3.549 16.481 0 1353 77
99 Saud, Africa - . . . . . . .
90MZDKiZ1IIs 319 936 102 0 47 lIii 467 1.049 2 13 85
91 istania 0 41 0 11t 0 0 0 51 0 0 96
92 Bhail 57.466 99.247 0 799 13.546 21.064 71.012 121.410 461 93844 300
93.Betswan 129 538 0 0 . 4 .7 333 545-0 U1 84
94 Malaysia ~5.256 16.198 0 0 1.355 3.639 6.611 19.537 0: 0 98
95 Venezueda 133793 28.975 0 2.946 15.55 5.27 29.34 37.193 51 620 98
96Belams 0 181 .9 0 0 0 01391 0 0 9
97 lInay-6.416 13.409 0 1.204 3.3S7 2.296 9J76 21.91]0 I) 0 301
98 UIgny1.3 3A428 0 52 322. 1.773 .1.660 5.253 I 0 100
99 Mexico 41.215 82,89 0 5M.95 16.163 24.535 57.378 t13378 0 0 97
100 Tuiniaduand Tobago 713 1.782 0 232 116 195 829 2,262 a 2 .99
101 Glibia 127 2.99 15 81 228 720 1.514 3.798 aI 707 97
102 Agemtiux 163774 49.079 0 2.314 10.31 16.176 27.157 67,569 0 14.657 4SiX
103 Oun - 436 2340 0 0 163 515 S99 23955 0 0 96
105 PienoRko
3106 Krna. RcP.
. .
19.236 31.079
-
683
.
0
.
10.561
.
31.920
.
29.410 42-99 0 0. 97
107 Greece
I0 1'xga .215 22.575 119 0 2.395 9.471
309 SaufidAmbia . . . . . .
9.729 32.046 0 0 97
I I INwACmlndt---- .-..-
14 tHon Kong -. .. ~.
lrinumemmni
111 NewZraands
113 SpninoAaErii
114 tFrangce
116 Anusia
117 GamnyzdGdn
129 lltiDandsf
120 Cuedei
121 Beqimm
122 Finland Eine
123WtUid aAa
124 Entice~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0

Table 21. Flow of public and private external capital
ne m we wn we nlm na w9n. NMu ium I9ts PM
EndvdIqzC1Im&1nik
I Mimbique
lEuliaph
0
110
.195
33737 0
4 0
0
17 7.4
13
63 0
3
0
0
17
II1
41 0
0
.0~~~~~~~
3 TUmUUk 373 353 31 a 26 109 16 0 38 60 7 0
4Sleuaean 86p 48 .0 0 32 it C 0 I 0 0
S Nepa 50 124 0 0 2 37 0 0 2 25 -0 0
6GUgaMa 9I 200.0 0 32 25 0 0 4 19 0 0
7BIwu0 5 0 0' 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0
SfBimanri 39 107 0 0 4 21 C 0 2 14 0 0
9 Malawi 153 137 0 0 33 43 0 3 35 30 0 a
782 0 0 63 303 00 4 6
10Dhngladml ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~657
U1Chad 6 148 0 0 3 4 a .1 0 6 0 0
12 Gninea-Biuuu 69 27 0 0 3 3 0 0 1 3 0 0
13 Madagscar 350 106 0 0 30 40 0 0 26 33 0 0
14 LapPDR. 39 56 0 0 1 7 0 0 1 4 0 0
I5 Rwanda .27 76 0 0 3 12 0 0 2 .7 0 0
16 Nigc 167 142 113 0 .23 4 35 20 16 4 49 8
17 BwminaFmso 65 158 0 0 11- 14 0 0 6 14 0 0
-13 India LIS7 6.1334 285 254 661 2.689 .91 306
I9.Kaya 539 228 87 60 [as 201 88 60
502 2.723. 30
124 124 39
123
56
2OIhIui 95 131 0 0 6 19 0 0 3 :3 0 0
21lNW&ui 1.157 702 565 4 65 2.069 177 12 440 1.653 91 .3
22lN-cmgua
23lTogo
276
100
299
44
0
0
0
0
45
19
44
10
0
0
0
0
42
19
35
'10
0
0
0
0
243Bod
25Co2S Afrin Ruplic
62
25
101
54
0
0
0
0
6
1
14
5
0
0
0
0
3
*0
.10
6
*0
0
0
0
26 Ptatdu 1.052 2.317 9 0 346 1.133 7 40 247 590 2 8
2.7 Gbam 220 391 0 7 77 115 0 6 31 73 0 2
25 China 2.59 15.232 0 0 613 5.204 0 *0 318 2.523 o a
29 Tajlkium
SflGuinns
0
121
10
190
0
0
0
0
0
75
0
47
0
0
0
0
.0
23
0
33
0
0
0
0
-31 Mamitaia 12 119 0 0 17 s0 0 0 13 20 0 *f
325S,iLmnka 269 355 2 0 51 242 0 3 33 129 .0 2
.33 lmtbnwc 132 671 0 86 40 335 0 4S NO 133 0 24
34 Hodus261 366 81 29 39 190 48 14 58 157 25 2
.35Lesotho 13 68 0 0 3 20 0 0 1 14 0 0
36 EyptLAubRep. 2J.50 1.437 126 11 36 1.167 46 260 378 32 2 .45
37 Indonesi 2.551 6.270 695 6.527 940 4.695 693 2.57 824 2.727 358 761
38 Mpz,ortr 265 75 0 0 66 26 0 0 45 26 0 (3
*39 naI1a 114 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
40&aSud 711 10B 0 0 53 14 0 0 49 II 0 0
4lYene;r. Rq7. 566 296 0 0 25
42 7hzw*t 597' 276 6 10 1in
IS
157
0
31
0
0
10
106
25
94
.0
10
0
0
NMUdkbmmnm
LI wawr ded4.eoe
43 C&ed'Ivaim 1.413 592 325 200 517 260 205 188 353 257 237 166
44BoIvia "41 391 16 0 126 126 19 28 164 97 9 10
45 Azamjmb. .. . . . . .
46 Philippines 1.382 5,431 472 274 221 3.118 320 143 375 1.276 204 4
47 Annenia 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
48Ssral327 269 0 6 152 79 4 12 67 42 0 3
49 CZR6= ~~561 517 50 127 82 76 32 59 104 83 IS 38
5D0KyrgyzRepublic 0 0 0 0 *a 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0
51Gogi.. . .
52 UzWkisanm 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0
53 FtpvNew Gomm* 120 1IN IS 973 32 120 40 360D 30 .77 22. 84
517Pam 1,24 632 60 68 959 444 60 58 547.316 124 14
S5 Guzztemla 138 190 32 30 15 298 62 16 30 1.50 30 8
S6 cang 522 -32 0 0 34 94 0 0 37 25 0 0
ST7Mozoco 1.70 1.663 75 12 565 927 -25 8 607 93 11I 7
5 DorninkcanRepublic 415 141 '67 0 61 173 74 17 92 107 29 ~6
59 Emador 968 352 315 0 272 441 263 42 285 371 78 5
6 Jordan M69 383 0 0 103 378 0 0 79 279 0 0
61Rommnia 2.797 1.108 0 0 824 85 0 0 332 45 0 0
6lEISuIvadar ~~~~ ~~~110
108 0 0 IT 126 18I 9 25 75 II I
63 Tuzkmeuistan ~ i 6 6 i* * * 6
6S iduunia 0 1o0 0 0a 0 0 0 0 0~( 0
G6fBnJgneia 364 284 0 0 25 82 0 0 20 183 0 0
67 Cokantj 1.016 I.43 55 131 250 2.36 13 122 279 1.077 31 73
6Glamnaira 328 275 25 6 91 396 10 6 lIt 165 7 2
69 Fnarguay 155 .123 48 5 44 378 36 4 35 231 9 0
.70 Naunbia.. - . .-..
71IJazakhstan 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a
l2 Tunsi 558 1358 53 43 216 551 43 30 212 398 16 13
NAte: Fordamacanpambilyandcovemgc. see tme Key and tmtechnknialntes. PigumiinmfIls me foryeasnmedir damn Caspecfifed-
202

Dbimnsuzm pulEIMS)
RqrsYWwsefpdnr4u1 ( Ja Its.tpuynmjn PnaI S)
afpI&r4 Anvw srd p.m rp rr ml ph00fidy. Fif
mm3 199 num nn urn 1im na nM nun 1m9 190 nn
.73 Ukraine 0 426 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
T4 Algeria 3.39 6.97 .0 0 2.59 6.951 0 0 1,43!n 1,891 0 0
75 ThailTnd 1.315 1547 1.2118 3,223 172 1.446 610 1.1313 26', 698 20 1.170
76Pda1ad 5.058 763 0 46 2.054 508 0 46 704 798. 0 3
77tLvziat 0 27 0 Cl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 SvankRepublic*. - --
79 CnsRPic 435 207 102 44 76 239 3 4 130 191 4 26
30 'Turkcy 2.400 5.415 75 2.230 566 4-556 29 726 487 2.876 20 325
U1IIrn. uande RcRp. 264. 2.51 0 0 531 195 0 0 4, 68 0 0
S2 Panasa 404 167l 0 0 215 402 0. 0 252 231 0 0
933 Cztech Republic.. .- - .. . .. . .---
34 RussiantFcdemtioc 741. 12.495 -0 0 489 1.095 0 0 125 506 0i 0
85 Chile
S6 Alhviuz
857
0
610
47
2.694
0
1.066
0
891
0
632
0
571
00
518 483
0
106
2
435
0
329
0
37.MIfNgtXdE 0 179 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 9 0 0
*8 SWIAmIAU6EI. .1.148. 526 0 0 225 642 0 0 77 163 0 0
89 Sauth Afria
91 Eswtfia 0 _U 0 - 2 0 7 ~0 3 0 0 I
92 BEmil 8.335 -2129 3.192 6.947 3.861 3.83 2.970 1I32 4.200 2.441 2.132 551
93 -Bowwana. 27 43. a 0 6 S1 0 0 7 33 0 0
94 aldaysia 1.015 1.323 M4I 1-358 127 1.707 218 230 250 I1? 38 149
95 venezuea 2.870 1.248 1,891 783 1.737 3D3 1.23 710. 1.218 1.501 257 100
96 Belans 0 182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
97 Hungay 1.552 2.209 0 490 3924 2.766 0 114 636
9Uzumguay 293 518 63 72 93 235 37 21 105
1.58
203
0
17
29
25
99 Mtezio 9.131 6.750 2.450 5,113 4.010 10.126 750 2.058 3.88 5.127 700 832
lCD Tuinid andauTbap -363 281- 0 0 176 266 0 0 50 127 0 0
lOl Gabon 171 101 0 0 279 99 0 0 119 235 0 0
102 Argentina 2.839 1.209 1.36 679 1.146 1.245 107 235 811 2.275 496 126
1030a. 8 254. 0 0 179 340 0 0 44 153 0 0
10 lSovenia . . .. .* - . .
105 PNenRko. m. . .- -- .- --
- . .-.-- -
106 Karen Rep.- 3.429 4.356 5.51 2.107 1.4il0 3.039 64. 1.000 1.293 1350i( 343 429
105 Portuga 1.950 5.671 149 617 533 3.342 126 115 416 1.490 43 41
109 Saudl Ambia . .. .- - -
s..&mndiedkjumttm ms Ž..rs. .-
- --.
16 Auspmnw.a
110 ICanada
111 NeZeland
113 Spanft rbEda
114 Frlgance
116 Austria
117 United Kingdm
118 Noraly
11.9 DeNahrkad
120 Canalan
121 Beliu
122 Switzland
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 20
123 tunited Ash Emirates

Table 22. Aggregate net resotaice flows
Tadnerjbw
and net
kW-ddpr NerMbide
OjkWgum pdrl
n7-fte-my
AWrrteiw AUR!RMRM
-- Tjqv- 01111*85
Lgw4ocmeeconamies
Mourab
2 Ethidoa
3
RW
TanEmb
4 Nepal
6
Sicrm
ugmwia
7 Bhutitn Lcom
8 Ekmtmfi
9 Mabrwi
It Cbad
12 Gahm-Bissm
13. b(adagascar
14 LAoIPDR
15 Rvimida
17 Bubna Faso
18 iorm
19 Kcup
20 Mali
21 Nigeria
n rfwwagm
23 Top
24 Denim
25 CMDW Afrkao Repubfic
26 Pakistm
27 Ghom
29 China
29 Taj-ddgn
3D Gahm
31 Mauribuiia,
32 Sri Lwb
33 Zknbabwe
34. Hduft=
36 ESMAtabRcp-
37 lodonesia
39 Mymvmw.
39 Smnaraz
40 Sad=
41 Ymm. Rep.
42 7AVXbia
MkIellesincomeevonomies
43 Lower-orAddle4nomm:
Ciftd1voint
44 Bolivia
46 PhRopim
47 Aruxnia
49 SenczW
49 Czneroon
SD KyqDzRcpuNic
St Goingia
52 Uzbeldmm
53 P4= 14ew Gainca
54 PCM
55 Guansub
56 cow
57 momcco
59 Dominican Repubtk
59 Ecmdor
W lonjm
61 Romania
62 BSalvador
64 Maklova
65 LJdmmia
66 B*uia
67 Cxiombia
68 Jamaica
69 Paraguay
71 Kxmkbs=
72 Tunisia
19M lm bw 1992 PM lm 19M im PM im lm lm
0 184 76 912
93- 0
274 125
25
795 0 76 1.071
363 2"
0 6 0 76.
495 0 218
1.060
24 782 1.075
37 -19
0 0 201 $01
1.033
37 1.026
49
0 0 59 III 304
97 79 46 93(i
163 0 99
60
4
176
0
62
0
X71
IV 254 125
0 0 3 0
227
1 2 40 0
0 i22
0
45D
0 118
0 431
35 86 39 2 41
120
130 0 0 0
2
0
39
594
97
479
'49. 265 to 74
1.001 0 217
1251 a 72
0 4 0 0
179
MM
35-L
1.733
135
11-1548
32Z
1.569
3 143 22 I"
66 0
24 37
5 0 0 -.25
319
50 292
-
0 0 0 25-
67 30 0 103
295
347 74
39 -1 21 im 7Z
54 49 16 0 0 348
25
SD 0 9
435
0
321
65 69 54
401
-223
ist 309
lig
16 .2 o 0
53
51 109
104
253 49 249 99
55
0 0 0 324
239.
144 88 371 249
097
236 0 0
359
.3.393 649 675
0 0 142 389
430 79 151 0 240
128
27 2,114
366
121' 4.460
89
46D 79 6 0
I.M
III 0
1.614
104 242 -.2 630 494 316
uio
-9 0 0 195
189
I -T& 3 346 192
231
.136 -740 997 306
255 48 496 0 0 773
92
-342-
34-
0 Is a -1.3S6
15 0 279
-2.114
93 766
56
42 0 0 217
97 0 139
719
4t 117
24
151 4 7 119
47 0 0
93
56 92 5 101 245
709 -3 0 0
96
1.144 492 85 126 85
143
SUS
- 63 Z75 119
277 23 I 1 -1254
I-9z7
475 1.935
loam
16 23 0 11.0110
7 0 191
U20
250 775
0 0 11.156 0 1.194
135
10 1.934
690
0 22,011
47
0 0 0 1.616
143 G
19.783
25 167 0 0 10 0
109 0 0 0 72
10
70 61 310 49
221
129 77 2 0
277'
110 161 Z74 a 197
93 43 2DI
374 123 0 .161
tZ7 0 4ZS
175
232
259 2 4 506
0 377
0 . M
342
10
192
48
20
52
245 6 60 610
62 133
5 283
373
3 0 0 66
497
tI3
t23
59
265
76
zsls 20 165
1.613
Z.M
5-93
549
109
459
295 0 0 3=9
282 ISD 4774 2.979
0 Z913
49 66 119 1,9M
2.092
62 7,711
106 0 3 0
-2514
0 0 268
1.764
274 113
659
ISO 0 3 0 .
223
94 399 0 97
570 0 380 193 379
542 0 0 0 1.046
183
211
140 368. ISD 34
664 997
0 653
62
391 9"
L
so 0 0 524 361
TI 63D 934
450
324 336
495
1.016 344 W 235 95
312 239
49 0
48 191.
0 1.139
47 629
93
360
0 0 407 101
511
1.313
.214
Z444 395
59 40D
0
-106
2 0
ns
0
0 333
0 1.765 3.405 488
171 0 0 1.694
194 73 0 2 0
499
351 15 0 0
2
503 29 Z?5- 0 263 535
0 130 10 0 I(I
0 0 656
457
22- 0 793.
- 427
0 0
672
a 22
0
0
-16
0 0 0
0 0 22
0 0 -0 0 0
64
40 0 0
0
597 279 280 56 0
299 76 400 0
56
199 31- 269 0 419 1.277
93 27 127 0 163
-AA 0 347
1.0117
14 IOD 5%
498
III 94 a
-510
-0 0 217
159
20
1.188 45 40 100
0
114
739 0
-94
75 600 99 sa -13 so
347
.424 0 0 1353 -45
-49 14 1.763 695
749
80 93 179 0
655
-132 7 0 ; 454
266
46 70 95 210
0 267
4 I.IZ7 0 825
97
600
I-M 34 41 -1
0 349
1,023 0 1,427
-527
0 .545
74
0 0 77 0
1,348
-27 0 I"
367
31 240 6 12
1.100
0 1.641
0 -111
1.056
225 34 106
0 29 0
0 to 0 101
339
0 10 29
0
a
0
12
121
m
203 0 0
-917
0 42. 0
0 339
121
9 49 157 245 319
253
790 0 0 974
67-
-121 13 -174 29 97 0
-79 292
553
140
-2.271
IV -253
0 169 -197 57
70
4K
10 16 32 -*19
40 0
a 16 0 0 0 too 0 0 116 0 116
352 516 26 137 235 379 0 0 612 1.032 232 341
Fordata compwability and covemge. see the Key aW dw ucbnkel noom Fom in itdim we roryeam otberthan iliose s
204

* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ToAd
njinuc
Net FDI in due Pa (ie equi Y. Arge net Allgeage d
________ (udWmrSJ hU&~~~ouaS OaeS .arms, IYSiIlUfl)
1PM 199 1Pm 12 1980 199 1Pm 192 IgMI 1992 19M 1992
* 73 Ukrmine 0 426 0 . 0 0 426 0 221
-74 Algiia. 869 19 77 1(X) 349 ..12 0 031,295 133 -830 -1,959
75 Thailan 1.822 1.516 75 200 190 2Z116 0 4 2.097 3.836 3,576 -1.618
761Pbland 3.005 255 123 0 IC 673 . 0 3,143. 933 2,439 -2.7
771Latvia 0 27 D 73 0 14 .. 0 0 334 0 314.
79 Costa Ricii 373 -52 0 33 53 220 0 0 425 298 235 12
SD Turkey 1.310 2.36 385 900 I8 844 0 0 2.083 4.107 1I54 486
81 [ran. lslanicRep. -267 2.390 1 0 0' -370 0 0 -265 2.320 -1.095 2252
821'flnua 189 -235 6 90 -47 -1 0 83 149 -58- -174 -310D
8 3 CzaJiRtpmblic . . .. . - . .. .
84 Rusdan Fedeadmi .252 31,1403 0 3.00 . . 0 252 14.401 127 33.395
95 Chile 2.089 5816 9 54 2.13 737 0 129 2,312 1,506 3130 -526
864A15nk 0 47 0 330 0 03 . 0 0 377 0 375
97 rIM noUd& 0 123 0 29 0 6 . 0 0 159 0 149
so8SyrkzAwb Rep. 974 -136 1.651 330 0 67 0 0 2.574 231 2,497 113
89 SanthAffica
90 tauzjIjs 79 5 1 .19 1 5 00 9 3 39 69 -38
91IlEstonia 0 26 0.95 0 53 . 0 0 179 0 178
92 BamzD 4.696 3.918 14 .45 3,91 1.454 0 1.734 6,621 7.151 -66 3.325
9.3 Bobswm 21 -8 51 70 112 61 0 0 384 123 69 -195
94 Malasa 1.111 744 6 so 934 4.118 0 3352.052 5.297 524 1.938
.95 vsrmela 1.789 1.018 0 7 55 629 0 146 1.844 3.799 47 -312
96fBdanus 0 182 0 0 ... . 0 0. 182 0 182
97MHnnpq 729 -241 0 0 0 149 0 34 728 1.273 92 -392
PlUzumguy 226 334 1 6 290 1 0 0 516 341 395 113
99 Mezico 6,321 -321 14 50 2,156 5-36 0 5.213 8,991. 10.309 3.043 2.613
* 100.TzinidamndTabapg 187 15 A 5 185 173 0 0 372 193 -157 -180
10OlGabon -109 2 4 39 32 -36 0 0 -73 5 -465 -387
102 Aipafia
1030Oman
Z855
-31
408
-86
2
157
40
15
673
93
4,179
59
0
0
392
0
3.535
174.
5.019..
-12
I.593
-356
1.782
-603
104 SIuVC&i
105. Pami Rico
106. KXoraPep. . 2,426 2X94 8. 6 6 .550 0 7,42D 2,440 5,899 740 3.67
107 Gauccc
103 Nprap!a. 1.434 2,832 21 12 15 1.873' 0 115 1.620 4.832 1.074 3.248
109 S&AudlMnia . . -. -. - .. * - . .
'ands ~ ~~ -. ,
.;;,-SWK%cx
h.-w.
R, W.-..,.~,.
310 idaSd
II] NewZealnd
112 tIsnal
.113 Sp.in
114 tHong Konag
115 iSingapoit
116Antui
117 Unfadlngopm
118 Italy
119Ndeaus
..120 Camnad
122 Brdgirat
*122 Fnla2nd
.123 'flinhed ArSEnthaels
124 Fuanc
125 Aumstia
126 Gamnny
I27 United Sta-e
ID9 Denat
130 Sweden
1-31 .Japan
132 Swkizeand
205

Table 23. Total external'debt ratios
~~~~~
Totl At s ent frmpq)ws
~~ClIP %Iufe.mptn' %ofeyn'ru
%ofnatalernmwI S oinaslexrel
debt debt
1939 199 1939 1992 193 1992 195 1992 1980 1992 1931 19112
1.awjnemeeeauamnls 20293w 171.4 w 30.2 w 32.1 w 18.2 w 183 w S.3wv 7.3 w 4539w 381wI 15I.9 w 24.1 w
ExeI.lng Chilna&lIndia 2753wi 234A4. 67.0 w 61.2 w 1138w 24.5 w 6.13w 946w 42.2 w 41.7 w 14.0 w 243 w
1 Mozambique 994.2 994.5. 312.9 494.38 0.0 8.1 tO0 3.9 0.0 60.3 0.0 13.9
2
3
EthIopia
Tannin
233.2
589.5
381.4
'784.4
37.3.
137.8
44.5.
177.7
7.3
19.6
14.2
31.5
4.5
10.0
6..0
11.5
71.3
55.3
75.6.
64.6
41.2
21.4
34.1
32.7
4.
S
Slin Leon
Ncpal
485.3
165.0
.574.0
347.2
92.4
22.3
. S5.3 .23.2
-29.2 3.2
20,5
11.7
5.7
2.5
10,9
5.0
32.8
75.7
37.4
92.I
14.2
62.0
16.2
80.8
6 Ugada 52A4A 906.5 49.6 58.9- 17*4 40.2 3.3 .I3.5 26.9 59.9 12.3 52.2
7 Bhiutan 47.4 53.9 16.7 19.2 . . 6.9 . . 2.1 .0.0 82.7 0.0. 60.4
8 Bumndi 368.7 416.2 39.5 .42.3 9.5 35.3 4.8 .14.1 62.6 88.5 35.7 74.6
9 Mdainwi 252.5 193.0. SIA 46.7 27.7 23.3 16 . 8.2 3338 80.2 26.7 74.5
IC Bangladesh 220.4 198.5 26.4 28.5 23.2 17.1 6* 5.6 32.4 91.2 30.3 56.1
13I Chad 500.1 157.2 20.8 29.4 393 S* 0.7 3.1 50.9 72.7 32.6 63.0
32 Guinea-Bismau 1,948.3 6,414.2 379.6 -200.5 .. 92.7 .. 4.3 64.3 71.5 2133 45.8
33 Madapsear 610.8 649.4 323.5 316.1 17.1 18.6 50.9 7.6 39.3 49.0 14.9 31.7
34
35
LaUoPDR
Rwanda
-457.3
174.2
239.3
395.3
54.5
31.6
40.4
26.3
..
4.2
5.7
23.4
..
28
2.1
12.3
92.1
74.4
93.2
91.8
7.0
47.8
39.2
74.0
36 Niger 277.2 333.2 49.2 50.9 21.7 14.2 12.9 4.6 13.0 52.5 105 42.7
37 BurIdin Faso 99.9 110.6 13.9 20.3 5.9 6.2 3.31 3.5 66.9 50.9 42.9 67.7
13 India 203.6 234.7 1738 25.9 9,3 .25.3 4.2 12.6 75.3 42.0 29.5 3339
39 Kenya 228.4 .230.1 55.3 65.0 21.0 .27.1 13.3.- 13.1 2038 42.6 .18.6 39.4
20 MaiI 2443 254.0 53.3 52.9 5.3 7*4 2.3 3.0 -84.5 93.2 23.7 41.1
21
22
Nigeria
Nicangu
356.5
2.5S3.6
-232.5
3,363.7
107.3
5,099.0
.308.4- 750.3
4.2
22.3
25.9
.26.5 .13.4
3.3 33.0
32.6
6.3
21.b
3.9 .6A
32*4 29.2
313.2
10.0
23~ Toga 335.2 3173.5 60.7 54.3 9.0 7.3 5.8 3.3 24.4 60.2 11.4 45.6
24 Benin 136.4 113.7 43.0 34.9 6.3 4.1 4.5 3.9 39.2 31.0 2435 45.9
25 CcniiwArrieanlepbire 130. 273*4 34.1 33.3 4.9 9.6 3.6 4.5 30.1 77.9 27*4 56.7
25 Pakidan 169.3 1* 31.3 36.3 37.9 23.6 7.6 9.9 73.3 53.0 15.4 36.4
27 Ghana. 236.2 236.0 41.2 39.1 33.1 26.7 4.4 30.2 57.9 59.5 19.g 51.2
.28 China 33.4 76.8 9.4 12. 4.3 10.3 1.5 4.2 0.5 56.5 0.0. 524
29 Tajlkistan . .. 0.0 . . . .. . .. 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
30 Guinea 237.4 247.4 60.4 55.0 39.8 12.4 6.0 5.3 597 7. 17 34.5
31 32
Mauuitania
Sui Laka
293.1
3443*:
342.4 155.4
111.4 .47.2
153.4
41.0
17.3
12.0
. .17.2
13.5
7.9
5.7
.6.1
4*4
60.7
56.2
60.1
76.3
14.8
11.7
31.0
32.8
33 Zimbaibwe 317.0 157.2 38.4 63.3 3.8 32.0 3.5 31.2 2.3 272 0.4 24.1
34 HoRufnas 265.3. 253.9 87.2 92.0 21*4 33.7 52.4 15.3 23*4 40.2 33.2 50*4
35 Lenodi 33A 39.1 13.3 22.6 3.5 5.3 0.6 2.2 61.0 75.2 55.3 69.5
36 EMpt. A'ab Rep. 37832 147.3 143.7 67.7 34.7 15.5 9.3 6.5 46.1 37.6 12.6 833
37 Inadonesia 384.9 212.2 52.6 .61.9 13.9 32.3 6.5 11.7 36.4 26.6 3.3 19.4
38 Mymarnr 5713.9. 1. 4.0 10.1 25.4 .. 9* 7217 362 33.6 24.5
39 Somalia 2,295.4 .. 153A5 . 439 0.9 8.332 63.3 24.1 30.5
40 Sudan 1.33t.0 2,961.3 . . 25.5 5*4 52.3 2.5 34.4 28* 32.3 11.7
41 Yemna. Rep. 145.0 329.8 50 . . 7.0 1.6
42 Zinnbff 407.7 1. 46.5 . 25.3 .. .7 ..
933.
25*4
501.9
39.0 32.2'
15.3
22.6
Mildle4mmecneomncnes 154.9 w 143.2w 34.6wv 34.2 w 24.9 w 13.4w 22.6 w 7.3 w. 3.2 w 10.0 w 6.4 w 11.6 w
Lawer.nzldlf-incose 134.4w 154.7 w 33.7 w 410.w 19.3 w 17.3w 8.3&w 638w 14.4 w 16.12w 3A4w 329wv
43 Cited'lvoire 349.4 .~473.7 .133.7 191.0 33.7 31.9 28.3 36.5 6.0 15.5 7.0 16.3
44.Bolivia 3552 392.3 73.5' 61.2 35.0 .39.0 21.1 34.9 24.7 46.1 16.5 43.6
47 Asnienia . . 3.1 GA0 0.3 . 0.0 .. 0.0 0.0 21.8 0.0 0.0
49
49
Senegl .169.7
Canxuemo 184.0
163.5
269.3
50.6
39.4
39.3
59.7
2817
15.2
13.3
16.2
30.5
3.1
4.5
7*4
27.9
32.0
57.4
31.7
17.3
16.3
42*4
21.3
50 Kyrgyz Rcpublic .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 0.0 .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
51 Gecigia . .. 0.0 5.8 .. . .. .
52 Uzbekisman .. .. (.0 0.1 . .. . .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
53.
54
Papa New Guinea
Pent
130.2
392.4
154.2
440.6
63.3
80.5
37.2
92.7
13.3
44.5
30.3
23.0
6.6
19.9
3.3
10.7
52.2
35.1
386
36.6
21.2
5.5
22*4
10.3
55 Cutenmala 160.3 115.3 29.7. 242 7.9. 24.0 3.7 7.9 21.6 28*.4 30.0 32.2
56 Congo 307.9 327.6 536.0 166.0 30.6 11.9 6.6 4.7 26*4 37.1 717 11.3
57. Maceo239.0 222.1 84.6 71.2 32.7 23.6 37.0 1153 37.6 28.1 7*4 24.9
53 Donminican Republic 149.9 170.0 56*4 57.0 25.3 13.5 12.0 5*4 20.5 40* 10.2 13.7
59 Ecuador 373.9 331.6 118.8 99.9 33.9 27.1 35.9 15.6 5.0 10.4 5.4 18.3
60 Jorana 217.5 203.1 178 363.2 3*4 20.0 4.3 9.2 41.5 36.9 3.0 31.3
61 .Ronmaia
62 ElISuIvaIor
10.0
146.2
67.3
93.7
2.8
31.2
34.0
25.5
12.6
7.5
3.3
53.2
4.9
4.7
.L2.
5.0
1.8
25.9
6.8
60.5
8.83
23.3
.39.6
40A
63 Tulrkmnenistan.. . .. . .. .. .. ..
64 MWaIdva. 3.8 0i.0 0.6 .. 0.6 .. o o.o 23.7 0.0 61.5i
65 Lidniania . .. 0.0 0.6 . .. . .. 0.0 25.2 tO0 0.0
66 Bulgaida 101.7 202.6 46.3 124.5 0.5 7.0 0.2 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2
67 Colombia 205.2 166*4 44A 36.9 36.0 36*4 11.6 32.3 36.3 5.5 19.5 342
68
69
imna3ca
'muy133.9
1873 345.9
101.3
312.7
51.6
131.7
24.6
39.0
18.6
27.9
40.3
10.8 .
8.5
.5
35.8
20.9
31.9
28.5
3B.9
25.0
20.2
26.3
39.8
70 aii . . . . . . . . .
71 .Kazakitstan 0.7 tO0 0.1 .. 0.0 .. 0.0 GA0 0.0 0.0 0.0
72 Tunisia 116.2 112. 60.3 49.6 14.8 20.6 .6.9 6.9 39.9 36.3 12.3 33.6
Note. FordstacompamabilItand coveragE.see die Keyand setecchnicalnotes.Figuresin italicsarefrorymarrothertlmun thse specified.
206.

Wpram agwofamdamrsdddirm
S of~~~S.fralmnz
Eqmtu a GNP 54'fewmu 8 Sa(azww 8 a debt Adr
we9 an nw 19m we 192 mm nn 1951 1992 195.3 19927
73 ~~~~~~~~~~. Ukialne ~ 3.5 tO 04 . tO . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14-3
74 Algeda 243.8 198.9 47.7 5939 27.4 71.3 10.4 16.6 6.5 3.6 135 10.3
75 Thailand 83.1 9035 31.3 35.2 18.9 14.1 935 6.4 10.9 22.5 12.0 7.4
76 PolmmI 257.1 234.2 53.6 55.2 27.9 7.9 5.2 5.0 9.1 1937 0.0 2.4
77: lawk ia. 0.0 IUD .. -. . .. t 25.3 0.0 0.0
78 Slovak Republc. . . . . . . .
79 Costa Rima 215.3 1358.4 56.6 58.7 29.1 20.6 1I.6 9.1 95 242i 14 29.6
so Turkey 171.6 137.7 50.6 47.8 23.0 31.9 14.9 13-3 23.0 13.3 21.2 17.0
SI rInn.Lilamic Rep. 46.8 69.7 5.3 12. 6.8 4.0 3.1 3.0 7.4 0.4 23.8 0.9
82 Panm 1'27.9 37.8 140.1 107.2 6.3 12.6 3.3 4.3 9.0 7.0 11.0 10.7
34 RtiaI,FSedega. . . 3.3 . 1.2 0.0 to0 o.o 0.2
895 Chike 176.0 1481.3 66.5 48.9 43.1 2039 19.0 10.4 6.2 137 2.9 2.4-
56 AlLania 0.0 243.7 . . 0.0 0.5 to0 o.s 0.0 7.1 0.0 0.3
37 MonalIa .0.7 72 .9. 0.0 17. 0.0 2.3 tO0 402 0.0 15.1
88 Syrim,Ara, Rep 239.7 253.3 101.8 . 11.4 18.2 4.7 5.3 63.5 77.2 &8. 5.6
Upper-nu
&Iidl ormee 15.4 w -140iw 35.w 36.5w 3.6 w 1899w 17.3wv 73w 3.33 3.2w 4.3 w. IO01w
59 SouthAfiica*. .. . .. *. . .. ..
90 NM3a9u-911ddu 49.3 44.9 339 99 91 8.1 5.9 2.9 15.6 37.2 166 25.1
Pi Ftonia .. 9.7 to0 Iti- .- 22 -- 0.2) to 19.5 tO 2.1
92 DazE 238.3 293.8 ~~~~~~~~~~2.5.7
31.2 63.1 23.1 33.7 9.2 23 2. 4.4 8.3
93 Batana. 193 9 17.6 12.6 iS9 .. LI .. 46.6 42.1 63.3 75.0
94 Mal,ay!ia 51.3 41-5 4339 352 6.3A 6.6 4.0 2.4 10.1 .12.7 11.3 9.4
95 Vepmc1a . 23.4 214.8 76.1 61.1 27.2 19.5 13.8 1225 0.4 0.3 0.7 7.3
96 Bdenams 4.8 to0 0.6 .. o . 0.0 0.0 ml4 0.0 035
97 Hungzs 168.0 158.2 '72.3 65.0 .. 35.6 . 13.3 56 0.6 0.0 14.8
98 .. uraguay 189.3 204-5 55-5 46.7 18.8 23.2 10t6 12.2 5.2 1.6 ILO0 1335
99 . Meake 236.~~~~~4 235.6 45.0 34.1 4935 44.4 27.4 16.4 0.9 1.1 5.6 1.3.7
100 TrinidadaadTab2zgO 98.5 103.1 46.7 45.7 6.3 23.8 1.6 7-5 4.7 2.3 8.6 9.2
101 Gual= 150.1 142.-1 76.9 68.9 17.7 1635 6.3 11.3 8.3 11.8 2.7 9-2
IC! Agemina 562.1 449.8 96.4 303 37.3 34.4 2018 187 1.8 0.9 4.0 735
103 0fmm 64. 47.4 39.1 V7. 6.4 9.0 1L8 3-2 43.6 14.0 5.8 5.8
104 siovenia . . . . . .
105 Puerto Rio.. .
106 Korea. Rep. 40-4 45.8 142 142 19.7 7.4 127 3.0 9.7 20.6 8.0 7.7
108 Portugal . 92.-6 102A1 43.9 39.0 183 133 10.5 6.9 4.4 3.6. 55 11
:Low-.iud.iddlhJ=aoe- 166.6w -154w.4w 33.1w,333w .206w- 185w 1)5wv 7A.w 173 1.w.56w- 18w.w
Y,-SdSuh&mnaAkic: ~ 27739w - m23.0w LSZ~,. 4w - Zw>lLr 2.0w -~ Lg0w-8. 26.3 w .35w -3.3W- 23.7w.
'SUSwz Mg8w- `20A4w 2.6w- 23 23.w 4wIILw 16w 1)w LT7w'-14.3w
ttSautkAt1~~~

Table 24. Termis of extenal public borrw*ing
FAhr- kamuusis
"M.1 199 DM3 12 191 1992 19) 152 181 19
Low4hfflitm lnk 30j013 t 41J04t 6.3 w S.0w 23w 21 w 6w 6 w 216.6w 20.3w
Ez duilugChia & Inda 21,401: = ES72 .W -39. 23 w 26 w 6 w 7w W 27.0 w 19.1 w
IMomiqc479 .456 52 0.5 is 42 10 Of 2.7
2 Edjpi 94 32D 3.6 0.9 19 41 4 10 IS 2.0
3 iat710 165 4.1, LI1 24 33 S 3 4.4 75
43lenaLmoa 70 171 5.2 0.3 26 40 7 9 0.0 0.3
5 Nepal 92 297 0.3 0.3 46 40 10 10 0.0 0.0
6 Ugauda 209 471 4.6 Li7 25 34 6 9 1.3 0.9
731huan 7 t0 LO0 1.9 50 30 10 7 .0 0.0
S BEunmdi 102 82 1.3 0.7. 4- 41 9 10 0.0 0.0
9 MAIV4 130S .220 6.0 0.7 24 40 6 10 232 25
10 Bangldesh 1.03 951 1.7 0.9 36 33 9 10 0.1 03
11Dm!d 0 106 0.0 4.9 0 26 0 7 .02 1.2
12 Gthainc*43i 33 11 2.4. 1.4 13 36 4 9 1.6 0.2
13 M2daascar 44S 97 5.6 1.2 i3 43 5 9 3.3 5.2
14 taPDR *.70 64. 0.2 0.9 45 40 34- 10 0.0 0.0
is Rwa,da 48 56 1.5. LI1 39 42 9 9 0.0 0.0
117 74 2.9 13 2256564 1.
17 Bad&aFaso 115 169 43 0.3 21 42 6 10 4.3 0.6
1Sladia 4.39 7.236 55 5.0 33 25 7 9 4.2 21.1
l9Okuya . 1 173 3.5 0.7 31 39 3 10 27.6 14.3
20 Mali 145 in5 2.2 2.0 23 32 5 1 to0 os
Z[Nigeiz - 1,904I-q 1.100i 05 4.6 it 22 4 7 7. 7
22 Numapua 434 232 4.0 5.0 25 23 7 6 47.6 25.9
231Top 97 54& 4.0 OS8 24 66 7 2-7 12. 3.3
213am . ~~~~ ~~443 It 3.3 1.4 12 40 4 904 7.3
25 Cev'aIAltitmuRepMIc 33 56 0.6 1.3 13 33 4 9 1.9 0.1.
26.Pa1~~~~~mn ~1.11:5 2.391 4.4 .4.4 30 20 7 7 1-5 16.6
27 GInm 170 482 1.4 0.3 M4 40 10 ID 0.9 -22
23 China 3,36 15.799 .10.4 6.3 .11 13 3 3 53.3 23.0
29 ibjIldatan ~~ ~~0 10 0.0 3.0 0 70 900 0.0
* 0 Guira 269 M9 4.6 3.0 19 3I 6 3 0.3 430
31 NIitashi - 211 62 3-6 1-6 20 23 7 . 2.4 32
32 SaIavnka 752 437 3.9 2.2 31. 31 3 9 6.9. 5.5
.33ZIMunabwe
M 7 65 7.1 45 IS 25 6 6 0.4 29.1
34 Bondas 4905 466 6.3 4.1 24 26 7 3 34.2 21.4
35LsTatdo 59 52 5.9 5-5 24 32 6 6 3-5 LI1
36 EgyT,Azabl ep. 2,55 1.416 5.0 5.3 23. 13 9 4 4-5 937
37 indonmah 4.27 6.197 . LI 5.5 19 20 6-6 30.7 45.4
35*Myusar 605 20 3.5 0.0 29 10 7 1. 1-0 0.0
39 slxia 13 0 33 0.0 25 0 6 0 0.0 1.0
40 Sudan .905 39 6.1 3&1 is 33 5 4t 10.6 19.1
4lTewm.Rqi. 553 53- ~~~~ ~~~~2.7 0.1 27 40 6 10 00 1
4Z ZhNka 645 343 63 0.9 19 40 4 10 12.6 103.
Iflue!hrmeOOm.ni ~67,21S.MMt 3321 0. W 6.7 W 12w 13w 4w SW S".w SL6 wi
Lwm~uuklie4nra 33.1S5 43,419:t 9.5 W 63 W 14w 13 w 4 w SW 05 4 36 L .w
I6Niger ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
43 Me&cflvcizc 1lASS 613 11.4 437 10 19 4 6 57.0 61.6
44 BoHvfra 370 389 3.4 341 15 31 5 9 31.6 '20.5
45 Azetrpln
46 Phulipoiues 2,143 5.59 9.9 5.6 17 20 5 12 49.9 34.4
47 Anmnia 0 57 0.0 LS5 .9 3 0 1 0.0 21.4
4 SSeuega 470 219 5.9 1.3 20 35 6 3 12.7 5.5
49 Caineion 164 226 6.9 4.9 24 I5 6 7 22.9 19.9
SD KyuWz Rqtk 0 42 0.0 35 0 4 0 4 (LO 0.0
51 Georgia .-.
52lUzbekisan 0 4iii 6.6 i60 4 0 I 0.0 73.5
53 PpqaNewGuinea 134 95 11.2 3.5 13 31 5 3 43-5 63.7
S4LPein 1.614 1,776 9.4 7.2 -12 20 4 6 31.2 45-5
55 Guaemala 247 383 7.9 7.0 - is 19 4 6 35.6 20.0
56-Congo 966 23 7.7 3.3 11 10 3 4 6.6 25.3
57Mbomucco 1.686 1,274 to0 tO Is 14 5 4 31.0 51.7
.5s DoeIr:k:jRepubIic 519 123 3.9 7.6 12 17 . 4 4 472 42.4
59 Ecuaca 1.143 764 10.7 6.9 14 19 4 5 62.5 60.9
60 Joain 768 112 7.3 4.3 IS 19 4 6 11-4 33.6
61lRomanaa 1.33 I.925 14.1 7.7 3 .13 4 4 59.2 62.3
* ~~~63
&2El S1vadlor 225 25 -42 tO0 23 27 3 7 27.4 13.3
inlaaemiumn 6. . .
.6l'Mokdaa S 0 .0 3.5 90 0.0 61.1
65SLidbuaria 0 1IN 0.0 7.5 .0 15 a 4 0.0 0.0
66 Blgaiau T33 0 13.6. 0.0 12 0 6 0 96.8 77.9
* ~~~~67TCoImbia 1.566 336 12.9 719 15 is 4 5 40.8 52.9
6S Jamaica 225. 319 7.6 7.8 14 20 5 4 23.0 2438
-..9Pamguay 99 483 7.0 7.3 24 22 7 6 27.3 15.9
70 Namibia.. ... ... .
71lKuzidata 0 617 0.0 7.1 .0 3 0 *3 0.0 1130.
72ltsh 777 1.157 6.7 7.4 15 13 5 3 20.0 23.3
Nowe Fiordata com mbliyad woeage. see dweyKtandthueftchniad nuate. guas is amlicsamfotycarsafiaediaahspapdflid.
208

Caiwhssu
~~~An iwqr6atwe A-ragromaB A-Wiqepar pig nwiabk ia inns
IsW 19.92 193 199 IPa 192 19 1992 1931 W
l73 Umiaae 0 1.098 0.0 6.2 0 6 0 3 0.0 100.0
74 Algeri 3.53 8.53 LI 5.8 12 .10 4 4 25.0 46.8
75 Thatiand 1.87 13934 9.5 7.0. 17 16 5 6 51.4 53.0
16 Pland 1,71S 538 9.3 7.4 1 14 4 4 37.8 70.9
7fLatvia . 0 116 -0.0 6.1 0 14 0 4 0.0 4S.4
78 SkNvakReun
19 Casmli 621 155 11L2 TA4 13 21) 5 5 57.0 31.4
OD Tuwicy 2,92S 6.093 8.3 TA4 16 8 5 5 26.5 3MA
at1311.ILshuuic Rqi. 0 4,34 0.0 4.8 -0 a 0 4 37.8 85.3
fl Paznarm 534 351 11.3 6.4 Il 2 5 6 52.7 63.1
83 Czech Republic
St4Rmsim Fedenzia 741 5.231i 8 6.9 1s 5 5 2 6.6 5CLM
asaCilec 835 689 t3.9 6.6 8 21 4 6. 75.6 78.
I6 AhMta 0 66 0.0 17 0 34- 0 9 0.0 60.6
87 A&mzgoa 0 109 tO0 6.0 0 7 0 3 -0.0 11.8
38 Syrian A4rub&Rp. 1.168 350 1.3 5.0 24 33 5 6 0.0 0.0
Uppr-lmaid ll4uomin 34J32t .3L85t 1.7 w 7.1w U w 11w 4 w 4w 66.5w 55.6Aw
89 SmabAfica
90 Mauzitiu 121 90 10.4 5.0 ii Is 4 47. 365i
91Easouia 0 120 0.0' 8.3 0 12p 0 4 0.0 40.5.
9 2 1 3Bz . 963 3.258 125 7.2 10 11 4 4 72.2 73-5
93 -BotswAaM . 9 So. 6.0 5.0 15 27 4. 6 0.0 13.3
.94 Malaysia 1.423 1.680 11.2 5.8 14 22 5 4 50.7 49.6
95 Venccla. 2.769 696 12. 6-5 8 14 3 5 . 1.4 63.0
96Ue1larus 0 374 tO0 6.3 0 7 0 3 0.0 87.9
97 Hngas 1.fl 2.095 91 8.3 13 10 3 7 3919 .32.4
Sihumgnay 347 513 Itt. 7.1 14 14 6 3 35.4 61.6
99MCXICO 7.632 435 11.3 7-5 10 11- 4 3 7539 49.1
Ifl0TdnidadtandTobago, 211 204 10.4 8.6 9 .6 4 4 31-9 53.5
101 Gabon 196 209 11.? 6.- It' 17 3 -5 39.3 14.2
IOlArgenfin 3.02 2.447 13.8 82 9 18 4 5 74.0 5519
I1030offla 454 144 7.9 5.0 9 11 3 3 0.0 59.7
106 Kinn.Itep. 4.92i 4.027 11.3 7.1 15 12 4 6 36.4 40.
107 Grecc -. - . . -
las; ftangaI zo0is s.z= 1,6 6.6 10. I3 I 30.6- 26.2
109 Sandi AcNabia. .- .. .-
110 lidmI
III NeWZealand
113 Spain
'114 tHongKICag
11s tSinapam
116 Azsualia
.117 United Kingdom
13Italy~
119 Nefludands
1211 Canada
121 Belgium
122 FInlad
123 tUcited Auab Emimees
125 Autaria
126 Gemuay
127 United Stams
128 Nora'y
129 Deinaik
130 Sweden
131 Japa.
1320 Swiizzhdm
A- m - T 3w-26A 16.7w
- .~~~~~~~7w 9w -3.1w - 7w
g;R.mpemadClaj;.nl2,C5t~t-~2746zC "r1Or-~~ tAr ' 12w * r 4w - S3w . air 52w
t-~~~~~~~~
~~-UMi1eE&1LAt~~~~~~~~-
~~1Zme>-s17AI0 -0 .;c ' 13w ~~~~~~~ SmW -:4 .W' L2w, 27.9wIV
-. " ~~~~~~~~~~~~ -.-..
. w .~~~4 .wV GA -w.&
~ZLSkAEfla&Carthtm3~z327*tfl,937tS~1L6wmd
7.2w ~- 11r~. 1Uw4L 5w Sw .72
W.Swdybd*ewcs~tt~ut7t36nsC..2nm3ri;x0.6w?t¾6.7v1 3 v W, L ;S w 65
a. Includes ebtrm cocvcrdbe inmnscu ony.
209

Table 25. PopWation and labor force
M 2M 2M #mGxW i970-0 PJW-P- W72=
"7000
lm
wgffm)
1W- 197" 19W420 JW--71W
Low-kmmecommin 3,1% t 3M t SAU I IAD t 22w 2.0 v 1-7 w Ijut Imst 2.2 w 2.2 w 1.7 w
Ezdo&mgChhm&1nd'w 1,146 t L= t 2=0 t 4JM c 2.6w 26 w Z3 v 631 t 491 t2.3 w 2.5 w 2.5 v
I m .17 ZD 40 IOD 25 2.6 2.6 9 9 3.8 .2.0 2.0
2 55b 67. 141 370 2.6 3.1 2.6 26 n 2.0 1-9
3 26 33 :59 117 2.9 3.0 3.0 13 13 2.8 2.9 3-0
4
s
Sierm Leone 4
.20
5
24
to
39
23
65
2.1
2.5
2.4
2.6
2.6
2.4 II
I
9
1.0
1.8
I'l
2.3
1.5
22
6
7
Ugan&
Bhutan
17
lb
n
2
45
3
121
6
2:7
1.9
2.6
2.1
3.0
2.4
9
1
9
1
2.6
1.8
2.8
1.9
3i)
1.9
8 Bamodi 6 7 14 31 1.6 2.8 2.7 3 3 1-3 2.2 2.5
9 MARV4 9 11 21 51 3.1' 3-2 25 5 4 2.6 2-6
10 am&desh- 114 t32 132 263 2.6 2.3 1.3 63 36 2.0 '2.9 2.9
I ICliad 6 7 14 29 2.0 2.4 2.6 3 2 1-7 1.9 I
12 GaWea-Bima I 1 2 4 .4.3 2.0 I -o 3-9 1.3 1-5
13 lkdhd 12 .. 16 26 49 7-6 2.9 2.8 6 5 2.2 '111 23
14 Lao PDR 4 6 10 20 IJ 2.6 2.9 2 2 13 2.0 '71
15 Rumida 7 9 13 n 3.3 2-9 2-1 4 4 3-1 219 7-9
16N-Ver 9 I I 24 71 2.9 3.3 3.3 4 4 1-9 2A 2.6
17 Budd=Faso 10 12 24 56 2.1 2.6 3.0 5 4 1-7 2.0
is IM& 894 1,016 UM LM 2.3 2.1 1.7 5-77 335 1-7 zo 1-7.
19 Kenp
20 bbH
26
9
3 1
12
47
24
75
57
3-7
2.1
3-6
2-6
2-5
3-2
t3
A
I 1
3
3-6
1-7
3.5
2A
-3.6
1-7
21 N*cri2 im
27 Nwoogn 4b
128
5
217
8
3U
I 2
29
3.1..
3.0
2.7
2.8
2.7
52
2
44
1
3-1
2.9
2.7
3.9
2.9
3.9
23 Togo 4 5 10 2D 2.6 3.3 3.1 2 1 2.0 2.3 2.5
24 Benin 5 6 11 20 2.7 3.1. -2.9 3 2 2.0 22 2-5
25 Cmmb2IAfricmnRqwbrw- 3 4 7 is 2i 2.6 2.5 2 1 1-2 1-5 1.9
26
27
Paidscm
Ghaxa.
llgb
16
148
20
243
36
40D
69
3.1
7-2
3-1
3.2
2.7
3.0
63
a
36
6
2.7
2.4-
2.9
2.7
2.9
3-0
29 CHIM. I.Ia 1,255 1.471 IAW 1.8 1.4 1.0 7w 699 2.4 2.0 i-t
29 TV-Uscut 6 7 11 Is 2.8 2.5. 3
30 clainn 6b 9 is 33 1-5 2.6 2.8 3 '3 1.9 Ij 0
31 Itauritmia 2 3 5 It 2.4 2A 2.8 I I ix 2.9 M
32 Sci I mtm 17 19 24 29 1.6 1.4 1-1 I 1 7 2.3 IA 1-6
33 T=*Wmc 10 12 t8 2S 2.9 3.3 2.1 5 4 28 24 3.0
34 liandom 5 7 11 19 3.3 3.3 'y 8 3- 2 3-1 3.9 3-7
35 Lesadm) 2 2 3 6 2.3 2.7 2.3 I 1 2.0 zo I
36 EIM Azab Rep. 55 63 86 -at 2A 2.4 1-7 31 15 2-1 2.6 2.7
37 bdooesia 194 206 265 355 2.3 1.9 1.4 it] 75 2.1 Z4 2.0
39 Mymv=w 44b 52 73 109 2.2 2.1 2.1 25 19' 2.2 1.9 '.1.7
39 Sonarm Sb 10 21 4T 2.9 3.1 2.9 4 2 3J Li 1-9
40 Smin Vb 33 57 log 2.9 2.7 2.7 14 9 2.6 2.9 3.1
.. 41 Yomg, Rep 13 17 36 a .2.6 3.9 3.3 6 3 1.1 3.0 3A
42 Zm%Na 8 10 17 3S 3.0 3.2 2.3 4 3 2.7 3.3 3.S
MkIe-income pq 2,4199 1,Wt ZWt 2,976 t 3.1 v Lgv. L5w gut 433 t2.5 v 2.2 w 2.9w
Lower-miffiSe-locomme 941 t 1,W t Mn t 2AIl-t 3.5 v 1.3 w Mw SIB t 257 t2.3 v 2.2 w 33v
-Z
44
CUed-lwim
Bolivia
13
9
17
9
34
14
74
22
4.0
2-5
3.9
2.5
35
2.4
6
4
5
2
2.5
2.1
2.6
2.7
7.5
2.6
45 Ambepu 7 3 it 13 1.5 1.2 5
46 Mipl*m 64 77 LIS 172 -2.5 2.4 2.3 37 24 2.4 2-5 2.3
47 Anneda 4 4 5 6 1.4 1.1 2 - - --
49 Sawgal 9 to .16 30 2.9 2.9 2.6 4 .3 3.2 1.9 2.1
49 Camewon 12 16 23 54 2.9 .2.8 3.0 6 5 1-5 1.9 2.3
5D KyqDzRcptMk 4 5 7 10 1.8 1.2 3
51 owlic, 5 5 6 7 0.6 0.0 4
57 UzbekisMn 21 26 39 57 2.5 2-2 12
S3 %qmNcwGumw 4 5 7 12 2.4 2.3 2.3 2 2 1.9 1-5 1.0
54 PCM 22b 26 36 48 7-7 2.1 1.8 13 8 3.3 2-9 2.7
55 Guaumzda 10 12 20 33 2.9 2.9 2-8 5 3 2.1 3.0 3.3
56 coop Zb 3 6 15 ZS 3.1 3.2 I 1 2.1 2.0 2.4
57 Morocco 26b 30 43 61 2.4 2-i 1.8 is 8 3.4 3.2 2.9-
59 DomiaimnRepubtir .7b 9 11 14 2-5 2.1 1-5 4 2 3.1 3.3 2.7
59 Ew2dor 11 13 Is 25 2.9 .2.5 2.0 6 3 2.6. 3.0 2.7
60 JoRba 4 5 9 t4 3.7 4.9 3.4 2 1 1.0 4.3 4.0
61 Rousania 23 23 23 0.9 02 0.0 tS 12 0.0 0.7 0.7
62 El S21vador 5 6 9 13 2.3 1.4 1.7 3 2 2.9 3-1 3-1
63 Tarkmenbnn 4 5 7 to 2-5 71 2
64- Moldovz 4 4 s 6 0.7 a-1 3
65 Udmania 4 4 4 4 0.7 0.0 2 2
66 Bulmr6 9 a 8 7 0.4 -0.3 -OA 6- 4 0.1 0.0 0-3
67 Columbia 33 37 49 62 2.2 1.9 1.4 1 2-5. 2.6 2.2
69 Jamaim 2 3 3 .4 1.3 1.0 0.6 1 1 2.9 2.7 2.2
69 Pamgny 5 6 10 17 2.9 3.0 m- 3 1 3.5 3.0 2J
70 Nzmbia 2 2 3. 5 2.7 3.0 2.6 1 t 1.9 2.4 2.7
71 Kazakhstan 17 18 22 28 1.1 0.7 I I --
72 Tunisia 8 to 14 20 2.2 2.3 7-2 5 3 3.6 3.0 2.6
Nomr. FbrdaticanWambUityandcm=MseedicKeyaWdicknFiginkdicsweforyeamodiertbandkwespccifw&
210

Tot 1.iS. 1lj9muksud Awiugnwf-guw* f % APe15-& Tat
suihnypda
pufbsifdwf
1.92 205 oaidIkusJ 193-8 293-9_ 199-20 I9. 1992 197l-W 1981-9 1992-*2k
*
.73 UJkmine 52 52 53 56 0- L 0.0
74At i 6 3 7 6 4 23. "-
34
14
- -
6
..
3.2
-
3.7 3.6
* 75 Tb.Iulm 58 65 31 .104 237 13. 1.3 37 31 2.5 ''7 1.-5
76 Poland 38 39 .42- 46 0.9 0.6. 0.2 25~ 20 0-7 0.6 (LB
77 Latvia .3 3 3 3 0.3 -0.4 2 1 - - -0.1
T7lSlovakltphlc5 6 . 6 7 .0.9 0.5 0.6 3 2 - -
79 cosm ~36 4 5 6 L2. 2.8 1.9 2 1 3.33 L 2'.3
SDOTmtey 59 68 92 122 2.3 2.3 L.9 35 25 L7 LI1 1.9
81 Inaa. IsuncflRrp. 60 75 126 20W 3.2 335 2.8 30 16 3.1 3.2 3.1
.z pazmma 3 3 4 5 2.4 2.1 1-7 2 1 2.4 2.8 2.3
83 Czealtepubfli 10 tI 11 12 OS5 0.1 0.2) 7 -. . - - .
84 Russian Fakcziom
SS Cble
149
14
150
15
153
19
160
23
0.6
L.6
0.1
Li7
041
1.3
99
9
. .
5
. ..
2.4
.
2.2
--
1.5
86 Albania 3 4 5 6 2.2 1.9 1.5 2 2 3.0 2.7 2.2
87JJavzgaz .2 .3 4 7 28 27 2. . 2.9 2L7
89SySpiAmRart 13 17 34. 66 3.3 3.3 3.3 6 3 3.4 3.6 4.0
UPWUppr-nddemwem Aft SO't 7117r. %St 2.5 w 1.8 w LS w 2S5t 176* 2.9 w 2.3wv 2.1 w
89 Sath Afiicza
.S90 inliuins.
40
I
47
I
69
1
103
2
2L7
1.5
2-5
LI1
2.2
1.0
23
I
13
9
1.3
2.5
2.8
2.7
2.7
1.9
91 Esonia 2 2 2 2 0.8 0.4 -0.3 1 1 - . -0OS
92P Burl! 154 1 224 285 2.4 2.0 1.4 9.5 51 3.4 2.2 LI1
93fEoswana I 3 4 3.7 3.4 LI9 1 0 3.0 3.3 3.3
S4 Ma]asit 19 22 30 41 2.4 2.5 2.0 II 173.7 LI8 2.5
95 VePVeCZu 20 24 34 45 3.4 2.6 2.2Y 12 7 4 3.2 2.8
96 Bdams
9iflnnniy
10
10
10
10;
I I
9
12
10
..
04
0.5
-0.3
0.2
-&-4
7
7
-- -.
5 -0-5
.
0.2 0.3
9tUzugua 3 3 4 4 0.4 0.6 0.5 2 1 0.2 0.7 L.0
99Mcuico 85 99 13 182 29 2.0 IS9 50 32 4.3 3.1 2.7
100 TdmWdad2nirobgo 1 1 2 2 LI1 13 0.9. I 1 .2.2 2.3 2.0
IOlQGabo lb 2 3 7 4.6 3.4 2.9 1 1 0.8 0.7 LI1
102 Argcutina .33 36 43 53. L6 1.3 1. 20 12 1.0 1.2 1.6
103Ormmn 2 2 5 12 441 4.3 441 1 0 4.5 3.5 2.8
I" Sovenkm 2 2 2 2 0.9 0.5 0.1 . I
lOShpencItico 4 4 4 S Li7 039 0.7 2 1 23 ii
.106 Kama..Rep. 44 41 53 56 139 LI 0.8 .. 31 19 2.6 2.3 138
107 Guuec 10 11 II 9 0.9 OS5 0.5 7 4 037 0.4 0.2
10OIFbnugaI 10 10 10 9 0.3 0.1 0.0 7 5 2.5 0.9 03
109 &TaudlArubia 17 Z2 43 83 4.9 4.9 3.3 .9 4 -5.5 3.9 3.2
Sw 1St~ SUit; ti4~ rZ4'T
5
3w$5 s t t4 Vt
RIpJahmmcmm.*s Mcu ZEst 922* 503s MS w 0.7wv 0.5W. t 380* 1.3w- . .6 w OA.4w
lIOIfuIuzd
IIlNew7maiad
4
3
4
4.
4
4
3
5
1.4
LO0
0.4
o.z
0.6
0.8
2
2
2
2
LI
1.9
1.6
135
1.5
LU
I1ZtIsmel 5 6 a 9 2.7 2.3 2.2 3 2 LI9 2.2 139
113 Spain
114ftHongKmng
39
6
39
6
33
6
32
5
1.0
2.5
0.4
1.2
0.0
0.6
26
4
iS
3
0.8
4.3
LI
2.0
0.7-
1.2
IISjSlnVpwe. 3 3 4 4 2.0 139 1.4 2 1 4.3 1.4 0.6.
116 Ausualia 17 19 23 24 1.6 1.4 1 12 Ii 2.3 L.6 1.2
117iUaitedKlngdomm 51 59 61 60 0.1 0.2 0.2 38 25 0.5 0.3 041
118 ital58 58 54 43. 0.5 0.2 0.0 40. 23 0.S O.S -0.1
119Ndmidsis 16 16 15 039 0.6 0.5 10 6 1.5 LI. 0.2-
120Camuda 27 30 34 35 1.2 LI 0.9 18 14 341 LI 039
121BcIgiwn 10 10 10 9 0.2 0.2 0.1. 7 4 0.9 0.4 0L0
122 inLand S S S 5 0.4 0.5 0.3 3 3 0.3 0.6 0.2
123'tU.tdMArabEmnintes 2b 2 3 4 15.6 4.0 2.0 1 1 17-2 3.6 1
.124 Fianc. 57 59 63 62 0.6 OS5 0.4 33 26 0.9 0.7 0.4
125SAmstu 8 8 8 7 0.2 0.4 0.4 5. 4 0.3 0.5 0.0
126 Gamny, . 1 81 75 62 0.1 0.2 0.! 55. 39 0.6 -1.5 -0.5
127 United22fS.e 255 276 323 348 LI1 1.0 1.0 168 124 2.3 1L0 (iS
12SIINowy 4 4. 5 .5 0.5 0.4 0.4 .3 2 2.0 038 0.5
1I29 Desnzk 5 5 5 5 0.4 0.1 0.2 4 3 1.3 0.5 0.0
1I30 Sweden 9 9 9 10 0.3 0.4 0.4 6 4 LI1 0.4 02
131 Japan 124 127 124 105 LI1 0.5 0.2 86 63 0.7 0.8 0.3
132 Swjiz$dand 7 7 7 7 041 0.1 0.6 5 3 0-3 0.4 -0.2
a. Fonheassumptions used in dueprojeciois.see the tchnialans. b. Based onccdarkoradnowgrapliccsn 5teycarcrodrdectming isouly ocine entof
data qiafity- Scede Key fortbhe Lw cstanyma
2Z1

Table 26. Demography and fertility
Cr=frbmk Cnde&Axh 'Aknmelsuuvmuof
ppdimi4 gmyaw&ai Towlfenilhmnr Iffhofvuarnmsd fer(
mtalhi,r
aa ntapa
(SJ
1905 1992 Im Lw_ MM5 199 21mg tWierlS Own3 NRRnfIb IQl.M9
Law aweaueecaogues 39 w 28 w 14w lOw EArn 3Am 3.1 w
Ezdudlnghhiu&indIa 45w 37 w 19wfl2w 6.3 w 43.9w 4Amw
IMazasubiqac ~~~48 45 24 21 67 63' 6.9 15 20 2050
Z-2Ethiopia 43 51 .20 18 5.8.7.5, 73 17 13 2050
3TaazDI6 .49 45 22 t5 6.4 6.3 5.5 17 .16 20.35 t
*4SleamLcan
5Nepal
49
46
49
32
30
22
22:
13
6.5
6.4
63'
53'
6.5
4.3
21
11
13
17
2045
2030
6-UgaWda
7Bhutan .
50
41
54.
39
17
22i
22.
17
7.1
5.9
7.1
5.9"
7.1
5.7
18
9
22
23
2050
2035
6
Sflmundi 46 43 24 17 6.8 6.8' 6.6 7 " 205
9Malai
to BangwmesI
56
48
47
31
24
21
20
Il
7.8
7.0
6.7
4.0
6.7
3.1
17
16
17
21 2045
2010
13
40
It Chad 45 44 26 IS9 6.0 £.9" 6.2 21 24 2040
t-2Gtinct-Bisssu 41 .46 27 25'5.9 6AO$ 6.0 21 13 2040.
13 Madaascar -46 43 20 15 6.6 6.1 5.4 is 15 2035
14 LaoPDR 44 4 23 15 6.1 6.7 6.0 7 "- 2040
15 Rvmnauf 527 40 18 17 7.8 6.2 4.9 9 29 202S 21
ISfliger 50 52 28 19 7.2 7.4 7.4 2 15 205 4
17BiudinaFaso 45 45 25 21 6.4 6.9 6.7 15 17 2045 8
It aInfa 41 29 is. to 5.5 .7 731 .12 ID 2010 43
19 Vtryn ~53 37 18 10 tO 5£4 4.0 16 24 2015 33
l9KMali Si 150 26 18' 6.5 7.1d 6.9 20 25 2050 25
21 N-%&~i 51 43 21 14 6.9 5.9 5.0 16 13 2035 6
"NiC212M 48 35 14 6 6.9 4A4d 3.7 2-0 10 2020 44t
2TcOP 50 45 20 13 6.5 6.5 5.8 is 18 2040 33
24 Beniim 50 44 22 15 6.9 6"1' 5-5 16 15 2035 -
25 CaatualAfimuRepmbfle 37 42 2 Is1 49 Sgd 6.3 210 14 2045
Z6 Pakisn -48 40 19>20 710 5.6 4.6 14 14 20130 14
-27Ghana
28 Cbin
46
33
41
19
16
8
12
8
6.7
*5.S
6.1
2.0
5.4
Ii9
15
4
18
5
2035
27030
13
83
29 Ta-ilistan ..- 36 -. 6 .5.9 £-1 4.2 6 13 2025
30OGuiura 46 48 22 20 6.0 6-5d 6.5 23 12 2045
31lMauritnia
3ZSriLh
.47.50
29~~~~~' 21
I 25
8
s1865
6 4.3
6.3
2-5
6.6
2-1
1s
S
15
14
24
20
33 Zimibabwac 53.34 16 8 7.7 4.6 3.5 13 14 2020 .43
34 Hondurs 49 37 25 7 7.2 439 4.0 17 12 2025 47
35 Lasodo 43 33 20 9 5.7 4.8 4-1 2 21 2025 23
36 Egypt.AmbRcp. 40 28 17 9 5.9 3.8 3.0 10 13 2015 47
37Indonesia 42 25 IS9 10 5-5 2.9 2.4 12 1 2s0o5
38 AJrwnamw .3 33 1s 10 5.9 Lid 3.5 5 16 2020
*39 smarcE 50 48 24 17 6.7 6.8d 6.6 20 13 2045-
40 SuAwe 47 42 22 14 637 6.1 55 13 16 203 9
4t Yenwz. Rep 53 50 23 15 739 7.6 6.9 15 lB 2045 10
42 Zmbfa* 49 47 19 17 6.7 6-5 5.3 17 15 2040 IS
Mlddeiecoranee.coinfes 35 w 24 w 11w SW 4.6w 3.0 w 2.7 w
* . ~~Lowera'.dfic-inconue 36 w 24 w 12 w 9 w 45w 341w 239w
43 C&td'lvoire 51 45 20 12 7.4 6.6 6.1 22 13 .2040
44DBolivia 46 36 19 10 6-5.4.7.4.0 13 15
45 Azetmj2n .. 25 .. 6 437 2.7 2.3 6 9
202
20
30
46FhIlippines 38 32 I21
47 Armenia ..
7 6.4
3.2
.4.1
U.
3.5
2.3
5
.14
26
9
2020
200OO-
40
4t Sengal 47 41 22 1.5 6-5 5.9 5.2 16 16 2030 7
49 C=ncmm ~43 42 is t2 3.8 5.8 5.5 20 12 2035 16
SO KyrgzRepubik * 25 . 8 4.9 3.7 3.1. 8 10 2015.
Sl Gorga .. 16 ..
52 Uzbekisuan . 3 .
I
6
2.6
5.7
221
4.1
2.1
3.3
12
7
10
9
1995
2020
53 PalmNICW GuIDC 427 33 18 20 6.1 4.9's 4.2 7 20 2025
S4 Peni 41 27 14 7 6.0 3.3 2.7 II 132005
55 GwuJala 45 37 14 7 6.7 .5.2d 4.4 16 12 2025
56 Congo .43 48 16 16 5.9 6.6d2 6.6 22 ! I 20*5.
57TMomcco 47 28 16 8 7.0 3.8 3.1 8 22 2025 42
58PDominican Rqpublkc
59 Ecuador
3.8 3.0 _9 2025 .53
63 Tudanenistan .. 32 ..
64bMoldova . 17 ..
7
10
6.0
2.6
4.2
2.3
3.3
.2.1
5.
12
LI
10
2020
1995
6SLkituaniaR. 14 .. 11 2.4 L-9 2.0 10 8 2030
66 Bulgaria 26 10 9 12 "- 1.5 2.5 19 4 2030
Ci Colombia 36 24 9 6 5.3 2.7 2.2 13 12 2000 66
6E Jarnaka 34 25 8 6 5.3 2.7 -2.1 17 9 2000 55.
6 6.0 .4.6 4.1 11 Is2035 48
10 6.0 5.4 437 IS 13 2030 23
69 Phmguay
70 Nalibia
38.35
44 37
.7
is
71lKzmkstan .; 21 .. 3.4 2.7 22 11 12 200D
72-Tumnsza 39 303. 14 7 6.4 3.8 3.1 5 17 2025 50
Nowe: Fardatacmnpambiliw and oveuge.see theKey2and dietedmnical nes.Figuntsin italicsare forymrsnother than hosspecilied.

Cnd&bin CswkdtmuhArifuve
rno fjrIUA rate a
vim4rJAVJ h-1U3vl4hDflt fliea CIMSN
1978i 1992 170 19)2 19W) 1992 7W lIafrrZO OrerJS nfl J933.)9)
73 Ukn2ine . 1 13 2.1. LX9 LB 16 6 2030
74 AS=ee 49 30 16.6 7.4 4.3 3.3 6 19 2015
75Tbuiand 39 20 9 6 5-5 22 2. 7 10 195
76 Polmzu 17 13 .1 10. 2.2 1.9 1.-9 S 9 2030.-
7 liLuivia .. 12 .. 13 1.9 1.3 LB9 13 9 2030
iSSlovakRepsbIic ~~~19. 15 9 II 2. 2.0. 2.0 12 6. 203
79 CosmaRica 33 26 7 4 4.9 341 2.4 14 II 2005
SDTazke 36 21 12 7 4.9 3.4 iB 10 10 2010 63
S1Irnmn.Islarniic rp. .45 37 16 7 637 5.5 4.5 13 16 21025
321'hnauna 37 25 3 .5 5.2 2.9 2.3 14 10 20
.S3eCzh RrubIir 16 13.12 II1 1.9 1.9 1.9 13. 5 20130 619
34 RusshizEedauti . . 12 12 2.0. Li7. 1.7 10 9 -.
Es Chile 29 23' Ia. 7 4.0 .2.7 2.1 1 l II 20
36 Albania 33 24 9 6 5.2 2.9. 2.3 5 II 2005
87 Mongolia 42 34 14 8 5.8 4.6 3-9 7 16 2025
38 Sw Aannb Rep. 47 42 13 6 7.7 6i'd 53. 14 13 2035
UppertitUiidIfl-ictUfe 33 w 24 w lO w 7 w 4.83w 2.9w 2.5 w
89 Soudx Afiia 37 31 14 9 5.7 4. 1 d 3.5 12, 15 2020
90 Maufitins
9l1Estonia
29
15
lBa
12
7
11.12 7 3.6.
2.1
2.02.0.
L9 1ES
10
14
12
7
203
20130
7
92DBmzgl 35 213 10 7 4.9 -.2._gd 9. 12 200
93fBlcvsau 53 36 17. 6 6.9 4.7 3.8 la 17 -20 33
94 Mn1ySia
95 Vncmnzda
36
35
23
30
10
7~
5
5
5.5
5.3
3.5'
3.6
2.3
2.8
7
.12
14
12
2010
2005
56
96flBlaxu 13 I.I1. 2.4 1.9 1.9 1 7 2030
97 Hunpazy IS 12 12 14 2.0 1.8 ES8 13 6 2030
Pl Umguay 21 17.10 10 2.9 2.3 2.1 12 1 1995
99 MCxico
100 Tkinixlad2ndTobugo
43.23
28 24
10
8
5
6
6.5
3.6
3.21
2.5
2.6
'1
14.
I 1
9.
I I
21110
2000
]DIlGabons 31 43 21 15 42 5.9' 6.4 19 is 20345
1ID2Azrmnia .23 20 9 9 3.1 .2.2 2.2 12 12 21100
103 Oman 50 43 215S 1.4 7.2 6.5 14. 17 20459
104 Slovna.a .. II . 10 .. 135 ES 9 6 2030 -
IOS PueroRkDo 25 Is 7 3 3.2 2.1 2.1 -13 9 1995s
106 Korea. Rep- 30 16 9 6 4.3 LU LB 2 10 2030 77
lOIDGm=c 17 10 8 10 2.3 1.4 1L4 9 3 2030 -
IDSPonpIrf 20 12 10 10 2.8 1.5 1.5 a 10 21030
ID9 SandIAzbia 48 35 IS 5 7.3 6.4 £.7 S 20 24
'low-raidmi-ea- 38wi- 27w- 13.w.-Sw -. 5.6w 3.33w 3J:I w
EStasia&Pam Ulc47w-4w .2w Iw 6 w.6w 5w
FastAda35w ir 9w 'w 5w 2.3w 12.2
-ASnaMoAsa-" - w 31wii '15w lOW. 1 .w
t2EnropeaDdCafllAea ~~22wv ISv1
o .5 .w a,w 21
M1ddkDmf&N.2Afrka ~ 45w --34 W 16 SW' 6.3W -49 2
LurtlvnArmu&Caribbea -36>w226 10w -7 5W 3w 5W
~~SSYSVSY1UdS(S-
36 w 277w 11 w- Sw;B .2 w 3.3w, 239w
Ery.h-icmeneconomies lIsv 13 w lO W 9w v 34W 1.7w v LAw
IIOii tfdad2
IlI1INew Zealand . '
15
17
I~ I
9
9
5
3.9
3-2
2.0
2.1
2.0
2.1
4
10
16
9
2030
ins5
60
1l2 tbmezl 26 21 7 6 3.8 2.7 2.1 6 12 2000
113 Spain 20 10 S 9. LB 1.2 .12 5 12 2030
114t HorigKong 21i 12. 5 6 3.3 1.4 1.4 2 14 203
lIiSngpore
.116 Axnstra
23
21
16
Is
5
9
6
3
341
2.9
1.5
1L9
S3
1.9 7 ~
1
7
00-
2030
117United Kkigdos 16 14 12 Ii- 2.4 ES 1.5 7 .9 2030
its Italy . 17 10 10 10 2.4 1.3 13 4 10 2030
119 -Netherlands i13 13 8 9 2.6 1.6 L.6 2 II1 2030 7
120 Canuda 17 15 7. 7 2.3 1.9 139 6 9 2030
I2leBelgium 15 12 12 II1 2.2 .. 6 1L6 4 7 .2030
1l2lFinlwnd 14 13 .10 10 1.3 E-9 1.9 4 14 2030
123 tUnized Amb Ernivates .35 22 1 4 6.5 4.5d 3.5 13 17 2025
124Pmnce 17 13 11 9 2.5 1.5 LB9 3 1 20303)
i125Austria
126 Gennany
.15
14
12
10
13
13
11
11 2.3
2.0
E.6
1.3
1.&
1.3
6
3
5
1 I
2030
2030
127 United Scns 15 16 10 9 2.5 2.1 2.1 io. Ii :9 74i
12t Nommay 17 14 10 10 2.5 1.9 1.9 ~5 9 2030 34
129 Dennak 14 13 ID 12 E-9 ES 1.1 3 9 2D30
.130 Sweden .14 14 10 I11 1.9 LI 2.1 4 12 1995
131lJapmn 19 I11 7 7 2.1 1.5 1.5 2 5 2030 56
132 Switze&lnd 16 13 9 9 241 1.6 [.7 2 12 2030
- - 34 w- 5w 13 w'. 9w- 4.9 w- 3.1w 239
a. Forassumptions used in the p.ojecctons. %ee die teduical notes to Table 25. b. NEIl is the sex xtpmoduction ame sewte tadunical notes. c. Data indoidewvotnief
whosehus5bansp.akecunracptau; see dc technici notn. d. Based on2adcwnogmpbicestiinat5yeatsortUldcrtinting is onlycue deanie f data quality.-See the
Key for the latest yeac
213

C.-
T;ii3lbk 27. Health and nutriti(iii
Pq-%d-JlEr
LOWNAwd* Lmr I.= 'Uhmmn
M03ilVp-
rfWbfrAF)
babiff (Si
boders)
19M im 1970 19W tm im lm 1997-92 Fewde A(de.
-Low.!O Pmmmm mg SJM v v 114 w 73 w 102 w 114 w
FAdudftChbm&hKlk w IUM w 11-00 w 2.W v L49 w 91 w 137 w 154 w
I Monmbkw iiim. 4.M. 20 156 162 a 269 293
2 EMWm W120 J2-W 16 159 122 194 216
3 Tammaia 22.600. 24.= JJIO 5.490 14 132 92. 25.2 139' tso
4 Siam Leone 17.830 23W 17 197 1432 =9 253
5 Ncpal 51-W 16.WO 17.MO 2.76D 157 992 145 139
6 ugmda 9.210 109 12Z 23.3 194 216
7 Bbm= 13.110 192 129 195 197
9 BMUDE _%xo 4i 139 tO6a 31.0 165 195
9 Malawi 76.590- 45.740 5m lf.BW 20 193 134 215 239
10 Bangladesh 9.45D 65.780 50 140 91 66-5 132 127
it Chad .61.9W 30,030 8.010 171 122a 194 216
12 Guinea4fim 17.5m 8m 20 185 140& 224 249
13 MaLvnw A0.110 8.120 24V 10 )Si 93 141 i(OD
.14 Lao PDR 15.160 4.3W I-M 490 18 146 97 149 168
15 Rvrmb 59" 40.610 5.610 2.330 17 142 117a Its 2DS
16 N*= 60.090 34AD 5.610 650 16 170 123 196 218
17 Buffinafte 97.120 57.310 1.660 21 178 1322 4E5 186 205
Is kda. 4.890 Z460 3,710 33 137 '79 63-0 109 104
19 Kcoya SJM IU5D 2XO 16 t0Z .66 95 Ito
20 mwi 44JM 19.450 2.590 IAV 17 M4 130a 25.1 189 212
21 Prwmia 19im 4.249 is 139 24 35-7 174 192P
22 Nommign 2.150 IAM is 106 562 68 75
23 Tqp 29JW 20 134 85 24.4 127 145
24 Bccin 2&VO zdw - 155 1102 35.0 Ir- 193
25 Ccutrat Aftkan Rqmbhc 44= 25.N0 Z450 is 139 1052 163 183
26 Pakim 4,310 Z940 6.6W S.W 25 142 95 40-4 129 142
27 Ghana WIO 22.970 690 1.62D 17 III 91 27-1 12D 139
28. China I.Sw 2.5W 9 69 31 21-3 32 43
29 Tajdium 350 49 57 70
30 Gokm 5O.OtO - - 3.720 21 ist 1332 213 237
31 Afaudianim. 17.9W 3.740 I 1 165 1178 30.0 196 207
32 Sri r-l- 5.9w I.2W 25 53 18 36.6 19 24
33 Timbabwe 6.M 7.110 .640 990 96 47 .10.0 53 66
34 Hoodum 3,7M 3.090 1140 - - 9 110 49 20.6 57 70
35 Lcsotbo 30.400 3.8W - - II I34 46 61 73
36 EsM Amb Rep. 1.9w 1.320 Z320 490 10 159 57 10.4 so 93
37 Indoncsia 26.820 7.030 4.910 t4 lis 66 39-9 82 98
38 Mywwnu- 8,820 12.9W 3,jW 1240 16 121 72a 32.4 91 log
39 Somo& 32.66D 16 159 1329 - 186 20S
40 Sudot 14-W 9i6 15 149 99 ..- 152 171
41 Ymm 34.790 19 175 106 30.0 I" le-
42 Zwdia 13.640 IO-gii 1.7i 589 13 106 107 25-1 167 197
b5We4ocommecommornics 3,=w 2XDw 1,72D w 43 w St w 61 w
Lown-middk4ocome i .. 2,= w 45 w S4 w " w
43 . COmd'lvdffe I.930 14 135 912 12.4 121 138
2.020 3.070 12 153 82 IIA 106 its
45 A=Wjm 250 32 33
46 phmwim 9.270 U20 2.490 is 66 40 33-5 44. 56
47 Annenia - 260 - 21 21 29
48 Scmgal 15,310 17.65D JAM 11 135 68 98 113
49 Camerom 28,W0 12.190 2.TM 1.6.90 O 126 61 13.6 109 124
5D KyqyzRqmbfic 2w 37 4D 52
Si Georgia 170 19 19 77
52 uzbdasm 290 42 47 59
53 Rpm Ncw Gmnea 11.640 12.= 1.710 1.180 23 112 %n 64 73
54 PCM 1.9m. 960 11 ]OS. 57- 10.8 61 75
5.5 GuauztWa 3.650 14 100 62a 2&5. 76 34
36 corqp 9.90 910 16 126 1142 23.5 t57 175
57 M 13.090 4.840 1.050 9 .129 57 11.9 69 94
icon Rqmbfic 16 90 41 10.4 49 54
SS Dwim 1.4W
59 Ecuador 2.910 980 Mm dw 11 [OD 45 16.5 51 64
6D Jordan 2480 770 sm 5w 7 - - 28. 6.4 32 41
61 Rmaoia 840 5W 430 7 49 23 - 32
62 El SaWidw 4.100- 890 I 103 40 15-5 47 52
63 Torkummistm 290 - - 54 64 78
61t Mobkwa 250 23 23 32
65 Lkbuania 220 - - 16 is 23
66 Btdvuk 540 320 240 6 27 16 17 22
. ..... 67 CD10mbia 22M - I 0 74 2 1 10.1 2 1 29
69 L-jnoim 2.011 530 I 43 14 7-2 15 19
69 FWMMY 2.300 12M 2VO 8 57 36 3.7 38 49
70 Nandbia 4.610 12 118 57 79 92
71 Kazakhstan - 250 -- 31 32 43
72 Tunisia 5.930 1.m m 3W 9 121 49 7-9 51 63
Mm- FwdaucompuabdLtyandermW-weftKcyandtbruxhmcalnoum.F4==mitdicsamforyczsodwrdm&=Spccificd.
214

1970 199 1971 POO0 199 1970 1992 1OU017 Foawl Makf
73ULcmiaie .. 230 . .. Is . 17 25
74 Algeria 8.1100 2.33 . 330 9 139 55 9.2 66 SD
75 hailad 3.29 4,360 1.170 960 13. 73 26 13.0 26 36
76 PoaIa 700- 490 250) ... 33 14 .. 14. 20
77lLatvm . 20.W .. 23 17 .. 17 25
78 SloV*kRcxiblic .. 21 .. . 25 13 .i13.. 18
79 CosasRica 1.620 I.030 40 - 6 62 14 is 1 19
IO TuuleY 2,230 1,260 1,010 .. 8 >147 54 .. 66 72
81 lrmn.IshmWicftep 3,27 3J40 1.71) 1.150 9 131 65 .. S 58
v- Ph1n66na84 .1.50 10 47 21 ~ . 23 28
*
83 Cmcch Rcp.bUc- .k. .. 21 10 -. 10 14
34 Russian Fedemltion . 21 .-... 20 .. 20- 23
15 Chile Z50 A 7-6) 73 17 -. 13 24
* 6 Ahwhz 1.070 .. 230 .. 7 66 32 .. 37 42-
S7 Mi&wgoHa 50 -330 250 .. 10 102 60 ..
IS SwrimAn.abRep.. 3.860 1,160 ISOm 87 11 96 36 -.
73
32
53
SD
Upparmiddle4iuaomae 1,9185w 1,141 w 2S1Uw .. 70 w 41 w 46 w 55 w
S9 SwdhAfiicaL -. .75 300. 79 .532. 63 77'-
90 Mainnitz 4.190 1.181) 610 .. 9 60 is. *. 20 25
91 Escaja. .210 -. - .20 13 -- 13 .18
92 BE%al 2.030 . 4.140 .. 11 95 SPa 7.1 70 76
-. 93 Botswana 15220 5.150 13(13 .. 101 35 I5tO 37 49
10 45 14 .. 14
9 53 33 .5.9 3543
94 Malaysia
95 Vcnczudta
4310.
1.320
2,590
590
1,270
440
-31
350
20
*
963Bdm.u . 250. .. .
97lHungazy 340 210 -.
..
9 36
5
I$ -1-5.
is 1 21
21
* - . - - .. 9l Ungua 910 46 20. 7.4 20 29
99 Mtezic 1,480 -. 1.610 -. 12 72 352 13.9 37 49.
100 TuinidadadTobago 2.25 .. 190 -. 10 52 is
101 Gabon 5:250 .. 57 1... 33 943 a
5.9
2520
15
143
.21
162
IM2 AZerntima 530 .. 960 .. 52 29 .. 33 32
103 Oman 3,33 1.060 3.420 411) 10 119 20 . 20 28
1-lSt snweni - - . 2.
105 PuertoRkca ... 29 1.3 ..
9
14
12
13
106 KOIcL.Rep. 2.220 1.070 2490 510 9 51 13 ..
I07 Greece 620 53D 990 - . 6 30 8 ..
13
9
is
12.
to08Portugal 1.110 490 820 5 56 9 .. 10 13.
109 SnuilAnhia 7.460 7W1 2.07 5 7 119 25 . 29 35
3171 . n,M e t n~jw,9 Ot-179r
~~~-T2 ~~~~~~~~~ --. 7~~~~~~~-2w W: W
ti '56v&-flw-
-. 6w~~~~~(15 .7w
HlgbincKnecummue710. w 4ls 2211w .20 w 7w W S 11 W
loI6jAnsuIi 930 .: 16- 4. I0 7 .S 10
IIUI NSKclagdn 810 .. 20 6. 19 7 . i0
112ItLnIa 5501 0 . 7- 30 9 .. 12
I14tHngliaaud 1050 41630 8~. 13 6 7 9
IZGtSngapor 6870 45 250 7. 19 7 .. 7
112lAB sUaium 650 0 .. 6 219 9 .1 t3
117 tUnitedAJngonbEiac .0 .4 4 . - 5 6I . 9 70 .. 2 . 2
124Fmnce . 50 210 27 -. 5 30 7 9 .12
126 Getrmany amg 410b .. 1.. 3 6 .7. 9
120lCanad5a 630 450 10 6. 20 9 9 12
122 NinLad 970 410 130) 4 .13 6 .. 7 9
123 tIUUniIeCAbEm 1.690 3900 .. 5 ..
6 14 70 .- 7
124wFreum 730 350 140 -. 5 II 7 -. . 8
125lAstan 590 210 3)0 . 6 13 7 9- 7
132S owizray 7002 0 .,6 .. 13 6 -. 7 9
13 Sedn 30 3m 14 t9w ik$3 -S 2 -ct. 1 . --
a. Based ona demnogaphic eznimte5ycan orolder.timing is miy iccldman
Genmany befrte ufnification.
afdauuaquality. See the KeyforddaelzeycaL b. Vax arclrsatheeemlR 1 bicO
215

Table 28,
Pli-Y
&--WY
7ard Ffxwi- Tdid Fende T-IWY mnffnm(%) &U&ff rado
MD ml gm 1991 1970 MI NM ml I P.V J991 m "91 im 1991
Low4womeecamomiks 74 w 101 w 93 v 21 w 41 w 35 w - 3 w . 36.w 33 w
Evan" Cbbm & Iona SS w 79 w 44w 71 v 13 w 29 w S v 2S w 3 w Sw' . 74 w 39 w 38 v
47 63 53 5 8 5 0 41 69 55
2 16 25 10 21 4 12 2 I I 0 1 48 30
3 34 a 27 69 3 5 2 4 0 0 47 47 36
4 SmaLam 34 49 27 39 9 16 5 12 1 1 32 34
5 26 - 9 to 3 3 7 22 39
6 Ugmda 39 71 30 63 4 13 2 35 1 1 34
7 BhuMm 6 0 - - 0 21
9 Burmndi 30 70 20 63 2 6 1 4 1 I 37 66
9 makwi 66 - .69 4 3 1 1 - 54 43 64
10 Bmwwk34 sit 27 35 71 19 12 3 4 . 65 46 O
it Chad 35 65 17 41 2 7 a 3 (Li 64
12 Gibica-Wtsm 39 23 -- a 6 0 59 45
13 Mabpsmr 90 92 82 91 12 19 9 is 3 3 6f 65 40
14 LWPDR 53 98 40 .94 3 22 2 17 1 1 69 36 28
15 Rwmlda 69 71 60 70 2 8 1 7 0 1 6S 60 SB
16 Niair 14 29 la Zi 1 6 1 4 0 1 25 39
17 BOFkima Pam 13 30 10 24 1 9 1 5 0 1 29 SS
19 hmfia 73 98 56 84 26 4-9 15 32 41 60
19 rmm
20 mg
59
22
95
25
48
is
93
19
9
5
29
7
5
2
25
5
1
0
.2
1
98 -
19
34
40
31
47
21 N*c& 37 71 27 62 4 20 3 17 2 4 - - 34 39
22 N=nVm SD 101' 91 104 19 44 17 46 14 10 65 75 37 36.
23 TW 71 M. 87 7 23 3 12 2 3 -- -- 59 59
24 Bcain 36 66 22 39 5 12 3 7 2 3 - 41 35.
.25 Ccnual Afiican Republic 68 41- 52 4 12 2 7 1 2 55 64 90
26 Nkioxg 40 46 22 51 13 2I 5 13 4 3 - -- 41 -ti
77 GhangL 77 54 69 14 38 9 29
29 China 99 123 Its 24 51 45
2
1
2
2 100
30
29
29
22
29 IV-kistan
30 Guincit 33 37 21 Z4 13 10 5 5 5 26 44 49
31 AburbniiL 14 55 9 49 2 14 0 10 3 24 47
32 Sri Lida 99 108 94 106 47 7-t 49 77 3 5 12
33 Mmbabw 74 117 66 IM 7 512 6 45 1 5 39
34 Handwas 97 105 87 107 14 19 13 34 8 9 35 39
35 Lesode 97 107' 101 116 7 25 7 30 2 3 20 46 54
36
37
EMp.-sabitep.
Indonesia
72
so
101
116
57
73
93
114
35
16
so
45:
23
1 71
41
is
4
19
10 72 98
39
29
24
23
39 Mjamuff 93 102 78 - - 21 20 16 5 - - 47 35
39
40
gamffEa
Sn&m 39 50
5
29
--
43
5
7 22
2
4 20 2 3
33
47 34
41 Yomm JCW. 27 76 7 37 3 31 0 51
42 YAmbic 91) 92 SD - - B - 2 2 . . 47
37
Afiddk-i ecommdm 93 w 104 w 97w 99 w ..32 w SS v 26w. 56 w 13 w lgw - . 90 w 34 w 25 w
LGWW-Middk-b$COM
43 Oked'lvokc 58 69 45 58 9 24 4 16 3 45 37
44 Bafivia 76 85 62 91 24 34 20 31 13 23 73 29 Z7 25
45 AacrWjai
46 ftffippiner 109 tio III 46 74 75 29 28 95 99 29 33
47 Anm!Wm
48 41 39 n 49 10 16 6 11 3 3 - - 48 45 58
49 Cancroom 89 101 75 93 7 29 4 23 2 3 69 75 49 51
50 Kylgzpepwic
51 Gemgk
52 Uzbddsin
53 PapuMcwGmm 52 71 39 65 8 12 4 10 2 73 30 31
54 Pon IVi IN 99 31 70 V - 19 36 - 35 29
55 Gulemala 57 79 51 73 8 28 8 - 8 53 36 34
56 CoW
57 MDMMD
-
52 66 36 54 13 29 7 29
5
6
6
la
fiz
34:
66
27
59 Dominim RVdft loo . . iw . .2t . - 55 47
59 Eccadu 97 . . 95 . - 22 . - 23 37 20 79 38 - -
60 Jordan 97 98 91 Q V 25 39 24.
.61 Romaen 112 90 113 90 44 SD 38 so I 1 21 17
62 8salvador 85 76 93 77 22 25 21 27 4 16 70 36 44
63 Ttuknmistan
6t Makhm
65 Btdguia
67 Colombia
101
108
92
Ill
log
110
91
112
.79
25
71
55
-
24
73
60
16
10
30
14 ...
85
... 73
22
38
15
30
69 iamaim 119 106 1 W 108 46 92 45 66 7 6 9D -09 47 37
69 F*aV=y 109 109. 103 108 17 30 17 31 9 8 93 95 32 25
70 NagWbin 119 126 41 - - 47 3
71
72
KazWdLoam
Tunisia 100 117 79 110 23 46 13 42 5 9 95 47 26
Now. FbrdatatompambilityandcovemgewcdwXcyandtbcfthnk:alnote&Fip=in italics are Ibrycamadwtham *M!Enied-
..216

_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ * A~~~~~~~~ifm a- PtswYpsWW
Tdat Faste Tad femak TodaY Mo.lwur (sI raachrnh,k
MD7 ml9 I=7 ml9 1930 Ml9 1915. 1991 MD7 191 M17 1ml 1970 1991
l3 Ukraie .. . . . . . . - - ~ . is S
74 Aleria 7 95 5 r 0 6 3 6 2 77 88 40 23
75 lhalhnd 83 1.13 19 88 17 33 15 .32 13 16 35 Is
76FPoLud 101 98 99 97 62 83 65 .86 18 22 96 97 23 17
7l SovukRepublie 100- 97 27 19
79 Costaka I10 103 109 102 28 43 29 4 23 28 92 87 30 32
so Tuskey 110 110 94 110 27 51 t5 40 6 Li 99 38 29
811n.lsIsnkcRep. 12 112 52 105 27 57- W 49 4 12 94 32 31
UZPmma99 106 97 105 38 60 40 62 22 24 87 92 27 20
83 Czech Repubic . -- -- - .---
14 Russian Fecleton- . - .-. - - . - -
85 chic 10`7 98 107 97 39 72 42 75.13 23 94 86 0 2
86 Agwnm& 106 101 102- 101 35 19 27 74 5 7 -. 26 19
17 Mango.-k -113 89 I(NJ10 87 77 _15 -. 30 25
89SSyiArnibRdp. 78 109 59 103 38 50 21 43 18 19. 87 98 37 25
* Uppur~~~nkId1e.heuuw 94w15w PZwlSSw ~~~~32w 54 w 29 w64 w 14 w 19w Sw Em 24w
S9 SanthAhiea 99 99 1s 17 -- 3- 3
90 mawdiuis 94 106. 93 108 30 54 25 56. 1 2 82 92 32. 21.
.92BmA1-0, -2- ii 6 3 ii718 26Li
23 23
-93 Boaswaa 65 119 67 12l 7 .54 6 57 I 3 58 91 36 30
94lMalaysa 87 93 84 93 34 .58 28 .59 4. 7 -- 31 20
95 Venevnela 94 99 94 100 33 34 34 40 21 30 81 61 35 23
9SbUngtay 1 108 109 107 59 84 64 - 13 32 29.
99Mbeaie 104 114 101 112 22 55 17 55 14 15 98 46 30
[OD Tdndxdand uTobsg 106 96 107 96 42 81f 44 82 5 7 87 91 34 26
lOl Gabon as5 81 -- 8 .5 -- 3 -- 46 44
lalrgmia105 107 106 114 44 47 - - 22 43 96 19 18
103Onu 3 IO0 1 96 ST5 .53 0 6 37 84 18 27
104. Slowenia-- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -. -- -- -
105 Pueuogko 117 --- 71 . 48 . - 30
106IC arau. Pcp. 103 107 103 109 42 88 32 88 I16 40 99 1IW 57 34
107 Gomm 10 97 106 98 63 98 55 94 17 25~ 97 - - 31 20
lOS Poutui . 98 17 96 115 57- 68 5t 74 II 23 91 .99 34 14
1095SajdiAmabi 45 77 29 72 12 46 5 41> 7 13 42 62 24 16
Cw

Table 29. Gender companwns.
Red&
Lreevedau7st" &AM) SqfcAwrperjivfttosr&dr4 Fe=desprfflOwdes FemgrteAittrof
Mare
1WAmrom
Fawk Mdt Pdmaq &__da,,.,a _f_ _ (S)
MO IM MO 1992 IWYA% IM 1970 IM JM IW 1970 D91 1970 199t PYM 1992
Low4neweeconande; 54,w .63 w S w 61 v 75 w 65 w 36 w 35 w
ExduxftChk&a&hWk 47w 57 w 4CP w 55 w 65 v 66 w 74 w 69 w 61 w 77 w 44 w 66 w 32 v 31 w
I Mozambique 42 45 36 43 70 6? so 47
2 Rhiopia. 44 50 43 47 57 56. 56 56 46 ff 32 67 40 37
3 Tsumank 47 52 44 49 342 a 90 89 .89 65 99 39 72 51 47
4 S'W=LCDDC 36 45 33 41 67 70 40 56. 35 32
5 Ncpal 42 53 43 Sit 833 tg 47 16 35 33
6
7
Usacoa
Rho-i-m
51
41
44
49
49
39
43
49
sso
13ff - -
65
5 59
31
3 41
43
35
41
-32
9 BMAM 45 SD 47 46 47 at 45 94: 49 94 17 59 50 47
9 mwawi 41 45 4D 350 55 67 60 72 59 92 36 53 4S 41
10 Baneadesh 44 56 46 55 6m - 43 43 47 81 - 49 s 3
il Cbad -40 49 37 46 77 St 34 44 9 22 23 21
U Guium-Bissm 36 39 35 38 43 56 62 53 43 40
.13. Madapsm 47 53 so 333 65 63 m N m -99 42 39
4 IADPOR 42 53 39 50 561 -- - R 77 M 66 46 44
15 Rwanda 46. 48 43 45 3W 63 75 65 75 79 99 44 56 50 47
16 Kipr 40 49 37 75 93 74 78 53 57 35 42 49 46
IT Buddoa Faso 42 50 39 47 Wo 71 86 68 84 57 62 33 50 43 46
Is 49 62 so 61 42. 45 60 71 39 55 30 25
19 Kenya 61 49 57 84 79 94 76 71 95 42 78 42 39
20 Mari 39 50 36 47 2-325 52 69 99 75 55 59 _n 5D 17 16
21 N3Cfa 43 54 40 50 m 64 66 59 76 49 74 37 34
22 Nzwjgm 55 69 52 65 3M 49 6! 45 59 tOt 104 99 139 20 26
73 Top 46 57 43 53 .95 73 99 96 45 65 26 34 39 36
34 Benin 45 52 43 49 161 71 75 - 45 51 37 49 47
25 Centmi Afiican Repubfic 45 49 40 45 67 91 67 85 49 LU 20 38 49 45
26
27
Palftm
Ghana
47
5
1
59
59
49
48
59
54
270
1=
56
77
60
92
.53
--
36
75
52
82
.25
35
41
63 42
9
40-
13
29 China 63 71 61 69 115 76 91 96 .72 42 43
29
30
Mg-ddm
Goinca 37
72
36
67
44
39
1.247.
- -
77
-
96 46 46 26 3i 42 39
31 41 5D 39 46 SW 83 83 39 73 13 45 22 23
32 Svi 66 74 70 89 94 97 73 99 89 93 101 icks 25 77
33 Zmbabwe 52 6i 49. 58 77 74 91- 80 81 79 99 63 89 39 34
-. 34 Homfoms 55 69 51 64 221 99 98 79 -- 14 2D
35 Lasotbo P2 63 48 58 220 87 97 70 76 150 121 III 149 48 43
36 ESM,s* Rcp. 52 63 50 60 95 93 .61 SD 48 76 7 10
37 Indonesia 49 62 46 59 450 67 81 89 99 94 93 59 SZ 30 31
39 Mymmor 53 AZ 50 59 -- 39 - 59 99 65 39 37
39 SmutEa 42 SD 39 47 46 51 33 27 41 39
40 Su&rn 43 53 41 St 61 75 40 SD 20 22
41
42
fho=4
75mNa
42
49
53
49
41
45
57
46
330
- -
to
so
31
91
3
49
is
59
a
28
14
30
bliddle4womeeconomie; 62 v 71 w 59 w 65w 77w 96 v. 76 w 90 v 36 v 91 v 92 w 106 v 30 w .32 w
Lower-ndddle4immme 71 w - "v
43
44
Ofed1voin:
Bolivia.
46
48
M
62
0 53
59 371
77 93 33 99 57
69
71
90
27
64
47
-
38
21
34
26
45 Ameftrjan 75 - 67 29
46 .59 67 56 63. .74 85 94 94- 99 33 31
47 73 67 3S
49
49
S-egal
camerom 46
SD
59
42
43
49
54. -
- -
59
9(
85
- -
59
94
86
63
74
72
95
39
36
51
71
41
37
39
33
so Kyriaz RcpabHe go 62 43 - - - - - -
51 Gwiem 76 69' 55
52 Uzbelds= 72 6rp 43
53 Papoa New Gainca 47 57 47 55 7W 76 84 57 SD 37 62 29 35
54 Pem 56 - 67 52 63 165 85 74 20 24
55 Gnau=da 54 6T 51 33 73 79 65 13 17
56 Congo .49 54 43 49 86 U 89 71, 79 97 43 77 40 39
57 Mmocco, 53 65 SD 62 79 30 83 91 51 66 40 69 14 21
59 Dominima Rqmbr- 61 70 ST 65 300 55 52 13 70 99 99 I 1 16
59 Ecuador 60 69 57 65 156 0 70 93 76 16 .19
60 JoWan 72 - - 69. 90 97- 92 99 78 94 53. 105 6 I I
61 Romania 71 73 67 67 90 .89 . 97 105 151 174 47
62 8 Salvador 6D 69 56 64 149 61 62- . 92 98 T7 95 20 25
63 Tarkmmistan 70 63 55 - -
64 Moldova 72 65 34 .
65 Lidmmtk 75 76 67 66 29
. . . 66 Bulptia 74 75 69 68 -- 91 91 zoo 93 46
67 Colonglia 63 72 59 66 200 57 74 St 72 101 22
68 Jznaki 70 76 . 66 71 115 100, 98 100 99 103 42 46
69
70
P=guay
Namibia
67
49
70
60
63
47
65
58
3w .70 77 71 77 89 93
108
91
--
102
IZI
21
24
21..
24
71. gazakbstm
72 Tunisia 55
73
69 54 -
64
67
53
127 91 94 64 85 39 77 12 25
Alow Fordaticampuabiityandcovcmg--swdv-Kcyanddicw-bnicalooom.FMwmbiiWksareforyearsotherthanthosespecifm:&
218

Luje'ecam=rurabt @vs A&J a(nionrpersiniquZmpal F.maesper iaile
Fenulr Male Fed Mak' ______ Seoay labor-- __
1970 199 J973 1992 blat., 198 170 198 193 597 1970 1991 I93 1991 193 199
73 Ukainr 74 75 67 66 33 ... 96 .. 127
74 AIgeuia 54 68 52 .67 .. 90 95 95 97 60 31 40 .79 6 I
75 haitnd 61 72 56 67 37 71 .. 69 .. 8 95 .69 97 47 44
76 PaImn 74 75 67 66 *. 9 . 97 .. 93 95. 251 266 45 46
77TLnvia .. 75 -. 6 57 . . .
73 Slovak Repubflc. 75 . . 67 .. . . . . . . .43.
79 CamRia 69 7 6a 74 13 93 91 91 0 9 4 Iii 103 18 22
O0TEIIq 59 70 55 65 146 76 93 31I 9 73 29 37 63 38 31
StIomn.IsLamic Rep. 54 66 55- 65 120 75 92 74 93 55 36 49 74 13.19
82 Pzmm - 67 75 64 71 wi 97 83 97 £5 92 93 99103J 25 28
94 ussmnFedraton75 (A4 4 . . -
asI Chiled66oo76 59 6 40 86 .. 9--
15 2 2
S6 Albana 69 75 66 70 . . - . . 90 93 92) 124 40 41
87 Mongolia 54 65 52 62 140 .. . . . . 100 . .. 45 46
* SSrianAmbRep. 57 69 54 65 143 92 9 5 5 5 7 36 71 -12 18
.Uppetauffildluiuern 64w.72 w 59 w " w .. 75w .. 78w .. 94w 95 w Dlvw 112wv 25wv 30 w
S9 SounhAffiea 56 66 50 60 -. -- 93 95 -. 33 36
90 mamutins 65 73 60 67 9 97 9947 9 1 93 661IW020 27
91lEuonia 74 75 66 65 41 . . . . . . .
*923Brz1g 61 69 57 64 140 56 .. 54 -. 99 .. 99 .. 2 23
93 Bcaswan 51 '70 43 66 -. 97 96 90 97 113 107 88 114 44 35
94 MaIysia- .63 73 60 69 26 . . .. . 8 95 69 .104 31 35
95 Venezuela 63 73 63 67. 55 34 91 61 S1 99 99 102 137 21. 23
96BdIanm 76 76 68 67 25-.-
97lHuuguy 73 714 67 65 .. 90 97 99 97' 93 95 202 193 40 45
9 UnTuay 72 76 66 6 36 .. 98' .. 96 91 95 129 .. 26 31
99 MCZIC 64 74 60 67 2W? . 73 -. 94 92 94 .. 92 IS '7
l00TdunkladandTobago 63 74 63 .69 89 73 . 74 - . 97 97 113 102 30 .30
IOICGabon 46 56 43 52 .. 73.80 73 78 91 43 - - 40 - 37
t0M Aegnti 70 75 64 63 140 92 . 69 .. 93103 156 176 25 23
103 0cmm .49 72 46 68 . . 97 . 0 16 89 0 32 6 9
I04 Sloveuia .. 77 -- 69 . . - . - - - - -
ll5 PbeatRieo 75 78 69 71 21 .
W16 Kom&a.Kp. 62. 75 53 67. 26 96 100 96 100 - 92 9SC 65 37 32 34
I07 Gmeee 74 Nl 70 75 .. 97 99 96 -99 92 94 93 103? 26 27
tog; Parnigu 7I 78 64 70 .. 92 . . 92 . 95 91.93 116 25 37
1095SadiAvabia 54 71 51 68 . 93 . . 91 .. 46 34 16 79 5 8
-Iaw-sdaiddlmjneame-
-Sab-uurmnAkfricii-- 4Gwv -53Mw43r SOw; 66 w.. 6w.-6-*7w 4w6wdw3'
WEnpedCuualAsu 69w 74w'66w6w so ...
EntAddeFa&'NMum 2 5w 66- 663 --S w ..
..
1w
".
9w
-;
3w
.-
9w
w
5w
.
7w-w
w.. .
.76w 416, w
56w Mw54w 62w ~~~~61;w,.64'w .. 69 Hlw:Mw-74;-35w-.;. 35'w
IlOWland 73 78 69 73 .. . 93 ~~~7S .. 97 968 95 w 17'124 100~- 26' -29
IIIlNewZculmnd 75 79 69 73 . . 98 -- 98 94 94 94 98
112 tLgwlI .73 73 70 75 . 96 97 96 97 92 98 131 116 30 3
113 Spain 75 81 70 73 .. 76 98 76 97 99 93. 84 102 19 24
*114 tHongr.ug 73 S1 67 75 4 94 92 -. 90 .74
ilts naae70 77 65 72 10t 991W? 9910lo S9 90) 103169 26 37.-
116u mia75 30 63 74 .. 76 97 74 94 94 95 91 99 31 33
117 UnitedKlUngdom 75 79 69 73 . - .. . .. 95 96 94 96 36.39
Il1ltal 75 3? 69 74 . - . .. 94 95 36 97 29 32
119 NedrulVAIS 77 381 71 74 .. 99 .. 96 .. 96 99 91 109 26 31.
12DOCanada 76 31 69 75 .. 95 97 927 93 95 93 95 96 32 40
121Belgiumn 75 79 68 72 . -. 87 -- 85 94 97 17 .. 30 34
122 F-inad 74 S0 66 72 -. 93 93 90 95 112 III 44 .47
123jfUnitod AmbEmimwes 63 74 59 70 .. 97 938 9 93 61 93 23 103 4 7
124 Fcne 76 31 63 73 .. 97 .. 90 .. 95 94 107 106 36 40
125 Austria 74 30 67 73 . 95 99 92 93.95 95 95 94 39 40
126 Gammy 74 79 67 73 jb 596 966 g, 9 6 b 966 b 93 6
gb40 39
IZ7,Unied Sues75 30 67 73 .. . - . .. 95 195 . . 95 37 41
12 Norwy .. 77 30 71 74 .. 99 -. 98 -. 105 95 97 105 29 41.
129 Demnuz 76 73 71 72 -- 98 lCD 96 lOG 97 96 102 106 36 45
130-.Sweden 77 31 72 75 .. 98 96 -. 96 95 92 109 36 45
131lJapan 75 32 69 76 .. 100 100 100 100 96 95 101 99 39 38
132 Swizzulan 76 82 70 75 .. 94 .. 93 .. 93 96 93100D 33 36
~VWI#4------- ,J6iw 63w 57w$4'-4-> r7w3w 6w .. 9 .
67w -73w-35w .3w
a. See thiee tdmi nomis b. Data referto fth Fedeol Republic of Gemany behe uuilicstion.
2-19

Table 30., lnwme iibuion and: PPP Of GNP
PPPes*ww4GNP
Pe-mage skwaft-me -c--qdm
per eqaw
seamd .7hird Fe" M*Sf mmgw IM
cuffent rati.
LMXW
dWka
r,- 20pimm qpk* fdndfe qoWk 20perrm ltpemw IW 1992 .1992.
Low-lommemontles
Enduding Cldm ludin
I MOZM*DC 2.6o 2,50 5700
2 Ethkipie 1981-82bc .9.6 12.7 16.4 21.1 41.3 2iS 1.9 1.5 .340d
3 TaraaWm 1991bc 2.4 5.7 10.4 18.7 62.7 46.5 2.5 2.7 630d
4 Siem Lmm 3.6 3.3 770d
5 Nepal 1994404 9.1 12.9 16.7 21.8 39.5 25.0 4.3m 4.P 1.1002
6 Ugmila 19" ke 8.5 12.1 16.0 21.5 41.9 27.2 4.48 4.0 1,0702
7 BilutBu 2.71, 2.78 6300
8 Bumpdl 3.2- 3.2- 750-
9 mabwi 3.5 3.2
10 P!%iadcSh 199849bc 13.4 17.0 21.6 38.6 24.6 5.1 53 1.
11 Chad 2.7N 3. IN 7100
12 Guium-Dissm 1991bc 2.1 6.5 12.0 20.6 58.9 42.4 2.919 UP VAN
13 Mzbpsmr 3.6 3.1 72Dd
14 Lao FDR 7.P 11.33 1.930m
15 Rwanda' 199345bc 9.7 13.1 16.7 21'.g 3ii 24.6 3.9 3.3 77gd
16 Wtgcr 3.81 329 740-
17 BwWaa Faso 3.28 3.28 7300
Is bidia iggg-o-C Ii 21'.3" 41.3 27.1 4.6 5.2 .210d
19. Kenya 3.4 6.7 10.7 17.3 61.8 47.9 6.1 5.9 :.360d
20 Mali 2.3 2.2 5ODd
21 wagerin 1.440d:
.22 N' HMMgua 12.7a 9.32 2.16DO
23 Togo 5.911 4.80 1.10DO
24 Benin 7.4 6.5 1 -vo
25 CentralAfrkm RmMic 5.12 4.58 1.0404
26 Pakimn Igglbc 9.4 12.9 16.9 22.2 39.7 251 11.3 9.2 2.130d
27 Ghm IqSS-g9be 7.0 11.3 IS.8 21.8 "A 29.o a.0a 9.2 1M:
28 China IW45 6.4 11.0 16.4 124.4 41.8 24.6 .6.5 9.1 1:910
29 Tajkb= 14.3 8.7 2.(OOh-
30 Gukm
.31 Mamitania 1997-ggbc 10.7- 16.2 23.3 46.3
3.5 30.2
&52 UP 1,3909
32 Sri Lanim 1990b-e 8.9 13.1 16.9 21.7 39.3 25.2 11.1 12.2 2,910d
33 Zknbabwe 1990-gib.. 4.0 6.3. 10.0 17.4 62.3 46.9 9.2 8-5 1,970d
34 EWndons 19W4 2.7 6.0 102 17.6 63.5 47.9 &5 83 1.9301
35 Lesado 19964ribc 2.9 6A 113 19.5 60.0 43.6 6.62 7.72 1.770a
36 Eoln. sab RqL 16.4 15.9 3.6700
37 LWbnesia 1990bc &7 12.1- 15.9 21.1 42.3 77.9 10.5 12.9 2.9701
39 Mymxar
39 SontaUa
40 Sudan
4 1YMM. Rgp-
42 7ambia Igglbe 5.6 9.6 14.2 21.0 49.7 34i Ki
hOddle-incometconomies
Lever4nWille4ocoffne
43 Coke d'lvoire Igggbe 7.3 11.9 16.3 22.3 42.2 26.9 9.5 7.1 1.6W
Balivim 5-6 9.7 WS 22.0 48.2 31.7 9.7 9.8 2.MI
45 Azabirpm 21.6 11.5 2.650h
46 PhMWRCS 6-5 10.1 14.4 21.2 47.9 32.1 10.9 10.7 2.4god
47 Annenia 27.3 10.8 2.5Wh
48 Sencgd 1991-92b.C 3.5 7.0 11.6 19.3 58.6 42.8 8.0 7.6 1.750d
49 Csuneroon 15.9 9.9 2.
50 KyWz Republic ISA 12.2
51- Gcorgia 26.7 10.7 2.470h
52 Uzbckistao 13.7 112 2.600h
53 Pipm New Guiom 8.60 UR 2.020H
54 rem IM-96b-C 4.9 9.2 13.7 21.0 $1.4 35.4 19.8 13.3 3.09D
55 Guatmula 1999fz .. 2-1 5.9 IO.S I&6 :63.0 46.6 14.5 14.6 3.370i
56 C= Al 10-6 2,450d
57 r 1990-91ke ig 161i iiii 2b 496 30.5 13.9 14.1 3.270d
59 Dominican Republic 19894 4.2 7.9 12.5 19.7 55.6 39.6 15.6 14.5 3.3ffl
S9 Ecuador. 17.8 18.9 4.380i
6D Ionian' 1991bc 20.9 47.7 37-6 26.42 18.3a 4.MN
61 Romania 19.1. 11-9 2,750i
62 El saivmjor 9s 9.6 2.7Mi
63 'TudmxnLsm 21.5 17.1 3.9M1
6it Mokkria 24.3 16.7 3.Mh
65 Lithuania 28.1 16.0 3.710h
66 lkd 1992fs 10.4 13.9 173 22.2 36.2 21.9 29.0a 22.2a 5 13011-
67 C-W= 1991fg 3.6 7.6 12.6 20.4 55.9 39.5 23.9 24.9 S. 66i
68 Jamaica 1990bc 6.0 9.9 14.5 21.3 48.4 32-6 15.2 16.3. 3,770i
69 Pamgny 15.0 15.2 3.510i
70 Nanisbia 13.2a 13.18 3.040a
71 KazaUmv 27.0 20.7 4.780h
1990bc 30.7 20.2 22.2 5.130d
72 Tunisia 5.9 10.4 15.3 22.1 46.3
Abre: Fordatacomparabilitymdcovemgesmdiereyauddicwchnkwnumr*uniaitWicsarcforycarsodxrtbmdwwspedried-
220

PPPEJrImE4fGNp
Tar Is seon N i Fe Ir an m Mi a t im &S 100 dU
~ ~~ ~r 2m- vnir qw *W OWm1pecw 1987 1992 192
2
' 'UU #dr lpxi IOveu 23.0 217 51b
73 Utmost
74 UkAlneraIaa
76 AolE Imh b 4
j.9 11i 149 20.7 4.S 31.7 27.5" 24.8' 5.74OR
7.5 l9ab4e ~~~6.1 9.4 1335 20.3 50.7 35.3 17.2 2S53 S.SS0d
M. Pbmd 7
999gggr 9.2 13.5 17.9 23.0 36.1 21.6 25.5 21.1 4.880
77 -Larva .... ..... 36.2 20.3 4.690h
.78 SlOVaIdRcpUuhlic . . . . .. 32A42 24.3& 5.62O'
79 Csta Rica j9gqgr. 4 9.1 14.3 21.9 50.5 34.1 216 24.0 5,551$
-80 Turkey ... . . . . 21.1 22.4 S.t7Ok
81 Inn. Islamii Rep. . 2 22.5 m, 5.780'
82 Phavar j939342. 6.3, 11.6 20.3 5919 42.1 25.8 23.5 5.440'
83 Czech Republic * . . . .. . ... 40.5 31.0 7 lok
84 RussIan Federatin.. . . . .. 38.7 26.9 6.22flb
85 Chile 9 r 8 3 . 0 16.2 62.9 48.9 27.7 35.0 S.090i
86 Albwani . . . . ..
S7 Monoi . . . . .-
*9 =wa.AtI Rep. . . . . .- . 09
89 South Afrka . . . . .. . . .-
91 Esonacdu.. ... .... 41.0 49.3 11,3901
27.3 3 2 mh 0
92 BnnaIl9gr 2.1 4.9 8. t619 673 51.3 26.3 22.7 '5,25i
93 Botswanw 1985486Lf 3.6 6.9 11.4 19.2 58.9 42.9 17.1 2214 5.190"
94 Malaysia 193914 4.6 I.3 13.0 20.4 53.7 37.9 26.6 34.8 8.0509
95 Veraela 39391.3 4.8 935 14.4 21.9 49.5 33.2 3635 38.0 8.790i
*96 Belns .. . -. -. - 32.2 29.6 6 . 8 4
97 Hungar 1989't 0. 14.8 18.0 22.0 34.4 0b
20.5 30.4 24.5 5.740d
98 Iluguzy . . . .. 30.6 32.2 7-450'
.99 Mxcow 1954f t5 4.1 719 1233 1939 5539 3935 31.6 32.4 7.4901
100 TrinidamdamTobago .. . . . . . 4P 3.' 840
.101. Gaban .. .. 6.4.. 4..
102 Argentn .. . . 26.6 26.3 6.0Hk
41.72 9.63D'
104 Slovcnia.. . ...
105i iNCtDsRnolio
106 Korna. Rep. 19988"' 74.4 17.3 16.3 21.3 42.2 27.6 28.8 38.7 8350"
107 Greece . . ... 33.9 34.6 2.010k
I0R Portugal . . .. 36.0 4318 10 .1 2
109 Saudi Axmbia Dk
. .44.5" 48-3' 11.17Da
91 Estania .. .. .. .. .. .. ~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~43.0
103 Oman .. .. .. .. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3
~~~~ i?tX~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~g..~~~~~~~~~~~~~V
- .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tt. i-..-
t
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7-.Liio
imiam 47-4 52.2. M~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I1 I eMW Zealand 1981412"' 5.1 10.5 16.2 23.2 44.7 28.7 67.3 62.3 14.4110k
112 fltLued 1979-" 6.0 12.1 17.8 24-5 39.6 23.5 60.5 63.1 14,500
113 Spain 1988""' 8.3 13.7 ILl1 23.4 36.6 21.8 50.5 57.0 13.170k
114 tHongKg -1980"'." 5A 10.8 15.2 21.6 47.0 31.3. 74.4 86.7 20.050d
115 iSingpore 19824-83'r 5.1 9.9 14.6 21.4 48.9 33-5 55.7" 72.32 16.720P
116 Austmlal 1985"'. 4.4 11.1 1735 2419 42.2 25.8 76.4 75.0 I 7 .350k
.117 United Kingdom 1985"'- 4-6 10.0 16.8 24.3 44.3 27.8 73.1 72.4 1
118 Italy 6.730k
- *. 1986"'~~~~~~" 6.8 12.0 16.7 :23-5 41.0 25.3 71.6 76.7. 73k
119- NahexLwnds -1958"'3" 8.2 13. 18.1 23.7 36.9 21.9 70.2 76.0 17.5601k
* 32 Canada 1987"'." 5.7 31. 17. 7 24.6 .40.2 24.1 93.0 8S-3 19.720
121- Belgium .1978--79"' 7.9 13.7 18.6 23.8 36.0 213 71.7 78. lS,1EOk
122 Finland ~ 1981"'. 6.3 12.1 18.4 2535 37.6 21.7 73.1 69.1 1 5 . 9 7 0 k
123 tUnired Ambfnmicre 85-;2
124 Fiance 1989"'-" 5.6 11.8 17.2 23.5 41.9 26.1 77.8 83.0 19.200"
125 Austria .. . . . . . 7. 0 94 l,5~
126 Gennaay ~~~~~1988"'." 7.0 11.2 17.1 2339 40.3 24.4 30.7 89.1 20.610"
127 United States 1985"'-" 4.7 *11.0 17.4 25.0 41.9 *25.0 .100.0 100.0 23.120k
128. Norny. 1979"'. 6.2 17.8 18.9 25.3 36.7 21.2 80.1 78.0 18.04W'r
12.9 Dennutac 1951mn1. 5.4 12-3 18.4 25.6 38.6 22.3 79.4 80.7 1 86 wk
130 Sweden 1981"'. 8.0 * 13.2 174 24-5 36.9 20.8 8005 76.2 17.610k
'131 Japan 1979"m." 5.7 13.2 I7.5 23.3 3735 22.4 7439 87.2 2,0.160k
132 -Swirxteslmnd 1982ti." 5.2 11.7 164 221 44.6 29.8 95.9 95.6 22.100k
Obtaned [um dn tIc grssion estimates. h. Data refer to expenditum shames by fractils of pecans c. Dam nakaed by household experidiune. d. Exunapolated
tita 198 IC!' estinumas a Data maked by per capita expediure. f. Data rfer to iburnt slurnn by I racrils of person. g. Data rauted b!y per capita
income. IL These valucs amc subject to nmoe dmthani usual margin of'renr (see technical notes). i.j. Data are extrapsilted respectively, foan 1980 and 1975 ICP
ctailors and scaL.d up by the comsponding US defLvaroc k Ectrapolated frmi 1990 IC!' admtres. L. Data refer to eqxpediturc slate by fnactilesor bouseholds.
mn. Data re1cw to incene shares by fEwscils of househoklds n. Data narnked by hoausehsold incmeo. Data nmfer to the Fedenal Republic of G-ermay hbeftf
umrricitiou.
-a.
221

Table 310. Urbanization
(kbuapaphilma ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ Pqukwh.ilMawiraag99urada%e(
As Sc(ffum Aiwwr-mud cMmf*7dc svd 1mhSewin1of S
1970 192 9219" 19w.92 19W) 19 1970 1992 1970 1992
Law4ncanweanmnls JE~IHw 27 w 3.7 w 4.1 w 12 w 3w 41 w 36 w 7 w lO w
ExduelchuCia&India- Jw 77Tw 4.6 w 4L7w 27 w 7 w 39 w 40 w 7w It1w
I Mozmbique 6 30 11.5 9.9 33 20 69 43 4 12
29 Edilo*i
3 T2nnuja
9
7
13
22
4.8
11.4
4.8
6.6
30
33
4
7
29
43
30
30
3.
3
4
6
4 SiWIU LcoK
iNqmal
18
4
34
1I
5.2
*.o
5=2
7.9
52
is
17
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6Upnda 8 22 3.7 3 4 a. 0
i7Slam. 3 6. 4.1 5.4 22 I 0
Bmlunmdi 2 6 7.7. Si1 as 4 0 0 0 0
9ldaNWi 6 12 71.5 .6.1 31.4 0 0 0 0
10 BngLmkesh 8 13 619 6.2 37 6 47 56 4 9
lItClud 12 .34 719 639 4! 13 . 0 0 0 0
12UGanca-BHssa 15 21 58 .3.5 36 7 0 0 0 0
13 Madagsca 14 25 .5.3 5.7 24 6 0 0 0 0
14 LaoIPDR 10 20 541 6.1 53 10a 0 0 0 0
tS RWUIdZ 3 6 7.5 319 77 4 0 0 0 0
16Niger 9 21 75 7.3 39 3 0 0 0 0
17 Buddua Faso
IsiSadi
6
20
17.437
26 3.9 3.1
30
4
50
1 327
0
34
0
.6
0
9
19 Kowa.
20OMnIi
10
14
25
25
8.5
LB9
7.7
5.2.
26
33
6
8
45
0
30
0
5
0
7
0
21Nige&i 20 37 6.1 5.7 23 S 26 29 5 10
flNfrapag 47. 61 4.4 3.9 146 28 0 0 0 0
23 Top 13 239 8.6 5.5 so 14 0 0 . 0 0
24DcBnin 18 40 8.5 5.2 12 4 0 0 .0 0
25 Cemm2lAfiaan Rqzabflc 30 48 4.7 47 52 24 0 0 0 0
26hkPscn 25. 33. 4.4 4.5 2 0 49 53 12 17
V Gsse 29 35 2.9 4.3 22 7 29 30 3 10
298CImn IS .27 2.7. 4.3 .4 1 48 35 8 9
29ljiVa . ... -. .. 0 0 0 . 0
300uidnc 14. 27 LB 5.8 87 23 47 34 7 2
3lMambnnia . 14 50 10.4. 7.2 53 39 0 0 0 0
32 SdLanka . 22 22 1.5 1ES 17 4 0 0 0 0.
33 Zhnlnbwe 17 30 53B 5.9 31 9 0 0 0 0
34lHiaduras 29 45* 5.7 5. 35 is 0 *(J 0 0
35 Ltwji ~9 21 6.9 6.7 18 4 0 0 0 0
36 EspLAnRep- 421 44 .2.5 2.5 39 17 53 5'2 22 23
37 duua17 32 S.1 5.1 17 5. 42 36 721
38 MMyara 23 .25 2.3 2.6 32 8 ~ 23 33 5 8
39 SuaSa 20 25
40 Sw&m .16 23 .
3.8
5.0
4.0
4.1
38.
34
9
8
0
28
0
37
0
5
0
3
41IYeCL RQP- 13 31 7.0 7.3 II1 3 0 0 0 0
42 7ab& 30 42 5.9 319 30 1.3 0 0 0 0
Middtjnmmwneamuaks. 46Ew 62 w 3.7 w 3.2w 26 w 14w 42w 40 w 19w 24 w
SLmweD-dldIeJDcome -.. - .
.. 36 w 5w. .19 w
43 COtcd'Ivaize
44 Boflvia
27
41
42
52,
.7.4
3.4
4.7
4.0
45
34
18
IT
37
'29
47t0
29 £2
1
15
45 Azestnjja .. . . . 0 45 .0 24
46 PbiliPbma 33 443.8 3.5 32) 24 29 36 9 15
47 AzDUnia . . 0 SD 0 34
45 Scueg
49 CWncroon20
33 41
42.
3.7
7.5
4.0
5.4
51 20
1i .7
43
M
58
24
14
5
23
10
50 Ky'gmzRcpublic . .. . . ... .. 0 0 0 *0
SI Gco-mga. .... ... . 0 43 0 24
52 Uzbekszn . . . 0 .25 0 10
53 PhzpnNew Gufine 10 .. 5.3 4.4 33 .5 0 0 0 0
54FYou 57 71 . 4.0' 2.9 42 29 Y9 45 22 31
55 Gtatenmla 36 40 3-3 35. 23 9 0 0 0 0
56 congo 33 42 3.7. 4.5 68 23 0 0 0 0
57 Morcco 35 47 4-1 319 9 4 38 37 13 17
SS DamI xicRq,pbic 40 62 4.9 3;9 52 31 47 .54 .19 33
59 Ecuador
V OJopJn
40
SI
58
69
4.8
5.5
4.4
6.0
21
46
12
31
50
.0
55
0
20
0
31
0
61lRouxuna 42 55 2.6 1.2 18 9 20 28 8 10
6-ZEl Salvador 39 45 . 2.9 2226 1 0 0 0 0
63 Thloncnistn . . ... ... .. 0 0 0 0
~~~W MoMm ~~~~~~~~~~~~0. 0 0 0
0 0 0
66 Balgmia 52 69 2.1 0.7 20 14 20 24 10 26
67 Cclasbia . 57 .71 . 3.3 2.9 21 25 . 40 41 . 23- 29-
68 Jamakca
69 Paraguay
42
37
54
49.
2"6
4.2
2.1
4.4
52
48
27
23
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
70 Namibia . 9 29 4.49 ii1 36 10 0 0 0 0
71 K=authstan.. 0 13 0 7
72 -hniia. .4 57 3-7 36 20 .33 41 -14 23-
FW.-rordmm ampanbU~izy And ovenLe. see ieKey and the tccINsICaIstes. Figmeis itaicsaimfarycamoatberdun dunespecified
22m
65 'I.AbUnia ~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~0

M%qainl
in. Elm arrarein 1992.. 5 %ar
ar70 19 1970-M 9-2 1990j 199 19711 1992 19M 1992
73 Uknine ..- .. .0 0 0 0
..74 Algera.
75 Thalmd
40
~13
54
23
4.1
5.3
.4.9
4.5
23
57
12
13
24
65
24
60
10
9
13
13
-76 Polmnd 52- 63 2.0 1.3 9 6 32 29 17 13
77 Latvia . . ... . 0 0 0 0
73 S'oakitepobflc . . - .. - 0 0 0 0
79 CosRicm 40 48 3.6 .3871 33 0 0 0 0
IOllutqr. 38 61 3.7 5.6 3a 5. 37 33 14 20
S1 Imn.IslamieRep. 42 58 S.D 5.0 21 12 43 41 13 23
f82Pnna 43 54 2.9 2.3 37 20 0 0 0 0
33 Czech Repblick .-. -- 0 0 it 12t
31 RussianFblcmda . . . .-. . . 0 25 16 19
SS ChiIc 75 35 2.4. 24 42P 36 40 44 30 33
36 Albania 32 36 2.9 2.6 21 7 0 0 0 0
S7MhfmgalIr 45 59 4.3 3.9 37 22 0 0 0 0
SS SyEm Arab&Rp. 44 S1 4.1 441 34 17 60 56 26 23
Upper.nldI4umm S1w 72 w 3.9w 3.0 w 22 w Isw 47Tw 46wv 26 w 33 w
S9 ScutkAIgic 43 SD 2.3 2. 12 6 40 33 19 17
90 maudtis 42 41 1.6 0.6 36 15 0 0 0 0
91IEnk.0 0
91-P Brig 56 77 4.1 3.3 -P 2 ~~~49 SI 27 339
93 Bswma 3 27 10.0 8.3 41 10 0 0 0 0
94 Malaysia 27 45 5.0 4.3 " 10 Is 24 4 1
9 5 varzuda 727 91. 5.0 1.4 23 21 23 30 20 27
96 Bclanis .. . . i .0 0 . 0 00
97H* 9 6620 0.,3 39 32 19 21
* 9 OUzumguy 32 39 0-7 LO0 44 39 51 47 422 42
99 N1u600 59 74 441 2.9 34 25 43 41 25 30
lfl0 TfidabdaadTdbago 63 66 LI Li7 13 3a 0 0 0 0
lOl Gaban 26 47i Z.3 5.3 57 26 0 0 0 0
IM Aarutin 73 .37 21i 41t 36 53 so 42 43
103 OM2u 5 12 -8.3 8.2 40 4 0 0 0 0'
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ *.i..0 0 .0 0
FMM 58 Rim
ii 3i 39 ~~~~~~~44 54 26 40
104 Slovenia
im
10l6 KowaIRep. 41 74 5.3 3.4 36 26 15 73 30 53
IDYOzre=c 53 61 1L9 1.3 55 34 55 55 29 34
103 funmgi] 26 35 2.6 1.4 49 16 45 49 12 17
109PSaudlAnibf 49 73 8.3 6.5 16 12 27 23 13 22
~Lo~"4idmMdk4icbi4hfl;25w
_3u 3..-w-~ i- .1 *7 n6j l i4w"
19- Lv3w w3w M mm~Lv i
KAMi&FMk
: 49w 29i - - 4 33u ttZu. .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ liv -~~~ 4w dEw~4 -W 37w41L v - 1.9& jflw
'41w .55uY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~•tI?
St4 -a---- 2:,~
3,T'-24w__ ___ 45 4W 26- w
EII-bacunwneecomomue 74 w 73 W l-W - @3 W.1w 9w Cu 4 Ow 32w 33wv
IIOIztIand 52 53 2.2 0.6 46 26 0 0 0.0
IIIlNewaIuand. 31 34 1.4 0.2 t2 10 0 0 a 0
ll2flnad 84 .92 3.2 2.1 12 11 41 44 35 41
11I3 ti66 79 .2.0 1.1 17 13 27 29 18 23
114lauag%Kao 90 91 2.6 1.4 100 95 100 100 90 95
ll5tSWmaptoo0 100 2.0 1.7 100 100 tO [W. lw [OD
116AnIa85 35 1.6 IS 2 I 66 72 .53 61
117liUnitedKlagdam 89 39 041 0.3 14 13 31 26 27 23
IlIualyd 61 70 OR9 0.6 3 5 43 .36 27 25
119 Nc&hdand 86 39 LI. 0.6 3. 7 .19 16 16 14
iZO caada -76 73 1.2 12 4 3 39 33 29 30
121iBegium 94 96 0.3 0.2 10 10 12. 14 11 13
.122 Rolazd 50 60 7.1 0O4 34 20 27 34 13 20
123 tUnitdAiamb Emn&tcs 57 32 20A4 5.0 . . 0 0 0 0
124F,aac 71 73 0.9 0GA 211 30 29 21 21
125.Anumia 52 59 0.7 1.0 47 27 S1 47 26 27
126 Gernmny 80 86 0.3 0.5 I 1 50 47 40 40
Il7UniaeSt=c 74 76 k0 1I 2 I 51 5I 38 38
12Z NorWay 65 76 1.3 1kG 21 16 0 0 0 0
129 Denmark SD 385 0.9 0.2 n 3 27 35 30 28 26
1301Sw,cdh SI 34 0.6 0.5 23 19 17 24 .14 20
131lJVw.
137ZSwiizezlam
71
55
77
63
LB9
0.4
0.7
IS5
19
7
is
4
.43
0.
47
00
30 37
0
223

Table 32. hiff-dstructure
.Law4ncomewanomfes
FAduding Chho & India
Amver Tek=M=UiMdMw ftwdmft: MY&-
sin= TtWmw Amris Rmddewav fimahm Pkp"m Loan Mfvoffw Diesds
jouff X Oerym ibnprp, S-deviaL sdIk--w- (% ofhMd Amp- iiwsar
(safNW Owlwo mdamm mruen- f% ofpatrd sife www wwrr Burm fs 0fdrind
M ofmwo ONW) P- 1 per--WI PL-) run&) afwmq P-dAW $GOP) k,,,MM
lm .1990 19W 1990 M mu lm 1985 1990 im
MazaaNque 4 .26 3 22
2 Eddopia 2 116 94 48 18 46
3 Tanzatim 6 2D 3 156 25 v-
4 Sierm Lwne 36 6 194 62 39
5 mma 30 27 3 16 139 40 48 45
6 Ugan& 40 2 fig 10 33 49
7 Bludan
9 Bmmndi I 19 2 7 1 t9:s Ss 45
9 Nblawi 16 19 3 278 % 5 1 43 77
10 BMW 30 - 59 is 78 47 4 1 73
11 Chad 1 149 56 57
1.2 Guinea-Bissan 4 25
13 Madapscar .17 3 . 78 475 .56 21
14 laip POR 17 12 28
15 RvrAida 15 1 39 149 41 69
16 N%- I 98 383 60 53
17 Buffima Faso 10 21 .24 70
I 9higa 54 19 i . .- .893 2D 73 593 90
19 Kcaya 16 9 32 49 13 320 5-1
20 Mali 19 I 309 63 11 106 44
21 Nigedi St St 3 376 67 .42 .17 2U
22 Nicamgm 41 20 13 55 20
23 Togo 10 -26 3 44 40 70
24 Bain m 3 233 26 55
25 Ccma-ad Aftican Rep- M 2 tss .30 24
26 Pakistan 31 24 8 120 229 is 55 40 168 79
17 Gimna 20 3 - 430 28 47
28 Chitia M 7-P
29 T2jd&= a
30 Gufwa 37 :f46 52
31 bLiudcuia 3 193 804 :s8 66
32 Sd IF 201M 15 19 7 536 10 60
33 -Zhubabwe 9 10 13 217 1.389 84 505 54
'44 Hoodems 25 24 17 66 .. 335 50 t4 - -
35 Ltsoft 7 359' 53 47
36 Egypr. Arib Rep. 46 14 33 5 302 39 90 394 93
37 hxkmcsia 14 21 6 5 16D 30 5 1 29 74
39 Muvnnar 3.6 210 74 7-7
39 Sbffjarta 375 52 36 .33 - -
40 Su&w 26 19 2 99 27 34 27 29
41 Ybw4 Rep. 15 11 20 951 39 36 45
42 Zambfir 29 9 9 69 751 40 59 294 A4
Middle-incoweecononfics
Lower-addille4ocome
43 Caft d'lvoire 40 5 357 75 69 16 35 58
44 Bolivia .33 16 26 198 21 53 91 60
45 A=baijan
146 Phlippbmcs 19 10 7 242 31 81 53
47 Armenia a
.49 Swelo 96 10 6 542 28 44 79 62
49 Caffwroon 6 3 299 39 44' 84 72
SD KyWzRqmblic - a
51 Geor0a 39 a
52 Uzbekistan 2
0 P2PUZ NCW GUb= 515 a 196 34 33
54 PL-m 90 26 347 24 53 27-
55 Guawmala 37 17 21 52 350 7 62
.:56 Coup 9 .19 7 584 50 38 17D
57 MOFUM 37 14 16 101 619 20 56 5 141 98
58 Doadalcm Republic .37. 33 48 3C4 51-Y 69
59 Ecuador 47 19 47 336 53. 54 47
60 .-Iombn 77 16 75 100 99. 41 Q 60
1593 30 28 52
61 Romania 49 9 102 102 93
62 El Salvador 34 is 2it 47
63 Tmdmznistan 6I a
64 MoWma 43 2
65 Udwanin 46 a
66 Bulpria 21 - so 19
75 6 42. 96
67 Colombia 79 22 36
38 5 35
68 12MaiCa 49 19 45 7 1.891 10 7-P 31
69 ftm 9MY
16 26 79
70 Nmibin 47
71 K2=khstm a
72 -Mnis-m 63 12 38 130 1,177 55 70 30
Note-FordamcpmpmbirityandwyeragesmtheKeyandtheochniednotmFigaminimlksamforycarsotbwtbandspecified.
224

ParTr TdecImUmfaIUkdIS Pawr,! at Water RaLIvpy
Nti ure 7,TWWSu Tdepiwrs Saas Rail dmb, Ratior Pq,uhnfn .laee Rauihraf Dknek
mbA bran udnlina ~er 10 impver gaeanaL v&a*hcrcnt IS of nlm limper woae
efeeurrls (Seofatn ewrIJDJ asdlis edHim. 150 ! 3*mm Now ue 'A0MIn (%If(des
(S fofa) au) person) per yaws pra) real,) (S efjss powizlm) S GDP) fitan1-)
198 If) Sf 990 13 1990 13
1990l 193 IF m 1m9
73 Ukuinme.. .... a..-
74 Algeria 49 14 3- I. .36 40 ... 85 99
75SThailand 43 1 I 24 2 513. so 77 4876 72
76 PoIad 96 iS 86 .. 617 69 89 ...- 7
l77Latvia.. . .-.. .a- -
78 StoakitRepuiblic . . - .-- . .-
79 Cam Rtea 97 10 93 .. 1.0i9 r2 9) -
SO Turkey 57 15 123 1 . .. 84 4$69 73
81 mna.IlarmicfRep. 48 12 40 -..- - 99.-- 57
a?2Pallmna 66 24 89 10 I.3 36- 81 4
83 Czech Republik . .- . . .-
84 RussianaFedemtian. . ..-.- - a ---
85 ChiIe 8.5 19 65 97753 42) 87 .48 57
36 A1&mia ..- 77.. 97 -
S7floagwia 48 .- 57 --. 88 -..-
S9 Swinm Arab Rep. 42 .41 66 .. -- 79 34t 49 52
Upper-nddde-inwme
89South Afrio..a 87 .- a. 987 88
90 Mnndtus 93 14 56 .. .57 95 95--- -
92-BM1I 791 3474 30 86 30 60 62!
93 BoMatem -- 6 21 53 13977 94 90 25 -. -.
94tMIa2ySia 64 6 99 7 -- 72 29 37 76
95 Vemezncla 89 to 77 6 10.269 40 92P
97 Hsmgae 96 11 96 55 5501 98 8
Y8Unrgay. 81 2 1.34 -. 2.106 26 95 .. I 56.
99 Mexico 75 13 66 -- 820 595 81t- 90 64
IOD TridadcalnnTobago 83 9 141 6
lOl Gabon so -is - -
1.7P24
650
727
30
96.
66 2255 94
l02-Azgentim 87 20 96 78 858 35 64 .. 161 49
103 Outan. 68 2-322 66 46 . .-
10$ Slowenia-
105 Ptaero Rio 97 - -.
106 Korct.Rep. 100 6 310 236 70 93 .- 89
107 Gitr
108 PRutga
89
78
.
11
391
241 1.740
..
50
98
92_
39
105
59
89
109 SmuiAmbia -. 13. 78 .2 93
.MMdIeEait &DU.Africa
1lOlIFClaNd 95 9 281 40 100 57 71
I II New Zealaad 10 437 97 61
112 tIsnd 974 350 ..- .100 30 -
113 sput 95 323 10- .. 70 89
I is5tSingpore - 98 3 .385 .. -. 100 8 -
ll6 Ansuulia 98 7 456 .. 25.695 *b 1too- 62
117 UnicedKlndaom .. a 442 16 64174 b 10 .66--
lisluRay 99 8 358 21 5.251 b 100 . 90 so
119 Nezhdnm-ds 95 4 464 4.6 .875 1. 100 .7.3 83
1210 Canada 100 7 577 ... 100 . 210>
121 Belgiwn 100 5 393 8 12.440 b 100 .. 110 77
122 FlIaad 96 5 535 12 . .96 -165 87
123 Waited Arab EffdrEs mm 3 . .100-...
124 Frnact 99 6 495 10 14.406 b 100 -. 146 93
125 Austria 6 418 35 144101 .b 100 . 209.- 90
126 Gemnanyc. 10 5 483 ... 100 .. 117
127 UnitedStates 1TM 9 545-- 14-172 b--333
128 Norway .6 503 21 [O10D.
129 Denmazik 106 56. 13.775 0 .9.-
130 Swedea 96 . 6 6,83 12- . 10. 198
131 Jqxa . 4 441 2 6.007 b 96 .147
132, Switzedand .. 7 587 45 10.817 b 10 . . .-
a. FarnueeFsriUZes see iamp on acces to safe waxe in tue ieovduction. b. 85 pecen arawoe ofmads arc in good eaxldn:m se the technical motes. e. Dama refer
tD the Fedei Re ic ofUGemamny befomullifiCnli0C.
-225

Table 33' Nahii-al resonmes
Nawdfmwarm Fnzbwkrremrow muwl wWrokul. 1970-9-lb
ToWaw Amd&*W. =-Oa Nmwj*pnxwd arm. M3 Air % afoW Nr 04wo (Cm
Dmmd Sfwd 7U..d AF %of Tatid ILINtr Monfidamd
lm 1990 zq ha arm s% hu AlakWr mdww fm W mmrces Taraf Avww Mmidwd
lAw4neomecconotoles
EXCINNEEMItchiuMbiff,
137 173 IA 0.7 0.0 I 0.0 0.9 13 55 13 42
2 146 142 0.4 0.3 25.3 11 2.1 2.0 49 5 43
3 379 336 4.4 1.2 130.0 28 13.9 Oj 0.6 35 7 28
4 Sirrm Lmm 20 19 0.1 0.6 0.8 2 1.1 U.4 0.2 96 7 89
5 Nepal 56 50 0.5 1.0 It I 12 7.9 2.7 1.6 149 6 142
6 UP'k 70 63 0.6 0.9 18.7 32 7.9 0.2 0.3 -70 7 14
7 Bhmn 30 28 0.2 0.6 9.1 5 19.3 0.0 0.0 14 5 9
9 Bitmodi 2 2 0.0 0.6 0.9 3 3.2 0.1 2.8 20 13
awi 10-6 9 0.2 1-8 20 7 13
9 MaL 40 35 05 L3 L9
10 Bangladesh 11 8 0.4 3.3 1-0 9 0-7 22-5 I.Od 212 6 206
It Chad 123 114 0.9 0-7 29.8 7 2.3 0.2 0-5 34 6 29
12 Guiom-BiSSW 77 2o 0.2 0.7 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 it 3 8
13 Mzbps=r 171 158 1.3 0.8 11.1 36 1.9 16.3 40-9 t.642 16 1.625
.14 Lao PDR 145 t3Z 1.3 0-9 0-0 0 0.0 1.0 0.4 259 21 239
15 Rwanda 2 2 0.0 0.2 3.3 2 12.4 0.1 .2.4 Z3 6 is
16 NiM 26 26 0.0 0.0 97.0 6 7.7 0.3 0.7d 41 9 33
17 Burkina FJW .47 0.3 0.7 26.6 1-1 9.7 0.2 0.5 is 5 13
is iwiz 551 517e 3.4 0.6 13" 331 4.0 390.0 19.2d 6t2 is 594
19 Kcap .13 12 0.1 0.5 34.7 36 6.0 1.1 7.4 51 14 37
20 1W 132 121 1.1 0.8 40.1 11 3.2 1-4 2.2 162 3 159
21 N-Mab 168 54 1.2 0.7 30.6 20 3-3 3-6 I.V 37 1 t
22 N-wmagta 73 6D 1.2 1.7 9-5 21 7-3 0-9 0-5 367 9r-P M
23 Top 16 14 0.2 1.4 6-5 11 I L4 0.1 0.8 28 IT .11
24 Berfm 56 49 0.7 1.2 8.4 2 7-5 0.1 0.4 26 7 19
25 Ccutial Afrkan RqxMk 319 306 1-3. 0.4 61-1 13 9.9 0-1 0.0 25 5 20
26 Pakistm 26 19 0.8 2.9 36-5 53 4.6 153-4 3_7&d 053 2.0-r-
27 Gimm 109 .96 1-4 1-3 10.7 8 4.5 0.3 0.6 35 12 23
29 Chirm t'150 W7.7 43't 3-2 460-0 16.4 46-1 28 434
29 Tajddstan. 0.9 3 0.1 12.6 I3.V 2.376 119 2257
30 Goinm 76 67 0.9 Ll 1.6 3 0.7 0.7 0.3 140 14 126
31 mmuiudo 6 ... 6 0.0 0.0 17-5 4 1.7 0.7 9.9d 495 59 436
32 &j U2nkm 20 17 0-3 1-3 7.9 43 11.9 6-3 14-6 503 10 493
33 Zmb2bwc. 95 39 0.6 0.6 30.7 25 7-9 1-2 5-3 136 19 117
34 Hon&ws 57 46 1-1 2-0 5-4 38 4.8 1.5 Zld 279 11 268
3.5 Lewde 0.1 1 02 0-1 1.3 31 7 u
36 EgM Amb Rep- &O 13 0.9 56-4 97_ld I.M8 72 956
37 kdonesia 1.217 IJM 1-,;i 1.0 193A ISS 10.2 16.6 0.7 95 12 83
39 Mjnwnat- 329 299. 4-0 1-2 1.7 2 0-3. 4.0 0.4 101 7 94
39 Somaffa 9 3 0.0 0.4 1.8 I 0.3 0-9 7.0 99 3 96
40 Sudm 478 430 4-8 1-0 93.9 16 3.7 M6 14.3d 1.093 11 1,097
41 Yenem, Rtp- 0.0 0 0.0 3.4 136.0 r-4 16 308
42 ZambFa 359 323 3-6 1-0 63.6 20 &S 0.4 0.4 N 54 32
blikidle-incmeemnowks
lAwer-sulddlefocurne
43 Med'fvoirc 121 109 .1.2 1.0 19.9 12 6.2 0.7 1.0 66 15 5-P
Bolivia 5% 493 62 1-1 92-5 26 9.4 I 0.4 186 19 167
45 Ambarian 1.9 it 0.2. 15.8 56.5d Z215 89 2.126
46 Pbfli" 110 78 3.2 2.9 5.7 27 1.9 29.5 9.1 696 123 56-l'
47 Annenia 2.2 4 oi 3.8 45_gd 1.140 149 992
43 &Dcgal 81 75 0.5 0.6 21.8 9 11.1 1.4 3.9d 202 to 19-7
49 Cammlow 216 204 1.2 0.6 20-5 -14 43 0.4 0.2 38 17 21)
50 KyWz Rqmblic 2.0 5 0.1 11.7 24.0 7-6S 80 2-W
51 Geo%-m 1-9 15 03 4.0 6-Sd 733 154 579
52 Uzbekistan 2.4 10 0.1 76.4d 4.007 160 3.847
53 FhpuaNcwGmum 371 360 1.1 0.3 0-3 6 0.1 0.1 0.0 28 9 2D
54 PCZU 706 679 2.7 0.4 41.9 3.2 6.1 15.3 301 57 244
55 G021CM21a 50 42 0.9 1.6 9.3 17 7.6 0.7 0-6 139 13 127
56 coma 2M 199 0.3 02 11-9 10 -3.4 0.0 O.Od 3D 12 7
57 Norocco 32 3.6 10 0.8 10.9 36.2 412 23 390
58 Dorninimn Repubik 14 11 0.4 2.5 10.5 .18 21.5 3.0 14.9 442 22 420
59 ECU2dor 143 120 2.4 1 J IIIA 15 39-3 5-6 t.8 W7 40 .528
60 JoWaaf I 1.0 8 1-1 0.5 31.6d 173 50 123
61 Ronnii'm 639 639 -0.09 -0.09 10.9 40 4.6 19-7 9.4d 853 68 785
-GZ 8 Salvador 2 1 0.0 2-1 0.2 5 0-9 1.0 5.3 245 17 229-
63 Torkmmism 11.1 8 0.2 22.9 32.6d 6.216 62 6.M
64 MaWm 29.1d
0.0 0 0.0 33 M 59 799
65 Lidwania. 0.0 0 0.0 4.4 19.0d 1.179 83 1.097
66 Bwga& 369 379 4.19 -029 2.6 50 2.4 13.9 6.gd I -US 43 1.502
67 Cologubia 5n 541 3.7 0.6 93.9 79 9.2 5.3 0.5 174 71 103
69 Jamaka 5 2 0.3 5-3 0.0 I 0.1 0.3 3.9 159 II 148
69 PWaM 169 129 4.0 2.4 14.8 19 3.6 0.4 0.11 110 16 93
'70 NarniVa 130 126 OA 0-3 103.7 It 12.6 0-1 1.5 104 6 99
71 Kazakhstan 8.4 8 0.0 37.9 302d 2.264 91 2.173
72 Tunisia 3 0.4 6 0-3 73 57 gd 317 41 Z76
Not--Fordatacarnpambilitymidcovemgeser--thrKcyandtheuchnicalnow&Fsgm=iniudksamforyadwrthandwsesp:ciried.
226

Taunt
iFemifirnms Fwstr,srsuahmrd. MO 3 91
.flb
a Auaidejhms. 19*1- 04O Maim&allypinnufareur.159J AsS eem, PeroJMW (eat l
*NUSISq.6*1 Wwbmald sqge Thrmani As%Sf Tel %V Indunidand
190 1999 sq. L-r aw sq4m Mutber swain (atb.r reswre Twl Dmnrss qgidagrat
73 Ukfaine 905 923 -023 -0.33 4.6 17 0.1 34.7 40.011' 669 107 562
74 AIpria IS .. ..~~~~~~- -. 12-72 19 5.3 3.0 15.7d 160 35 12
iSThaland ~~~~~~..179 12.7 522.9 61.8 106 12.6 31L9 17.8d 606 24 552
76 Polaad 86 87 -0.13 -(U1t 22.4 s0 72 *14.5 25.8d 383 51 332-
77 Larva .- . .. 137 21 0.3 0.7 224 261 109 151
7lslovakRepublic -
79 'Costaic WW i1 - . 5 1.1 14 U 7i -. 3 4
so Turkey 2025 202' .O 0.9 2 18 0.3 23.8 l3 433 104 329
91In Ismi Rip -0.0 79.4 52 4 45.4 33.6 1.36 54 1.307
.82Panaun 38 3!1 0.6 L7 113 15 17.2 1.3 0.9 744 BY9 654
83 Czeh Republic - . . . . . - . . .
'84 R&st-n FC&eadntIU 210.3 75 12i 11 2.7':ji 787 13 653
85 Chile 7 6h. 137.2 65 18.1 16.8 3.6 1.623 97 1.526
56 Albaiwza 149 143 -0.05 -0.01 0.4 13 1.5 0.2 0.9'd 94 6 as
S7 Mauroa. 95h .... S.? is 1.9 0.6 2.2 273 30 243
55 SWriOKAIab Rrp. 2 . ...- 0.0 0 0.0 3.3 9.44 435 30 405
Upps'uuiddflehxuut
9South Africa .13h .. . iL 4. 235 6.1 14.7 29.3 386 46 340
90 lanzitiufs 6 6 0000 17.5 4 1.7 0.7 9.Vd495 59 436
91- Eazonia . ..... .3.6 37 0.8 3.3 21L1 2.085 104 1.930
92 Brazl 5.973 5.611 36.7c 0.6 . 7.4 214 3.3 36-5 05'd 245 54 191
93 BOsw1Mn 150 143 0.8 0.5 1023 9 17.6 0.1 0.5' 100 5 95
94 Malaysi .215 176 4.0 LB8 14.9 48 4.5 9.4.2.1 .768 177 592-
95Venezuda 517 457 6.0 1.2 775.3 104 30.2 4.!1 ." 8 166 220
96. Belant 60' 635 -0.35 -0.55 2.4 4 0.1 3.0 5S4 292- 94. 199
97 Hungan 163 17 -0.15 -053 5.3 54 6.2 6-4 5.5" 596 54 543
Yl Unguay 5h' - -. 0.3 S 0.2 037 0.5' 241 14 227
99 Meziw ~~~~ ~~~554 4863 6.8C .12 99.0 60 5.1 54.2 152 92-1 55 85
IOD Tuindmsmd Toahgo 2 *2 0.0 1.9 02 9 3.4 0.2 2.9 149 .30 108
10OlGabom 194 182 1.2 0.6 10.5 6 3.9 0.1 0.0 57 41 16
I0M AqSemnta 4 45w' . .. - 93.4 t00 3.4 .27.6 2.8' 1.042- 94 948
1030Oman .. .... 0-5 2 0.3 0.5 23.9 623 19 604
104 Skwveni . .. . . . . -. . .
105 Puem Rkco .-. 0.4 29 4O 0
106 Kenn- Rep. 49b . - . 7.6 26 7.6 277.6 4L-7 625 116 509
107 Gcct:t .603 c -0.03 -0.03 LU0 Is 0.8 7.0 11.' 721 5q 663
1083 Portugal 309 31it -0.159 -0.59 5.6 23 6.1 10.5 162' 1075 I! t 914
109 SzxudAzabia ' '2.0 9 9-9 3.6 163.8 497 M.4 3
La;&6aindedbame? -
* S.SubtAfka
&ShAsh4Z4'-A9 -- 3 . 6 06 0. -6 3 3 9
III Niewcatd Cen9t0ra0l da 1A
269 31
li hAutrali 1456 1456 -0.109 -1.3r 0144 63 10. 0.17 5.6 2356 349 1957
Ill nitedcalmadm .. 1 75 -0. ..-1 29.6 14 1 0.7 1.9 045 . 2585 269 231
l18IZtaly mg15 .. 2.-1 214 10.0 56U 36'd 410 139 344
113 Nepains 256 253 -0.05 -0.05 350 161 694 14-5 416" 1914 143 1.44
120iSCanada e 0 03 0.040.0 50.0 1 2.6 02. 313 684 304 46.
1216 Agusai 1463 1463 -0.05 -0.03 SILO 33 10.6 171 52d 917306 81965
112 Uit Kiingdo 2133 234 -0.23 -1.1 46.4 131 18.9 14.5 12.1 253 51 203
123tUditedAa ria 3t3 -. 0;-.3 0.5 67 9.4 14.5 299.ld 994 50 944
124 Fr-nce. 1415 1423 -0.15 -0.15 53.0 33 9.6 4337 23.6d T73 125 654
12 Austria 375 39 -0.15 -0.45 21.2 187 -25.3 2.1 2.3' 276 52 224
126 -Gnamany 1035 107' -0.5' -0.59 87.8 472 24.6 5337 31.4d 687 73 614
127 Unitd tae '-992 2-9609 3.25 0.15 984.6. 937 10.5 467.0 13.8 1.568 244 1.624
128 Noirway 963 . . . 16.1 51 5.0 2.0 0MY' 491 95 .393
129 Demnuik 55 5 -0.03 -0.25 LI1 6 9-5 1-2 9_4 228 68 160
130 Sweden -. 28CR ... 29.6 193 6.6 3.0 13"d 352 127 225
131 Iapat .2485 2475 0.0' 0.03 46.7 685 12.3 89.3 16.3 7327 125 607
I3 M_Switzerand 115 125 -0.15 -0.69 7.5 112 1812 LI .f22 5 168 39 129
a-Negauve values 'uparse an increae in ftost ama. b. Water witadrAwal data certo any yearfum 1970 so1992- e. Data IbrEtina,not yet diagmntd.t
included in Ethiopia. d. Toad water rescuEr include tvir flows fugo other countries in addition to bazenictnewable tenures e. See the fehlalmt or
akenuzive esdnazes. LExcept orwmaniSxIwalestimats,dataforicidan cyertheEastBDank only. g.IJucludcsotedrtwooded land. hi.Closcdfomstonly.
227

Table it. Basicmindicators for other economnies
PqanIuhm sirs WWiI~~~ A fjeqiuc Aih&UL S
fw*masj Choassi fiShes Afl aagnuv _____rg_eo __ hi DaDS) Ftmrak Trild
MIiI-199 4fsq. Am) "P) r M. 1939 9Z4J 1839 1981 52 19W)P m l
I EquatosiaGuinea 437 28.00 330 .. . . .48 63 50
2 Guyana 806 215.W0 330 -16 96 37.9 65 5 4
3 Sio Tantn nd Pdncipe 121 1.00 360 -310 4.0 23.0 63 . 33
4 Ganmbia, Tbe 989 11L00 370 -0.4 10.6 17.8 45 i34 73
5 Maldiwes 229 0.30 500 (La. . 620
6 Coma 510 2.00 510 -1.3. .. 5.6 56
7fSft anisamuH geia 21.538 652.00 b,. 43 i6i7
9 DniandHr.-losna 4.38 51.13 b 71
9CGmnbod&z 9.054 132.00 b ..... 5 t.
78- 65
10 blar c 117.W0 b ... .47
it flid 6.715 28.00 bU -2.4 9.3 7.6 55 .53 47
22 Liberia 2.371 98.00 b . 92 .;
13 Pe nms 69306 332.00 b ... .6
53 72
6
61
12
14 Zaire 39.737 .2345.00 b -1.3 31A . 52 39 23
.lSKlzlhs 75 LID 700 1.0.6 5.4 58
I6 SolomonlsMuds 335 29.00 710. 3.3 BA4 12.1 di
17 Cape Vest 339 4.00. 35 3.0 9.4 9.3 68 . -
13 Westernsamaa 162 3.010 940 .... 11.2 65...
19 Swaziland 853 17.00 11.090 2.6 12.3 ItS8 57.. .-
20 Vain 156 12.00 1,210 ... 5.3 63.. -
21lTonga 92- 1.00 1.480 ... -
22 St. ViacMn 2nd theGinadmincs 109 o.39 1.990 5.0 13.3 4.9 71
23 rt-i 750 13.00 2.010 0.3 12.3 5.6 . 72
24 Beire 199 23.00 2.22 2.6 8.6 3.1 69
25SGIRMOMIR 91 0.34 2.310 ... .71 -
26 Daominka 72 LW0 2.520 -4.6 16.8 5.7 72
'7 Angola 9,732 1.247.00 d
28 Creeds . 4.789 56.54 d.....73
... .46 72 53
29OCaba 10.32 lILT0 d ... .76 7.
301)jibmua 546 23.00 d -... 49
31 Irnq 194165 438.00 d .. 17.9. .. 64 5I 40
32 Kore. Den. Resp. .22.620 121.00 d ...
33 Lebuwmt 3.781 .10.00 .d --..-
.71
66 27 20
.34NMaedsioa, FYR 2.172 25.71 . d .. . . .72
35 Man*&l [slods so 0.13 d . ..
36 Miwroaneiae.Fa Set 103 0.70 d ..- .63
37 MrIIZEnMOIiJXskIndMs -47 0.48 d...... ..-
33 flogrIsta. Fed. Rep. 10.597 202.17 d . ..
39 SL Lucia 155 LIM 2.90=.. 70
40 SKttsCinaad Ncvis 42 0.36 3.990 5-7 .. 6-5 63
AI1Smimane
42 SeychUels
404
69
163.60
0.28
4.23)
5,46
-16
3.2
ILK8
16.9
9.0
3.3
69
71
. S
43 Antigua and Batbuda 66 0.44 5.980 5.0 .. 6.6 74 .. -
44 Bhabades 259 0.43 6.540 2.0 13.5 5.1 75
45. Amedcatn&mno 39 0.20 a ..
46 Aruba 67 0.19 a .. . . -
47 Bahnzbz 530 LOO0 e 3Ji 70 31 23
48 Frnchk Gdana 129 90.00 a . . .... . -
49 Gibraltar 32 0.02~ a ..
.SoGurdelanp 400 2.00 e .. .7
SltsGum 239 0.55- e .... 72
52IsleeofMan 71 0.57 .a...-
53 LiA5w 4.867 13760.00 .. .'. .63 50 36
54Marne 374 0.02 a . . ... 73
55 Mal's 360 0.32 a 3.3 4.2 2.2 76
56 Msaninie 366 1.00 c . .. .76.. -
57 Mayse 97 0.37 a .i
53 NedrheruzndAndlfrs 194 0.80 e~ 77
59 New Cakedonia 175 29.00 a .... 70
.6 RAanhna 611 3.00 a . . . 74
61 jypj= 71 9.00 9,820 511 . 5.4 . 77
62 Cahzma. The 262 14.00 12,070 1.0 645.9 . 72 -
63 Qatar 503 ItT0 16.750 -11.2 ... 721
64 Icland 261 103.00 23.88 1.5 35.1 27.7 73
65 Lzembonug 3927 3.00 35.160 3.3 6.9 4.1 76 -
66 Andorm 61 0.45 f ..
67 Bermuda 62 0.05 f
63 Eamen 273 6.00 F ...-
8. .4..-
74
69 Ckwmndlslnds 144 0.19 f . .. 77
70 Fasroee Ilads 48 0.40 F ... .
71 French Polymnea 207 4.00 1 .... 63
72 GCeenand 58 342.00 f
73maK4vir 1.410 23.00 f . 2 zt9. 75 33 27
74 SenMarbin 23 0.06 f .
75 -Flhgn Wsarnd (U.&J 99 0.34 f . 6.9 .. 75 .
a. See d'e wclucd nse forTable I. b. Estiniated as law-income (5675 or less.). a. Data forEdnas.nt yetd gmpxarit dmkdin Et iapia. d& Estinated
aslowcr-middl--incmc (676-S2.695). a. Estinwtdadsuppcr-middlc-inincnc 5269643.3155). E. Esdtiradas high-4ncome (53.356 armoi).
228

E000
*t Technical notes'
The main critenon for country classification is gross Base yers
national product (GNP) per capita. Vith the addition
of the recently independent republics of the for- To provide long-term trend analysis, facilitate intermer
Soviet Union, the main tables now include national comparisons, and include the effects of
country data for 132 economies, listed in ascending changes in intersectoral relative prices, constant
GNP per capita order A separate table (Table la) price data for most economies are partially rebased
shows basic indicators for 75 more economies with to tiree base years and linked together- The year
sparse data or with populations of fewver than 1 nil- 1970 is the base year for data from 1960 to 1975,1980
lion. Other changes are outlined in the Inhtroduction. for 1976 to 1982 and 1987 for 1983 and beyond.
These three periods are "chain-linked" to obtain
Data refiabil7ity
1987 prices throughout all three periods.
Chain-linking is accomplished for each of the
Considerable effort has been made to standardize three subperiods by rescaling; this moves the year in
the data, but full comparability cannot be ensured, which current and constant price versions of the
and care must be talen in interpreting the indica- same time series have the same value, without altertors
Mlany factors affect availability and reliability; ing the trend of either. Components of gross domesstatistical
systems in many developing economies tic product (GDP) are individually rescaled and
are still -weak, statistical methods, coverage, prac- summed to provide GDP and its subaggregates- In
tices, and definitions differ widely among countries; this process a resaling deviation may occur beand
cross-country and cross-time comparisons in- tween the constant price GDP by industrial origin
volve complex technical problems that cannot be and the constant price GDP by expediture Such
unequivocally resolved. For these reasons, although rescling deviations are absorbed under the heading
the data are drawn from the sources thought to be privte consmption, etaC on the assumption that GDP
most authoritative, they should be construed only by industrial ongin is a more reliable estimate than
as indicating trends and characterizing major differ- GDP by expenditure
ences among economies rather than offering precise Becaute private consumption is calculated as a
quantitative measures of those differences. In partic- residual, the national accounting identities are
ular, data issues have yet to be resolved for the fif- maintained. Rebasing does involve incorporating in
teen economies of the former Soviet Union. Cover- private consumption whateverstatistical dscrepanage
is sparse, and the data are subject to more than des arise for expenditure The value added in the
the normal range of uncertainty-
services sector also includes a statistical discrep-
Most social and demographic data from national ancy, as reported by the original source.
sources are drawn from regular administrative files,
although some come from special surveys or peri- Summary measures
odic census inquiries. In the case of survey and census
data, figures for intermediate years have to be The summary measures are calculated by simple
interpolated or otherwise estimated from the base addition when a variable is expressed in reasonably
reference statistics. Similarly, because not all data comparable units of account Economic indicators
are updated, some figures-especialy those relat- that do not seem naturally additive are usually coming
to current periods-may be extrapolated. Sev- bined by a price-weighting scheme The summary
eral estimates (for example, life expectancy) are de- measures for social indicators are weighted by poprived
from models based on assumptions about ulation.
recent trends and prevailing conditions. Ii;sues re- The World Development Indicators, unlike the
lated to the reliability of demographic indicators are World Tables, provide data for, usually, two reference
reviewed in United Nations, World Popuathon Treds points rather than annual time series. For summary
and Policies. Readers are urged to take these linita- measures that cover many years, the calculation is
tions into account in interpreting the indicators, based on the same countrv composition over time
particularly when making comparisons across and across topics. The World Development Indicaeconomies.
tors pernit group measures to be compiled only if
229

the country data available for a given year account since the latter tend to be collected less regularly and
for at least two-thiirds of the ful group, as defined change less dramaticaly over short periods of time.
by the 1987 benchmarks. As long as that criterion is All growth rates showtn are calculated from conmet,
noncurrent reporters (and those not providing stant price series and, unless otherwise noted, have
ample history) are, for years with missing data, as- been computed using thie least-squares method. The
suimed to behave prcs like the sample of the group that least-squares growt rate, r, is estimated by e, fitting and a
does.provide estimates.- Readers should keep in least-squares linear regression trnmd line to the logamind
that the purpose is to naintain an appropriate rithmnic annual values of the variable in the relevant
relationship across topics, despite myriad problems period. More specifically, the regression equation
with country.data, and that nothing meanintgful can takes the form log X, =a + bt ± e,, where this is
be deduced about behavior at the country level by equivalent to the logarithimic transformation of the
working back from group indicators. In addition, compound grwth rate equation, X, = X 0 (1 + rf - In
the weighting poesmay result in discrepancies these equations, X is the variable, t is timeana=
between sunmmed subgroup figures and overa to- log X, and b log (1+ r) am the parameters to be estals.
This is explained more full in the introduction imated; e is the error tern- If s* is the least-squares
to the World Tables.
estimate of bl then the average annual percmntage
growth rate, r. is obtained as [antilog (b*) -1 and is
Sou;rces and methods
multipled by 100 to express it as a percentgega
Data on extemral debt are compiled directly by the Table Basic indTicators
- World Banm k on the basis Of reports from iths developingg
member countries through the Debtor Report- For basic indicators for economies with sparse data
ing System (DRS). Other data are drawn mainly or with popaulations of fewer than I millon, see
from the United Nations (Uoic) and its specialized Table la
agencies, the International Monetary Fund (Mn, Populathon numbeXs for mid-1992 are World Baik
and country reports to the World Bank. Bank staff estimates. These are usuall projecftions from the
estmates axe also used to improve currentness or most recent population censuses or surveys; most
cons stency Fir most countries, national accounts are from 1980-92 and, for. a few countries, from the
esimates are obtained -from membier goverunents 1960s or 1970s. Note that refugtees not permntly
through World Bank economicmissions. In some in- settled in the country of asylum are generaly constances
these are adjusted by Bank staff to ensure sidered to be part of the population of their country
conformity with international definitions and con- of origin.
cepts, consistency, and currentness.
The data on arie are from the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAQ). Area is the tota surface
Growih atmes
area, measured in square kilometers, comprisg
land area and inland waters.
For ease of reference, only ratiosand rates of growth GNP per capita figures in US. dolars are calcuare
usually shown; absolute values are generally lated accordin to the World Banrk Atlas method,
avafilable fnm other World Bank publications, no- which is descrbed belowl
tably the 1994 edition of the World Tables. Most GNP per capita does not, by itseef, constitute or
growth rates are calculated for two periods, 1970-80 measure welftre or success in development It does
and 1980-92, and are computed, unless otherwise not distinguish between the aims and ultimate uses
noted, by usig the least-squares regression method of a given product, nor does it say whether it merely
Because this method takes nto account all observa- offsets some natural or other obstacle, or harms or
tions in a period, the resulting gowth rates reflect contributes to welfart For example, GNP is higher
genemrl tmreds that are not unduly influenced by ex- in colder countries, where people spend money on
ceptional values, particularly at the.end points. To heating and warm cothing, than in balmy climates,
excude the effects of inflation, constant price eco- where people are comfortable wearing light dcothnomic
indicators are used in calculating growth kg in the open air
rates. Details of this methodology are given at the More generally, GNF does not deal adequatelv
beginning of the technical notesi Data in italics are with environmental issues, particularIy natural refor
years or periods other than those speified-up source use- The Wi rld Bank has joned wiBk th others
to two years earlier for economic indicators and up to see how national accounts mightprovide insights
to three years on either side for social indicators, into these issues. FSatellite' accounts that delve into
230

practical and conceptual difficulties (such'as assg- its exchange rates for the two preceding years, after
bing a meaningflzl econormic value to resources that adjusting them for differences in. relative inflation
mlarkets do not yet perceive as "sam and aflocat- between the country and the United States. This
ing costs that are essentially global within a frame- three-year average smoothis fluctuations in prices
work that is inherently national) have been incuded and exchange rates for each country. The resulting
in the 1993 revision of the U.NL's Systemt of National GNP in US. dollars is divided by the midyear POP-
Accounjts (SNA). This will provide a firamework for ulation for the latest of the three year to derive
national accountants to consider environumental fac- GNP per capita.
tors in estimating alternative measures of income. Some fifty low- and middle-income econormies
GM' measures -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ the total domestic and foreign suffered declining real GNP per e: capita. in constant
value added claimned by residents- It comprises GDP prices during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In ad-
(defined in the note for Table 2) plus net factor in- tion, significant currency and terms of trade fluctuacome
from abroad, which is the income residents re- tions have affected relative income levels. For this
ceive from abroad for factor services (labor and cap- reason the levels and ranking of GNP per capita esital)
less similar payments made to- nonresidents timates, calculated by the Atlas method, have somewho
contributed to the domestic economy.
times changed in ways not necessarily related to the
In estimating GNP per capita, the Bank recog- relative domestic growth performiance of the
nizes -that perfect cross-country comparability of economiues.
GPper capita estimates cannot be achieved. Be- The followi-ng formulas describe the procedures
yond the classic, strictly intractable index number for computing the conversion factor-for year t.
problem, two obstaces stand in the way of adequate
comparability One concerns the GNP and popula- (.i? ( S
tion estimates themselves-, mhere are differences in +4i/-j +4
national accounting and demographic reporting systems
and in thecoverage and relabilty of underlyl - and for calculating per capita GNP in US. dolars
ing statistical informationaamong various countries, for year ta
The other obstacle relates to the use of official exchange
rates for converting GNP data, expressed in J (Y,EN,)te'
-Y
difffeent national currencies, to a common denonuination-conventionally
the Uw S dollar-to corm- where
pare them across countries
Yo = current GNP (local currency) for year t
Recognizing that these shortcomiongs affect the P, = GNP deflator for year t
comparabiity of the GP per capita estimates, the e, average annual exchange rate aol cunrency
World Bank has imtroduced several improvesments
to the US. doLlar) for year t
i the estinmtion procedures. Through its regular re- ti= midyear population for year a
view of member countrieh s national accounts, the
=i US- GNP deflator for year t
Bank systemratically evaluates the GNP estimates,
focusing on the coverage and concepts employed, Because of problems associated with the availand,
where apprpriate, makng ad ei- justments to ability of c arable data and the deermirnation of
prove comparability. As part of the review, Bank conversion factors, information on GM' per capita
staff estimates of GNP (and sometimes of popula- is not shown for some economies.
tion) may be developed for the most recent period. The use of official exchange rates to convert ma-
The World Bank also systemtically assesses the tional currency figures to US. dolars does not reappropriateness
of official exchange rates as conver- fled the relative domestic purchasing powers of
sion factors. An alternative conversion factor is used currences. The U. N. Interational Comparison Pro-.
(and reported in the World Tables) when the official granmne (ICP) has developed measures of real GD?
exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exception- on an interationally comparable scale, using puralye
large margin from the rate effectively applied to chasing power of cunrencies (PPPs) instead of exforeign
transactions. This applies to only a smal change rates as conversion factors- Table 30 shows
number of countries. For al other countries the the most recent PPP-based ON? per capita esti-
Bank calculates GNcP per capita using the World mates. Information on the ICP has been published
Bank Atlas method.
in four studies and in a number of other reports. The
The Atlas conversion factor for any year is the av- most recent study is Phase VI, for 1990, a part of
erage of a country's exchange rate for that year and which has al een p
231

.;~~3
Lion for Economic Cooperation and Development stiU be using the recommendations of Revision 3 for
(OECD).
the next few years. Estimates are obtained from na-
The ICP figures reported in Table 30 are prelimi- tional sources, sometimes reaching the World Bank
nary and may be revised. The United Nations and -thrugh other international agencies but more often
its regional economic comnuissions, as well as other collected during World Bank staff missions.
international agencies, such as the European Com- World Bank staff review the quality of national
mission (EC), the OECD, and the World Bank, are accounts data and in some instances, through misworking
to improve the methodology and to extend sion work or technical assistance, help adjust naannual
purrhasing power comparisons to all coun- tional series. Because of the sometimes linited
tries. However, exchange rates remain the only gen- capabilities of statistical offices and basic data prob
erally available means of converting CGNP from na- lems, strict international comparability cannot be
tional currencies to US. dollars.
achieved, especially in economic activities that are
Avenige annul rnte of inflation is measured by the difficult to measure, such as parallel market transacgrowth
rate of the GDP implicit deflator for each of tions, the informal sector, or subsistence agriculhtre
the periods showrL The CDP deflator is first calcu- GDP measures the total output of goods and serlated
by dividing, for each year of the period, the vices for final use produced by residents and nonvalue
of GDP at current values by the value of GDP residents, regardless of the allocation to domestic
at constant values, both in national currncy. The and foreign claims. It is calculated without maling
least-squares method is then used to calculate the deductions for'depredation of "manmade" assets or
growth rate of the GDP deflator for the periodL This depletion and degadation of natural resources. Almeasure
of inflation, like any other, has limitations. though the SNA envisages estimates of GDP by in-
For some purposes, however, it is used as an indica- dustrial origin to be at producer prices, many countor
of inflation because it is the most broadly based tries stil report such details at factor cost
measure, showing annual price movements for all International comparability of the estimates is afgoods
and services produced in an economy.
fected by differing country practices in valuation
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of systems for reporting value added by production
years a newborn infant would live if prevailing pat- sectors. As a partial solution, GDP estimates are
tens of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay shown at purchaser values if the components are on
the same throughout its life Figures are World Bank this basis, and such instances are footnoted Howesnmates
based on data from the U.N. Population ever, for a few countriesin Tables 2 and 3, GDP at
Division, the U.N. Statistical Office, and national purchaser values has been replaced by GDP at facstatistical
offices.
tor cost.
Adult illiteracy is defined here as the proportion The figures for GDP are U.S. dollar values conof
the population over the age of fifteen who cannot, verted from domestic currencies using single-year
with understanding, read and write a short;, simple official exchange rates. For a few countries where
statement on their everyday life- This is only one of the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate efthree
widely accepted definitions, and its applica- fectively applied to actual foreign exchange ransaction
is subject to qualifiers in a number of countries. tions, an alternative conversion factor is used (and
The data are from the illiteracy estimates and projec- reported in the World Tables). Note that this table
tions prepared in 1989 by the UN. Educational, Sci- does not use the tree-year averaging technique apentific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). plied to GN- per capita in Table 1.
The summary measures for GNP per capita, life Agriculettnr covers forestry, hunting, and fishing
expectancy, and adult illiteracy in this table are as well as agriculture In developing countries with
weighted by population. Those for average annual high levels of subsistence farming, much agriculrates
of inflation are weighted by the 1987 share of tural production is either not exchanged or not excountry
GDP valued in current US. dollars
changed for money. This increases the difficulty of
measuring the contribution of agriculture to GDP
Tables 2 and 3. Growth and structure of
and reduces the reliability and comparability of
production
such numbers.
Indistry comprises value added in mining; manu-
Most of the definitions used are those of the U.NJ's facturng (also reported as a separate subgroup);
A System of National.Accounts (SNA), Series F, No.2, construction; and electricity, water, and gas. Value
Revision 3. Revision 4 of the SNA wtas completed. added in all other branches of economic activity, inonly
in 1993, and itis liely that many countnes will duding imputed bank service charges, import du-

ties, and any statistical discrepancies notd by na- areas are counted once), temporary meadows for
tional compilers, are categorized as sernices, etc. mowing or for pasture, land under market or
Partially rebased, chain-linked 19857 benes in do- kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow or
mestic currencies, as explained at the beginning of lying idle. The time reference for fertilizer consumpthe
technical notes, are used to compute the growth lion is the crop year, July to June.
rates in Table 2. The sectoral shares of GDP in Table Average growtlh rate of food prTducUon per capita
3 are based on current pnce series. has been computed from the index of food pmduc-
In calculating the summary measures for each in- tion per capita. The index relates to the average andicator
in Table 2, partially rebased constant 1987 nual growth rate of food produced per capita in
US. dollar values for each economy are calculated 1979-92 in relation to the average produced annufor
each year of the periods covered; the values are ally in 1979-81 (1979481 = 100). The estimates are
aggregated across countres for each year; and the derived by dividing the quantity of food production
least-squares procedure is used to compute the by the total population. For the index, food is degrowth
rates. -The average sectoral percentage fined as comprsing nuts, pulses, fruits, cereals, vegshares
in Table 3 are computed from group aggre- etables, sugar cane, sugar beet, starchy roots, edible
gates of sectoral GDP in current US. dollars.
oils, livestock, and livestock products Quantities of
food production are measured net of annual feed,
Table 4 Agriculture and food
seeds for use in agriculture, and food lost in processing
and distribution.
The basic data for value added in agriculture are from Fishz products are measured by the level of daily
theWorld Bank's national accounts series at current protein supply derived from the consumption of
prices in national currences. Value added in current fish in relation to total daily protein supply from all
prices in national currencies is converted to US. food. This estmate indirecdy highlights the relative
dollars by applying the single-year conversion pro- importance or weight of fish in total agriculture, escedure,
as descnbed in the technical note for Tables pecially since fish is not included in the index of
2 and 3- food production.
The figures for the remainder of this table are The summary measures for fertilizer consumpfrom
the FAO. Cereal buports are measured in grain tion are weighted by total arable land area; the sumequivalents
and defined as comprisMg all cereals in mary measures for food production are weighted by
the Standard Internationtal Trade Classufifcation (SITC), population.
Revision 2, Groups 041-046. Food aid in cereals covers
wheat and flour, bulgnr, rice, coarse grains, and the Table 5. Commercial energy
cereal component of blended foods. The figures are
not directly comparable because of reporting and The data on energy production and consumption
timing differences. Cereal imports are based on cal- are primarily from International Energy Agency
endar-year data reported by recipient countnes, and (EA) and U.N. sources. They refer to commercial
food aid in cereals is based on data for crop years re- forms of primary energy-petroleum (crude oil,
ported by donors and international organizations, nahtual gas liquids, and oil from nornconventional
including the International Wheat Council and the sources), natural gas, solid fuels (coal, lignite, and
World Food Programme. Furthermore, food aid in- other derived fuels), and primary electricity (nuformation
from donors may not correspond to ac- dear, hydroelectric, geothermaL and otherf)-all
tual receipts by beneficiaries during a given period converted into oil equivalents- For converting nubecause
of delays in transportation and recording or dear electricty into oil equivalents, a notional therbecause
aid is sometimes not reported to the FAO or mal efficiency of 33 percent is assumed; hydroelecother
relevant international organizations. Food aid tric power is represented at 100 percent efficiency
imports may also not show up in customs records. Energy consumption refers to domestic pnrmary
The time reference for food aid is the crop year, July energy supply before transformation to other endto
June.
use fuels (such as electricity and refined petroleum
Fertilizer consumption measures the plant nutri- product) and is calculated as indigenous production
ents used in relation to amble land. Fertilizer prod- plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and
ucts cover nitrogenous, potash, and phosphate fer- international marine bunkers. Energy consumption
tlizers (which indude ground rock phosphate). also includes products for nonenergy uses, mainly
Arable land is defined as land under permanent derived from petroleum. The use of firewood, dried
crops and under temporary crops (double-copped animal excrement, and other traditional fuels, al-
233

t-iough substantial in; some developing countries, is other industries (Major Group 390). When data for
not taken into acccunt because reliable and compree- textiles,.madtinery, or chemicals are shown as not
hensive data are not available.
available, they are also included in oilier.
Energy use is expressed as kilogram oil equiva- Summary measures given for value-added in
lent per capita. The outpnit indicator is the US. dol- manufacturing are totals calculated by the aggega-
-lar estimate of GDP produced per kilogram of oil tion method- noted at the beginning of the technical
equivalent.
notes.
Energy imports refer to the dollar value of energy
imports-Section 3 in the SITC, Revision 1-and Table 7. Manufacturing earnings and output
are expressed as a percentage of earnings from mer- '
chandise exports. Because data on energy imports Four indicators are shown: two relate to real earndo
not permit a distinction between petroleum im- ings per employee, one to labor's share in -total
ports for fuel and those for use in the petrochemi- value added generated, and one to labor productivcals
industry, these percentages may overestimate ity. in the manufacturing sector. The indicators are
dependence on imported energy.
based on data from UNIDO; the deflators are from
The summary measures of energy production other sources, as explained below.
and consumption are computed by'aggregating the Earnings per employee are in constant prices and
respective volumes for each of the years covered by are derived by deflating nominal eamings per emthe
periods and applying the least-squares growth ployee by the country's consumer price index (CPI).
rate procedure. For energy consumption per capita, The CPI is from the :IMFs Iiternational Financial
population-weights are.used to compute summary Statistics.
measures for the specified years.
Total eaniings as a percentage of value added are de-
The sunmary measures of energy imports as a rived by dividing total earnings of employees by
percen-tage of merchandise exports are computed value added in current prices to show labor's share
from group aggregates for energy imports and mer- in income generated in the manufacturing sector.
dhandise exports in current dollars.
Gross outputt per employee is in constant prices and is
presented as an index of overall labor productivity
Table 6. Structure of manufacturing
in manufacturing, with 1980 as the base year. To derive
this indicator, UNIDO data on gross output per
The basic data for value added in manufacturing are employee in current prices are adjusted using imfrom
the World Bank's national accounts series at plicit deflators for value added in' manufacturing or
current prices in national currencies. Value added in in industry, taken from the World Bank's national
current prices in national currencies is converted to accounts data files.
U.S. dollars by applying the single-year conversion To improve cross-country comparability, UNIDO
procedure, as described in the technical note for Ta- has, where possible, standardized the coverage
bles 2 and 3.
of establishments to those with five or more
The data for distributiont of manufacturing value employees.
dded among industries are provided by the United The concepts and definitions are in accordance
Nations Industrial Development Organization with the International Recomenwdations for Iiiditstrial
(UNIDO), and distribution calculations are from na- Statistics, published by the United Nations. Earntional
currencies in current prices.
ings (wages and salaries) cover all remuneration to
The classification of manufacturing industries is employees paid by the employer during the year.
in accordance with the UN. International Standard The payments include (a) all regular and overtime
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activitis cash payments and bonuses and cost of living al-
(ISIC), Revision Z Food, beverages, and tobacco com- lowances; (b) wages and salaries paid during vacaprise
ISIC Division 31; texties and clothing, Division tion and- sick leave; (c) taxes and social insurance
32Z mackinery and transport equipment, Major Grou contributions and the like, payable by the employ-
382-84; and chmnicals, Major Groups 351 and 352. ees and deducted by the employer; and (d) pay-
Othier comprises wood and related products (Divi- ments in kind.
sion 33), paper and related products (Division 34), The termn "employees" in this table combines two
petroleum and related products (Major Groups categories defined by the United Nations: regular
353-56), basic metals.and mineral products (Divi- employees and persons engaged. Together these
sions 36 and 37), fabricated metal products and pro- groups. comprise regular employees, worldng professional
goods (Major Groups 381 and 385), and prietors, active bisiness partners, and unpaid fam-
234

ily workers, they exdude homeworkers. The data ment income, interest, and labor income, is exrefer
to the average number of employees working duded. Current transfers are also excluded.
during the year .
The nsoterce balaitce is the difference between ex-
'Value added" is defined as the current value of ports of goods and nonfactor services and imports
gross output less the current cost of (a) materials, of goods and nonfactor services.
fuels, and other supplies consumed; (b) contract and Partially rebased 1987 series in constant domestic
commission work done by others; (c) repair and currency units are used to compute the indicators in
maintenance worlk done by others; and (d) goods Table 8. Distribution of GDP in Table 9 is calculated
shipped in the same condition as received.
from national accounts series in current domestic
The value of gross output is estimated on the currency units.
basis of either production or shipments. On the pro- The summary measures are calculated by the
duction basis it consists. of (a) the value of all prod- method explained in the note for Tables 2 and 3.
ucts of the establishment (b) the value of industrial
services rendered to others; (c) the value of goods Table 10. Central government expenditure
shipped in the same condition as received; (d) the
value of electricity sold; and (e) the net change in The data on central government finance in Tables 10
the value of work-in-progress betwveen the begin- and 11 are from the IMF, Govenament Finance Stallsning
and the end of the reference perod. In the case tics Yearbook (1993), and IMF data files. The accounts
of estimates compiled on a shipment-basis, the net of each country are reported using the system of
change between the begnning and the end of the common definitions and classifications found m
reference period in the value of stocks of finished IMF, A Muanl on Government Finance Statistics
goods is also indluded. (1986).
For complete and authoritative explanations of
Tables 8 and 9. Growth of consumption and
concepts, definitions, and data sources, see these
investnent;structure of demand
.IMF sources. The commentary that follows is intended
mainly to place these data in the context of
GDP is defined in the note for Tables 2 and 3, but the broad range of indicators reported in this edition.
here its in purchaser values.
The shares of total expendituire and current rev-
Generul governmnt consumption includes all cur- enue by category are cakulated from series in narent
expenditure for purchases of goods and ser- tional currencies Because of differences in coverage
vices by all levels of government Capital expendi- of available data, the individual components of centure
on national defense and securty is regaided as tal government expenditure and current revenue
conysumption expenditure'-
shown in these tables may not be strictly compara-
Private constwnptioni, etc. is the market value of all ble across all economies.
goods and services, including durable products Moreover, inadequate statistical coverage 6f
(such as cars, washing machines, and home com- state, provincial, and local govermments dictates the
-puters) purhased or received as income in kind by use of central government data; this may seriously
households and nonprofit institutions. It exdudes understate or distort the statistical portrayal of the
purchases of dwellings but includes imputed rent allocation of resources for various purposes, espe-
-for owner-occupied dwellings. In practice, it in- cially in countries where lower levels of govemdludes
any statistical discrepancy in the use of re- ment have considerable autonomy and are responsources.
At constant prices, it also indudes the sible for many economic and social services. In
rescaling deviation from partial rebasin& which is addition, "central government" can mean either of
-explained-at the beginning of the technical notes. two accounting concepts: consolidated or bud-
Gross domestic invetment consists of outlays on getary. For most countries, central government fiadditions
to the fixed assets of the economy plus net nance data have been. consolidated into one overall
-changes in the ievel of inventories.
account, but for others only the budgetary central
Gross donestic savings are calculated by deducting government accounts are available. Since budgetary
total consumption from GDP.
accounts do not always include all centrl govern-
Export of goods and wonfactor services represent the ment units, the overall picture of central govemvalue
of all goods and nonfactor services provided ment activities is usually incomplete. Countries reto
the rest of the world, they include merchandise, porting budgetary data are footnoted-
.feight, insurance, travel, and other nonfactor ser- Consequently, the data presented, especially
vices. The value of factor services, such as invest- those for education and health, are not comparable
235

aacoss countries. i many economies, prvate health dress of regional imbalances; and creation of emand
education services are substantial; in others, ployment opportunities. Research, trade promotion,
public services represent the major component of geological surveys, and inspection and regulation of
totaL expenditure but may be financed by lower lev- particular industry groups are among the activities
els of government. Caution should therefore be ex- included.
ercsed in using the data for cross-country compar-, Othzer covers general public services, interest payisons.
Centml govermnent expenditure comprises ments, and items not included elsewhere; for a few
the expenditure by all govenunent offices, depart- economies it also indudes amounts that could not
ments, establislunents, and other bodies that are be. allocated to other components (or adjustments
agencies or instruments of tlhe central authority of a from accrual to cash accounts).
country It indudes both current and capital (devel- Total erpendithre is more narrowly defined than
opment) expenditurtthe measure of generl govement consumption
De: Lrse comprises all expenditure, whether by given in Tables 8 and 9 because it excludes condefense
or other departments, on the maintenance sumption expenditure by state and local governof
military forces, including the purchase of military ments. At the same time, central government expensupplies
and equipment, construction, recruiting, diture is more broadly defined because it includes
and training. Also in this category are closely re- government's gross domestic investment and traislated
items such as military aid programs. Defense fer payments...
does not include expenditure on public order and Overall surplusdeicit is defined. as current and
safety, which are classified separately.
capital revenue and official grants received, less
Edutcation comprises expenditure on the provi- total expenditure and lending minus repayments.
sion, management, inspection, and support of
prepinary, primary, and secondary schools; of uni- Table 1. Central government current revenue
versities and colleges; and of vocational,, technical,
and other tamining instititions. Also included is ex- Information on data sources and comparability and
pendituxe on the general administration and regula- the definition of central government is given in the
tion of the education system; on research into its ob- first four paragraphs- of the note for Table 10. Curjectives,
organization, administration, and methods; rent revenue by source is expressed as a percentage
and on such subsidiary services as trnsport, school of total cunret revenue, which is the sum of tax revmeals,
and school medical and dental services. enue and nontax revenue and is calculated from na-
Health covers public expenditure on hospitals, tional currencies.
maternity and dental centers, and clinics with a Tax revenue comprises compulsory, unrequited,
major medical component; on national health and nonrepayable receipts for public purposes. It inmedical
insurance schemes; and on family plannig dludes interest collected on tax arrears and penalties
and preventive care.
collected on nonpayment or late payment of taxes
Housing, amenities, social security, and welire cover and is shown net of refunds and other corrective
expenditure on housing (excluding interest subsi- transactions. Taxes on income, profit, and capital gain.
dies, which are usually classified with other) such as are taxes levied on the actual or presumptive net inincome-related
schemes; on provision and support come of individuals, on the profits of enterprises,
of housing and slum-dearance activities; on com- and on capital gains, whether realized on land sales,
X- muniily development; and on sanitation services securities, or other assets. Intragovemmental pay-
These categories also cover compensation for loss of ments are eliminated in consolidation. Social security
income to the sick and temporarily disabled; pay- contibutions include employers' and employees'
ments to the elderly, the permanently disabled, and social security contributions as well as those of selfthe
unemployed; family, maternity, and child .al- employed and unemployed persons. Taxes on goods
lowances; and the cost of welfare services, such as a.nd services cover all domestic taxes including gencare
of the aged, the disabled, and children. Many. eral sales and turnover or value added taxes, selecexpenditures
relevant to environmental defense, tive excises on goods, selective taxes on services,
such as pollution abatement, water supply, sanitary taxes on the use of goods or property, and profits of
affairs, and refuse collection, are induded indistin- fisc monopolies. Taxes oit international trade and
- guishably in this category. transactions include import duties, export duties,
Ed withc sete ces compnse expenditure associ- profits of export or import monopolies, exchange
ated with the regulation, support, and more efficient profits, and exchange taxes Other taxes indude emoperation
of business; economic development re- ployers' payroll or labor taxes, taxes on property,
;ZE C -0-
236

and bxes not allocable to other categories. They tics on merchandise trade are based on countres'
may include negative values that are adjustments, customs returns.
for instance, for taxes collected on behalf of state Merchandise exports and imports, with some exand
local governments and not allocable to individ- ceptions, cover international movements of goods
ual tax categories.
across customs borders; trade in services is not hi-
Nonta revenue comprises receipts that are not a cluded. Exports are valued fob. (free on board) and
compulsory nonrepayable payment for public pur- inports cif. (cost, insurance, and freight) unless
poses, such as fines, adminsitrative fees, or entre- otherwise spedfied in the foregoing sources. These
preneurial income from government ownership of values are in current U. S. dollars.
pmperty. Proceeds, of grants and borrowing fmds The growth rates of merchandise exports and imarising
from the repayment of previous lending by ports are based on constant price data, which are
governrments, incurrence of liabilities, and proceeds obtained from export or import value data as defrom
the sale of capital assets are not included. flated by the corresponding price index. The World
Bank uses its own price indexes, which are based on
Table 12. Money and interest rates international prices for priary commodities and
unit value indexes for manufactures. These price in-
The data on bradry defined money are based on the dexes are country-specific and dsaggregated by
IMFs International Financial Stfatistic (IS). Broadly broad commodity groups. This ensures consistency
defined money comprises most liabilities of a coun- between data for a group of countries and those for
ry's monetary institutions to residents other than individual countries. Such consistency will increase
the central govenmnent For most counties, broadly as the Wlorld Bank continues to improve its trade
defined money is the sum of money (S line 34) price indexes for an increasing number of countries.
and quasi money (IFS line 35). Money comprises the These growth rates can differ from those derived
economy's means. of payment currency outside irom national piactices because national pnrce inbanks
and demand deposits. Quasi money coom- dexes may use different base years and weighting
prises time and savings deposits and similar bank procedures from those used by the World Bank.
accounts that the issuer can exchange for money The terms of trde, or the net barter terms of trade,
with little if any delay or penalty. Where nonmone- measure the relative movement of export pnces
tary financial institutions are important issuers of against that of import prices. Calculated as the ratio
quasi-monetary liabilities, these are often included of a country's index of average export prices to its
in the measure of broadly defined money
average import price mdex, this mdicator shows
The growth rates for broadly defined money axe changes over a base year in the level of export prices
. calculated from year-end figures, while the average as a percentage of import prices. The terms of trade
* of the year-end figures for the specified year and the index numbers are shown for 1985 and 1992, where:
previous year is used for the ratio of broadly de- 1987 = 100. The price indexes are from the source
* : fined money to GDP. cited above for the growth rates of exports and
-The nominal izterest rates of banks, also from IFS, imports.
-.. represent the rates paid by commercial or similar The summary measures for the growth rates are
banks to holders of their quasi-monetary liabilities calculated by aggregating the 1987 constant US.
(deposit rate) and charged by the banks on loans to doDar price series for each year and then applying
prime customers (lending rate). TIhe data are, how- the.least-squares growth rate procedure for the periever,
of limited international comparability partly ods shown.
because coverage and definitions vary.
S-ince interest rates (and growth rates for broadly Tables 14 arid 15. Structure of merchandise
defined money) are expressed in nominal terms, imports and exports
-: much of the variation among countries stems from
dfferences in inflation. For easy reerenc, the Table The. shares in these tables are derived from trade
* indicator of recentinflationisrepeated in this table. values in current dollars reported in the U.N. trade
data systern, supplemented by World Bank esti-
Table 13. Growth of merchandise trade
mates.
Mlerchandise exports and imports are defined in
*The main data source for current trade values is the the technical note for Table 13
U.N. Commodity Trade (COMTRADE) data file, The categorization of exports and imports folsupplemented
by World Bank estimates. The statis- lows the Standard I!ernationial Trade Classification
237

(SITC), Series M, No. 34, Revision 1. For some coun- Revision 1 SlTC for 1970 and Revision 2 SITC for
tries, data for certain commodity categories are un- 1992.
available and the full breakdown cannot be shown. Manufactured imports of the predominant mar-
In Table 14, food commodities are those in SErC kets from individual economies are the best avail-
Sections 0, 1, and 4 and Division 22 (food and live able proxy of the magnitude and composition of the
animals, beverages and tobacco, aninal and veg- manufactured exports of developing economies to
etable oils and fats, oiLseeds, oil nuts and oil ker- all destinations taken together.
nels). Fuels are the commodities in SETC Section 3 Manufactured goods are the commodities in the
(mineral fuels, and lubricants and related materi- SETC, Revision 1, Sections 5 through 9 (chemical and
als). Otlier prhnary commrtodities comprise SEIC Sec- related products, basic manufactures, manufactured
tion 2 (inedible crude materials, except fuels), less artides, machinery and transport equipment, and
Division 22 (oilseeds, oilnuts, and oil kernels). and other manufactured articles and goods not else-
Division 68 (nonferrous metals). Machurdriy and wlhere classified), exduding Division 68 (nonferrous
t-s port equipnt et are the commodities in SITC Sec- metals) This definition is somewhat broader than
tion 7. Other manurjfchures, calculated residually the one used to define exporters ofmanufactures.
from the total value of manufactured imports, rep- The major manufactured product groups reresent
SETC Sections 5 through 9, less Section 7 and ported are defined as follows: textiles and clothing
Division 68.
(SrIC Sections 65 and 84), chmnicals (SETC Section S),
In Table 15,frels, ninerals, and mnetals are the com- deectric macriitiery and elctronics (SITC Section 72),
modities in SETC Section 3 (mineral fuels, and lubri- trtnsport equipmeint (SlTC Section 73), and other, decants
and related materials), Divisions 27 and 28 fined as the residuaL SEC Revision 1 data are used
Icrude fertilizers and crude minerals, excluding for the year 1970, whereas the equivalent data in RecoaL
petroleum and precious stones, and metallifer- vision 2 are used for the year 1992.
ous ores and metal scrap), and Division 68 (nonferrous
metals). Ott.:er prinary commodities comprise Table 17. Balance of payments and reserves
SITC Sections 0, 1, 2, and 4 (food and live animals,
beverages and tobacco, inedible crude materials, ex- The statistics for this table are mostly as reported by
cept fuels, and animal and vegetable oils and fats), the IMF but do include recent estimates by World
less Divisions 27 and 28. Machinery and tmasport Bank staff and, in rae instances, the Bai's own 0
equipment are the comnnodities in SITC Section 7. coverage or classification adjustments to enhance
Other manufactures represent SETC Sections 5 intemational comparabElity Values in this table are
ffirough 9, less Section 7 and Division 68. Textiles in US. dollars converted at current exchange rates.
and clotiing, representing SETC Divisions 65 and 84 - The current accunt balance after officia tmrnsfers is
(textiles, yarns, fabrics, made-up articles, and re the difference between (a) exports of goods and serlated
products and clothing),. are a subgroup of vices (factor and nonfactor), as well as inflows of
other manufactures. - unrequited tansfers (private and offical) and (b)
The summary measures in Table 14 are weighted imports of goods and services, as well as all unreby
total maraindise imports of individual coun- quited transfers to the rest of the world.
tries in current US. dollars and those in Table 15 by The current account balamce bere official tsf is
total merchandise exports of individual countries in the mcurent account balance that treats net official
curnent US. dollars (See the techical note for Table unreuited transfers as akin to official capital move-
13.) nments. The difference between the two balance of
payments measures is essentially foreign aid in the
Table 16. OECD imports of manufactured goods form of grnts, technical assistance, and food aid,
which, for most developing countries, tends to
The data are from the United Nations and were re make current account defidts smaller than the fi-
. - - ported by high-income OECD economies-the nancing requirement
OECD members excluding Greece, Portugal, and Net morkers' remittances cover payments and re-
Turkey..
ceipts of income by migrants who are employed or
The table reports the -alue of fmports of nmanufac- expect to be employed for more than a year in their
tures of high-income OECD countries by the econ- new economy, where they are considered residents.
:omy of orgin and the Compostion of such imports These remittances are classified as private unreby
major manufactured product groups. These data quited transfers and are included in the balance of
are based on the U-N. COMIRADE database- payments current account balance, whereas those:
235

derived from shorter-term stays are induded in ser- bursements to multilateral institutions are now revices
as labc income. The distincion accords with ported for all DAC members on the basis of the date
internationally agreed guidelines, but many devel- of issue of notes; some DAC members previously
oping countries dassify workers' remittances as a reported on the basis of the date of encashment..
factor income receipt (hence, a component of GNP). The nominal values shown in the sumunary for
The World Bank adheres to intemrational guidelines ODA from high-income OECD countries were conin
defining GNP and therefore may differ from na- verted at 1987 prices using the dollar GDP deflator.
tional practices.
This deflator is based on price increases in OECD
Gross international rnsexrvs comprise holdings of countries (excluding Greece, Portugal, and Turkey)
monetary gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), the measured in dollars. It takes into account the parity
reserve position of members in the 1MvF, and hold- changes betwveen the dollar and national currencies.
mgs of foreign exchange under the control of mone- For example, when the dollar depreciates, price
taxy authorities. The data on holdings of interna- changes measured in national currencies have to be
tional reserves are from IMF data ifies. The gold adjusted upward by the amount of the depreciation
component of these reserves is valued throughout at to obtain price changes in dollars.
year-end (December 31) London prices: that is, The table, in addition to showing totals for
$3737 an ounce in 1970 and $33325 an ounce in OPEC, shows totals for the Organization of Arab
1992 Because of differences in the definition of in- Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)_ The
ternational reserves, m the valuation of gold, and in donor members of OAPEC are Algeria, Iraq,
reserve management practices, the levels of reserve Kuwait~, LiAya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United
holdings published in national sources do not have Arab Emiates. ODA data for OPEC and OAPEC
stricly comparable sinificance- The reserve levels are also obtained from the OECD.
for 1970 and 1992 refer to the end of the year indicated
and are in current U5. dollars at prevailng Table 19. Offlcial development assistance: receipts
exchange rates. Reserve holdings at the end of 1992.
montls of import covemge, are also expressed in terms Net disbursemets of ODA from all sources consist of
of the number of months of imnports of goods and loans and grants made on concessional financial
services they could pay for.
terms by all bilateral official agencies and multilat-
The. summary measures are computed from eral sources to promote economic development and
group aggregates for gross international reserves welfare. They indude the value of technical cooperand
total imports of goods and services in current ation and assistance. The disbumsements shown in
dollars,
this table are not strictly comparable with those
shown in Table 18 since the receipts are from all
Table 18. Official development assistance from sources; disbursements in Table 18 refer only to
OECD and OPEC members
those made by high-income members of the OECD
and members of OPEC Net disbursements equal
Offlcial development assitance (ODA) consists of net gross disbursements less payments to the originadisbursements
of loans and grants made on conces- tors of aid for amortiation of past aid receipts. Net
sional financial terms by official agencies of the disbursements of ODA are shown per capita and as
members of the Development Assistance Commit- a percentage of GNP.
tee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Coop- The summary measures of per capita ODA are
eration and Development (OECD) and members of computed from group aggregates for population
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and for ODA Summary measures for ODA as a per-
(OPEC) to promote economic development and centage of GNP are computed from group totals for
weLfre Although this definition is meant to ex- ODA and for GNP in current US. dollars.
dude purely military assistance, the borderline is
sometimes blurred; the definition used by the coun- Table 20. Total external debt
try of origin usually prevails ODA also includes the
value of techrical cooperation and assistance. All The data on debt in this and successive tables are
data shown are supplied by the OECD, and all US. from the World Bank Debtor Reporting System,
dollar values are converted at official exchange supplemented byWorld Bank estimates. The system
rates.
is concerned solely with developing economies and
Total net flows are net disbursements to develop- does not collect data on external debt for other
ing countries and multilateral institutions. The dis- groups of borrowers or from economnies that are not
239

members of the World Bank. The dollar figures on Disbursements are drawings on long-term loan
debt shown in Tables 20 thomugh 24.are in U.S. dol- commitments during the year specified.
lars converted at official exchange rates.
Repayments of principal are actual amount of prin-
The data on debt include private nonguaranteed cipal (amortization) paid in foreign currency. goods,
debt reported by thirty developing countries and or services in the year specified.
complete or partial estimates for an additional Interest paymienits are actual amounts of interest
twenty that do not report but for which this type of paid in foreign currency, goods, or services in. the
debtis knownto be significant.
yearspecified.
Long-tenn debt has three components: public,
publicly guaranteed and private nonguaranteed Table 22. Aggregate net resource flows and net
loans. Public loans are external obligations of public transfers
debtors, hiduding the national goverranent, itsagences,
and autonomous public bodies. Publicly Total net flows on long-term debt are disbursements
guaranteed loans are external obligations of private less the repayment. of principal on public, publicly
debtors that are guaranteed for repayment by a guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term
public entity These two categories are aggregated in debt Officia grnts are transfers made by an official
the tables. Private nonguaranteed loans are external agency in cash or in kind Li respect of which no
obligations of private debtors that are not guaran- legal debt is incurred by the recipient Data on offiteed
for repayment by a public entity.
cial grants exclude grants for technical assistance.
Use of IMF credit denotes repurchase obligations Net foingn direct investment (FDI) in the reporting
to the IMF for all uses of AMV resources, excluding economy is defined as investment that is. made to acthose
resulting from drawings in the reserve quire a lasting interest (usually 10 percent of the vattranche.
Itis shown for the end of the year specfied. ing stock) in an enterprise operating in a country
It comprises purclases outstanding under the credit other than that of the investor (defined according to
tranches, including enlarged access resources, and residency), the investor's purpose being an effective
all special facilities (the buffer stock, compensatory voice in the management of the enterprse -
financing, extended fund, and oil facilities), trust Portfolio equity flows is the sum of the country
find loans, and operations under the.enhanced funds (note that the sum of regional or incomestructural
adjustment facilities. Use of IMF credit group flows does not add up to the total due to the
outstanding at year-end (a stock) is converted to global funds),. depository receipts (American or
U-S. dollars at the dollar-SDR exchange rate in effect global), and direct purchases of shares by foreign inat
year-end.
vestors
Short-term debt is debt with an orginal maturity Aggregate net resource flows are the sum of net
of one year or less. Available data permit no distinc- flows on long-term debt (excluding use of IMF
tions between public and private nonguaranteed credit), plus offcial grants (exdluding technical asshort-term
debL
sistance) and net foreign drect investment. Aggre-
Total external debt is defined here as the sum of gate net tnms,fers are equal to aggregate net resource
public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguar- flows minus interest payments on long-term loans
anteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short- and remittance of all profits.
term debt
Total arrears on long-term debt outstanding and dis- Table 23. Total extemal debt ratios
bursed (LDOD) denotes principal and interest due
but not paid.
Net present value of total exernaf debt as a parentage of
Ratio of present wlue to nomial value is the dis- exports ofgoods and serces is the discounted value of
counted value of the future debt service payments future debt service to exports of goods and services.
divided by the face value of debt.
The present value canbe higher or lower than the
nominal value of debL The determining factor for
Table 21 Flow of public and private extemal the present value being above or below par are the
capital
interest rates of loans and the discount rate used in
the present value calculationL A loan with an inter-
Data on disbursements, repayment of princpal est rate higher than the discount rate yields a pre-
(amortization), and payment of interest are for pub- sent value that is larger than the nominal value of
lic, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed debt the opposite holds for loans with an interest
long-term loans,
rate lower than the discount rate. Throughout this
240

table, goods and services include workers' remit- prime rate. This colurmn shows the borrowers extancest
For estimating net present value of total exter- posure to changes in inentinlinterest rates.
vial debt as a perceitage of GNP, the debt figures are The summary measures mn tins tatble are
converted into US. dollars from currencies of repay-~ weighted by the amounts of the lo'ans.
ment at end-of-year official exchange rates. GP is
converted from national currencies to.US. dollars Table 2.5. Population and labor foDrce
by applying the conversion procedure described im
the tecduiical note for Tables 2 and 3.
Population and labor force growth rates are expo-
Total debt service as a percenrtage of exports of goods nential period averages calculated from midyear
and servie is the sum of prncipal repayments and populations and total labor force estimtes (See the
interest payments on total extenal debt (as defined Key for survey and census informationa i
in the note for Table 20). It is one of severl conven- Population estimates for mid-1992 are made by
tional measures used to assess a country's abiity to the World Bank ftom data provided by the U.Nservice
debtL
Population Division, the U.N. Statistical Office, and
* tetrst - pamtents as a percentage of exports of goods country statstical offices. Estimates take into acand
services are actual payments made on total exer- count the results of the latest population censuses,.
nal debtL
which in some cases are neithier recentt nor accurate.
Concessioal dEbt as a percentage ext total ernai Note that refugees not permanently settled in the
debt conveys information about the borrower's -re- country of asylum are generally- conisidered to be
ceipt of aid from official lenders at concessional part of the population of their country of origintms
as defined by the DAC, foTat is, loans with an The projections of population for 2000,2025, and
original grant element of 25 percent or more.
the year in which the population wsil eventually be-
Multilakr l debt ass percentage of total ertemal debt conie stationary (see definition below) are made for
conveys information about the borrower's receipt of each: ecnomy separately hiformation t on total popaid
from the World Bank-, regional development ulationoby age and sex, fertility mortality and interbanks,
and other multilateral and intergovernmen- natonal migration is projected on the basis of genertal
ageces. Excuded are lan from funds admnin- alized assumptions until the population becomes
istered by an international organization on behalf of stationaryf
a single donor government
-A stationary population is one in which age- and
TMe summnary measures are weighted by exports sm-specific mortality rates have not changed over a
of goods and services in current dollr and by GNP long period, during which fertility rates have rein
current dollars respectively
mained at replacement leven that is, the net reproduction
rate (defined in the note for Table 26) equals
Table 24. Terms of external pubic borowing
1. hi such a population, thebirth rate is constant and
equal to the death rate, the age structur is constant,
Commitments refer to the public and publicly guar- and the growth rate is zero.
anteed loans for wich contracts were signed in the Population projections are made by age cohort.
year specified. They are reported in currenies of re- Mortityp fertility and migration are projected separpayment
and converted into US. dollars at average rtely, and the results axe applied iteratively to the
annual official exchange rates.
1990 base-year age structure. For the projection pe-
Figures for interest rtes, maturities, and grace pei- nod 1990 to 2005, the changes in mortality are counols.
are averages weighted by the amounts of the try specific increments in life expectancy and decreloans.
Interest is the major charge levied on a loan ments isn infant mortality are based on previous
and is usually computed on the amount of principal trends for each country When female seconsdary
drawn and outstanding. The naturity of a loan is school enrollment is high, mortality is assumed t
the interval between the agreement date, when a decline more quiddy; infant mortality is projected
loan agreement is signed or bonds are issued, and separately f eom adult mortality. Note that the prothe
date of final repayment of princial. The grace jections incorporate the impact of acquired immune
period is the interval between the agreement date deficiency syndrome (AIDS) on mortality.
and the date of the first repayment of prinipal
Projected fertility rates are also based on previ-
Public loans with veble interest rates, as a mercent- ous treds. For countries in which fertility has
age of public debt rfer to interet rates that float with strted to decline (termed "fertility tasitioe), this
movements in a key market rate; for exmple, the trend is assumed to continue. It has been obseved
London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) or the U.S. that no c Fountry in which the population has a life
241

eqxpctancy of less than 50 years has experienced a cduring her lifetimne (assuming fixed age-specific fer-
for these countries, fertility ran- tiity and mortalty rtes) reflects the extent to which
sition is delayed, and the average decline of the a cohort of newborn girls will reproduce themgroup
of countries in fiertility transition is applied. selves. An NRR of indicates that fertility is at re-
Countries withi below-replacement fertilty are as- placement level: at this rate women will bear, on avsurned
to have constant total fertility rates until erage, only enough daughters to replace themselves
2005 and to regain replacement level by 2030. in the population.
Internationalmigration-rates are based on.past Married twomen of childbearing aige utsinzg cant racep.-
and present trends in migration flows and migra- tion are women who are practicing, or whose bustion
polic3r; Among the sources. consulted ame esti- bands. are practicing, any formn of contraception.
mates and projections made by national statistical Contraceptive usage is generally measured for maroffices,
intemational agencies, and research institu- fled women age 15 to 49. A few countries use mealions.
Because of the uncertainty of future miegrationr sumes relating to other age groups, especially 15
trends, it is assumed in the projections that net mi- to 44.
gration rates will reach zero by 2025
Data are mainly derived from demographic and
The esineaytes of the size of the stationary popu- health surveys, contraceptive prevalence sunreys,
lation are very long-term projections. They are in- and World Bank country data. For a few countries
duded only to show the implcations owf recent fertil- for which no survey data are available and for sevity
and. modtality trends on the basis of generalzed era African. countries, program statistics are used.
assumptions. A fuller description of the methods Program'statistics ma understate contraceptive
and assumptions used to calculate the estimates is prevalence because they do not neasure use of
contained in World Population Projections, 1994-95 methods such as rhythm, -withdrawal, or absti-
Editioln (orthcomingc
nence, or use. of mcntraceptives not obtainedl
Total laborfofrce is the "economically active" popu- Ctrough the official family plannmg program- The
lation; a retrictive concept that indudes the armed data refer to rates prevailing fi a variety of years,
forces and theo unemployed -but uexdudes home- genealy not more than three years before and one.
makers and others unpaid caregivers. Labor force year after the year specified in the table.
numbers in several.developing countries reflect a All- summary measures are country data
significant underestimation of female partiipation weighted by each country's share inrthe appropria
rates, Labor force growth rates are derived from In- population subgroup. Thus the crude birth (death)
ternational Labour Organisation (ILO) data.
rate is weighted by the number of brths (deaths) in
each country, and the total fertility rate and births to
ityable 26.Dmogrtapy arends on ebiog ty
nrLAwomen under 20 and over 35 are weighted by the
The crude birth rate and crude deatei rate indicate, re- relevant population subgroups.
spectively, the number of live births and deaths oc- Tablen27.Healthandnutri
curing per thousand population in a year. They
come fomn the soures mentioned in the note to The estimates of population per pheysicia and per
Table 25. (See the Key for survey and census infor- nursing person are derived from World Health Orgamation.)
rnzation (WHO) data and are supplemented by data
The tota--fertility rate represents the number of obtained directly by the World Bartk from national
children that would be bor to a woman if she were sources. The data refer to a variety of years, genertoslivelto
the endofherchildbearingyearsandbear allyno more than wo years before the year specichildren
at each age in accordance with prevailing fled. Nursing persons include auxiliary nurses, as
age-specific fertility rates. The rates given are from well as paraprofessional personnel such as tradithe
sources mentioned in the note for Table 25 (Se t tional birth attendants.. The inclusion of auxiliary
Key for (the survey and census information.)
and paraprofessional personnel provides more real-
Births to uwomen untder age- 20 and over age 35 are istic estimates of available ntursing care. Because deshownas
a percentage of all births. These births are finitions of doctors and nursing personnel varyoften
high risk because of the greater risk of compli- and because the data shown are for a variety of
cations dulv ng pregnancy and childbirth. Cidren ars-the data for these two indicators are not
bor to very youngf or to older women are also more strictly comparable across countries.
242:sona vulnerables eetg falbii.Teebrh r iiin Loa birthrveigdt f obr atbies n are usn children eire bor weighing ay
The net reproduction rate (NRR), which measures less than 2,500 grams. Low birthweight is frequently
the number of daughters a newbomr girl wi bear associated with materal malnutrition. It tends to
fertility -tansition;

aise the isk of infant mortaliyand tolead topoor refer to a year earlier than that for overall totals. The
growth im infancy and childhood, thus increasing data are mostly from UNESCO-.
the incidence of other forms of retarded develop- Primary school enrollment data are estimates of
menL The figures are derived from both WHO and the ratio of children of all ages enrolled in primary
U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) sources and are school to the country's population of schoolage
based on national data. The data are not strictly childrenL Although many countries consider pricomparabIe
across countries because they are corn- mary school age to be 6 to 11 years, others do not.
piled from a combination of surveys and admiinis- For some countries with universal primary educatrative
records that may not have representative na- tion, the gross enrollment ratios may exceed 100
tional coverage.
percent because some pupils are younger or older
The ijifant mortality rate is the number of infants than the country's standard primary school age.
who die before reaching one year of age, per thou- The data on secondary school enrollment are calsand
live births in a given year. The data are from culated in the same manner, and again the definithe
sources mentioned in the note to Table 25i (See tion of secondary school ag differs among counthe
Key for survey and census information) tries. It is most commonly considered to be 12 to 17
Pnwalence of malnutrition measures the percent- years. Late entry of more mature students as vell as
age of children under 5 with a deficiency or an ex- repetition and the phenomenon of "bunchingC in
cess of nutrients that interfere with their health and final grades can influence these ratios.
genetic potential for gowth. Methods of assessment The fertiary enrollment ratio is calculated by divary,
but the most commonly used are the follow- viding the number of pupils enrolled in all postbng:
less than 80 percent of the standard weight for secondary schools and universities bv the populaage;
less than minus 2 standard deviation frm the tion in the 20-24 age group. Pupils attending voca-
50th percentile of the weight-for-age reference pop- tional schools, adult education programs, two-year
ulation; and the Gomez scale of malnutrition. Note community colleges, and distant education centers
that for a few countries the figures are for children 3 (primarily correspondence courses) are induded.
or4 years of age and younger
The distnrbution of pupils across these different
The under-5 mortality rate shows the probabili types of institutions varies among countries.The
that a newbonm baby will die before reaching age 5. youth population-that is, 20 to 24 vears-has been
The rates are derived from life tables based on esti- adopted by UNESCO as the denominator,- since it
mated current life expectancy at birth and on infant represents an average tertiary level cohort even
mortality rates. In general, throughout the world though people above and below this age group may
more. males are born than females. Under good nu- be registered in tertiary institutions.
tntional and health conditions and in times of Prnary net enrollment is the percentage of schoolpeace,
imale children under 5 have a higher death age children who are enrolled in schooL Unlike
rate than females. These columns show that gross enrollment, the net ratios correspond to the
female-male differences in the risk of dying by age country's primary-school age group. This indicator
5 vary substantially. In industrial market econo- gives a much dearer idea of how many children in
mies, female babies have a 23 percent lower risk of the age group are actualtly enrolled in school withdying
by age 5 than male babies, but the risk of out the numbers being inflated by over- or underdying
by age 5 is actually higher for females than age children.
for males in some lower-income economies. This The primary pupil-tacer ratio is the number of
pattern is not uniformly associated with develop pupils enrolled in school in a country divided by the
ment. There are low- and middle-income countries number of teachers in the education system.
(and regions within countries) where for example, The summary measures in this table are country
the risk of dying by age 5 for females relative to enrollment rates weighted by each country's share
males approximates the pattern found in industrial in the aggregate population.
countries.
The summary measures in this table are country Table 29. Gender comparsons
data weighted by the relevant population subgroup. This table provides selected basic indicators disag-
Table-28. Education
gregated to show differences between the sexes that
illustrate the condition of women in society. The
The data in this table refer to a variety of years, gen- measures reflect the demographic status of women
eraly not more than two years distant from those and their access to health and education servicesspecified.
Figures for females, however, sometimes Statistical anomalies become even more apparent
,: i.; - - . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4

when social indicators are analyzed by gender be- These time series attempt to bring together readcause
reporting systems are often weak in areas re- ily available information not always presented in inlated
specificaliy to women. Indicators drawn fiom ternational publications. WHO warns that there are
censuses and surveys, such as those on population, inevitablygaps in the series, and it has invited countend
to be about as reliable for women as for men; tries to provide more comprehensive figures. They
but indicators based largely on administrative are reproduced here, fnom the 1991 WHO publicarecords,
such as maternal and infant mortality are tion Maternal Mortality: A Global Facdbook. The data
less reliable. More resources are now being devoted refer to any year from 1983 to 1991.
to developing better information on these topics, The education indicators, based on UNESCO
but the reliability of data, even in the series shown, sources, show the extent to which females have
still varies significantly.
equal access to schooling.
The health and welfare indicators in Table 27 and Percentage of colhort persisting to grade 4 is the perin
the maternal mortality column of Table 29 draw centage of children starting primary school in 1970
attention, in particular, to discrimination affecting and 1987, respectively, who continued to the fourth
women, especially very young girls, and to the con- ggrade by 13 and 1990. Fgures in italics represent
ditions associated with childbearing.Childbearing -earlier or later cohorts. The data are based on enstill
cames the highest risk of death for women of rollment records. The slightly higher persistence
reproductive age in developing countries. The indi- ratios for females in some African countries may
cators reflect, but do not measure, both the availabil- indicate male partcipation in activities such as anity
of health services for women and the general imal herding.
welfare and nutnrtonal status of mothers. . All things being equal, and opportunities being
Life expectmcy at birth is defined in the note to . the same, the ratios for females per 100 males should
Table I.
be dose to 100. However, inequalities may cause the
Matera mortalty refers to the number of female ratios to move in different directions. For example,
deaths that occur during childbirth per 100,000 live the number of females per 100 males wil rise atsecbirths
Pxcause deaths during childbirth are defined ondary school level if male attendance declines
more widely in some countries to include complica- more rapidly in the final grades because of males'
d.ons of pregnancy or the period after childbirth, or greater job opportunities, conscription into the
of abortion, and because many pregnant women die army, or migration in search of work In addition,
from lack of suitable health care, maternal mortality since the numbers in these columns refer mainly to
is difficult to measure consistently and reliably - general secondary education, they do not capture
across countries. The data are drawn from diverse those (mostly males) enrolled in technical and vocanational
sources and collected by the World Health tional schools or in fulI-time apprenticeships, as in
Organization (WHO), although many national ad- EastenEurope
ministrative systems are weak and do not record Females as a paretage of total laborforce, based on
vital events in a systematic way The data are de- ILO data, shows the extent to which women are
rived mostly from official community reports and "gainfuly employed" in the formal secor. These
hospital records, and some reflect only deaths in numbers exclude homemakers and other unpaid
hospitals and other medical institutions Sometimes caregivers and in seveal developing countries resmaller
private and rural hosmitals are exduded, flect a significant underestimate of female participaand
sometimes even relatively pnrmitire local facii- tion rates.
ties are included. The coverage is therefore not al- All summary measures are country data
ways comprehensive, and the figures should be weighted by each country's share in the aggregate
treated with extreme caution.
population or population subgroup.
Clearly, many maternal deaths go unrecorded,
-. - .partiularly in countries with remote rural popula- Table 30. Income distribution and FPP estimates
dions. This acoDunts for some of the very low num- of GNP
bers shown in the table, especially for seireral The first columns report distribution of income or
African oDuntries. Moreover, it is not dear whether expenditure accruing to percentile groups of housean
increase in the number of mothers in hospital re- holds ranked by total household income, per capita
flects more extensive medical care for women or income, or expenditure. The last four columns conmore
complications in pregnancy and childbirth be tain estimates of per capita CNP based on purchas
cause of poor nutrition, for instance C(Table 27 ing power parities (PPPs) rather than exchange rates
shows data on low birth weighL)
(see below for the definition of the PPP).
244

Columns 2 thrugh 7 give the shares of popula- two changes from previous editions: GDP has been
tion quintiles and the top decile in total income or replaced by GNP; and PPC (purchasing power of
consumption conre =- hav expenditure bee copie for 45 low- frmtw.am97 and miiddle- currencies) by FF1'. FP1P is the term commonly
income countries and 20 high-income countries. The used to refer to the parities com'puted for a fixedt
data sets for these countries refer to different years basket of products, even though theoreticaly these
betweent 1978 and 1992 and are drawn mostly from are more apprprately labeled PPC The data innationally
representative household surveys.
dude (a) resuldts of the International Comparitson,
'The data sets for the low- and midddle-income
countris havebeen cmpiledfrom to main
Programme (ICP) Phase VI for 1990 for OECD coun-
tries extrapolated backw.ard to 1987 (b) results of
sources: government statistical agencies (often ICP Phase V for 1985 for non-OECD countries exusing
published reports) and the World Bank trapolated to 2987; (c) the latest available results
(mostly data originating from the Living Standards from either Phase IV for 3980 or Phase EII for 1975
Measurement Study and the Social Dimensions of extrapolated to 1987 for countries that participated
Adjustment Project for Sub-Saharan Africa). Wihere in the earlier phases only; (d) a World Bank estimate
the original unit record data from the household for China and the economies of the form-er Soviet
survey were available, these have been used to cal- Union; and (e) ICP estimates obtained by regression
culate direcly the income (or expenditure) shares of for the ren aining countries that did not participate
differenit quantiles; otherwise, the latter have been in any of the phases. Economies whose 1987 figures
estimated fr-om the best available grouped data. For are extrapolated from regression estimates are footfurther
details on both the data and the estimation noted.
methodology, see Chen, Dalt and Ravallion 1993. The blend of extrapolated and regression-based
The data for the high-income OECD ecoDnomies are 1987 figures underlying column 8 is extrapolated to
caeh tie refe to
based on information from the Statistical Office of 1992 using Bank estimates of real per capita ONP
the European Union (Eurostat), Thze Luxembourg it- growth rates and expressed as an index (US = 100)
come Study, and the OEC'D. Those for other high-in- in column 9. For coutrides that have ever particicome
countries come from national sources_. paled in the ICP' as well as foDr China and the
There are several comparability problems across economies of the FSU, the latest available PPPcountries
in the underlying household surveys, based values are extrapolated to 1992 by Bank esti-
These problems are diminishing over time as survey mates of growth rates and converted to current "inmethodologies
are both imnproving and becom-ing temnationtal dollars" by scaling all results up by the
more standardized, particularly under the initia- US. inflation rates. The blend of extrapolated and
tives of the United Nations (under the Household regression-based 1992 estimates is presented hin col-
Survey Capability Program) and.the World Bank urnn 10. Economries whose 1987 figures are extrapo-
(under the Living Standard Measurement Study lated from another year or imnputed by regr'ession
and the Social Dimensions of AdjustmentProject for are footnoted accordingly- The adjuistments do not
Sub-Saharan Africa). The data present-ed here take account of changes in the terms of trade.
should nevertheless be interpreted with caution. In The ICP recasts traditional national accounts.
particular, the following three sources of noncompa- through special price collections and disaggregation
rability ought to be noted. First, the surveys differ in of GDP by expendifture components. 10P details are
using income or consumption expenditure as the prepared by national'statistical offices, and tlhe reliving
standard indicator. For 28 of 'the 45 low- and stilts are coordinated by the U.N. Statistical Divisio n
middle-income countries, the data refer to con- (UNSTAT) with support from other. international
sumnption eqxpnditure. Typically, income is more agences, particularly Eurostat and the OECD. The
unequally distributed thian consumption. Second, World Bank, the Econormic Commission for Europe,
the sresdiffer in using the household or the in- and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia
dividual as their unit of observation; in the firt and the Pacific (ESCAP) also .contribute to this exer-
cs,tequantie reeopercentage of households cise. For Nepal, which participated -in the 1985 ex-*
or per capita, rather than percentage of persons. ercise, total GD? data were not available, and corn-
Third, the surveys diffeer according to whether the parisons were made for consumption onlye
units of observation are ranked by household or per Luxembourg and Swaziland are the only tvo
capita income (or consumption). The footnotes to economies with populations under I mifllon that
the table identify hese differences for each country. have participated in the ICp; their 1987 results, as a
The 1987 indexed figures on PPP-based GNP per percentage of the US. results, are 81u 1 and 15.0, recapita
(US= 100) afe presented in column Note spectively. The next round of ICP surveys, for 199,
245

is expected to cover more than 80 countries, includ- locating the new regional totals on the basis of each
ing China and several PSU econoriues.
country's share in the original companson.
The -international dollar" (l$) has the same pur- Such a method does not permit.the comparison
chasing power over total GNP as the US. dollar in a of more detailed quantities (such as food consumpgiven
year but purchasing power over subaggre- tion). Hence these subaggregates and more detailed
gates is determined by average international prices expenditure categories are calculated using world
at that level rather than by US. relative prices. prices. These quantities are indeed comparable in-
These dollar values, which are different from the ternationally, but they do not add up to. the indidollar
values of GNP or GDP.shown in Tables 1 and cated GDPs because they are calculated at a differ-
3 (see the technical notes for these- tables), are ob- ent set of pnces.-
taned by. special conversion factors designed to Some countries belong to several regional
equalize the purchasing powers of currencies m the groups. A few of the group have priority; others are
respective countries. This conversion factor, the pur- equal. Thus fudty is maintained between members
chasing power parity (PPP), is defined as the num- of the European Union, even within the OECD and
ber of units of a country's currency.required to buy world comparisons. For Austria and Finland, howthe
same amounts of goods and services in the do- ever, the bilateral relationship that prevails within
mestic market as one dollar would buy in the the OECD comparison is also the one used within
United States. The computation involves deriving the global comparison. But a significantly different
implicit quantities from national accounts expendi- relationship (based on Central European prices)
ture data and specially collected price data and thenr prevails in the comparison within that group, and
revaluingtheimplicitquantitiesineachcountryata this is the relationship presented in the separate
single set of average prices. The average price index publication of the European.comparison.
thus equalizes dollar prices in every country so that To derive ICP-based 1987 figures for countries
cross-country comparisons of ONP based on them that are.yet to participate in any ICP survey an estireflect
differences in quantities of goods and ser-. mating equation is first obtained by fitting the folvices
free of price-level differentials. This procedure lowing regression to 1987 data:
is designed to bring aoss-country comparisons in
line vith cross-time real value comparisons that are ln(r) = 05932 ln(ATLAS) + 026 In(mL) + 0.6446;
based on constant price series. (0.298) (0.0552) (0.1676)
The ICP figures presented here are the results of a Ra or30 AdJR-Sq 0.95 N 80
two-step exercise. Countries withiin a region or
group such as the OECD are first compared using where all variables and estimated values are extheir
own group average prices. Next, since group pressed as US = 100 and where
average prices may differ from each other, mal

the ICP Phase IV report, World Comparisonis of Pinr- Inidicators from the users' perspectives would mearinsing
Power anid Real Product for 1980 (New.York: sure the eff-ectiveness of the service ultiTmately deliv-
United Nations, 1986). Readers interested in de- ered. Service quality indicators (such as faults per
killed ICP survey data for 1975, 1980, 1985, and 100 main lines per year) are the moDst difficult data
1990 may refer to Purchasuing Power of Currencies: to obtain -on a comparable and recurrent basis for a
Compar ing Pational. IVnrortes Using ICP. Data (World lare sample of countries. Some indicators represent
Bank 1993).
both system efficiency and service quality, such as
fthe share of paved roads in good condition.
Table 3L Urbanization
Although the data reported here are drawn from
the most authoritative sources available, compara-
Data on urban population and agglomeration in ..bility may be linited by variation in data collection,
large cities are from the U.N.'s World Urbanization statistical methods, ant definitions.
Prspects, supplemented by data from the World Electric powver. Coverage is measured by the per-
Bankc The growth rates of urban population are cal- centage of households with access to electricity sufculated
from the World Bank's population esti- ficient for at least electric lighting. This indicator is
mates; the estimates of urban population shares are from Kurian 1991 and is available only for.1984. Syscalculated
from both sources just cited.
tem losses, which are obtained from the 'Power
Because the estimates in this table are based on Data Sheets" compiled by the Industry and Energy
different national definitions of whatis urban, cross- Department of the World Bank and IEA Energy Sta-.
country comparisons slould be made with caution. tistics, combine technical and nontechnical losses.
The summary measures for urban population as Technical losses, due to the physical characteristics
a percentage of total population are calculated from of the power system, consist mainly of resistance
country percentages weighted by each country's losses in transmission and distribution. Nontechnishare
in the aggregate population. The other sum- cal losses consist mainly of illegal connection to
mary measures in this table are weighted in the electricity and other sources of theft System losses
same fashion, using urban population.
are expressed as percentage of total output (net generation)
Table 32. Infrastructure
Telecommunicationts. The measure of coverage is
the number of telephone exchange maimlines per
This table provides selected basic indicators of the thousand persons. A telephone mainline connects
coverage and performance of infrastructure sectors. the subscnber's equipment to the switched net-
Coverage. Indicators of coverage are based. on the in- work and has a dedicated port in the telephone exfr
astructure data most widely available across coun- change. This term is synonymous with "main statries
whidc measure the extent, type, and sometimes tion," also commonly used in telecommunication
condition of physical facilities in each infrastructure documents. Faults per 100 main lines per year refer
sector (examples are provided in the Appendix ta- to the number of reported faults per 100 main telebles).
Such data are divided by national population phone lines for the year indicated. Some operators
totals to derive indicators of coverage or availability indude malfunctioning customer premises equip-
(as in teLephone main lines per thousand persons or ment as faults, while others include only technical
road kilomneters per million persons). More direct faults. Data on main lines and faults per. 100 main
measures of coverage are based on household sur- lines are from the International Telecommunication
veys of actual access, reported as percentage of Union database. -
households with electricity or access to safe water Roads Indicators used to represent coverage in
For roads and railways, physical proximity (such as this sector include spatial road density (a countrys
share of population within 1 kilometer of a paved road length divided by land area) and- per capita
road) would be a good measure of coverage, but it is road density length of the road network per popurarely
available.
lation size). The latter measure (kilometers of paved
Pcrfonwnce. Performance quality should be as- roads per millior population) is used here as an apsessed
from the perspectives of both the infrastruc- proximate indicator of coverage. As the measure of
ture providers and the users Indicators from the performance, paved roads in good condition is deproviders'
perspectave measure operating efficiency fined as roads substantially free of defects and re-
(such as power system losses, unaccounted-for quiring only routine maintenance. Data for paved
water, and locomotive availability), capacty utiliza- roads are from Queiroz and Gautam 1992 and are
tion, or financial efficiency (such as cost recovery), available for 1988 only.
247

Wnter. For most countries, the percentage of the agreed on. Nor are the measures shown in this table
- - population with access to safe water either by intended to be final indicators of natural resource
standpipe. or house connection is the measure of wealtlh, environmental health, or resource deple-
: coverage and is drawn primarily from tle World tion. They have been chosen because they are avail-
Health Organization's Thec International Drinikinig able for most countries, are testable, and reflect
- -Water Supply and. Sanitationt Decade series, various some general conditions of the environment.
years. For the econornies of the FSU, the percentage The nat(ral forest total area refers to natural stands
of public housing equipped with running water is of woody vegetation in which trees predominate.
the measure of coverage, and the source is Housintg These estimates are derived from country statisiics
Conditions in thie USSR, published by the State Com- assembled by the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
V mittee on Statistics for the USSR Data for water tion (FAO) and the United Nations Economic Comlosses
are frori G(am 1987 and are for metropolitan mission for Europe (UNECE). New assessments
area systems. Where 1986 data were not available, were published in 1993 for tropical countries (FAO)
the dosest available year was taken. Water losses in- and temperate zones (UNECE/FAO). The FAO and
dude physical losses (pipe breaks and overflows) the UNECE/FAO use different definitions in their
and conunercial losses (ineter underregistration, it- assessments. The FAO defines natural forest in troplegal
use including fraudulent or unregistered con- icail countries as either a closed forest where trees
nections, and legal, but usually not metered, uses cover a high proportion of the ground and there is
such as firefighting).
no continuous gMss cover or an open forest, defined
Railuwys. The coverage indicator is the number of as mnixed forest/grasslands with at least 10 percent
rail traffic units per million US. dollars GDP. Rail tree cover and a continuous grass layer on the forest
--. traffic units are thesumofpassenger-kilometers and floor. A tropical forest encompasses all stands ex
ton-lilometers and were obtained from the database cept plantations and includes stands that have been
maintained by the Transport Division of the Trans- degraded to some degree by agriculture, fire, logport,
Wate, and Urban Development Department, gin& or add precipitation.
World Bankl Diesel locomotive availability is one of UNECE/FAQ defines a forest as land where tree
the better measures of technical and managerial per- crowns cover more than 20 percent of the area. Also
formance because locomotives are the most expen- included are open forest formations; forest roads
sive rolling stock the railways own. Data for diesel and firebreaks; small, temporarily cleared areas;
locomotive availability as a percentage of diesel in- young stands expected to achieve at least 20 percent
ventory are from the same World Bank database. crown cover on maturity; and windbreaks and shel-
GDP figures are from Summers and Heston, Th1e terbelts. Plantation area is included under temper-
Penni World Tables (Alrk 55), forthcoming.
ate country estimates of natural forest area. Some
-countries in this table also include other wooded
Table 33. Natural resources
land, defined as open woodland and scrub, shrub,
and brushland.
This table represents a step toward including envi- Deforestation xefers to the permanent conversion
ronmental data in the assessment of development of forest land to other uses, including shifting cultiand
the planning of economic strategies. It provides vation, permanent agriculture, ranching, settlea
partial picture of the status of forests, the extent of ments, or infastructure developmenL Deforested
..areas protected for conservation or other environ- areas do not include areas logged but intended for
-mentally related purposes, and the availability and regeneration or areas degraded by fuelwood gatheruse
of fresh water. The data reported here are drawn ing, add predpitation, or forest fires. The extent and
from the most authoritative sources available, percentage of total area shown refer to the average
which are cited in World Resources Institute, World annual deforestation of natural forest area.
- Resources 1994-95. Perhaps even more than other Some countries also conduct independent assessldata
in this Report, however, these data should be ments using satellite data or extensive ground data.
used with caution. Although they accurately charac- A 1991 country-wide assessment using Landsat imterize
major: differences in resources and uses agery estimated India's forest cover at 639,000.
among countries, true comparability is limited be- square kilometers. An inventory based on 1990
cause of vaination in data collection, statistical meth- LANDSAT TM imagery estimated Mexico's forest
- : X ods, definitions, and government resources. cover at 496,000 square kilometers, with a deforesta-
No conceptual framework that integrates natural tion rate of 4.06 square kilometers per year between
resource and traditional economic data has yet been 1980 and 1990. In Brazil two recent satellite-
248

mation explicitly excludes decade-long cycles of wet
and dry. The Departement Hydrog&ologie in Or-
leans, France, compiles water resource and with-
drawal data from published documents, including
national, United Nations, and professional litera-
ture. The Institute of Geography at the National
Academy of- Sciences in Moscow also compiles
global water data on the basis of.published work
and, where necessary, estimates water resources and
consumption from models that use other data, such
as area under irrigation, livestock populations, and
precipitation. These and other sources. liave been
combined by the World Resources Institute to gen-
erate data for this table. Withdrawal data are for sin-
gle years and vary from country -to country between
1970 and 1992. Data for small countries and coun-
tries in arid and semiarid zones are less reliable than
those for larger countries and countries with higher
rainflL
Total after resources include both internal renew-
able resources and, where noted, river flows from
other counties. Estimates are from 1992. Annual internal
renewable water resources refer to the aver-
age annual flow of rivers and aquifers generated
from rainfaid within the country. The total with-
drawn and the percentage witlhdrawn of the total
renewable resource are both reported in this table.
Withdrawals indude those from nonrenewable
aquifers and desalting plants but do not include
losses from evaporation. Withdrawals can exceed
100 percent of renewable supplies when extractions
from nonrenewable aquifers or desalting plants are
considerable or if there is significant water reuse.
Total per capita water withdrawal is calculated by
dividing a country's total withdrawal by its popula-
tion in the year for which withdrawal estimates are
available. For most countries, sectoral per capita
withdrawal data are calculated.using sectoral with-
drawal percentages estimated for 1987. Domestic
use includes drinking water, municipal use or sup-
ply, and use for public services, commercial estab-
lishments, and homes. Direct withdrawals for in-
dustrial use, including withdrawals for cooling
thermoelectric plants, are combined in the final col-
umn of this table with withdrawals for agriculture
(irigation and livestock production). Numbers may
not sum to the total per capita figure because of
rounding.
imagery-based assessments of deforestation in the
Brazilian Amazon have resulted in different deforestation
rate estimates for this region. A study by
the. US. Natio.nal Space and Aeronautics Administration
(NASA) and the University of New Hampshire
estimated forest loss at l5,000 square kilometers
per year- during 1978-88. Brazil's National
Institute for Space Research (iNPE) and National Institute
for Research in the Amazon (INPA) estimated
deforestation at 20,300 square Idlometers per
year for. the same period. Deforestation in secondazy
forest areas and-dry scrub areas were-notincluded
in either study. The.FAO data presented in
this table include forestation in all Brazil, including
secondary forest areas. and other forested area
Note also that accordin,, to the FAO Brazil has an estimated
70,000 square kilometers of plantation land,
defined as forest stands established artificially byafforestation
and reforestation for industrial and nonindustrial
usage. India has an estimated 189,000
square kilometers of plantation land and. Indonesia
an estimated 87,500 square kilometers.
Nationaly protected areas are areas of at least 1,000
hectairs that fall into one of five management categories:
scientific reserves and strict nature reserves;
national parks of national or international significance
(not materially affected by.human activity);
natural monuments and natural landscapes with
some unique aspects; managed nature reserves and
wildlife sanctuaries; and protected landscapes and
seascapes Cwhich may include cultural landscapes).
This table does not include sites protected under
local or provincial law or areas where consumptive
uses of wildlife are allowed. These data are subject
to variations in definition and in reporting to the organizations,
such as the World Conservation Monitoring
Centre, that compile and disseminate them.
Total surface area is used to calculate the percentage
of total area protected.
Freshzater resorces: anniiual zwithdrawal data are
subject to variation in collection and estimation
methods but. accurately show the magnitude of
water use in both total and per capita terms. These
data, however, also hide what can be significant
variation in total renewable water resources from
one year to another. They also fail to distinguish the
seasonal and geographic variations in water availability
within a country. Because fieshwater resources
are based on long-term averages, their esti-
- ~ I -
249

Data .'sources
Production U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Various years Statistical Yearbooa New.
and domestic York.
absorption - . Various years. EneW Statistics Yearbook. Statistical Papers, seres J. New York
U.N. International Comparison Program Phases IV (1980), V (1985), and VI (1990) reports, and data
from ECE, ESCAP, Eurostat, OECD, and U.N.
FAO, IMF, UNIDO, and World Bank data; national sources.
Fiscal and. International Monetary Fund. Goverrmnent Finanice Statistics Yearbook. Vol. 11. Washington, D.C.
monetary
.Various years. International Financinl Statistics. Washington, D.C.
accounts U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Various years World Enery Supplies.
Statistical Papers, seriesJ. New York.
IMF data.
Core
International Monetary Fund. Various years. hItena7tionil Financial Statistics. Washington, D.C.
interniational U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. Various years. Handbook of Intenrational Trde and
*transactions Developmert Statistics. Geneva.
U.N. Department of International Economic and Soal Affairs. Various yeams Mantlily Butietin of
Statistics. New York
Vanious years. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. New York.
FAO, IMP, It., and World Bank data.
Extemal Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmenL Various years. Devdopment Co-peration.
finance
Paris.
1988. Geogrpial Distribution f Financial Floms to Devedoping Countries. Paris.
-IMF, OECD, and World Bank dab; World Bank Debtor Reporqtg System.
- 0 HHuman Bos, Eduard, My I !fu, Ernest Massiah, and Rodolfo A. Biatao. Worrd Population Pmjections, 19cE -95
rsources e- and Editior (f orthcoming). Baltimore,Md. Johns Hopkins University Press.
envirmnmentafly Gamn, Harvey 1987. 'Patterns in the Data Reported on Completed Water Supply Proj World
sustaiwble Banlc, Trdnsport Water, and Urban Development Deparunent, Washington, D.C.
development Heiderian, J., and Wu, Gary 1993. 'PowerSector Statistics of Developing Countries (1987-1991)-"
World Bank, Industry and Energy Departuent, Washington, D.C.
- . : v - - - Instthute for Resource Development/Westinghouse. 1987. ChlRd Survival: Risks and tie Road to Healtl.
Columbia, Md.
International Energy Agency 1993. iEA Statistics: Energy Prices and axes. Pars: OECD
International Road Transport Union. 1990. World Transport Data.
International Telecommunication Union. 1994 World Teleronnrunications Development Report Geneva-
Kurian, G. T. 1991. Tic Newr Book of World Rankings. New York: Facts on Fle.
Querioz Caesar, anid Surhid Gautam. 1992. 'Road Infastructure and Econonic Development: Policy
Research Working Paper 921. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Ross, John, and othersm 1993. Family Planning and Population: A Comnwidium of International Statistics.
New Yorlc The Population CounciL.
Sivard, Rutk 1985. Women-A World Survey. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities.
U.N. Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis (formerly U.N. Department
of International Economic and Social Affairs). Various years. Demraphlic Yewrbook New Yorkl
- Various years. Population and Vital Statistics Report. New York
- Various years. Slatistigil Yearbook- New York.
1989. Levels and Trends of Contraceptive Use as Assssed hi 1988. New Yorkl
--- - ~1988 Mortaity of Chl7dren under Age 5: Projections 295O-2025. New York-
: -- . : .~~~~~1986. .Wcrld Comprisons of Purcaing Psowerand Rea Product for 1980. New York.
1991- World Urbanization Prospects: 1991. New York.
.1991 World Population Prspects. 1990.New York
.1993. World Populationl Prospects 1993 Revision. New York.
- g - . 1993. World Urbarniaion Prospects 1992 Revision. New York.
UN. Educational Scienfific and Culkittal Organization. Various years Statistical Yearbook Paris.
1990. Compmdiwu of Statistics on illitenzy. Paris.
UNTCEF 1989. The State of the World's Children 1989- Oxford: Oxford University Pres
World Bank 1993. Purdcasing Power of Carrences: Comparing National Incomes Using ICP Data.
Washington, D.C -
World HealIth OrganizationL Various years. World Healthi Statistics ArnuaL Geneva.
.1986. Mateminl Mortality Rates: A Tabulation of Available Information, 2nd edition. Geneva.
.1991- Maternal Mortalityh A Global Factbook, Geneva.
- Various years. World Health Statistics Report. Geneva.
Various years. The Intenational Drinking Water Supy and Sanitation Decde. Geneva.
World Resources Institute- 1994. World Resources 1994-95. New York-
* FAO, ILO, U.N., and Wodd Bank dab; national sources.
250

t 1 Classfiction orec"onomuies by income and regicon
Sub-Suhann Africa Asia. EuramoeandCentrl Asia
Middle East anid freitar Africa
ou SU kr EastAsik Europe and Past of Midde !Jetk
--.ap Subgrouqp Afric West Africa endP cu*i South Asia Cent rlAsi Eutrope East Africa Americas
w
UppeIr
Burundi Beain Cambodia Afghaistan Tajldstan Yemen, Rep- Egypt. Arab Guyana
Contoros Burkina Paso China Bagldeh ep Haiti
Erlirca Central Afican Indonesia lhtnHonduras
Ethiopia Republic LaoPDOR India Nicaragua
Kenya Chad Myanmar Makldives
Lesotho Equatorial VietNam Nepal
Madagascar Guinea Pakistan
Malawi Gmi.TeSri Lanka
Mlozambique Ghana
Rwanda Guinea
~~Somaiaa . Guinea-Bissau
Sudan Liberia
Tanzania Mali
Uganda. Mauritania
Zaire. Niger
Zamibia Nigria
Zimbabwe Slo Tom
and Prinripe
SiLeirra Leone
__ __
_ Togo _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Angla Camron iji Albania Turkey hran, ILdanii Algeria Belize
Dpibouut Cape Verde Kiubati Armenia . Rep. Morocco Bolivia
Nanmiba Congo KCorea. Dent Azerbaipn Iraq Turaua Chile
Swaziland Cated'Ivoire Rep. Bosnia and Jordan Colombia
Senegva Marshall Herzegovina Lebanon Costa Rica
Islands Bulgaria . Syrian Arab Cuiba
Mkcronesia Croatia Rep. Dominkca
Fed.LSt& Czech Dohtinuran
Mongolia Republic Republic
N. M4ariana Is. Georgia Ecuador
Papua New Kazakstan ElSalvador
Guine
Philippines
Kyrgy
Republic
Grenada
Guatemala
LOW
Solomon Latvia Jamaica
[sian .'. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Lithuania Panama
Thailand Macedonia Parguay
Tonga
Vanuatu
FyiR
Moldova
Peru
SLVinwent
Western Poland and the
Samoa Romania Grenadines
Russian
Fe-deration
Sloak
Republic.
Turlcmenistan
Ukraine
- if ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~UzbekLdsan
Yugoslavia.
Fed-. Rep.
Botswana Gabon Amierican Belaius Gibraltar Bahirain Liken Antignaand
Mauritius Samioa Estonia . Greece Oman Barbuda
Mayotte Guam Hungary Isle of M.n Saudi Arabia Argentin
Reunion . Korea. Rep- Slovenia Malta Aruba
Seycheles Macao Portugal Barbados
Souith Africa Malaysia Brazil
New
Caledonia
Frernch Guiana
Guadeloupe
Martinique
Me,DCo
Netherlands
Antilles
Puerto Rio
S lGtts,axnd
Nevis
St. Lucia
Surname
Trinidad
and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
al 169 -27 23 26 8 r 27 6 9 .5 38-
(rabk-centimnezran tirfjbtmiongpI-SC
T~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~5

Part 1 ~(winnd
Sub-&wanaAffrj . Asia Ero Maand CentralAsia MiddleEstandfNorlhAfiia
-Est and
Eastern
: Incmem :
SoUthr . EastAs Eurmpead Rw of Midle North
- up .-Suhzrnup Afria West Africa andPacfic SaUfh Ask, CetmblAsi Eumrpe East Afric. Anericfs
AustalUa Austria Canada
1 .. I Japan Be.iu UnitedSlams
NewZealand
Denmark
incomeSpi
OECD
.: . . ... 0 0 . . - - . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ulae
nd-. ~ .. ~~~Germanyi.
cmntriEs
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
~~~~~~~~~~~~~Lwxembourg
Neerands.K.
Sweden:
United
Kingdom
. Bruni .. - . . Andorra Israe Bahamas,The
French Channel Kuwait Bermuda
NenT Polynesia .slands Qatar Vir .
OECD HongKog Cyprus UnitedAzab slads (Uf
Sinpore
Faeroelslands Emirates
OA
~~~~~~~~~Greenland
___ ____ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~San
marina
.roaf 208 27 23 34 8 27 2 1343
a. FomerYugoslavRepublicof Macedonia.
.b Other Asian econories-Taiwan. China.
Definitions of groups
Thesectahicsclassifyall WorldBankmcmerbereconomies, anda.11other
economies with populations of more than 30,000..
Income group. Economies are divided according to 1992 GNP per
capita,calculated using the WorldBahkAtlasmethodLThegroups art
low-income, $675 or less; lower-middle-income, 1676-2,695;
upper-middle-incomne, 5S2.696-$8 ,355; and high-income, $8,35r
more-
The estimates. for the 'republics of the former Soviet Union
preliminai7 and their classification will be kept under review.
:~~~~~~:
252

Part 2 Clssfcation of economies by maj'or export category and indebtedness.
Lmat-incmt AM&M =Wf-ioa Not Highncm
* Serely ~~~Mair Rl Les Seerely hModenidy Ls dassjleby
Crimpr indbedikbtmm chiefd indebtd indebtd indebtd bsdbienes OECD nmOECD
1mM-
,rters
res
China Bulgaria Hnay Armenia Canada HongKong
FPoland Rusin Dearus Finland Lsmael
Federtion Estonla. Germany Singpore
Georgia Iretand OAr
KoreaXem. ~Itay
Rep-
Japan
Koiwa. Rep. ~Sweden
Swilzerland
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Kyrgz
Rilepublic
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Lahvia
Lebawnn
tithuania
Mcano
Moldova
Romanla
Ukraine
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~~~~~Uzbekdstan
_ _ _ _ _ _
Afgbanmstan Guinea Chad Albania Chile' American french Guiana Icelard Faeroe Islands
Burnmdi Malawi Argentina Guatemala Samoa Guadeloupe New Zealand. Greenland
Equatoria Tapo Bolivia Papua New Botawana Reunion
Guinea Zimbabwe C6ted`voire Guinea Mongolia
Ethiopia Cuba Namibia
Ghana Peru Paraguay
Guir,ea-Bissau
Slomon
Guyana
sldands
Honduras
S Vincent
Liberia
and thie
Madagascar
Grnawdines
.1r5 Mali Surinane
TKi Mau,,britania
Svaziland
wry Myanmar
a Nicrgua
Rwanda
and Principe
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
VetNWar
Zaire
Zambia
_
Nigeria Algeuia Cabon. Bahram n
Brunel
Angola Venezuela IrazzIlainic Qatar
Congo Rep- United Arab
Iraq
LyaEmirates
Oman
SaudiArabia
Trinidad
and Tobago
Turkrmernstan _ ___
Cambodia Gambia. The BenLin Jamaica Dominicn Amtigua and Mairtinique United B3aharnas, Te
Egypt Arab Maldire Bihutan Jordan R1epublic !3arbuda Kingdom Bermuda
Rep- Nepal. Bulkina Faso Panama. Greece Amuba Cyprus
Yemen Rep. Haiti Barbados French
Lesotho Belize Polyne-ia
Cape Verde
Djlboti
El Salvador
Eiji
Grenada
Netherlands
SLrtsnd
Nevis
StLucia
Vanuatti
Western
(Tale oramunonthe folloing Pare)
253

Part 2 (cs~irmwdJ
Law-ad nbdte-fincnnuw
Law-imaor Mfddleiuwme Mat High-inowc
Caw'
Serdy- M&Wkratly Less Seraedy Mode-fry Less ckaiSE*d by
Enitebd indebted indebte idethd& indeted indebta indeblatess OECV nonOECD
CentralAfrican Bangladesh Sri Lanka Brazil Colombia Azerbaijan Yugoslavia Australia Kuwait
Republic Comoros Tajikstan Camrovon Costa Rica Doiminica Fed. Rep. Austria
Kenya. India Ecuador Philippines Kazakhstan Belgium
Lao PDR Indonesia Mexico Senegal Malaysia Denmark
DkwivesWf Mozambique Pakistan Morocco Tnsa Muiu France
exrt rio Sierra Leone Syrian Arab Turkey Portugal Luxembourg
Rep. Uruguay SoutihAfica Netherlands
Thailand
Norway
Not
by ezp-t
ckow
atesey
_____ ________ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Gibraltar Bosnia and Andoxr
Heyzegovina
Channel
Croatia
Isands
Czech Republic
San Marino
Friars
Guam
Islands (US
sl-e Of Man
Mlacedoniat
PYle
~~~~~Virin
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Marsh
tslandts
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Mavotte
Nlcronesia,
Fed.Sats
NewCaleonia
N- Mariana Ls.
Puerto Rico
Slovak
Republit
Slovenia
TotaL~20B 32 13 9 117 .57 20 2IS1
a. CthwrAsian economies--Taiwan, China.
K. Economies in whichrnosingle cxot categoyvaccounts for more than5) percent oftotalexports.
c. FrmerYugaslav Republic of Macedoia.
Defintions or'groups
These tables classify all WorldBank membereconomnies.plus all other to GNP (80 percent) and present value of debt service to exports (2t
economnies with populations of more than 30,001).
expots tose ae hat ccont fr ~
percent). Moderately indebted mean either of the two ke atad
exceeds 60 pecent of, but does not reach, the critical levels. F
Majrcn exort maeory:o Moaj xort ogodansevcsf-mne
percnt otalexpots o mor of o goos an sericesfromone
economies that do not report detailed debt statistics to the World Bai
Debtor Reporting System, present-value calculation is not possibicatgor,
i th peiod198-91 Th caegoiesarcnonuelprinal Inted the following methodology is used to classify the non-DE
(Sff 8).fues 0..2,. (ITC3),manfacure pus
(STC w ~ economies. Severelyindebtedmeansthreoffourkeyratios (averag.
less 8), ad an sevices(facor nonfctor~ 'r~p~ ~over 1990-97) areabovecritical levels:debttoGNP(50 percent);de6
workas f nosinle rmitance). ctegry acouts fr 5 perent
or more of total exports, the economny is classified as diversified.n
to exports (275 percent), debt service to exports (30 percent); at
eprs(0ecnt.Mdaelidbedmnshee
Indebtedness:-Standard World Bank definitions of severe and four key ratios exceed 60 percent of, butt do not reach, the critic
roderAtreindebtedness,averagedoverthreeyears(1990-92) m
amu-sed levels. All other classified low- and middle-income economies a
to classify economies in this table. Severely indetdmeans eithe of listed as less-indebted.
the two key ratios is above critical levels: present value of debt service
254