ASi" kUCTURE FlOR DEVELOPMENT
ASi" kUCTURE FlOR DEVELOPMENT
ASi" kUCTURE FlOR DEVELOPMENT
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Table 2.1 Common management problems in public sector infrastructure entities, 1980-92<br />
(pardentg of World Batk loais in witidr comnditiors wer imposed to address trie pmblen artrt)<br />
Secfor Nzrnnberof lorns U[ndear grls<br />
Sounreofprobkm.<br />
Lackofrnmwagaunmt<br />
artonotmy rand accmutiatbiliy<br />
Financial<br />
pbtentks<br />
W agea:nd<br />
labor prbens<br />
Electricty 48 27.1 333 72.9 31.3<br />
.Water 40 25.0 40.0 70.0 35.0<br />
Telecom 34 14.7 353 5_29 32.4<br />
Rail 39 15.i 20.5 53.S 333<br />
Road 35 8.6 22.9 40.0 -40.0<br />
Parts 28 21A 35.7 32.1 42.9<br />
Source World Bank database (ALCID).<br />
providers are subject to regulatory oversight by America, or South Asia, water and power entities<br />
their parent ministries. Government sets clear poli- receive miixed signals from governments about<br />
des and goals while leaving detailed planning and where to expand their networks. The main victims<br />
implementation of services to the providers. This of inconsistent official prionrties have often been<br />
delegation of responsibility and conscious absence rural areas, where government failure to improve<br />
of political intervention are one reason wvhy these coverage is pushing users to search for alternative<br />
public agencies have retained high-quality man- forms of service provision (Chapter 4).<br />
agers and why they enjoy stability in mid-manage- A lack of autonomy and accountability underlies<br />
ment and professional structures. Successful public many other problems. Fmancial problems, overemsector<br />
organizations also enjoy financial strength. ployment, and unfocused goals occur because man-<br />
Tariffs cover (at a miniimum) the requirements for agers do not have control over day-to-day operaoperations<br />
and maintenance, while effective cost ac- tions-or over decisions on prices, wages,<br />
counting controls expenses. This reliance on cost re- employment, and budgets. Managers in such crcovery<br />
from users accounts in part for the emphasis cumstances seldom. have much mcentive to try<br />
on good customer relations. Also common (although harder. In Ghana, for example, a 1985 reform made<br />
not universal) among well-run public organizations the chief executive of a utilitv responsible to its<br />
is the use of private contractors and private capital board of directors, but amendments gradually<br />
in infrastructure operation and maintenance,<br />
shifted accountability back to the relevant ministry,<br />
thereby restoring direct political intervention. The<br />
Wht fiizre shows<br />
problem became even worse when perfornancebased<br />
bonuses, introduced to motivate managers<br />
A survey of forty-four countries with World and employers, became an integral part of the salarv<br />
Bank-financed projects designed to improve infra- structure and thus lost their incentive valuestructure<br />
performance revealed the most common The third problem, financial difficulties, is comproblems<br />
in six infrastructure sectors (Table 21). mon in power and water utilities when politically<br />
Unclear goals, lack of managerial autonomy and ac- motivated tariff adjustments lag behind cost incountability,<br />
financial difficulties, and wage and creases. These difficulties reflect a lack of managelabor<br />
problems are recurrent problems for the pub- ment autonomy and the use of public infrastructure<br />
lic sector entities involved.<br />
entities to achieve diverse uncompensated goals-<br />
The goals of public sector infrastructure pro- such as keeping tariffs low in order to counter inflaviders<br />
are often hazy and inconsistent More than tion- In Brazil, between March 1985 and the end of<br />
simply financial objectives are necessary in setting 1989, three freezes on public sector pnrces caused the<br />
goals for infrastructure providers, especially when a real tariff tD drop by 59 percent for port services, 32<br />
large share of the population is without access to the percent for railways, and 26 percent for telecormmuservice<br />
involved. The goals may indude quantita- nications. The results were higher public enterprise<br />
tive targets like user coverage or capacity expan- losses that defeated the anti-inflation strategy by<br />
sion. In the absence of such goals, public providers fueling the overall public sector deficit.<br />
have often failed to recognize that some consumer Problems with wages and employment often<br />
groups-such as the poor and rural consumers- have their origins in the first three problems. Many<br />
are willing to pay for services and thus should be infrastructure utilities are overstaffed because govtargeted<br />
to receive them. Whether in Africa, Latin emments use them to create public sector jobs and<br />
39