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ASi" kUCTURE FlOR DEVELOPMENT

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Management conitracting<br />

wHEN is Ir Em!Fcnvf? management contr-acting<br />

works better when a contrctor is granted significant<br />

Management contracting gives responsibility for a autonomy in decisionmaking and compensation is<br />

broad scope of opera tions and maintenance to the based, at least. in part, on. performance.. In France,<br />

private sector-usually for thiree to five years. This where management contracts are common in water<br />

approach can be more effective than relying on a supply and sanita tion, the incentive for productivity<br />

performance agreement to achieve similar objec- improvement links the contractor's payment to such<br />

tives. A management contract signed for th-e power indicators as 'reduced leakages and increased concompany<br />

in Guinea-Bissau is demonstrating that nections. The- contract for the Electricity and Water<br />

management contracts may work where many per- Company of Guinea-Bissau specified that 75 percent<br />

formance agreements have failed. Thiere, a new of the remuneration was guaranteed but that the remanagement<br />

team succeeded in doubling electricity maining 25 percent was based on performance.<br />

sales in just three years (Box 2.5).<br />

Management contracts with fees based on perfor-<br />

However, when public agencies prevent a pri- mance tend to be more succesful than those with<br />

vate contractor frorn controlling key functions af- fixed fees-such as traditional management confecting<br />

productivity and service quality-such- as suiting assignments. Fixed-fee arra ngements differ<br />

staffing, procurement, or* publicly provided work- little from technical assistance and are seldom suc-.<br />

ing capital-the contractor cannot be held acoDunt- cessfuL. Relating incentives to performance may not*<br />

able for overall performance, and generally the con- work, however, where a government can interfere<br />

tract does not succeed. That is why a recent withi tariffs. In general, such contrxacts tend to be<br />

management.contract signed for a power plant in~ more useful as interimn arrangements allowing prithe<br />

't<br />

Philippines<br />

t'<br />

failed within nine months. When the vate firms and public agencies to gain<br />

unai<br />

experience<br />

new. managers and the governmuent disagreed on withi partnerships before engaging in mare compre-<br />

*staffing levels and composition, the contract was hensive contracts or while the regulatory framework<br />

broken despite the rapid improvemnents observed in is being develope-d (both discussed in Chapte-r 3).<br />

maintenance following the arrival of the new man- A recent innovative application of management<br />

*agement team. contracts is the experience with Agences d'Execu-<br />

::'~~~~Fe<br />

Box 2.5 Management contracting in Giiinea-Bissau-a success story?<br />

Introducing a five-person mnanagement team under a The foreign management cpntract was implemented<br />

foreign mnanagement contract improved the perfofnance under a joint Initiative of the French Mfinistry of Cooperof<br />

Guinea-Bissau's national electric utility. Previously, ation, the United Nations.Development Progrmmue, the<br />

service interruptions had been chronirj and most' areas Afri'can Developmenit Bank, and the World Banik. Itr-mhad~<br />

elctricity only a few hours a day. Comnpara tive sta- duced wastage of foDreign aid.. (n the previous ten years.<br />

-tistics for 1957 and 1990 shovw the turnaround.. But more foreign aid for power was more than three times the estirecent<br />

experience illustrates the difficulties of manage- mted value of the utility at the.end of the.period.)<br />

ment-government relations.<br />

At the begitnniing of 1994. however, seriousi problemns<br />

became evident. Despite economic tariff~ the utility was<br />

Box table 2.5 Performancoe of Cufinea-Bissau's<br />

unable to generate revenue to finance expansion~-or<br />

national utility electric<br />

. ~~~~even, at times, current operations-leadin agin to<br />

Indictor 1987 1990 1993 ~~~~shortages and reductions in service quality. This precari-<br />

Installed (megawatts) capacity 72 ~ous finandal.condition was due to a large rise in receiv-<br />

Operable capacity(megawatts)<br />

fl 73ables stemming fromi the utility's difficulty in collecting<br />

Capacityfacor (percent. 32 51 42 payments. The goveffnirent demnanded continued sercuo<br />

xnsumnptin (kilograms<br />

vice for 'critical' functions even when.isupi bills<br />

per l ott-hour) 0300 0.254 0275 wr causg financial disr-es And ira the perivate sec -<br />

Syst losses (percent 30 26wr 24 tor fiiudulent connectons were rampant despite the<br />

Electrucity-sales (millions of -<br />

utinty's efforts to prevent them.<br />

keIlowatt-hours)<br />

Average, revenuwe (dollai<br />

14 28 27.<br />

- per ki]owatt-hour) 0.12 0.25 .0.22<br />

44

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