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ASi" kUCTURE FlOR DEVELOPMENT

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For example, the optimal dimensions of a high-volt- steel mill and a residential community may both deage<br />

transmission gnd may well be national, but the rive water from the same supplier,- but each user<br />

volume-related unit cost savings for water can be group values the quality of the water in quite differrealized<br />

at the municipal or submunicipal leveL ent ways. Yet, because many infrastructure faclities<br />

Even within sectors, different production stages are locationally fixed and their products are nonhave<br />

different characteristics. In power, size savigs tradable, users cannot readily obtain substitute serfor<br />

generation are often exhausted at a capacity that vices that oetter suit their needs. Moreover, it is<br />

is small relative to the size of a well-developed mar- often difficult for users to obtain information about<br />

ket. Activities also differ in the importance of sunk service alternatives or characteristics. They cannot,<br />

costs, another potential source of natural monopoly. therefore, "shop around" for the best source of suP-<br />

In rilways and ports, for example, sunk costs are ply and are vulnerable to any abuse of monopoly<br />

less significant for investments in rolling stoclk or power. With many infrastructure activities, howfreight-handling<br />

equipment than for the fixed facili- ever, supply can be better tailored to differences in<br />

ties. It is easier for firms to enter and exit activities demand once suppliers understand them-for exwith<br />

a relative absence of sunk costs and thereby ample, transport can be offered at varying service<br />

challenge one another's potential market power. and fare levels-and provided that consumers have<br />

Such activities are said to be "contestablea" Techuo- adequate information to declare their choices. Serlogical<br />

and econominc differences in production cre- vice markets can also be opened to alternative supate<br />

the possibility of "unbunding" the components pliers and technologies in order to provide a differof<br />

a sector that involve natural monopoly from entiated product (such as cellular and enhanced<br />

those that can be provided more competitively- services in telecommunications)..<br />

Many infrastructure services can be produced by Many infrastrucue services are almost (alvery<br />

different technologies. Sanitation based on' though not perfectly) private goods. Private goods<br />

improved latrines or septic tanks provides the can be defined as those that are both "rival" (consame<br />

underlying service as does sewerage-dis- sumption by one user reduces the supply available<br />

posal of wastes, but without networked invest- to other users) and "excludable" (a user can be prements.<br />

Small-scale irrigation-particularly irriga- vented from consuming them). In contrast, "public<br />

tion based on wells or boreholes-and small-scale goods" are neither rival in consumption nor exdudrenewable-enae-based<br />

power generation (such as able. Markets work best in providing pure private<br />

micro-hydro schemes) also need not involve inter- goods or services. Most of the services that the infraconnections<br />

with large networks but can provide structure sectors produce are excludable in a specific<br />

service highly responsive to users. Telephone ser- sense-their use depends on gaining access to a favices<br />

can be provided over wire-based networks or cility or network, for example by connection to the<br />

through radio-based systems.<br />

piped water, gas, or sewer system, and service use<br />

may be metered and charged for. In the case of rail-<br />

Consumption chamictenstics<br />

ways, ports, and airports, access to the entire infrastructure<br />

can be testricted. However once a user is<br />

As seen earlier, the demand for infrastructure ser- connected to the network utility or gains access to<br />

vices derives from the activities of both industries the transport facility, the degree of rivalry with other<br />

and individuals. Ensuring a flow of services of at users depends on the costs (including congestion)<br />

least mnimium quality and quantity is often consid- imposed on existing users or on the service supplier<br />

ered by governments to be of strategic importance, when an additional service unit is consumed.<br />

since any interruption or restriction of supply It has been common in many countries not to<br />

would be seen as a threat to sodety. However, be- charge users for the volume of some utility services<br />

cause infrastructure investments are often "lumpy' consumed because the marginal supply cost was<br />

(new capacity must be created in large increments), considered negliglile, congestion was absent, or<br />

it is difficult for planners to match the availability of technological constraints (such as the absence of<br />

supply with demand at all times. Costly episodes of water meters) prevented volume pnrcing. However,<br />

over- or undercapacity often result.<br />

recent developments, such as the increased scarcity<br />

Beyond consuming an "essential minimum" of (and supply cost) of water, growing congestion as<br />

certain infrastructure services, users have very di- network capacity becomes ully utilized, and techniverse<br />

demands-although the output of large-scale, cal innovations in meterng consumption, have<br />

monopoly providers is often not sufficiently differ- made it possible and desirable to price these serentiated<br />

to meet these demands. For example, a vices like other private goods.<br />

23

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