disciplinary handbook: volume v - Supreme Court - State of Ohio
disciplinary handbook: volume v - Supreme Court - State of Ohio
disciplinary handbook: volume v - Supreme Court - State of Ohio
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Index- 372<br />
suspension)<br />
McShane (2/25/2009) (master commissioner<br />
granted default motion and board report<br />
was filed with court, but respondent<br />
<strong>of</strong>fered compelling evidence <strong>of</strong> mental<br />
disability to the court to explain his<br />
failure to answer, thus court remanded<br />
the case to board for further<br />
proceedings as to appropriate sanction)<br />
Meade (12/22/2010) (neglect coupled with<br />
failure to cooperate warrants indefinite<br />
suspension; no mitigating effect to<br />
claims <strong>of</strong> mental disability when there<br />
is not medical evidence as BCGD<br />
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g) requires)<br />
Minamyer (7/28/2011) (respondent‘s<br />
extensive mental health problems led<br />
court to lower sanction recommended<br />
by board; Justice Lundberg Stratton‘s<br />
11-page concurrenceadmonished the<br />
examining psychiatrist‘s evaluation)<br />
Mishler (4/10/2008) (discussion <strong>of</strong> engaging<br />
an unaffiliated ―per diem‖ attorney)<br />
Mishler (12/14/2010) (after <strong>disciplinary</strong><br />
hearing, respondent filed a motion<br />
attempting to change testimony and to<br />
add or amend exhibits; much <strong>of</strong> his<br />
testimony and the motion that followed<br />
were contradictory)<br />
Mitchell (1/26/2010) (court noted in a<br />
footnote that board noted respondent‘s<br />
prior CLE suspension, but that CLE<br />
suspension is not to be considered in<br />
imposition <strong>of</strong> a <strong>disciplinary</strong> sanction)<br />
Muntean (12/20/2010) (self-report)<br />
Nance (11/19/2009) (respondent raised<br />
health problems and mental disability<br />
but not establish as mitigating factor<br />
under BCGD 10(B)(2)(g)(i) and (ii);<br />
court addressed proper sanction when<br />
lawyer‘s financial distress is a major<br />
factor in lawyer‘s failure to pay funds<br />
under a court order)<br />
Newman (3/17/2009) (remanded because<br />
conditions <strong>of</strong> Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F)(1) not<br />
met because neither sworn or certified<br />
evidence; defined ―certified copy‖)<br />
Nicks (2/25/2010) (meaning <strong>of</strong> ―competent<br />
representation‖ under Rule 1.1; no<br />
violation found)<br />
Noel (6/17/2010) (evidence to support<br />
default motion neither sworn nor<br />
certified therefore court relied only on<br />
deposition testimony and exhibits<br />
attached thereto; court found a violation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Pr<strong>of</strong>.Cond. R. 1.15(d) as charged but<br />
noted in footnote 1 that 1.16(d) is more<br />
fitting charge for the conduct chargedfailing<br />
to return the file)<br />
O‘Brien (12/4/2008) (refusal to admit wrong<br />
doing <strong>of</strong>fset by fact that respondent<br />
sought legal advice as to assertion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
attorney-client privilege; in footnote 1<br />
the court noted that in certain instances<br />
DR 7-102(B)(1) contravenes client<br />
confidentiality but DR 7-102(B)(1) was<br />
not charged and misconduct not charged<br />
cannot be adjudicated in a <strong>disciplinary</strong><br />
proceeding)<br />
Ohlin (8/24/2010) (respondent claimed<br />
alcohol dependence and a mental<br />
disability but no evidence provided and<br />
therefore not a mitigating factor; court<br />
dismissed some <strong>of</strong> the alleged violations<br />
for which the record did not contain<br />
sworn or certified evidence as required<br />
by Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F)(1)(b) in a<br />
motion for default.)<br />
Peskin (4/29/2010) (did not establish<br />
cocaine as mitigating factor under<br />
BCGD 10(B)(2)(g)(i)-(iv)<br />
Pfundstein (12/21/2010) (purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>disciplinary</strong> sanction; deference to<br />
panel‘s credibility determinations unless<br />
record weighs heavily against; actual<br />
suspension for dishonesty unless<br />
significant mitigating factors justify<br />
lesser sanction; court agreed with<br />
board‘s dismissal <strong>of</strong> stipulated<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>.Cond.R 8.4(d) violation)<br />
Pheils (6/23/2011) (prohibition against<br />
loaning client money is absolute;<br />
arranging with a close relative to loan<br />
money is tantamount to the attorney<br />
providing the loan; loan necessary to<br />
advance litigation is tied to the<br />
litigation)<br />
Plough (7/21/2010) (respondent was charged<br />
with a violation <strong>of</strong> Pr<strong>of</strong>.Cond.R. 8.4(d),<br />
but the court made a finding <strong>of</strong> a<br />
violation <strong>of</strong> DR 1-102(A)(5) because<br />
the record showed the conduct occurred<br />
prior to February 1, 2007)<br />
Poole (12/4/2008) (court rejected board<br />
using findings <strong>of</strong> violations <strong>of</strong> DR 1-<br />
102(A)(4) (dishonesty) and 9-<br />
102(A)(commingling) as aggravating<br />
factors because the charges were<br />
dismissed by stipulation <strong>of</strong> the parties;<br />
the court distinguished between<br />
violations <strong>of</strong> DR 9-102(A)(4)<br />
commingling and DR 9-102(B)(4)<br />
violations)<br />
Portman (4/16/2009) (respondent moved<br />
court to supplement record; court<br />
granted motion, ordered interim