Australian Maritime Issues 2007 - Royal Australian Navy

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<strong>Australian</strong>s at Guadalcanal, August 1942 209 Florida Island. Four Japanese planes were destroyed by fighters from the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise on patrol in the eastern Nggela Channel, while the screen’s anti-aircraft fire brought down another thirteen. The destroyer USS Jervis was hit badly and had to leave the area, and nearby a burning Japanese plane crashed purposely into the transport George F. Elliot with deadly results. The US aircraft carriers had helped to save the transports, but they lost 21 planes in just two days. Their commander, Vice Admiral Fletcher, knew that he was commanding three out of only four US aircraft carriers in the Pacific. Fletcher signalled at 1807 on 8 August: ‘Total fighter strength reduced from 99 to 78. In view of large number of enemy torpedo and bomber planes in area, recommend immediate withdrawal of carriers.’ Fletcher’s recommendation to withdraw one day early (they had planned for three days with carrier air support) was a major concern for the Amphibious Force under Rear Admiral Turner, USN, for how could his transports and Crutchley’s screening force remain at Guadalcanal without air cover? The captured runway at Guadalcanal would not be fully operational until 17 August. The Battle of Savo Island Crashed Japanese bomber floating off Tulagi, 8 August 1942 (80-G-K-383) The Guadalcanal invasion forces had weathered the Japanese air attacks of 7 and 8 August, but the IJN response, although taking longer to eventuate, was much more devastating. Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa commanding the Eighth Fleet was at Rabaul on the morning of 7 August when the signal describing the Tulagi attack arrived. Mikawa reacted smartly, ordering all available warships in the vicinity to assemble. By 1930 Mikawa had available a squadron of seven cruisers and one destroyer: Chokai, Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Tenryu, Yubari and Yunagi. Mikawa decided that his best chance of success against the Allied forces was to initiate a night surface attack. His cruisers had trained extensively in night gunfire and torpedo action, and he also knew that very few US aviators were proficient in night flying. Mikawa’s squadron steamed in line-ahead at 24 knots through ‘The Slot’ in daylight on 8 August. They prepared for action and increased speed to 30 knots prior to making contact with the Allied forces guarding the approaches to Guadalcanal to the south of Savo Island.
210 AUSTRALIAN MARITIME ISSUES <strong>2007</strong>: SPC-A ANNUAL Battle of Savo Island, 9 August 1942 The Allied Screening Force was positioned in night dispositions around the amphibious transport groups off Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Two destroyers acted as radar picket ships to the west of Savo Island. The Sound off Guadalcanal was divided into three sectors. The Southern Force (south of Savo) consisted of the cruisers Australia, Canberra and Chicago, and two destroyers. The Northern Force (north of Savo) consisted of the US cruisers
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