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Australian Maritime Issues 2007 - Royal Australian Navy

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236 AUSTRALIAN MARITIME ISSUES <strong>2007</strong>: SPC-A ANNUAL<br />

technology development, and outreach programs – and form them into a coherent,<br />

mutually supportive set of activities for each country. Each TSCP is broadly similar in<br />

concept to a smaller nation engaging in defence diplomacy in its region through an<br />

international engagement plan. The CNO’s global vision of a ‘1000-Ship <strong>Navy</strong>’ logically<br />

could be expected to integrate the appropriate maritime air, surface and sub-surface<br />

capabilities into each Combatant Commander’s TSCP. There is no indication this occurs,<br />

although inevitably there will be coincidental synergies between concept and TSCPs.<br />

In terms of command and control it would have been preferable for the Chairman of<br />

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to propose and champion the ‘1000-Ship <strong>Navy</strong>’, encouraging<br />

closely coordinated joint force integration in its support.<br />

It would be naive of any nation to trust that TSCPs exist for the mutual benefit of the<br />

US and themselves. The Quadrennial Defense Review and National Security Strategy<br />

of the United States exist to protect current national security arrangements, dissuade<br />

military competition, deter threats to vital interests, and defeat enemies that cannot be<br />

deterred. In 2002 Admiral Fargo expressed it thus: ‘Pacific Command operationalizes<br />

national security strategy and national military strategy with a regional emphasis’. 9<br />

By 2006 the focus for PACOM was divided into five areas:<br />

• prosecuting and winning the ‘war on terror’<br />

• maturing joint and combined warfighting capabilities and readiness<br />

• ensuring the credibility of operational plans<br />

• advancing regional security cooperation’<br />

• posturing forces for agile and responsive employment. 10<br />

Equally, the CNO’s enthusiasm for his ‘1000-Ship <strong>Navy</strong>’ is driven not by philanthropy<br />

but national interest. A year after introducing the ‘1000-Ship <strong>Navy</strong>’, Admiral Mullen<br />

was urging positive steps to act quickly to develop global maritime partnerships. He<br />

describes three ‘compelling’ reasons to do so: the rapid pace of globalisation, that the<br />

threats faced are real and pervasive, and the ‘carrot’ of significant technical progress.<br />

It is not at all surprising that the CNO of the world’s greatest economy would state:<br />

We are all now connected. We all face the same dangers. We all share the<br />

same opportunities. And since most of the world’s commerce still travels by<br />

sea – some 90 percent – the opportunities before us in maritime security have<br />

become more critical and more promising. In this global era, the economic tide<br />

of all nations rises – not when the seas are controlled by one – but rather when<br />

they are made safe and free for all. 11<br />

The US economy is potentially the biggest loser if Admiral Mullen’s ‘ideologues,<br />

pirates, proliferators, criminals, and terrorists’ succeed. 12 But succeed in what, and to<br />

what degree, and how to define their success? The CNO’s target set appears now to<br />

have grown radically beyond terrorism. A cynic might claim that without September<br />

2001 and terrorism as its catalyst, PSI, RMSI and the ‘1000-Ship <strong>Navy</strong>’ concept would<br />

not have seen the light of day. The broad expansion of the latter to include ‘pirates,

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