RIO 1055 .U51 S-E -C -R--L--T U.S. Army. European Command ...
RIO 1055 .U51 S-E -C -R--L--T U.S. Army. European Command ...
RIO 1055 .U51 S-E -C -R--L--T U.S. Army. European Command ...
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SECRET (14'<br />
KO Spain envisioned another possibility for R-work in the<br />
support of a clandestine right-wing Falange group led by Perales, one<br />
of the earliest Falangists and a sincere idealist. Perales' political<br />
activities were of little interest to Abwehr II, which, despite its<br />
New designation, Mil Amt D, had remained a purely military organization.<br />
It was suggested to BERLIN, however, that a demonstration of good will<br />
that 20 000 pesetas be alloted to Perales' organization for its propaganda<br />
program. Perales and his followers were in opposition to Franco's<br />
foreign policy, which in their opinion was becoming increasingly favorable<br />
to the Allies. Perales was a fanatic Catholic, a rabid opponent<br />
of Communism and a thorough Germanophile.<br />
Perales' group consisted of old Falangists who had supposedly<br />
remained honest and had not joined in on the frequent attempts by Falange<br />
leaders to enrich themselves. They considered themselves the "Falange<br />
autentica" as opposed to the regular Falange founded by Primo de Rivera.<br />
Perales, known as a very secretive person, never divulged more<br />
than vague information regarding the composition of his organization.<br />
Moreover, it was felt by KO Spain that his tremendous enthusiasm caused<br />
him to exagerate the importance of his group. He claimed that such<br />
military leaders as General Yogue and Munez Grande supported his movement,<br />
and that even Serrano Suner was sympathetic to his cause. It was considered<br />
doubtful, however, whether these important figures would openly<br />
ally themselves with France's enemies.<br />
Despite suspicions of wishful thinking on the part of Perales,<br />
Referat II was agreed that he could be of value in R-operations in the<br />
event that Franco should break off diplomatic relations with Germany, or<br />
that Spain should be invaded by the Allies. In July 1944 a plan for<br />
making use of Perales was submitted to BERLIN. Since approval was not<br />
immediately forthcoming and Perales needed time to round up and brief<br />
his collaborators little progress was made in 1944. The project was<br />
still in its preliminary states when Blaum left Spain in February 1945.<br />
The first step of this plan was to set up a NA net which would<br />
assure permanent contact with Perales after a break between Germany and<br />
Spain. This net would have been the basis forfhture II work. The<br />
remainder of the plan, including S-training, could not be carried out<br />
because of the blanket order prohibiting all S-activities was still in<br />
effect. Three Wit stations were to be established at MADRID, BARCELONA<br />
and SEVILLA. The procurement of personnel and appropriate sites for<br />
the stations were entrusted to Fernando Alzaga, head of the anti-communist<br />
department of the Falange information service. It had also been<br />
decided to turn over to Perales, a set of the documents revealing the<br />
location of S-deposits mentioned above. Since the documeib were not<br />
available in Spain, a set was requisitioned from BERLIN. They were to<br />
be given to Perales just before the contemplated diplomatic rupture or<br />
invasion. In February 1945, this had not been done.<br />
SECRET