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RIO 1055 .U51 S-E -C -R--L--T U.S. Army. European Command ...

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SECRE<br />

d. Cooperation With Other Sections of KO Spain.<br />

Only a minimum of news and opinion were exchanged between Referat<br />

II and the other sub-sections. Information of I and III interest which<br />

was gathered along with II material was merely passed on to the interested<br />

sections. There were, however, some exceptions to this policy.<br />

In Sevilla, Capt Antonio Ojeda and Patricio Diepel, neither of<br />

whom were connected with II, were used in sabotage activities. Ojeda, a<br />

member of the Spanish intelligence service, volunteered information on<br />

maritime traffic to and from Gibraltar. Most of his reports came through<br />

Referat . I. Diepel, a German resident of SEVILLA, contributed reports on<br />

the internal political situation, police records, etc., some of which were<br />

used by III.<br />

Referat II obtained an especially valuable item of information for<br />

I/TLw through Diepel. A Spanish air force colonel supplied a complete<br />

description of a US four-engined bomber . which had made an emergency landing<br />

In southern Spain. Various technical manuals were included in the report.<br />

At the time (summer 1943), the Ahwehr was looking for such material, and<br />

was anxious to obtain data on radar equipment, which was supplied in this<br />

report.<br />

Some III F functions were taken over by the II office after all<br />

S-operations had been forbidden by BERLIN. Perfecto Brioso, a Falange information<br />

service agent, had contacted Baldwin, of the US Embassy. Brioso,<br />

who had been engaged by the Spanish III F service, had offered his services<br />

to the II office without the knowledge of III F. Thus Blaum was able to<br />

learn what questions Baldwin had asked Brioso and what cover answers Brieso<br />

had been furnished by his own intelligence service. In one case, when<br />

Baldwin screened a number of Germans with Brioso's aid, Brioso's cover<br />

answers were supplied by the II office. Brioso's activities came to an end<br />

when Spain decided to discontinue III connections with the U.S. Embassy and<br />

Brioso refused to carry on without the shield of his awn organization.<br />

Enrique Zabela, a Spanishfilend of a member of the II staff, claimed<br />

to have established III F contacts with the British Embassy through certain<br />

left-wing and anarchist circles, who in turn claimed to know Varela, a<br />

Spaniard in the service of the British. KO Spain had always been extremely<br />

interested in the results of Allied measures to gain support of Spanish<br />

leftist parties. Zatela, however, was arrested by the Spanish police and<br />

admitted having worked as a III F agent for the Germans.<br />

Another III F man, Fernandes Fernandez, was engaged by Referat II.<br />

A Spanish police agent in SEVILLA, Fernandez worked in a III F capacity<br />

with the British Consulate, supplying British intelligence with lists of<br />

arrivals and departures of aliens. He had also been asked to investigate<br />

suspect German agents. Necessary answers, were, of course, supplied by the<br />

IT office.<br />

4<br />

SECRET / 0 /

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