RIO 1055 .U51 S-E -C -R--L--T U.S. Army. European Command ...

2i. The Abwehr in South East Europe.
A. Introduction.
The necessity for a change from stationary ASTs to mobile FATE
first became apparent in the USSR. These new units were no longer under
the direct control of the Abwehr and 00 but instead were attached to
armies or an army group. In this manner the intelligence chief was to
control the operational, financial and disciplinary functions of the
units, while Abwehr headquarters in BERLIN was to decide only on matters
of general policy. This dual regime caused many difficulties since both
the Abwehr and intelligence chiefs jealously guarded their authority,
which had never been properly defined in the first place, and issued
contradictory orders to the Trupps under their command. The actual chain
of command depends entirely on the personalities of the leaders and their
respective influence and popularity with higher headquarters. The intelligence
chief for instance, would decide where and how the various Trupps
were to be employed, but if the Abwehr in BERLIN did not agree it could
withdraw it to another army. The intelligence chief would then protest thist
ddaision to the OKH and the final decision would favor the more popular
group.
b. Struggle for Power.
It is clear that under these conditions, friendships or personal
animosity very often decided the course of operations. People who disliked
each other were more interested in fighting their own little wars than in
fighting the enemy. Reorganizations became daily routine and efficiency
lessened continually. Matters were further complitsated by the constant
struggle between the Abmehr and .the SS, with the latter steadily gaining
the upper hand. Their hostile relationships were likely to produce the
following results.
The Abwehr, hotly attadbed by the SS because of its political
unreliability and general inefficiency, would be split into various groups
which were busily fighting each other and covertly trying to gain more power.
The intelligence chief felt that he was the sole authority in matters pertaining
to the Abmehr in combat areas. The FAN tried to dominate its respective
FATs, and the subsequently-formed Leit Stellen started issuing
orders and directives which nobody was willing to execute. Meanwhile Abwehr
headquarters, which had authority over all these units, found itself either
uninformed or misinformed about happenings and its directives misinterpreted
or disregarded entirely. Theoretically a FAX was controlled by:
(1) The intelligence chief of an army group.
(2) Abwehr Headquarters in BERLIN.
(3) The Leit Stellen.
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