Cyclone Giri - Two Years On - Burma Action Ireland

Cyclone Giri: Two Years On
and Training on Preparation of Disaster Management Drills and observance of Disaster
Department Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM)’s National Crisis Management Drill
2010 (C-MEX10) in Thailand; and
2010 Fourth AMCDRR (25 28 October) in Korea: 50 states adopt the Incheon DRR
Declaration (2010) and the Incheon Regional Roadmap and Action Plan on DRR through
Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) in Asia and the Pacific (Incheon REMAP).
In this last Ministerial Conference, the 25 October earthquake and tsunami in Mentawai,
Indonesia, were mentioned, but Giri (22 October) was not.
But despite attending workshops and activities the junta did not build defences or fund early warning
systems and the victims had to rely on their local communities for relief. We interviewed survivors of the
1968, 2004 and 2006 cyclones, and each reported that no support was provided to the survivors. In one
interview, a 72 year-old woman from Sareprum Village, Pauktaw Township recalled the 1968 cyclone.
According to her report, neither the government nor INGOs provided support to the victims (see interview
excerpt 1 in Annexure I).
A 29 year-old man from Sitetway remembered the devastation caused by the 2004 Cyclone and said
“[un] fortunately, I heard that no support or relief supplies were given to the survivors of the cyclone by
either local government or the international communities.” (see interview excerpt 2 in Annexure I)
A monk from Bazunphae Village, Mrauk-U Township, reported the same pattern for Cyclone Mala in
2006 (see interview excerpt 3 in Annexure I). These reports suggest that Burma is has failed to meet its
obligations to protect its people, as planned during many international disaster-preparedness events.
4.1 Misleading Early Warning
“[A] government that even censors the weather”
Aye Chan Myate, “Blowing in the Wind,” The Irrawaddy, 25 March 2011 95
One effective way to mitigate the impact of a cyclone is to alert the affected population through an early
warning system, so they can take appropriate steps. In a country where the majority of the population is
not online, or doesn’t have even access to electricity, an effective early warnings system does not simply
mean uploading information onto a website, as the government did. It must be disseminated by as many
available media outlets as possible and must be appropriately tailored to the target population so as to
reach the maximum audience. The art of this process requires that people are notified of the procedures
to follow in the event of a disaster, to be able to recognise an oncoming disaster as well as identify the
location of temporary shelter and relief supplies. This is common sense and would not require an
international convention. It seems the difficulty lies in assigning responsibility within the government, or
even registering the need for a comprehensive early warning system and in Burma one is still not in
place. 96
Ultimately, any warning system will begin with the nation’s meteorological service. In Burma, this agency
is the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology (DMH), 97 Central Forecasting Office (CFO) in
Rangoon, since it already observes the weather, monitors ships’ reports and radar and satellite 98 data.
Together with the Myanmar Post and Telecommunications and Department of Civil Aviation, the CFO
handles the collection and dissemination of meteorological data in Burma. 99
The CFO should provide cyclone and surge warnings to the population because, so long as a cyclone is
within the range of a particular meteorological centre, the CFO is in continuous surveillance of the
storm. Every three hours, the CFO transmits its observations to RSMC New Delhi and other Bay of
Bengal countries. A special weather outlook issued observation will also contain the 72 hrs forecast of a
cyclone, and have been in use since December 2008.
Whenever a cyclone is present in the north Indian Ocean, between longitude 45° E to 100° E, storm
advisories are issued every three hours between 00:00 and 21:00 UTC. Storm surge guidance is
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