Cyclone Giri - Two Years On - Burma Action Ireland

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Cyclone Giri: Two Years On any support. The Western Commander, Soe Thein, had informed them that he would provide 300,000 bamboos and other relief goods, however, nothing was supplied (see interview excerpt 8 in Annexure I). Even when temporary shelters were provided by the government or INGO’s, the devastated cyclone victims were threatened with having to pay large amounts in compensation if they damaged the shelter in some way: in the same village, Kahntoutgree Village, Mraybon Township, both a fisherman and a farmer each declared during an interview that they had received a tent from the army. In case of damage to the tent, compensation has to be paid to the army or the UN to the tune of 350,000 – 450,000 kyat ($350- 450) i.e. more than a year’s average income 197 (see interview excerpts 6 & 7 in Annexure I). In the aftermath of Cyclone Giri the junta appeared more focused on campaigning for the 7 November election than on relief efforts for the victims. 198 On 24 October 2010 Prime Minister U Thein Sein delivered a speech on the 65 th anniversary of UN founding day - just two days after Cyclone Giri. He talked about Cyclone Nargis, but made no comment on Cyclone Giri 199 and made no response when the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator (HC) in Rangoon said that the international community was ready and willing to help cyclone victims. 200 As a matter of fact, for the victims events then took an even more sinister turn (see Box 5.1). Box 5.1: Consequences of Junta telling the UN to keep the Humanitarian Operation “low profile” “[S]imilar to Nargis, international staff and new INGOs were not allowed to visit the area until nearly 2 months after (mid December). Cyclone Giri hit an impoverished and politically sensitive area 2 weeks before national elections. The Government asked the UN to keep a humanitarian operation ‘low profile’. Thus the Humanitarian Coordinator (simultaneously the Resident Coordinator) requested the implementation of an ‘informal’ cluster system in Yangon. Thirteen days after Giri, when more information became available regarding the extent of damage and persons affected (260,000), the cluster system was officially activated with a letter sent to the Emergency Relief Coordinator. Seventeen days later application was made to the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) and a month later a general appeal made to donors (22 Nov). […] The ‘low profile’ approach to the disaster made a more transparent humanitarian operation difficult, resulting in delays in information, funding and action. It also had an impact on what to expect from clusters in terms of their normal roles and responsibilities.[…] On 1 November, the RC/HC wrote to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) Valerie Amos requesting to formally activate the clusters. […] According to OCHA and the RC/HC, the difference between informal clusters and formal activation was artificial and in fact was only a ‘normal delay’. However it did cause some confusion among cluster coordinator agencies, NGOs and donors. The delay or initial convening ‘informally’ had several impacts; a) per donors it sent the message that the magnitude of the disaster did not require additional resources for coordination and therefore was not that severe, b) some NGOs were not sure if it was then necessary to participate in clusters and some did not start until several weeks later, c) without an appeal no resources can be mobilised to fund additional coordination capacity, d) many lead agencies did not dedicate full time cluster coordinators but instead used existing staff, and e) the cluster coordinators, in the case of IFRC, reduced their terms of reference to a bare minimum. When the cluster became ‘activated’ the [terms of reference] were not reviewed or revised, which later left some members/stakeholders with unmet expectations particularly in the area of strategy development and resource mobilisation.” (Source: Kerren Hedlund, “Shelter and NFI Cluster Evaluation: Cyclone Giri Response”, July 2011) 201 This official inhumane indifference 202 led to crucial delays in emergency relief and medical care reaching cyclone victims. This was further exacerbated by the logistical difficulties of reaching the remotest parts of Arakan State following the damage to infrastructure caused by the cyclone. Additionally, the authorities restricted the movements and activities of international and local relief agencies. All donors were advised that assistance could only be delivered through their military units. 203 29
Arakan Human Rights and Development Organisation The local NGOs were asked to work under the management of township authorities and their freedom of access to the victims was limited. A Cyclone Giri survivor from Pauktaw Town tells how in Mraybon Township some INGO workers refused to supply victims under army supervision and left without giving any support (see interview excerpt 16 in Annexure I). At the international level, the Giri disaster funding was deliberately weakened: the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) did not make a funding appeal at the request of the MRCS 204 and neither a UN Flash Appeal 205 nor Consolidated Appeal 206 was launched for funding for Cyclone Giri victims. 207 That same year the UN Flash Appeals for Haiti ($0.57bn) and Pakistan ($0.46bn) were 100% funded within 35 and 44 days respectively; they eventually raised $3.5bn and $2.6bn. 208 One year on, only $21.65m (38% of Giri’s required $0.05bn) has been pledged 209 - 0.3 % of the 2010 grand total of the world’s contributions for natural disasters. 210 Contrary to the claims of the Burmese ambassador, Ye Myint Aung, in the Global Platform for DRR in Geneva, it’s physically impossible to reach all the destroyed villages in one day, not to mention providing shelters and materials. Only 3,547 households (17.7%) had received emergency shelter within 6 months. 211 Ritual standard phrases such as the government “providing the necessary assistance” or “fulfilled the needs” 212 are only the visible face of the official cover up, whereas on the ground level little is being done. Local Action There is no evidence that the government spent any significant time or money on relief or recovery from the cyclone and the lack of transparency left the door open to theft, corruption and siphoning off of funds. 213 Official reports of the government assistance extent and/or impact have never been made public. Funding the recovery is almost solely done by donor countries despite Burma bringing in hundreds of millions of dollars in annual natural gas sales. 214 Official media 215 lists all the things the authorities have done and distributed, but they are predominantly taking the credit for what local groups and NGOs did. Relief efforts were made by some GO-NGOs (Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisation) 216 or, for instance, the Inland Water Transport (IWT) which made it possible for local or international donors who wanted to transport relief supplies to hire ships. 217 However, the real first responders were the thousands of ordinary Burmese who went on their own initiative to support their fellow citizens. Instantaneously and from all backgrounds, monks, business people, youths, doctors, and others, collected food and clothes from their communities and took it to aid the survivors from the day the cyclone struck. For instance, the Rangoon-based Arakan Friends Association reported on the day of the disaster that public transport was unavailable to travel from Rangoon to Arakan because of the traditional Thadingyut Festival. 218 This Spontaneous community action highlights the generosity of the Burmese citizens and deeply contrasts the actions of the government: who should be the ones supporting its people. Just like after Nargis, some of these initiatives became more organised and some communities formed their own CBOs. 219 Many Burmese abroad returned to the country to bring donations. Migrant workers and their families in Thailand, Singapore, the US, Europe and Australia started to send money and supplies. 220 Some businesses became local donors: the local rice traders’ association in one of the hardest hit townships agreed to sell bags of rice at a discount to cyclone victims. 221 But when these local relief groups and donors started to give support to the survivors, the SPDC reasserted control through checkpoints (e.g. more than five from Kyaukphru to Rangoon) 222 and close monitoring of aid. Relief Camps In the week after the cyclone struck, the local authorities set up rescue camps. The NLM (New Light of Myanmar) reported on 27 October that there was a rescue camp in Mraybon in the Basic Education 30
Page 1 and 2: Arakan Human Rights and Development
Page 5 and 6: [ P A R T I ] Arakan Human Rights a
Page 7 and 8: TABLE OF CONTENTS Arakan Human Righ
Page 11 and 12: PRELIMINARY REMARKS Arakan Human Ri
Page 17 and 18: Giri affected futureless children A
Page 23 and 24: Table 2.2: 2010 Health Indicators o
Page 39: Arakan Human Rights and Development
Page 61 and 62: Table 6.5: Relief Effort 1 Month Af
Page 83 and 84: U Aung Shwe Members of National Lea
Page 85 and 86: s/ [U San Aung Kyaw] National ID Ca
Page 91 and 92:
Head of people from the West Stream
Page 93 and 94:
19. [Official Stamp] Arakan Human R
Page 95 and 96:
Arakan Human Rights and Development
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141:
show all

Cyclone Giri - Two Years On - Burma Action Ireland

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?