Cyclone Giri - Two Years On - Burma Action Ireland

Cyclone Giri: Two Years On
regime’s seven-step “roadmap to discipline-flourishing democracy”, 250 and so energy was focused on
this rather than minimising the damage of Giri.
The election took place on 7 November, 16 days after Cyclone Giri struck. When the date was announced
three months earlier, 251 the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology’s (DMH) head, Tun Lwin, had
also announced that La Niña would bring heavy rains and flooding around November. The two cyclone
seasons in Burma are always in May and October-November, hence, the junta knowingly chose these
periods for the constitutional referendum (10 May 2008, 8 days after Cyclone Nargis) and the election (7
November 2010). 252
Voters could cast their ballots in advance or on the day of polling. In Arakan State, there were 81 polling
stations for 9 townships. Coercion of the advance voting was the main method of fraud used as the
secrecy of these votes was not guaranteed nor had the procedures to manage them been made clear. 263
The elections were both for the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and for the (Arakan) State Hluttaw. The Union
Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) had metamorphosed into the USDP and was the main
government-backed party. In the Arakan State Hluttaw the USDP came second after the RNDP – the
only 1 of 14 states/regions where the USDP did not come first. 254
The RNDP wrote to the Union Election Commission (UEC) requesting that polling be postponed for a
month in the three most cyclone affected townships. 255 The RNDP claimed that holding elections in the
most damaged areas would not be fair, as the voters were suffering and focused on trying to rebuild their
lives, finding new homes or simply feeding themselves, rather than voting. They cited the precedent of
Cyclone Nargis, which had occurred just eight days before voting on a referendum to approve the
constitution in 2008. In that instance, the junta had delayed voting by two weeks in the worst hit areas. 256
However, the UEC ignored the plea and proceeded with the election on 7 November, the same day as in
the rest of the country.
In other aspects, Nargis was indeed a precedent: high officials exploited the relief for electioneering
purposes. The then Prime Minister and chairman of the USDP, U Thein Sein, visited some of the affected
areas ten days after the cyclone. However, his main aim appeared to be canvassing for his party instead
of overseeing the relief and rebuilding efforts for cyclone victims. During a public meeting on 3 November
2010 with local people and local authorities at Yammawaddy Hall in Kyaukphru, rather than listening to
the survivors’ hardship, U Thein Sein encouraged them to vote for the USDP:
“People should behave like good citizens and go to the polling station on election
day….they should clearly tick right in the middle of the box next to [his] party’s Lion
symbol.” 257
In Ngarachai Village, Pauktaw Township, a man explained in an interview how the government had told
the villagers to vote: they had to claim that their “eyesight is not good” and thus give the ballot papers
to the government workers at the ballot box. And if the villager had made the wrong choice, the ballot
would be destroyed (see interview excerpt 12 in Annexure I).
Voter coercion
Many votes are invalid due to the wrongful ways local officials acquired them. In some cases the
authorities forced the villagers to vote for the government-backed USDP in exchange for receiving food
and other relief, 258 or, officials threatened to cut aid to victims if they failed to vote for the USDP. 259
In another incident, Pauktaw TPDC chairman collected advanced votes from the cyclone survivors of
Ingrachai Island and threatened that officials would stop providing relief assistance to them if they did
not vote for the government party. 260 A similar threat was made by the Mraybon Township authorities to
cyclone victims who were told that they would only continue to receive aid if they voted for the USDP. 261
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