Cyclone Giri - Two Years On - Burma Action Ireland

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Cyclone Giri: Two Years On regime’s seven-step “roadmap to discipline-flourishing democracy”, 250 and so energy was focused on this rather than minimising the damage of Giri. The election took place on 7 November, 16 days after Cyclone Giri struck. When the date was announced three months earlier, 251 the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology’s (DMH) head, Tun Lwin, had also announced that La Niña would bring heavy rains and flooding around November. The two cyclone seasons in Burma are always in May and October-November, hence, the junta knowingly chose these periods for the constitutional referendum (10 May 2008, 8 days after Cyclone Nargis) and the election (7 November 2010). 252 Voters could cast their ballots in advance or on the day of polling. In Arakan State, there were 81 polling stations for 9 townships. Coercion of the advance voting was the main method of fraud used as the secrecy of these votes was not guaranteed nor had the procedures to manage them been made clear. 263 The elections were both for the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and for the (Arakan) State Hluttaw. The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) had metamorphosed into the USDP and was the main government-backed party. In the Arakan State Hluttaw the USDP came second after the RNDP – the only 1 of 14 states/regions where the USDP did not come first. 254 The RNDP wrote to the Union Election Commission (UEC) requesting that polling be postponed for a month in the three most cyclone affected townships. 255 The RNDP claimed that holding elections in the most damaged areas would not be fair, as the voters were suffering and focused on trying to rebuild their lives, finding new homes or simply feeding themselves, rather than voting. They cited the precedent of Cyclone Nargis, which had occurred just eight days before voting on a referendum to approve the constitution in 2008. In that instance, the junta had delayed voting by two weeks in the worst hit areas. 256 However, the UEC ignored the plea and proceeded with the election on 7 November, the same day as in the rest of the country. In other aspects, Nargis was indeed a precedent: high officials exploited the relief for electioneering purposes. The then Prime Minister and chairman of the USDP, U Thein Sein, visited some of the affected areas ten days after the cyclone. However, his main aim appeared to be canvassing for his party instead of overseeing the relief and rebuilding efforts for cyclone victims. During a public meeting on 3 November 2010 with local people and local authorities at Yammawaddy Hall in Kyaukphru, rather than listening to the survivors’ hardship, U Thein Sein encouraged them to vote for the USDP: “People should behave like good citizens and go to the polling station on election day….they should clearly tick right in the middle of the box next to [his] party’s Lion symbol.” 257 In Ngarachai Village, Pauktaw Township, a man explained in an interview how the government had told the villagers to vote: they had to claim that their “eyesight is not good” and thus give the ballot papers to the government workers at the ballot box. And if the villager had made the wrong choice, the ballot would be destroyed (see interview excerpt 12 in Annexure I). Voter coercion Many votes are invalid due to the wrongful ways local officials acquired them. In some cases the authorities forced the villagers to vote for the government-backed USDP in exchange for receiving food and other relief, 258 or, officials threatened to cut aid to victims if they failed to vote for the USDP. 259 In another incident, Pauktaw TPDC chairman collected advanced votes from the cyclone survivors of Ingrachai Island and threatened that officials would stop providing relief assistance to them if they did not vote for the government party. 260 A similar threat was made by the Mraybon Township authorities to cyclone victims who were told that they would only continue to receive aid if they voted for the USDP. 261 33
Arakan Human Rights and Development Organisation A female interviewee from Thunganut Village, Marmbra Township, shared her views on who received support and why: those who gave advance votes to the USDP received quite a lot of support from the government or USDP (see interview excerpt 11 in Annexure I). The owners of salt farms were told that their land would be confiscated if they did not vote for the USDP. 262 Ya Ya Ka (the village Council) and ward heads told the voters to vote for the USDP if they wanted relief aid 263 and relief supplies have reportedly effectively been cut because the villagers failed to collectively vote for the USDP. 264 Relief had to be distributed through the Ya Ya Ka, however, the chairmen refused to distribute to non-USDP members when they came to the chairmen’s houses to collect relief supplies. Higher authorities were aware of this exploitation, but ignored it because they needed USDP votes. 265 Even the Western Commander told the elders and the villagers to vote for the USDP. If they did not, they would not receive any provisions. 266 Despite all the coercion the USDP lost the election in Arakan state. Retribution was swift: villagers suspected of voting for the NDPD were reportedly arrested or fined. 267 In Pauktaw Township, in retaliation the irrigation authorities destroyed an embankment that was constructed to prevent salt water from entering paddy fields in Kan Chaung Village, causing damage to 1,000 acres (405 ha) of paddy fields. 268 Prior to the election, the village authorities and leaders of the USDP had threatened to do this if the villagers did not vote for their party. In another case, the authorities suspended relief assistance in Wa-Khaung Village of Mraybon Township and told the villagers “go and ask for aid from the party you did vote for”. 269 In Paikseik Village of Kyaukphru Township 300 names were removed from the assistance recipients list because they had failed to vote for the government-backed party. 270 Relief workers told us that similar cases of withholding relief assistance from the cyclone victims occurred in many villages of Kyaukphru, Mraybon, Pauktaw, Marmbra, Rambray, Ponnagywan, and Sitetway townships. Nargis was also a precedent as far as the regime’s paranoia regarding the international presence was concerned: the UN reported that the SPDC banned Nargis-related visas for humanitarian workers in August 2010 and told the INGOs that the recovery effort should be ‘mainstreamed into development programmes”, requiring new MOUs, leading to 90 INGO staff with uncertain visa status and negative consequences for the people in need of continued assistance. Fears that foreigners may enter Burma to observe the election was the rationale for banning the visas. 271 From the accounts of survivors, it is clear that the “Giri election” was not conducted in a free and fair manner, just like the “Nargis referendum”. While the government frets over votes, the survivors are continuing to struggle to survive: the election process only complicated their efforts to find food, housing, and potable water as the authorities diverted most resources to their election. Many affected areas in Arakan were neglected by the government due to their bad election results. 272 NGOs observed that the government-backed USDP had been distributing rice to victims before the election; however, after the election the party and relief supplies were nowhere to be seen. 273 5.5 Weak Media Coverage “if it bleeds, it leads” “in the case of starvation, no airtime on this station” “we know that all of those corporations who are the world media’s sponsors, are the same one’s jockying to get a piece of the high profits which are based on Burmese slave labour.” Garrett reacting to Lawi Weng, “Cyclone Giri Victims Short of Food”, The Irrawaddy, 22 December 2010 In 2008 Nargis set a clear precedent in many respects for what would happen after Giri, but a major difference that left Giri victims even more neglected was the media coverage and the amount of aid donated. Andrew Kirkwood (Save the Children Myanmar director) compared the amount of media coverage and the huge outpouring of international assistance after Cyclone Nargis with Giri, which was 34
Page 1 and 2: Arakan Human Rights and Development
Page 5 and 6: [ P A R T I ] Arakan Human Rights a
Page 7 and 8: TABLE OF CONTENTS Arakan Human Righ
Page 11 and 12: PRELIMINARY REMARKS Arakan Human Ri
Page 17 and 18: Giri affected futureless children A
Page 23 and 24: Table 2.2: 2010 Health Indicators o
Page 43: Arakan Human Rights and Development
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Page 83 and 84: U Aung Shwe Members of National Lea
Page 85 and 86: s/ [U San Aung Kyaw] National ID Ca
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